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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE MATTER OF THE EST ATE OF: GEORGE 
D. PERRY. Supreme Court Case No. 38694 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, 
Respondent on Appeal. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada. 
HONORABLE KATHRYN A. STICKLEN 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
PETER C. SISSON 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO 
000002
Date: 5/31/2011 
Time: 02:50 PM 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
User: CCLUI\IDMJ 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
3/18/2009 NCIE CCCHILER l\lew Case Filed - Informal Estate Christopher Bieler 
3/19/2009 APPL CCCHILER Application for Informal Probate of Will and Christopher Bieler 
Informal Appointment of Personal Representative 
WILL CCCHILER Last Will And Testament Christopher Bieter 
ACAP CCCHILER Acceptance Of Appointment Christopher Bieter 
3/20/2009 STNP CCMARTLG Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And Christopher Bieler 
Informal Appointment Of Personal Representative 
LTST CCMARTLG Letters Of Testamentary Christopher Bieter 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieter 
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, Subject. Case 
Close date: 3/20/2009 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed Christopher Bieter 
STNP CCMARTLG Statement Of Informal Probate Of Will And Christopher Bieler 
Informal Apointment Of Personal Representative 
LTST CCMARTLG Letters Of Testamentary Christopher Bieler 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: McCormick, Barbara Christopher Bieler 
K, Other Party; Perry, George D, Subject. Case 
Close date: 3/20/2009 
3/30/2009 CRCL CCMARTLG Creditors Claim (Wells Fargo Bank NA) Christopher Bieter 
4/7/2009 IFHD CCMARTLG Information To Heirs And Devisees Christopher Bieler 
4/15/2009 MISC CCMARTLG Satisfaction Of Probate Claim (Wells Fargo Bank Christopher Bieler 
NA) 
DEI\IO CCMARTLG Demand For Notice (Larry L Goins For Idaho Christopher Bieler 
Dept Health and Welfare) 
CAES CCMARTLG Claim Against Estate (Idaho Dept Health and Christopher Bieler 
Welfare) 
6/2/2009 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieler 
6/4/2009 NOTC CCCHILER Notice of Disallowance of Claim (Idaho Dept Christopher Bieter 
Health and Welfare) 
GERS CCCHILER Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
6/15/2009 PETN CCNELSRF Petition for Allowance of Claim (Larry Goins for Christopher Bieter 
Idaho Department of Health & Wealthfare) 
6/25/2009 OBJE CCNELSRF Objection to Petition for Allowance of Claim Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCNELSRF Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
11/27/2009 MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of The PR's Objection Christopher Biei:er 
To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn For 
Allwance Of Claim 
AFFD CCMARTLG Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Christopher Bieter 
Objection To Dept of Health And Welfare's Petn 
for Allowance Of Claim 
PPUB CCMARTLG Proof Of Publication Christopher Bieter 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
12/4/2009 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Telephonic Status Conference (1-08-09 Christopher Bieler 
@2:30 pm) 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User Judge 
12/4/2009 HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30 Christopher Bieter 
PM) Telephonic Conference 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk Christopher Bieter 
action 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
12/9/2009 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Telephonic Status Christopher Bieter 
Conference (1-08-10@ 2 pm) 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2010 02:30 Christopher Bieter 
PM) Conference 
1/8/2010 HRHD MCURIZDJ Hearing result for Status held on 01/08/2010 Christopher Bieter 
02:30 PM: Hearing Held Telephonic Conference 
1/14/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing On Objection To Petn For Christopher BiEiter 
Allowance of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am) 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Christopher Bieter 
02/26/2010 09:00 AM) Objection To Petn For 
Allowance of Claim 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
1/21/2010 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Hearing On Objection To Christopher Bieter 
Petn for Allowance Of Claim (2-26-10@ 9 am) 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Christopher Bieter 
1/29/2010 MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of Petn for Allowance Christopher Bieter 
Of Claim 
2/26/2010 HRHD MCURIZDJ Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Christopher Bieter 
02/26/2010 09:00 AM: Hearing Held Objection 
To Petn For Allowance of Claim 
3/10/2010 ORDR MCURIZDJ Order Disallowing Claim Christopher Bieter 
CDIS CCMARTLG Civil Disposition entered for: Idaho Department Of Christopher Bieter 
Health And Welfare, Other Party; Idaho 
Department Of Health And Welfare .. Other Party; 
McCormick, Barbara K, Other Party; Perry, 
George D, Subject. Case Close date: 3/10/2010 
STAT CCMARTLG STATUS CHANGED: Closed Christopher Bieter 
3/18/2010 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Stay Pending Appeal (W Corey Christopher Bieter 
Cartwright For Idaho Dept Of Health And 
Welfare) 
BREF CCMARTLG Brief In Support Of Motn To Stay Kathryn A. Sticklen 
APDC CCMARTLG Appeal Filed In District Court Kathryn A. Sticklen 
CAAP CCMARTLG Case Appealed: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
NOTR CCMARTLG Notice Of Reassignment (To Judge Kathryn Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Sticklen) 
3/19/2010 CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/23/2010 OGAP DCTYLENI Order Governing Procedure On Appeal Kathryn A. Sticklen 
3/26/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10@ 2:30 pm) Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User 
3/26/2010 HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/20/2010 02:30 
PM) To Stay Pending Appeal 
3/29/2010 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Transcript 
MEMO CCMARTLG Memorandum In Support Of Motn For Transcript 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
4/2/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (4-20-10@ 2:30 pm) 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
4/8/2010 RPLY CCMARTLG PR's Reply Memorandum To Dept's Motn For 
Stay Pending Appeal 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
BREF CCMARTLG Brief Re Fiduciary Duty Of PR To Creditors 
4/9/2010 RSPS CCMARTLG Response To Motn For Transcript 
4/16/2010 RPLY CCMARTLG PR's Reply Memo To Dept's Brief Re Fiduciary 
Duty Of PR To Creditors And Motn for Atty Fees 
And Costs 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Certificate Of Service 
4/20/2010 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Certificate Of Service 
DCHH CCNELSRF Hearing result for Motion held on 04/20/2010 
02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Sue Wolf 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 500 To Stay Pending Appeal 
4/27/2010 AMEN DCTYLENI Amended Order Governing Procedure on Appeal 
ORDR DCTYLENI Order Approving Motion for Transcript 
5/10/2010 TRAN CCMARTLG Transcript Of Proceedings Lodged 
5/11/2010 NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Lodging of Appeal Transcript 
5/20/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order (RE: Motion 
for Stay Pending Appeal) 
5/28/2010 GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
6/3/2010 TRAN DCTYLENI Transcript Filed 
NOTC DCTYLENI Notice of Filing Transcript on Appeal 
6/18/2010 MOTN CCSWEECE PR's Motion For Attorney Fees And Costs 
AFFD CCSWEECE Affidavit of Peter C Sisson In Support of PR's 
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs 
MEMO CCSWEECE Supplemental Memorandum In Support of PR's 
Motion For Atty Fees and Costs 
NOHG CCSWEECE Notice Of Hearing (07-12-10 at 2:30 pm) 
HRSC CCSWEECE Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Attorney fees and 
Costs 07/12/2010 02:30 PM) 
CTSV CCSWEECE Certificate Of Service 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
Judge 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticlden 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Stick:len 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Fourth Judicial District Court -Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User 
6/29/2010 BREF CCNELSRF Brief and Objection in Opposisiton to Attorney 
Fees 
7/7/2010 MEMO CCSWEECE PR's Reply Memorandum To Departments Brief 
And Objection in Opposition To Attorney Fees 
GERS CCSWEECE Certificate Of Service 
7/8/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Appellant's Brief 
7/12/2010 DCHH DCOLSOMA Hearing result for Motion for Attorney fees and 
Costs held on 07/12/2010 02:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: K. Madsen 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 
7/23/2010 MOTN CCMARTLG Motion For Extension Of Time In Which To File 
Respondent's Brief 
AFFD CCMARTLG Affidavit Of Peter C Sisson In Support Of Motn 
For Extension Of Time In Which to File 
Respondent's Brief 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
7/26/2010 MEMO CCNELSRF PR's Memorandum on Applicability 
GERS CCNELSRF Certificate Of Service 
BREF CCNELSRF Simultaneous Brief RE: Finality and Idaho Code 
12-117 
7/27/2010 ORDR DCTYLENI Order Approving Motion for Extension of Time in 
Which to File Respondent's Brief (due 9/2/10) 
8/26/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Respondent's Brief 
CERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
9/16/2010 BREF CCMARTLG Appellant's Reply Brief 
9/22/2010 NOTH CCMARTLG Notice Of Hearing (11-04-10@ 1:30 PM) 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 
11/04/2010 01 :30 PM) 
10/4/2010 AMEN CCMARTLG Amended Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC CCMARTLG Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument on Appeal 
11/18/2010 02:00 PM) 
GERS CCMARTLG Certificate Of Service 
HRVC CCMARTLG Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held 
on 11/04/2010 01 :30 PM: Hearing Vacated 
10/13/2010 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order 
11/18/2010 DCHH DCKORSJP Hearing result for Oral Argument on Appeal held 
on 11/18/2010 02:00 PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: No Court Reporter 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Less than 100 
Document sealed 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
Judge 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
Kathryn A. Sticl<len 
Kathryn A. Sticlclen 
Kathryn A. Sticfden 
Kathryn A. Sticf,len 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Stic~:len 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Stick:len 
Kathryn A. Stick:len 
Kathryn A. Stick.len 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-IE-2009-05214 Current Judge: Kathryn A. Sticklen 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
In The Matter Of The Estate Of George D Perry Deceased 
Date Code User 
3/16/2011 DEOP DCTYLENI Memorandum Decision and Order 
Document sealed 
4/7/2011 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court 
4/11/2011 NOTC CCMARTLG Notice Of Preparation Of Appeal Transcript 
5/31/2011 NOTC CCLUNDMJ Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Ct. 
Docket # 38694 
User: CCLUNDMJ 
Judge 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
Kathryn A. Sticklen 
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-· 
Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON ·-·-··---------- -
--~
7
---LJ·: o~i 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-072() 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Lhr # 4682 
Attorney for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
CV J E O 9 0 5 214 
IN THE MATTER OF: I Case No. 
GEORGE D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL 
PROBATE OF WILL AND INFORMAL 
APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE 
(I.C. 15-3-301) 
APPLICANT. BARBARA K. MCCORMICK. formerly BARBARA K. PERRY, STATES AND 
REPRESENTS TO THE COURT THAT: 
1. 
3. 
Applicant's interest in this matter is that of the Daughter and Personal Representative of 
Decedent. a dcvisee under the decedent's will and a person having priority for 
appointment as personal representative. 
The person whose appointment as personal representative is sought is the J\pplicant and 
is qualified to act as such and has priority because there is no person \Vith a higher or 
equal priority for appointment. The person whose appointment as personal reprcsent~tivc 
is sought has priority for appointment as the person nominated in, or pursuant to the 
exercise of a power conferred by, the decedent's will. 
The decedent died on February 25, 2009. at the age of 79 years. A copy of his death 
certificate is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
APP LI CATION FOR INFORMAL PRO BA TE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 1 
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4. Venue is proper because at the time of death the decedent was domiciled in this county. 
5. The names and addresses of the children, heirs, and devisees of the decedent are: 
Barbara J. McCormick 
2525 Joretta Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
Steven A. Perry 
81 79 East McKenzre 
Nampa, Idaho 83687 
Robert E. Boyle 
3519 Rose Hill Street 
Boise, Idaho 83705 
Martha Jean Perry 
c/o Barbara J. McCormick, Trustee of the 
Supplemental Care Trust for Martha J. Perry 
2525 Joretta Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83704 
George D. Perry, Jr. 
20966 Wells Road 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Richard J. Perry 
594 W. Halverson 
Middleton, Idaho 83644 
Martha (Marty) Simonson 
2085 N. Trailview Place 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare 
Medicaid Estate Recovery 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
There are no surviving parents of Decedent. Decedent has no surviving siblings. 
6. No personal representative has been appointed in this state or elsewhere whose 
appointment has not been terminated. 
7. Applicant has neither received nor is aware of any demand for notice of any probate or 
appointment proceeding concerning the decedent that may have been filed in this state or 
elsewhere. 
8. The time limit for informal probate or appointment has not expired because not more than 
three years have passed since the decedent's death. 
9. The original of the decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, accompanies this applicai:ion. 
To the best of applicant's knowledge, neither that will nor any other will of the decedent 
has been the subject of a previous probate order. 
APPLICATlON FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE - PAGE 2 
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22 test SISSON AND SISSON 
r· -":34 a.m. 03-19-2009 
--
I 0. Applicant believes that the will which is the subject of this application was validly 
executed. 
11. Having exercised reasonable diligence, applicant is unaware of any instrument revoking 
the will which is the subject of this application and believes that such will is the 
decedent's last will. 
12. To the best of applicant's knowledge, the will to which this application relates is not part 
of a known series of testamentary instruments (other than wills or codicils), the latest of 
which does not expressly revoke the fonner. 
13. Bond is not required under J.C. 15-3-603. 
14. Any required notice has been given or waived. 
WHEREFORE, APPLICANT REQUESTS THAT: 
I. The decedent's will, dated February 4, 2005, be infonnally probated. 
2. Barbara K. McCormick be informally appointed personal representative of the estate of 
the decedent, to act without bond. 
3. Upon qualification and acceptance, letters testamentary be issued. 
DATED !/;1 At 
~/ ---; ----I---- Peter C. Sisson 
Attorney for Applicant 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL A~D 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE- PAGE 3 
2 /2 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada ) 
VERIFICATION 
13arbara K. McCormick, Applicant, being sworn. says that the focts set forth in the 
foregoing application are true. accurate, and complete to the best of applicant's knowledge and 
belief. 
Barbara K. McCormick - Applicant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Pffm///r , Idaho 
My Commission Expires Z-/ _!->o IL_. 
APPLICATION FOR INFORMAL PROBATE OF WILL AND 
INFORMAL APPOINTMENT OF PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE- PAGE 4 
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....,PEUF' 
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•WE COflOHER 
MUST 
r~oMl'LETE AHO 
"illGtlTHC: 
r;uwnCAff 
T> 
. 1~'r~~~~;"' 
STATE OF IDAHO 
DEPART\1ENT OF HEAL Tri A"-1D WELFARE 
BUREAU 0" \ ITA.L RECORDS A~D HEALTH STATIST CS 
DAl (: f-'L!:C BY STATl:c ;:,EGISTRAR 
CERTIFICATE OF DEATH 
.c ] George D. Perry 
0 4a. AGE ~-1~ ~ . ._ :.>. db. UNDEFI 1 YEAR 
0 79 
~, UNO~R 1 DAY 5. DATE OF BIRTf-f •,1 " ,; ', 11 
-·-
" >-8 ia. RESlbENC!: STATE OA FOREIGN COUt,fi'Rv 7b. COUNTY 
"' ID Ada 
STATE FILE NO 
2 SE:r; J. SOC1AL SECURITY NUMBER 
Male 
. e 81.:ITHPLACE (l' IV~ra ~:d(t"! : >! _:n L .. ·,..~.:,,, 
Overland Park, KS 
7c cm oA row~ 
Meridian 
-:- ,~ I 
~ 7d. STRE.E'I'" ANO NUMBER 
;:; 1351 \'/, Pine 
7e APT NO 7t ZJP CODE 
83642 
7g INSIDE CIT't' 
LIMITS-;, x,,,, 
.Si 8. \IARITAL STATUS ATTlME of DEATH 
U: 
~ X Marr,.-.~ f,,1_1Tlf'd t'>u! sp1•arate11 \\•J. ""::l r,,:,rc:eJ 
.. if"Sil.B_yrv_lNO SPOus·e S NAME.lit W,ip g,.-a r-1,~,,-, 
Martha Harper 
: 10 EVER IN US 1 ta. FATHERS NAME ;r ·:.1 "-' ~~,.- "st~! Si,IT,ll llti BIR.THf>LACE (Slato :.-~,;n':I\ c· c::_,re,9n CC'1,n1r,, 
'E ARMED MT ~ FORCES~ Archie W. Perry 
12a. MOTHER"S MAIDEN NAME ,F ..... '.'•ilt11e L.:st. ,3l[IT11I 12b. BIRTHPLACE !Stale IP:ri·-:---, er F('•e19n \uun!lyl 
;;; 
o... X r-.0 
~ 1111 INFORMANTS NAME ( I 1'1"-' ,, p·1r11' 
u 2525 ,Toretta Dr. z Barbara McCormick Daughter Boise, .ID 83714 _ .. _ .. 
<( * 14. METHOD OF DISPOSITION 15· f'LAi::-E OF Cl1SPOSITION \Na1..:ti "r-: JOU -~s::. ol Ceme!ory, • 115. NAME AND CQM~LETE ADDRESS OF FUNERAL FACILITY 
0 ~ ~~~:;,8., X ~~:;:~:n~ni Cff'TCl~~;1;dale Crematory Cloverdale Funer~l Home ~ a,m,,.,""~"''" 1 200 N. Cloverdale Rd. 1200 N. Cloverdale Rd. 
o . 0,h" ,..,...,,, _ ..... Bo.ise, _ID_ 8371 3 . . .... Boise, I.D 8371 3 
~ * 17a. SIGNATURE OF FUNERAL SERVICE llCENSEE OR PERSON ACTING AS SUCH : • 17b. LICENSE NUMBER :0' l·s:ensee) 18. WAS CORONER CON-JACfEi:> 
DUE TO CAUSE OF DEATH? 
Leona Cox KS 
- 'lb RELATIONS"11P TO DECEDENT tJc. "4AIUNG ADDRESS ,::Clfl'f'I- 'll',1 r,1w, twr (',·, ~1 •'t> ;::-- ~ ,-, 
M-804 
PLACE OF DEATH (19-22) 
* 19a IF DEATH OCCURRED IN A HOSPITAL * 19b !F DEATH OCCURRED SOMEWHERE ontER THAN A HOSPITAL 
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Meridian Care and Rehab Meridian, ID 83642 Ada 
* 23. DATE OF DEATH 1Mo,'Da~'rt) tS(w+I 1r.,1,t'11 24. TIME OF DEATH 2S OAT£ PRONO\JNC:1:;C 0EA6 11.1LJ t1d¥1'rr) (Spf'li°n~,mth) '26 rniE e.B_QNQUt-4CE0 DEAD 
February 25, 2009 0030 February 25, 2009 
27 CAUSE OF DEATH 
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0030 (24h) 
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LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY 
CV IE 
MAR t :! 2009 
J. D/\V,D NAV 
Bv L fvl.:i.r·:~-:;,. · 
UEi-·ur, 
0905214 
I, George D. Perry, with the present addressof2 l 04 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705, being 
of lawful age and sound mind and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence 
of any person, do make, publish and declare this my LAST WILL and TEST AMENT in the: 
manner following, to-wit: 
ITEM I 
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS/CODICILS 
I hereby expressly revoke any and all other and former Wills and Codicils to Wills by 
me at any time heretofore made. 
ITEM II 
MARITAL ST A TUS 
I am married and my spouse's name is Martha J. Perry. All references in this Will 
to my spouse's name are to Martha J. Perry. 
ITEM III 
CHILDREN 
I have four ( 4) living children, whose names are as follows, to-wit: George D. Perry, 
Jr., Barbara K. Perry, Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Perry. 
Richard J. Perry and Steven A. Pe~are the children ofmy marriage to my wife, 
Martha J. Perry. George D. Perry, Jr. and Barbara K. Perry are children of a previous 
marriage. Donna J. Holmes and Christine N. Ramsey, also children of my previous 
marriage, are deceased. Christine N. Ramsey did not leave issue. Donna J. Holmes left 
issue. I intentionally make no provision for any distribution from my estate to any of 
Donna J. Holmes' issue. 
My wife, Martha J. Perry, has two children from a previous marriage, whose names 
are as follows, to-wit: Robert E. Boyle and Marty Simonson. I will refer to them herein as 
my step-children. I further certify that I have no other children, living or deceased, nor have 
I ever adopted a child. 
ITEM IV 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
I direct that my Personal Representative shall not be required to furnish bond, and 
000013
shall be allowed to administer my estate without the intervention of Court, with full power 
to sell, mortgage, lease or dispose of all my Estate, real, personal or mixed, at public or 
private sale for any reason which may seem right or proper to said Personal Representative, 
regardless of whether or not it is necessary to do so for the purpose of administering my 
Estate, and I vest full power and authority in my Personal Representative to carry out the 
provisions of this, my Last Will and Testament, under a non-intervention Will procedure. 
I nominate and appoint the following people in the following order of priority as my 
Personal Representative until one such person qualifies and accepts to act as my Personall 
Representative: 
1. Barbara K. McCormick, of 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83 704; 
2. George D. Perry, Jr., of20966 Wells Road, Caldwell, Idaho 83605; 
3. Steven A. Perry, of 8179 East McKenzre, Nampa, Idaho 83687. 
My Personal Representative shall have the full power and discretion to do everything 
necessary to settle my Estate. I direct that my Personal Representative, shall pay all the 
expenses of my last illness and burial, and all transfer and other taxes due on or from my 
Estate, all costs and charges of the administration of my Estate and all my just debts, as soon 
as the same can be conveniently paid, and that no order of Court be required therefor. 
All estate, inheritance, succession or other death taxes, duties, charges or assessments. 
imposed on or in relation to any property by reason of my death, whether passing under this 
Will or otherwise, shall be paid by my Personal Representative out of the residue of my Estate, 
without proration of any charge therefor against any person who receives such property under 
the terms of this Will or otherwise. 
ITEMV 
FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS 
It is my intention to prepare a "Letter of Instruction" regarding my preferred burial 
wishes, and I direct that my Personal Representative follow these instructions in so far as 
possible. 
ITEM VI 
CHARACTER OF PROPERTY 
All of my Estate is separate property and community property. It is my intention by this 
Will to dispose of my separate property and my one-half interest in the community property 
of myself and my spouse. 
Last Will and Testament - -b.Z'.::::XL.J:~~~~,__/j~~-1,.,,P,./v 
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ITEM VII 
PERSONAL PROPERTY DISTRJBUTION 
I give my personal and household effects of every kind, including but not limited to 
furniture, appliances, furnishings, pictures, silverware, china, glassware, jewelry, wearing 
apparel, boats, personal automobiles and other vehicles, in accordance with a written statement 
signed by me or in my handwriting which I intend to leave at my death. I give all of such 
property not effectively disposed of by such written statement to my children who survive me, 
to be divided among them as they shall agree, or if they shall fail to agree within six months 
after the appointment of my personal representative, to be divided among them in portions of 
approximately equal value, as determined by my personal representative. 
ITEM VIII 
SUPPLEMENTAL CARE TRUST FOR SURVIVING SPOUSE 
A. If my spouse, Martha J. Perry, survives me for five ( 5) days, then I give, devise and 
bequeath to her the rest, residue and remainder of my estate IN TRUST, to my Personal 
Representative, as Trustee, in lieu of any statutory allowances available to my surviving 
spouse. This share of my estate that is set aside for Martha J. Perry, shall be held by my 
Trustee, in a trust for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, in a Supplemental Care Trust in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
1. Intent. 
It is my intention by this Trust to create a purely discretionary supplemental care fund 
for the benefit of Martha J. Perry, herein after referred to as the beneficiary. It is not my 
intention to displace public or private financial assistance that may otherwise be available to 
the beneficiary. The following enumerates the kinds of supplemental, nonsupport 
disbursements that are appropriate for the Trustee to make from this trust to or for the 
beneficiary. Such examples are not exclusive: medical, dental and diagnostic work and 
treatment for which there are no private or public funds otherwise available; medical 
procedures that are desirable in the T ms tee's discretion, even though they may not be necessary 
or life saving; supplemental nursing care and rehabilitative services, differentials in cost 
between housing and shelter for shared and private rooms in institutional settings; care 
appropriate for the beneficiary that assistance programs may not or do not otherwise provide; 
expenditures for travel, companionship, cultural experiences, and expenses in bringing the 
beneficiary's siblings and other appropriate persons for visitation with the beneficiary. 
2. Supplement, not support. 
I do not want this Trust eroded by the beneficiary's creditors nor do I want the 
beneficiary's public or private assistance benefits made unavailable to the beneficiary or 
terminated. This Trust is not for the beneficiary's primary support. It is to supplement the 
Last Will and Testament - -~ ¼ ;J , g4AIJ' 
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beneficiary's supplemental care needs only. 
I have no obligation of support owing to the beneficiary, and the beneficiary has no 
entitlement to the income or corpus of this trust, except as the Trustee in his, her or its 
complete, sole, and absolute, and unfettered discretion, elects to disburse. In this regard the 
Trustee may act unreasonably and arbitrarily, as I could, ifl were living and in control of these 
funds. The Trustee's discretion in making nonsupport disbursements as provided for in this 
instrument is final as to all interested parties, including the state or any governmental agency 
or agencies, even if the Trustee elects to make no disbursements at all. The Trustee's sole and 
independent judgment, rather than any other parties' detennination, is intended to be the 
criterion by which disbursements are made. No court or any other person should substitute its 
or their judgment for the discretionary decision or decisions made by the Trustee. 
3. Income. 
Any income received by the Trustee not distributed to or for the benefit of the Trust 
beneficiary, shall be added annually to the Trust's principal. 
4. Access to Public Benefits. 
The Trustee shall consider all resources and income limitations that affect the 
beneficiary's right to public assistance programs. Distribution to or for the benefit of the 
beneficiary shall be limited so that the beneficiary is not disqualified from receiving public 
benefits to which the beneficiary is otherwise entitled. The beneficiary's probable and possible 
future supplemental care needs should be considered by the Trustee in connection with 
disbursements made by the Trustee from this Trust. The interests of remainder beneficiaries 
are only of secondary importance. 
5. Resist Requests. 
The Trustee should resist any request for payments from this trust for services that any 
public or private agency has the obligation to provide to my beneficiary. In this regard, the 
Trustee may not be familiar with the federal, state and local agencies that have been created to 
financially assist disabled persons. If this is the case, the Trustee should seek assistance in 
identifying public and private programs that are or may be available to the beneficiary so that 
the Trustee may better serve the beneficiary. 
6. Spendthrift Provisions 
No part of this Trust, neither principal nor income, shall be subject to anticipation or 
assignment by the beneficiary nor shall the Trust corpus or income be subject to attachment by 
any public or private creditor of the beneficiary; nor may the Trust principal and income be 
taken by any legal or equitable process by any voluntary or involuntary creditor, including those 
I ,ast Will and Testament - s:il?Plr- I)' /4'!) 
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that have provided for the beneficiary's support and maintenance. Further, under no 
circumstances may the beneficiary compel distributions from this Trust. 
7. Trustee - Authority to Terminate Trust 
If the existence of this supplemental care Trust adversely affects the beneficiary from 
receiving public entitlements or private support benefits, the Trustee may terminate this Trust. 
If this occurs, the remainder interest will be accelerated, and the remainder beneficiaries shall 
receive the accrued and undistributed income and corpus then held by the Trustee. 
In the event of voluntary termination, as provided for in this article, it is my hope and 
expectation that the remainder beneficiaries will continue to provide for the nonsupport care 
needs of the beneficiary. This request is an expression of my wishes. It is not binding on the 
remainder beneficiaries, and is merely precatory language in this paragraph. 
If Martha J. Perry fails to survive me for five (5) days, or upon the death of the 
beneficiary or upon the Trust's earlier termination. the trust created for Martha J. Perry, shall 
be distributed according to Item VIII (B) of this Last Will and Testament. 
8. Trustee's Powers 
To carry out the purposes of the Trust created under this Will, and subject to any 
limitations stated elsewhere herein, the Trustee is vested with all of the powers and authority 
as set forth in the Uniform Trustees' Powers Act, being Chapter 1 of Title 68, Idaho Code, as 
now in effect and as it may hereafter from time to time be amended after the date of my Will 
and after my death. The Trustee shall specifically have the power to invest in non-income 
producing assets. 
9. Unsupervised Administration 
The Trust created by this Will may be administered by my Trustee free from the control 
of any court that may otherwise have authority over my estate. 
10. Successor Trustee: Trustee Powers and Duties 
No resignation shall be effective until acceptance by the successor Trustee. No Trustee 
shall be required to post surety or personal bond while serving in this fiduciary capacity. 
The Trustee should take whatever legal steps may be necessary to initiate or continue 
any public assistance program for which the beneficiary is or may become eligible. The 
Trustee may bring such action in any court or regulatory agency having jurisdiction over the 
matter, to secure a ruling or order that the Trust described in this article is not available to the 
beneficiary for any purpose absent specific exercise of the Trustee's discretion. Any expenses 
Last Will and Testament - -~ ¥,,d) • &01 
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of the Trustee, including reasonable attorney's fees, specifically incurred in connection with 
matters relating to determination of eligibility of the beneficiary for public or private support, 
but not limited to such services, shall be a proper charge to the Trust. 
11. Choice and Effect of Law 
This Last Will and Testament is entered into and executed in the State ofldaho. It shal I 
be administered in accordance with the laws of that state. 
B. The rest, residue and remainder of my estate shall be distributed in equal shares to 
my children and step-children who survive me for five (5) days. In the event any of my said 
children or step-children should predecease me or should not be living upon the death of the 
beneficiary of the Supplemental Care Trust referred to herein or upon the Trust's earlier 
termination, then in that event such individual's share shall lapse. 
ITEM IX 
CONTEST 
Every person under this Will who shall contest in any Court any provision of this 
instrument shall not be entitled to receive any property of any type whatsoever under this Will. 
That person shall receive absolutely nothing under the provisions of this Will or out of my 
estate. Any property which would have passed to that person under this Will, shall instead be 
distributed as if such person had died prior to my death without issue. My Personal 
Representative is specifically authorized to defend at the expense of my estate any contest or 
attack of any nature upon this Will, or upon any portion thereof. 
ITEMX 
CHARACTER OF DISTRIBUTION 
Unless otherwise specifically stated, all distributions, whether of income or principal. 
shall be the separate property of each individual distributee, beneficiary or heir under this will. 
All income, rents, issues, profits, gains and appreciation of property distributed to each individual 
as separate property shall also be the separate property of each such individual. 
ITEM XI 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have signed these presents and do publish and declare 
the same as and for my LAST WILL and TEST AMENT, consisting of eight (8) typewritten 
pages, the witnesses' certificate included, and on the bottom of each page I have signed my 
name for greater security. 
I, George D. Perry, the Testator, sign my name to this instrument this l/ ~ay of 
February, 2005, and being first duly sworn, do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that 
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I sign and execute this instrument as my Last Will and that I sign it willingly ( or willingly 
direct another to sign for me), that I execute it as my free and voluntary act for the purposes 
therein expressed, and that I am eighteen (18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under 
no constraint or undue influence. 
Geo,;h:; ~f) 1 ~ 
Testator 
We, George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, sign our names to this 
instrument, being first duly sworn, and do hereby declare to the undersigned authority that the 
Testator signs and executes this instrument as his last Will and that he signs it willingly ( or 
willingly directs another to sign for him), and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of 
the Testator, hereby signs this Will as witness to the Testator's signing, and that to the best of 
our knowledge the Testator is eighteen ( 18) years of age or older, of sound mind, and under no 
constraint or undue influence. 
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho 
..z........---~~A '?_---------------..:~~-
Steven A. Perry -··c_:;) 
Residing at Nampa, Idaho 
Last Will and Testament - ~-<-') 'j--' J) · L7 
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this t/7!.,__ day of February, 2005, before me personally appeared George D. Perry., 
the Testator, and George D. Perry, Jr. and Steven A. Perry, the witnesses, known to me ( or 
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the persons whose names an:: 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. IN 
WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year in this 
Notary Public in and r Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho. 
My commission expires 12/12/08. 
Last Will and Testament - ~k"? ,,.. -'19 , ~'J 
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Re,cE.\VEO 
t-PR··, S '2000 
• cou~ C\er\<. 
Ada LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
ciO. . . 
1>..M_jJ·· ]Q 
APR 1 5 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByLMARTIN 
DEFUT'f 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
___________ ) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE 
(LC. § 15-3-204) 
EXEMPT I.C. § 31-3212 
COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, (hereinafter the 
"Department") pursuant to Idaho Code§ 15-3-204, and hereby files its Demand for Notice of orders 
or other filings pertaining to the estate of the above-named Decedent. The Department asserts that 
it has a financial or property interest in said estate based upon the amount of medical assistance 
benefits which it was required to pay on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, and 
based upon its right to recover the amount of medical assistance benefits paid on her behalf as set 
forth at Idaho Code § 56-218. 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 1 
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The Department further requests a copy of the Inventory and Appraisement, upon its 
preparation within three months of the personal representative's appointment, pursuant to Idaho Code 
§ 15-3-706. 
Notice should be given to the Department through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy 
Attorney General, Division ofHuman Services, 3276 Elder, Suite B, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 
83720-0036. 
DA TED this~ day of April, 2009. 
~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE was mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the 1--3 day of April, 
2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
C/O PETER C SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
ADA COUNTY CLERK 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83 702 
DEMAND FOR NOTICE - Page 2 
Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\C&D.wpd 
Marchelle Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
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ATTORNEY GENERAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Division of Human Services 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
NO.---;-:-:---;-::---;::;;-;:;::------l , • I C' Fil.ED A..M~-~---L.l-''-"-J~ . PM. ___ _ 
APR 1 !i 2009 
J_ DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By L MftRTIN 
DEPUrv 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(LC. § 15-3-804) 
EXEMPT: LC.§ 31-3212 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (the "Department"), 
through undersigned counsel, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. This 
claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover the amount of medical assistance paid 
on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. The 
Claimant has paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of the Decedent's spouse MARTHA J. 
PERRY in the amount of $106,251.08, as of April 8, 2009. To the extent that the Claimant is 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE -1 
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obligated to make further medical assistance payments on behalf of the Decedent's spouse, it reserves 
the right to supplement its claim. 
IMPORTANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's right to establish 
its claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218. As long as the decedent's spouse survives, there: is no 
demand for payment of this claim. This claim is made against any property or estate which, at any 
time, had been the community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been 
the property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of the estate 
to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands that, before any other 
distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the future payment of the Department's 
claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 15-3-81 0(b )(2). Transfers of property by either spouse ( except to 
one another), including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affe:ct the 
eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in accordance with Idaho Code 
§ 56-218(2). 
DATED this 1.34 day of April, 2009. ~~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
JULIE RAICHART, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: That I am the Claimant's 
Paralegal; that I have read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate and know the 
contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this I ~1"" day of April, 2009. 
~z.f~t' 
Notary Public for Idaho 12J 
Commission Expires: 8--1'-f ,,.,JO(? 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of the foregoing 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the '-3 day of April, 
2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
C/O PETER C SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
ADA COUNTY CLERK 
ADA COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
200 W FRONT STREET 
BOISE ID 83702 
CLAIM AGAINST EST ATE - 3 
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
-
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Har# 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
JUN O 4 2009 
IN Tl IE DISTRICT COURI OF Tl IE FOURTI l JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN Tl IE f\1\TTER Of: 
GEORGE D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 
(J.C. 15-3-806) 
TO: THE DEAPRTMENT OF HEAL TH AND WELFARE. Claimant. 
The undersigned personal representative of the above-entitled estate hereby disallows 
your claim for $106.251.08 (and any supplemental claim for further medical assistance payments 
made on behalfofDeccdcnfs spouse) presented on April 13. 2009. Claimant's reliance upon 
I.C. ~ 56-218 to make its claim "against any property or estate which. at any time. had been the 
community property of the decedent and decedent" s spouse, or which had been the property of 
decedent's spouse" exceeds the scope of recovery allowed by federal law. is preempted by 
federal law. and is hereby disallowed. 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #08-197 
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Claimant's demand that "before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be 
made for the future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to I.C. § 15-3-810(b)(2)" is also 
hereby disallowed because no assets of the estate are subject to the Claimant's claim, nor wil I 
they he upon Decedent's spouse's death. 
Failure to protest the disallowance by filing a petition for allowance in the above named 
court. or commencing a proceeding against the undersigned, within sixty ( 60) days after the 
mailing of this notice shall result in your claim for the disallowed amount indicated above being 
forever barred. 
DATED this zJ day of June, 2009. 
cif(V4MQ~ 
BARBARA K. McCORNUCK 
Personal Representative 
ST A TE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Ada ) 
On this V, day of June, 2009, before me personally appeared Barbara K. McCormick. 
known to me ( or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name 
is subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that she executed the same . 
Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
Residing at It/ 47YJ/J JJ- . Idaho 
My commission expires 2 -/J '#LI . 
NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
File #08-197 
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RECEIVED 
J l-., 1 5 2009 
Ada County Clerk 
LA WREN CE G. WAS DEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
LARRY L. GOINS 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
3276 Elder Street, Suite B 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 2295 
[goinsl@dhw.idaho.gov] 
-
N0.---,---,------\00.S Fli_ED A.M P.~i ___ _ 
JUN 1 5 2009 
J. DAVID NAVAl~RO, Clerk 
By RIC i!ELSO~J 
OEPUT" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE EST A TE OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
PETITION-FOR ALLOWANCE 
OF CLAIM 1 
COMES NOW the State ofldaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department), claimant 
in the above matter, by and through its attorney, LARRY L. GOINS, Deputy Attorney General, and 
pursuant to Idaho Code § l 5-3-806(b ), petitions the Court as follows: 
1. The Department has paid medical assistance (Medicaid) benefits on behalf of the 
decedent's surviving spouse, MARTHA J. PERRY in the amount of$109,464.23 to date; 
2. After appointment and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-3-804 and 56-218, a written 
statement of the Department's claim in the amount of 106,251.08, was timely mailed to the Personal 
Representative of the estate and filed with the Court on April 15, 2009; 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
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3. The Department's statutory claim is just and valid, and payment should be allowed for 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the decedent's surviving spouse to the fullest 
extent possible. 
WHEREFORE, THE DEPARTMENT REQUESTS that the Court enter an Order allowing 
the above listed claim to be paid to the fullest extent possible. 
DATED this~ day of June, 2009. 
'----- _A_;-~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM was mailed first class, postage prepaid on the // day of 
June, 2009, to: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
C/O PETER C SISSON 
SISSON & SISSON 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE, ID 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 2 
Ir) Cy~ Q:m" 
~e Premo, Legal Assistant 
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSO~ & SISSON 
The ~]dcr Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jdkrson Street 
Boise. Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar# 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
NO,-----=-=-=-------
c:i FILED 
A.M ~ Y \ P.M ___ _ 
JUN 2 5 2009 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By RIC NELSON 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STAIE OF IDJ\I IO. IN AND FOR TI IE COl lNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
<,LOR<,E D. PERRY. 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
OBJLCT!ON TO PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
COf\1ES NOW. Barbara K. McCormick. the Personal Representative of the above-named 
estate. hy and through her attorney Peter C. Sisson. and hereby objects to the Petition for 
Al lo\\ ancc or Claim i'i led herein hy the State of Idaho. Department or I lea Ith and \\ cl fare. 
This Objection is based on the fvtemorandum in Suppo11 of Objection to Petition for 
Allowance (l!'Claim and aflidavit(s) in support to he filed in this matter. Oral argument is 
requested at the hearing to be set on this matter. Time for creditor claims runs on August 10, 
2009. The Personal Representative will notice up a hearing on this matter after that date. 
DATED this~ofJune, 2009. '/N.,~ 
PETER C. SISSON 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
OJBECTION TO PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #08-/97 
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Peter C. Sisson 
SISSON & SISSON 
The Elder Law Firm, PLLC 
2402 West Jefferson Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tel: (208) 387-0729 
Fax: (208) 331-5009 
Idaho State Bar# 4682 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
J. 1_,.-r.v/8 !'Jl"\''."A¥1rr.:1 1C.H~n, 
By ·~, !~tit:Jti~'; ~ - -, 
-.'~f'i,. ' .. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE 
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
I AND WELFARE'S PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
COMES NOW, Barbara K. McCormick, the Personal Representative of the above-named 
estate, by and through her attorney of record, Peter C. Sisson, of the firm Sisson & Sisson, The 
Elder Law Firm, PLLC, and hereby submits the following Memorandum in Support of the 
Personal Representative's Objection to the Department of Health and Welfare's ("Department'') 
Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Personal Representative ("PR"), Barbara McCormick, was appointed in this probate 
action on March 19, 2009. Pursuant to statute, the Department was given notice of the probate 
action on April 3, 2009. On April 13, 2009, the Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the 
amount of $106,251.08. On June 2, 2009, the PR timely filed her Notice Of Disallowance Of 
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Claim, denying the Department's Claim in its entirety. On June 11, 2009, the Department filed 
its Petition For Allowance Of Claim. On June 25, 2009, the PR filed her Objection To Petition 
For Allowance Of Claim, noting that the time for creditor claims had not yet passed, but when it 
had, she would file a Memorandum in Support and set the matter for hearing. The PR has now 
filed the Legal Advertising Proof of Publication from the Idaho Statesman, verifying that legal 
notice to creditors was duly published and the time for claims has now passed. She now files her 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to the Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim, the 
PR's affidavit in support of said Objection, and hereby requests that a hearing be set on the IPR's 
disallowance of the Department's claim this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), 
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, 
Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George Perry. Affidavit of Barbara McCom1ick, 
Exhibit A, incorporated herein by reference. 
2. As of October 1, 2006, the Department approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. 
Affidavit of Barbara McConnick, Exhibit B, incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now 
lives in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive 
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today. 
4. Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately 
was forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he 
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be unable to 
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maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the home, he provided the 
Department with written verification documenting the fair market value of the home and the 
Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 was fair market value. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit C, incorporated herein by reference. 
5. Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer 
who had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remaim:d on 
the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25, 2009, before he could 
complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to purchase the 
home. 
6. The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale 
of the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. Affidavit of Barbara 
McCormick, Exhibit D, incorporated herein by reference. 
7. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, 
is now held in the Estate's checking account as reflected in the Estate Inventory. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit E, incorporated herein by reference. The proceeds from the sale of 
George Perry's home are the only assets that are contained in the Estate of George Perry. The 
Inventory makes clear that all estate assets were George Perry's separate property. The 
Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was 
of de minimus value and was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing 
home. The Estate of George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property. 
8. The only property that Martha currently owns is one financial account located at 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM- Page 3 
000033
Wells Fargo, checking account# ending -3540. This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" 
trust account that was necessary to qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income 
(social security and pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then 
paid out of this account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her 
health insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than 
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. Affidavit of 
Barbara McCormick, Exhibit F, incorporated herein by reference. Martha owns no other re:al or 
personal property. Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference. 
9. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's 
death, any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account# ending -3540 are owed to and will be 
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out during 
her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside from the funds in 
this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in any other property. 
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick, incorporated herein by reference as if set forth in full. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case requires interpretation of a federal statute and consideration of whether the 
Department's application ofldaho law (LC.§ 56-218) violates federal law and is therefore 
preempted by federal law. Under certain circumstances specified by federal law, the states are 
allowed to recover correctly paid medical assistance benefits from the estates of Medicaid 
recipients. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the probate estates of Medi 1caid 
recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also allows the states to expand the 
definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a recipient at the time of the 
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recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of "estate." LC.§ 56-218(4). 
Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct medical assistance estate 
claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of benefits. Despite strong 
pressure from the states and others, in 1993 Congress refused to enact legislation to allow direct 
claims against the estates of non-recipient surviving spouses. 
Under the current statute, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estat,~ any 
real or personal property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the 
time of the recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, Idaho 
Code § 56-218, requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased 
recipient, but also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who 
never received medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of 
LC. § 56-218 in its estate recovery claims (including the one at bar) conflicts with federal law to 
the extent that the Department asserts recovery claims against assets in the non-Medicaid 
spouse's probate estate which were not assets in which the Medicaid recipient held an interest at 
the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the United States government's 
principal agency in charge of protecting the health of all Americans and providing essential 
human services. The work of HHS is conducted by the Office of the Secretary and 11 agencies. 
CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) is the HHS agency that governs the 
Medicaid program in the United States. HHS most recently stated in clear and unambiguous 
terms that an estate recovery claim by a state could be asserted only against assets in which the 
Medicaid recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of death to the extent of the interest. 
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In the instant case, none of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which 
Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient, holds a legal title or interest. Since she doesn't hold any 
such interest now, while she is alive, she cannot possibly hold any such interest at the time of her 
death. The Department's claim in this probate action is exactly the type ofrecovery claim which 
goes beyond what federal law allows. That is why the PR disallowed the Department's Claim 
and that is why this Court should uphold that disallowance. 
OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID 
Statutory Framework 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure 
medical care to individuals who do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. 
Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006); In Re Estate of 
Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 436,439, 111 P.3d 121 (2005). The program is jointly funded with the 
states as a "cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance 
to participating States to aid them in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 
448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation 
and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. 
Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. 
III 2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each 
state administers its own program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) administer the program and approve state plans. Arkansas Dept. 
of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
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One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the program and 
receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [ 42 U.S.C. § 1396p] 
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid, transfors of 
assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider 
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the 
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of 
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not 
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 
U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to 
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not considered available 
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the 
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or 
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of 
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need to provide for his or her own 
support. 
Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is important to start with the pre-
1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, because it is the basis for the rationale of several relevant 
cases, including the sole case in Idaho that peripherally addressed the issue at bar. Prior to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S OBJECTION TO 
DEPARTMENT'S PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - Page 7 
000037
amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal 
Medicaid statute stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid 
Medicaid benefits, subject to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he 
received such assistance, from his estate. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). 
Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the 
recipient's estate. The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could 
only be made after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse. Id. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). 
Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving spouse, there was no 
express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of the term "estate." 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). As amended, the federal law 
retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid payments correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 
1993 amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, the 1993 amendments 
lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 1993 amendments made 
recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, the amendments 
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added a definition of "estate,'' which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As 
amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read as follows: 
( 1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
* * * * 
(8) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. ( emphasis added) 
Id. The amended version of section 13 96p(b )( 1 )(8) retained the express reference to recovery 
from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the 
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any 
adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's 
surviving spouse, if any* * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )(2) ( emphasis added). As with the pre-1993 
version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, 
recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, 
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that 
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual --
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
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Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid 
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone els1~ on 
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right 
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the 
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded 
definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to 
the surviving joint tenant. 
Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the scope ofrecovery of 
medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 U .S.C. § 1396p. 
Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006). 
Idaho 's Medicaid Recovery Provisions 
Idaho Code (LC.)§ 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part, 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance may 
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both: ... 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
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deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. ( emphasis added). 
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand 
the definition of "estate" beyond the scope of probate law. LC.§ 56-218(4). Therefore, it 
follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute 
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for 
medical assistance paid "from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such 
aid paid to either or both." LC.§ 56-218(1). The Department does not interpret and apply this 
statutory language consistently with federal law. In order to be consistent with federal law, the 
Department's claims against a Medicaid spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the 
individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest." The Department, however, regularly makes claims against assets in which the: 
Medicaid recipient had no legal title or interest at the time of his death. That is the case in this 
matter and that is the reason this Court should rule in favor of the Personal Representative's 
disallowance of the Department's claim in this case. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does federal law limit the scope ofrecovery against the individual's estate or the 
estate of the spouse to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her 
death, thereby preempting the broader recovery sought by the Department in this case? 
2. If recovery is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at th1;: 
time of her death what, if any, interest does Martha Perry have in the homestead sale proceeds 
that make up the assets in the Estate of George Perry, her deceased husband? 
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........ 
ARGUMENT 
I. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation. 
Congressional purpose is "'the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White 
Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks 
Int'lAss'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). 
The Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. 
Fed. Sav. &LoanAss'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). 
The United States Supreme Court has explained that "[ c ]onsideration of issues arising under the 
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504,516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) 
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518, 112 S.Ct. 
2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 479 U.S. 
at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. 
Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, "congressional intent to pre-empt state 
law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation is sufficiently 
comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary 
state regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). In 
this case, Congress did not expressly preempt state law nor did it so completely occupy the field 
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as to leave no room for state action, because the Medicaid program specifically permits and even 
requires action by participating states. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress has not chosen to 
displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan A.ss'n, 
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state 
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law 
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
II. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF LC.§ 56-218 IN THIS CASE 
ACTUALLY CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW AND IS THEREFORE 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The Department's claim against the Estate of George Perry is premised on the Medic.aid 
benefits paid out on behalf of his spouse, Martha. Federal law precludes the Department from 
asserting a claim against any property which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, does not have legal 
title to or an interest in at the time of her death. See discussion, supra. In this case, the 
Department's claim against the estate of Martha Perry's spouse must be denied because she has 
no legal title to nor any interest in the assets of the Estate of George Perry, nor will she ever have 
such an interest, even at the time of her death. 
The appellate courts in Idaho have not squarely addressed the issue presented in this case, 
although the only two Idaho cases which have dealt with Medicaid recovery claims are discussed 
below. However, a very recent decision from the Supreme Court of Minnesota and the 
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procedural aftermath of that decision is particularly instructive in this case. In Re Estate of Barg, 
752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on point and is on all fours with 
the instant situation. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth and exhaustive review of 
state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety is very instructive on the issue 
at bar because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the same argument in favor of 
its recovery action as is made by Idaho's Department in this action. The facts of Barg, when 
pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts as are present in this probate. For the 
Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum as 
Appendix 1. 
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the 
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that 
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she 
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon 
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of 
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Minnesota Supreme Court determined 
that the county could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in 
at the time of her death. Since Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died 
because she had transferred her interest to her husband while she was alive, the Court ruled that 
the county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Id. 
These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the 
couple's home to her husband years ago in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She 
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retains no legal interest in that real property, nor in the proceeds from the sale of that real 
property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. Statement of Facts 
("SOF"), ,r,r 1-2, 7-8. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed the federal statute at length, which is directly 
applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal language verbatim in LC. § 
56-218. In discussing the statute at issue it addressed the state's argument that the "other 
arrangement" phrase opened the door for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's 
statute. The Court rejected that argument. The Court's opinion on the scope of the Minnesota 
recovery statute, directly on point with the instant case, is cited at length below. 
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving 
spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. 
Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B. l 5 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital 
property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." (Emphasis 
added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section l 396p(b) should 
be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to expand, not 
restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for broad estate 
recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals 
of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to 
more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from 
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 
1396p(b)(l) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) 
allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring 
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language. 
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of 
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have 
interpreted federal law to allow direct claims against the estate of a surviving 
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spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that were 
transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied 
on language from the 1993 amendments to support that extension. See In re 
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other 
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that 
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state 
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting 
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate 
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that 
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovery 
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of 'estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re 
Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov .1, 2006) ( explaining that courts that have allowed recovery 
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had interest in 
assets at time of death) .... 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle 
requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota 
court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson decision that recovery allowed 
under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an 
interest at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court 
rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 
851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid 
recipient to his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the 
surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court stated that limiting 
recovery under section 1396p{b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the 
Medicaid recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-
in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust" would ignore the words 
"interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the 
court relied on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide 
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did not 
explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with 
the limitation to recovery from assets in which the recipient had an interest at the 
time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of 
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the 
time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional 
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of any other real and personal property and 
other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, 
heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further 
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause 
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately 
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to 
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual." Id. ( emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes 
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place --
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient 
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we 
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330,339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To 
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words 
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement" 
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. 
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the 
time of death. The list ofrecipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign 
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid 
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have 
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the 
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language 
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is 
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
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not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 68-71. 
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to 
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor 
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the 
attorneys from the Department of HHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting 
the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is THE most recent le;gal 
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every 
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond 
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor 
General's amicus curiae brief filed in In Re Estate of Barg is attached hereto and incorporated 
herein as Appendix 2. 
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The 
legal positions taken in that briefrepresent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted 
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is 
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legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. In its 2009 
briefing in Barg before the U.S. Supreme Court, the United States Solicitor General and HHS 
expressly reject the interpretation and application that Idaho's Department relies upon in using 
LC. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of George Perry in this case. 
The United States in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part, 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant 
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid 
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death ... 
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the Medicaid 
Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid benefits from assets 
in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at the time of her death. 
Under the Medicaid Act, a State generally may not seek to recover 
correctly paid Medicaid benefits. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l). The Act provides, 
however, that a State (1) must seek recovery of nursing home and related benefits 
paid on behalf of an individual over the page of 55 from "the individual's estate" 
as defined by state probate law; and (2) may, at its option, define "the individual's 
estate" more broadly to include any "assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such 
assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or assign of the deceased individual through 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other 
arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4)(A) and (B). Thus, the Medicaid 
Act, which permits recovery only after the death of the recipient's surviving 
spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to file a reimbursement 
claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the value of any assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. 
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that 
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's estate "the 
value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned 
property at any time during the marriage, "Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd. 2 
(2007) ( emphasis added), without regard to whether the recipient retained an 
interest in the assets at the time of her death. Because a State may not recover 
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correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent authorized by federal 
law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l), Minnesota's statute conflicts with federal law 
and is therefore preempted. See California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272, 280-282 (1987). (emphasis added). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Barg went on to determine whether Dolores Barg 
owned any interest in the property held by her husband's estate. It stated, 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer 
existed at the time of her death. No other recognizable interest has been 
identified .... We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of 
her death that were part of a probate estate or an expanded estate definition 
permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no basis for the County's 
claim against the estate. 
Id. at 72-73. 
The same conclusion follows in this case. Martha Perry retains no legal interest 
whatsoever in the house sale proceeds that make up the Estate of George Perry. Nor can she be 
said to have any interest in those assets under the expanded estate definition permissible under 
federal law. She conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to her husband years ago 
via a quit claim deed. SOF, 1 1. The Department has no valid recovery claim nor will it ever 
have a valid claim against the assets making up the Estate of George Perry. The Court should 
rule accordingly. 
Idaho Cases 
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a 
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 
436, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Although the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the 
Department's clam, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly 
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated, 
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Medicaid is a public assistance program designed to provide medical care and 
services to persons with insignificant financial resources. The provisions of 
Idaho's Public Assistance Law (Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code) and its 
implementing regulations provide eligibility requirements. Only persons with few 
financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance comes with strings 
attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of the State, pursuant 
to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid assistance from the 
estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, this right of recovery 
constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. (emphasis added). 
Id. at 439. The Department did not attempt in Kaminsky, however, to assert any claim against the 
surviving/community spouse's estate. 1 
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 
Idaho 213, 215, 970 P.2d 6, 8-10 ( 1998), held that the version of LC. § 56-218 then in effect 
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but 
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the 
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized 
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by LC. § 56-218, and held 
that the only asset that might be recoverable against from the surviving spouse's estate was 
community property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement 
agreement. Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal 
law does preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to LC. § 56-218. 
Jackman is also important with respect to two further points in that opinion. 
First, the Court held that the separate property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse 
(the community spouse) were not subject to an estate recovery claim by the Department. Id. at 
1 Reference is sometimes made in case law to the "surviving spouse" which is often used to refer to the "commw1ity 
spouse" or the spouse which is not the Medicaid recipient. This Memorandum refers to George Perry as the 
community spouse because he did not in fact "survive" his spouse, Martha Perry, the Medicaid recipient. 
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216. This conclusion is consistent with the federal law because the Medicaid recipient does not 
own any interest in the community spouse's separate property. In Jackman, the Court held that 
all assets transferred to the community spouse upon the Medicaid spouse's approval for Medicaid 
by use of a marriage settlement agreement effectively transmuted those assets into the separate 
property assets of the Medicaid recipient's spouse, precluding the Department's claim against 
those assets. The Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate 
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Id. at 216-217. In this case, all property of 
the estate in the Inventory served on the Department was identified as George Perry's separate 
property. Those assets are entirely made up of proceeds from the sale of George's home. Martha 
conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the home to George in 2006. Therefore, the home 
and the proceeds from the sale of the home are George's separate property assets. The 
Department never objected to that characterization in the Inventory. 
Second, the Jackman Court also rejected the Department's effort to use the post-OBRA 
1993 definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B) as support for a broader right to 
recovery. Id. The Jackman Court rejected this argument because the definition of "assets" was 
not in effect at the time the agreement transmuting the couple's community property into the 
Medicaid recipient spouse's separate property was signed in that case. In other words, the 
definition of "assets" that the Department sought to rely upon in Jackman was pre-OBRA 1993. 
If the Department seeks to resurrect that argument in this case, the Court should reject it a second 
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time, but not because the definition is not in effect. The Court should reject it because the 
argument lacks substantive merit. 
The State of Minnesota posited the very same argument when it sought certification 
before the U.S. Supreme Court in order to reverse the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in In Re 
Estate Of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In rejecting the State of Minnesota's argument that the 
term "assets" supported a broader right to recovery, the U.S. Solicitor General stated, 
2. Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term "assets" 
to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the individual's 
spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y including 
resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in the meaning 
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources fall within the 
scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of 
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid 
recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision of the Medicaid 
Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b )( 4)(B) (emphasis 
added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to rewrite that clause to read 
"'any * * * assets in which leither or both the individual and the individual's 
spouse] had any legal title or interest."' Pet. 26 (brackets and asterisk in 
original) (emphasis added). But this editing does nothing less than make the 
statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain language of the operative 
provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings.2 
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the 
Act's other provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. 
As petitioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the community 
2 In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative history of the 1993 
amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, rather than the 
resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 835 
( 1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [ which] * * * recovery is sought may include any real or 
personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including 
the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original) 
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spouse's assets for purposes of determining whether an institutionalized 
individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain 
property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(10, 
1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of 
resources and income that are not considered available to pay for the applicant's 
medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). Moreover, once the 
institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits, the Medicaid Act 
provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed available to 
the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in 
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that 
"spouses are expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with its plain terms thus is consistent with the 
broader statutory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting 
spousal estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient 
had a legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption 
does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
485 ( 1996) )-even assuming, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the 
context of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative program like Medicaid in 
which the State's program is subject to federal approval. And for similar reasons, 
petitioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly enforces against the 
State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on the acceptance of federal funds under 
Spending Clause legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 ( citing Arlington Cent. 
Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. V. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291,296 (2006)). (emphasis added) 
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in asserting that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 1396(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the 
interpretation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has neither promulgated 
regulations nor issued guidance interpreting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize 
this kind of estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be sure, CMS in 
2007 approved Minnesota's state plan amendment incorporating its statutory 
spousal recovery provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-93a. But CMS' s approval is not 
the equivalent ofbinding interpretive guidance. Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.16(a)(l) (a 
state plan or plan amendment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90 
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval followed binding judicial 
decisions in Minnesota's own courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit 
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at time of death. 
See, e.g., In re Estate o.fGullberg, 652 N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). 
As set forth above in this brief, seep. 9, supra, HHS also interprets the Medicaid 
Act to limit recovery in that manner. ( emphasis added). 
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The Department applies the language in LC. § 56-218 too broadly in 
attempting to recover against assets in which Martha, the Medicaid recipient, has no title 
or interest. Martha conveyed all of her interest in those assets to her husband years ago. 
The Department's effort to broaden the scope ofrecovery allowed under LC.§ 56-218 
violates federal law and is therefore preempted by federal law. This Court should uphold 
the PR's disallowance of the Department's claim in its entirety. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the assets in the Estate of George Perry are assets in which Martha Perry will 
hold a legal title or interest at the time of her death. She holds no such interest now. She 
relinquished any right, title or interest to that property years ago. The Department is applying 
LC.§ 56-218 too broadly in making a claim in this probate, in contravention of federal law. The 
Department's recovery claim in this action seeks to recover against the separate property assets of 
George Perry- assets in which Martha has no title or interest. 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the 
Court uphold her disallowance of the Department's recovery claim against the Estate of George 
Perry. 
,-g_ 
DA TED this 12_ day of November, 2009. 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
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Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs 
County. 
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg. 
Julian J. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amici curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National 
Senior Citizens Law Center. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for amicus curiae 
Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services. 
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane. 
OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estate of Francis E. 
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The 
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, concluding that Dolores Barg's 
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated 
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The County appealed, arguing that it was entitled to 
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim 
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the 
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property. In re Estate of Barg, 722 
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N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
Factual and Procedural Background. 
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was born in 1926, married Francis E. Barg in 
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transactions, th2 Bargs 
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October 
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001, 
she applied for long-term Medicaid benefits.(fnl) 
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their 
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive to DecemlJer 1, 
2001. 
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg as personal 
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg 
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when her dau~Jhter and 
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson de eted 
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no allegation tl1at these 
actions were improper or fraudulent. 
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death, 
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, ancl an IRA 
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's 
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at 
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointly held at some time 
during the couple's 55-year marriage. 
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a 
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowa:ice of 
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the certificates of deposit, 
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The 
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was 
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equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. 
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d 709 
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital 
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law 
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu/Iberg, Dolores 
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The court valued that 
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a recalculation 
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id. 
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on the issue of 
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as 
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of "whether 
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a 
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services to file an amicus curiae brief 
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Elder Law Section of 
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Citizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief ciligned 
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and 
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. 1 and lc-lk (2006), to the authority the County argues exists under 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (2006) and Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects 
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law. 
Statutory Framework. 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who 
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N. W .2d 1, 9 
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id The program is jointly funded with the states as a 
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them 
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). 
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those 
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own 
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer 
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the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements imposed on state plans is that 
they must "comply with the provisions of [42 U.S.C. § 1396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of 
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (2000). 
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estate of Atkinson v. Minn. 
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other 
specified federal assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that 
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id To qualify as medically needy a person 
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. Id If the 
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until 
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value 
within a certain period of time before eligibility, the recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period Ji1andated 
by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2000). This provision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for 
Medicaid by transferring their assets away. 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and 
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c) (2000). But there are several provisions in 
place to protect the community spouse(fnS) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to 
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the 
couple's home is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id § 1396r-5(c)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 
1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets 
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396r-S(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, 
to his or her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to 
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community 
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support. 
Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions. 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid 
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases. 
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute 
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject 
60 
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made, except --
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such 
assistance, from his estate. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b}(l} (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recove1· Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The 
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's 
surviving spouse. Id.§ 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving 
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of "estate." 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) 
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid 
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 
amendments changed section 1396p(b} in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. 
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition 
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and 
the relevant exception read as follows: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
* * * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate* * *. 
Id The amended version of section 1396p(b}(l)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's 
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the 
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only afferthe 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any* * * ." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b}(2) (emphasis added). And like the pre-
1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision 
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the 
scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual --
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as 
defined 
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for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State * * * any other real and personal property and other assets in 
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of 
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part 
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recipient's death. For 
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the decea~.ed joint 
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the 
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint 
tenant. 
Minnesota's Medicaid Recovery Laws. 
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own 
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To 
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a 
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. la (originally enacted as Act of 
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision la provides that, "on 
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, * * * the total 
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the 
[recipient] or the estate of the surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse 
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that 
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." Id., subd. 2 ( emphasis addecl). 
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions la and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments 
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions lc-lk. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of 
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a)(2) (2006); 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common law to provide for 
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of 
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the 
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lg, lh(b), li(a), lj. The 2003 amendments also establish specific 
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures 
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives 
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living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1751, 2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. li and lj). In this case, the County filed its 
claim under subdivisions la and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments. 
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of 
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's claim was 
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu/Iberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value 
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time during the marriage was partially 
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient 
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d 21t 714). 
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that 
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gu/Iberg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery 
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to the 1993 
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that the 1993 
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that 
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had 
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing 
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead. 
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The Estate and its supporting amici curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate, 
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues 
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law 
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and 
subdivision 2 of section 256B. 15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that 
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest 
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in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband 
during her lifetime. 
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, 
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if 
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, 
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage7 Third, if recovery is 
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg 
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the court of appeals 
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she 
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic 
preemption principles. 
I. 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo. 
Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992). 
Congressional purpose is,,. the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks Int'l Assn, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 
U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of 
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause 'start[s] 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Opollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, '>18, 112 
S.Ct. 2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, 
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, 
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal reiiulation 
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state 
regulation." Id. at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress 
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because 
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress 
64 
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt 
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obstaclei to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 
S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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II. 
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against 
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only 
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or 
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law. 
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed require,--
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law 
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
(b)(l), which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipient of the 
benefits. 
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
three specified exceptions: 
( 1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (emphasis added). Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate** *. 
Id.§ 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of 
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's 
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because 
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by 
federal law. 
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and concluded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from 
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't of Pub. Aid, 221 
Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245, 
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute 
never "counter[ed] tt1e initial blanket prohibition" 
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on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246. The Illinois 
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement from the 
recipient's estate after the death of his surviving spouse. Hmes, 302 Ill. Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But insteacl, as 
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows 
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a]II are specifically directed to the estate of 
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add 
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law. 
Id. 
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budney were wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute, 
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the 
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits after age 55, and does not 
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a 
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say 
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that, absent such express limiting 
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b)(l)(B) merely specifies one potential 
source of recovery, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate. 
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) comports far more closely with the interpretation of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision. 
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Indeed, in explaining 
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility 
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse: 
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 years or older at 
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the beneficiary's 
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor 01· 
disabled child. 
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report 
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so 
clearly. 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we 
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a 
surviving 
66 
spouse. The courts reaching this conclusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law 
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For example, the New 
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid 
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against 
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 
1003, 1006 ( 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate 
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy 
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson 
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the 
basis that the Budney court had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the 
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at 
851. The court explained that, under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was from one estate or 
the other: 
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )( 4) extends only to assets in 
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," it is 
a matter of little moment whether the department seeks to recover the benefits paid by filing a claim in 
the estate of the recipient after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse or by filing a claim in the 
surviving spouse's estate. 
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6, 9-10 (1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits could be made from the 
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets 
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law. 
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning 
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts 
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving 
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on 
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there because they 
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's 
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate. 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of 
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. Bucholtz v. Be/she, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Cir.1997); Citizens Actior' League v. 
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Ct. 1524, 108 L.Ed.2d 764 (1990). In toth cases, 
the 
67 
Ninth Circuit addressed whether California's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law. 
The California law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but 
"' against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival."' Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 ( q Joting Cal. 
Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.5 (West Supp.1989)). Thus, California law allowed the state to trace assets of the d2ceased 
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbursement from the recipients of those assets. 
In Kizer the plaintiffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had 
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. at 1005. To determine 
whether California's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the 
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition against recovery with 
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. Id. at 1006. The Ninth Circuit noted 
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federcil statutory 
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. Id. at 1006. The court held that an "ectate" 
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed 
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in Kt:Zerdid 
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim 
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make tre claim 
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse. 
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Circuit again addressed a preemption challenge to 
the same broad California Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of 
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of Joint interests: inter vivos 
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. Id. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle that"' use of the 
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's 
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,"' id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the 
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held in an inter vivos 
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject 
to recovery under the federal law. Id. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in property held in 
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the decedent's estate 
under California law. Id. at 926-27. The Ninth Circuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in 
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could 
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property; "[californ1a] may, however, pursue people who 
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." Id. at 928 (•=mphas1s 
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Circuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recovery from the 
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred 
68 
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property. 
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section 
1396p(b)(l) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim a9ainst that 
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid recipient's estate, 
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we would conclude 
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the 
Illinois court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of state laws is 
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is consistent with both the 
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a surviving spc,use as 
well as with the purposes of the federal legislation.(fn7) These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split 
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate 
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la, to seek 
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted. 
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, and the 
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The 
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in 
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as 
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2. 
III. 
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under 
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at 
any time during the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this 
69 
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal 
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting 
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(1) 
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of 
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal 
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but 
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that 
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have 
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the 
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid 
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under 
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of· estate' in [section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient· had any legal title or inte1·est in at 
the time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov.1, 2006) (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have 
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death). 
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of 
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat.§ 
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time during the 
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And 
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gu/Iberg, the 
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the 
recipient's death."). 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
70 
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an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. Although the North Dakota court: had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson 
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest 
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtzthat any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to 
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. T1e court 
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medicaid 
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living 
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. Wi~ 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional 
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. The court did 
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to recovery from assets 
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied 
in Wktz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is arrangements other 
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" allows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may 
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers 
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a 
"survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes several 
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of 
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used " Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a 
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other 
arrangement" cannot 
71 
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of 
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyEInce to 
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the deceased" 
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the conclusion of the Witt!"court 
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for 
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law 
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wiltz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow 
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits 
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's 
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time during the 
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the ti 1 le of 
her death. 
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IV. 
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest in property at the time of her death that 
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfer of her joint 
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of-
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint 
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis's estate. Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to determine the nature of 
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu/Iberg in deciding that 
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree. 
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property based on its 
understanding that the court in Gu/Iberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer 
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a 
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests 
that have been previously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to include lifetime 
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context require that phrase 
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot 
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agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to 
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest in the property at 
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death. 
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her death that may be 
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals 
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property 
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those 
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the definition of estate 
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by 
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized 
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed 
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those 
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate, 
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time of death, and 
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the 
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have 
expanded the definition of estate to include the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b )( 4). 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No 
other recognizable interest has been identified. 
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legislature's intent 
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at 
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to 
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was 
added to federal law. 
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the 
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's death, 
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis. 
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an 
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no 
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basis for the County's claim against the estate. 
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 256B.15 by extending the definition of 
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to include assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy or life estate at the 
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-2217 
(codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1, 1c-1k). The amendments do not mention the other fo1·ms of 
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with 
respect to joint tenancies. Id. subds. 1(a)(6), lg, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to include two forms of 
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provided in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life 
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death. 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. 1h(b)(2), li(a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by exemptinq from the 
reach of subdivisions le through 1k a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and 
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(a)(6). In 2005, the 
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and 
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. 
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1(c)). 
It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery 
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 amendments to 
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003 
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us. 
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis for the County's 
claim. The new subdivision li specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery 
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 1i(b). That subdivision provides 
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Id., subd. 1(f). If this 
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient, 
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of 
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdivision li. Id., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was 
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003. 
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a 
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a 
legal interest at the time of death, and to 
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the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Ba.-g had no 
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg. 
V. 
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was 
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death, 
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny 
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is 
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest 
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a 
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from 
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled. 
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota 
Statutes§ 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the 
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal 
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal 
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challen9ing only 
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the 
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed 
part of its claim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the distrid: court 
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. Civ.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. 
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly 
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek 
that relief for the first time in this court. 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the 
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a 
Joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment based on the partial 
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this case. 
Footnotes: 
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1396v (2000). 
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 256B.02, subd. 8 (2006). 
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores Barg, $L04,875 
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehicle, and a burial lot. When 
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not 
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5( c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the non recipient spouse, Francis 
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607. 
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents: 
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 05-012; Idaho 
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 06-10. The motion is 
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999. 
FN4. Formerly the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002). 
FNS. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those of the Bargs. 
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer 
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse. 
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly 
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that 
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because 
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the 
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's decision. The County's argum~nts go 
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect 
independent of the specific scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough 
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or 
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our 
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of 
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.1997). 
FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as 
an effort to "protect community spouses from 'pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining 
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 480, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, because the spouse 
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished 
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human 
Servs., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Cir.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow 
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even greater). 
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004). 
FN9. The parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question. 
MN 
N.W.2d 
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QUESTION PRESENTED 
The Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq., gen-
erally forbids participating States from recovering cor-
rectly paid benefits. The statute requires, however, that 
a State seek to recover the cost of nursing home services 
paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 from 
the individual's probate estate, after both the individual 
and her surviving spouse have died. The statute also 
permits (but does not require) a State to recover from 
"any other real and personal property and other assets 
in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includ-
ing such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or oth-
er arrangement." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
The question presented is whether, under Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B), a State that seeks to recover correctly 
paid benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse is limited to recovering the value of assets in 
which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of 
her death. 
(I) 
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LEO Vos, DIRECTOR, MILLE LACS COUNTY, 
MINNESOTA, FAMILY SERVICES AND WELFARE 
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
V. 
MICHAEL F. BARG 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MINNESOTA 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE 
This brief is filed in response to the Court's order 
inviting the Solicitor General to express the views of the 
United States. In the view of the United States, the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
STATEMENT 
1. a. The Medicaid program, established in 1965 in 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 
U.S.C. 1396 et seq., is a cooperative federal-state pro-
gram under which the federal government provides fund~ 
ing to States to provide medical asaistance to eligible 
needy persons. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 
(1980). 
To participate in the Medicaid program, a State must 
develop a plan specifying, among other things, the cate-
gories of individuals who will receive medical assistance 
(1) 
l,OH:1 
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2 
under the plan and the apeclflc kinde of medical care and 
aervicea that will be covered. 42 U .S.C. 1896&. State 
Medicaid plane &n! reviewed by the Cent.en for Medi-
care and Medicaid Services (CMS) (formerly the Health 
Care Financing Admlnlatration) In the Departniant of 
Health and Human ServJceB (HHS). 42 U.S.C. 1896; see 
66 Fed. Reg. 85,487 (2001). If CMS approvea a State'• 
pl~ the State is thereafter eligible for federal reim-
bunement for a specified percentace of the amounts 
"expended • • • ae medical uaiatance under the State 
plan." 42 U.S.C. 1896b(a){l), 1896d{b). 
b. The Medicaid .Act requirea participating States 
to provide Medicaid benet'lta to the .. categorical-
ly needy, .. that ie, those persona elig1ble tor ttnancial aa-
&tat.ance under specifled federal programs. Atkin.a 
v. Ri11ttra., 477 U.S. 164, 157 (1986); see 4.2 U.S.C. 
1896a(a){l0)(A)(l)(IV). (VI) and (VII). 
The Act aleo permit& States to extend benefit.a to 
the "medically needy," that ia, "peraoru, lacking the abil-
ity to pay for medte&I expenses, but with lncomea too 
large to quality for categorical -iatance." Sclw1riJeer v. 
Grag Po.ftlMTtJ, 458 U.S. 34, 87 (1981); see 42 U.S.C. 
1896a(a)(lO)(C). To quality u medically needy, a person 
may have Income no higher than a deftned threshold and 
may own aaseta o! no more than a deftm,d valne. If the 
aueta of a Medicaid applicant eltceed the qualifying 
threshold, ehe muat "apend down .. her asset.a until they 
are at or below the qualifying threshold. See 42 U .S.C. 
1896a(a)(17). 
When a married peraon tis inBtitutiouatized 1n a nun-
ing home or other fac:lllty. the Medicaid A.ct considen the 
aaaeta of both the tnat1tut.tonallzed apouae and the non-
lnetitottonalized, or "community," apooae tn determin-
ing the applicant'• ellgtbWty for beneftte. 42 U .S.C. 
000079
.•. ..., 
8 
1896r-5(c). To prevent the community apouee f'rom beilli: 
impoveriahed ae a reault of a required spend-down or 
aa&eta, the at.atute exempt.a certain aa~ta, auch aa thE1 
couple"s home and an automohil•, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l),, 
1396r-5(c)(6), and &llowe the community spouse to retain. 
a certain level of reeources and income that are not con-
sidered available to pay for the applicant's medical care,. 
4.2 U.S.C. 1896r-6(d) and (t)(2). See Wiaconain Dep't of 
Hsalth & Famil,v Sen,11. v. Blunurr, 584 U.S. 478, 480 
(2002) (anti-impoverishment provisions are Intended to 
"protect COllll1'1unity spouaea from •pauperi~tion' while 
preventing tinanctally aecuN couplee from obtaining 
Medicaid asaiatance"). Furthermore, although the Medi-
caid Act generally forbids a Medicaid applicant or her 
spouse from trand'erring aaaetft at below market value in 
order to become eligible for beneftta, 42 U.S.C. 
1896p(c)(lXA), the atatute expreealy perm1t8 the appli-
cant to tranafer uaeta, including an lntere«it in the home-
stead. t.o the community spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2). 
Once the inatitutionalized spouse le determined to be 
eligible tor beneftta, the atatute provides that "no re-
sources of the community spouse shall be deemed avail-
able to the inatitutionaltzed spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1896r-
6(c)(4). 
c. Aa a general rule, the Medicaid Act forbids Stat.ea 
from seeking recovery ot Medicaid benefit.a that were 
correctly paid. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l); aee also 42 U.S.C. 
1S96a(a)(18). The statute provide• an exception, how-
ever, for recovery from tbe eetAte8 of certain tnstttutton-
alized and older beneftciaries. 
Before 1998. the Medicaid Act•a recovery provision 
permitted. but did not require, States to recover beneflts 
paid on behalf of certain individuals, from the individu-
als' estate.a. 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l)(B) (1988). In 1998, 
000080
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Congress amended Section 1396p to require States to 
recover correctly paid benefits in certain circumstances. 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA 1993), Pub. 
L. No. 103--66, § 13612, 107 Stat. 627. As amended. the 
Act's estate-recovery provi&ion requires States to seek 
recovery in the case of an individual who was perma-
nently institutionalized, 42 U.S.C. 1396p{b)(l){A), and in 
the case of a person who received, at age 55 or thereaf-
ter, nursing facility services, home and community-
based services, or related hospital and prescription drug 
services, 42 U.S.C. 1S96p(b)(l)(B). In addition, a State 
has the option to seek recovery of the cost of other items 
or services paid on behalf of individuals over the age of 
55. Ibid. The recovery "may be made only after the 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any," and 
only at a time when the individual has no surviving chil-
dren under the age of 21 or children who are blind or 
disabled. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov-
ery may be waived in cases where it "would work a.nun-
due hardship." 42 U.S.C. 1396p{b)(3). 
The statute provides for recovery or the cost of bene-
fits paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 
from "the individual's esta~." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l)(B). 
The term "estate," for those purposes, "shall include all 
real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(A). The stat-
ute further provides that an individual's "estate" 
may include. at the option of the State • • • , any 
other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or intereet at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), in-
cluding such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint ten-
6d W\:ft0!0t 600G 9t 'tnf 
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5 
ancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life e5tate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
2. Since 1987, Minnesota law has provided for recov-
ery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of a recipient's 
surviving spouise, as well as from the estate of a recipi-
ent. Act of June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82 (Minn. Stat. 
Ann. § 256B.15 (2007)). Minnesota's estate-recovery law 
provides that "[a] claim against the estate of a surviving 
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, r or medi-
cal assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, is 
limited to the value of the aasets of the estate that were 
marital property or jointly owned property at any time 
during the marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15, subd. 
2 (2007). 
3. In 2004, petitioner filed a claim against the estate 
of Francis Barg, in which he sought recovery of Medicaid 
benefits paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceased 
spouse, Dolores Barg. Pet. App. 4a.1 
a. During their marriage, the Bargs purchased real 
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which they took 
title as joint tenants. In 2001, Ms. Barg entered a nurs-
ing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and re-
ceived, long-term Medicaid benefits. Pet. App. 2a-3a. 
Ms. Barg subsequently transferred her joint tenancy 
interest in the homestead property to Mr. Barg. At the 
time of the transfer, the assessed value of the property 
was $120,800. Ms. Barg also terminated her ownership 
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held 
jointly. Id. at 3a-4a. 
1 On March 2, 2009, this Court granted the State otMinnet0ta's con-
ditional motion to intervene a& a party .Ugned with petitioner Vos. All 
references in this brief to "petitioner" refer to petitioner V OIi. 
000082
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Ma. Barg died ln 2004, having received a total of 
$108,413.53 In medical-assistance benefit.a through the 
state Medicaid program. Mr. Barg died five months 
later. Pet. App. 4a. 
b. In his claim against Mr. Barg"e estate, petitioner 
sought to recover the full amount of Medicaid benefits 
paid on behalf of Ms. Barg. Pet. App. 4a. Respondent, 
who is the representative of Mr. Barg's estate, allowed 
$68,880 ae a claim against the estate, but disallowed 
$44,533.53. Ibid. 1 
Petitioner filed a claim-allowance petition in state 
court. The district court upheld the partial disallowance. 
Pet. App. 46a-51a. The court relied on the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals' decision in In re Eat.ate of Gullberg, 
652 N.W.2d 709 (2002), which held that Minnesota's 
eat.ate-recovery law is preempted Insofar 88 it permit& 
recovery up "to the value of the assets or the estate that 
were marital property" at any point in the marriage, be-
cause 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(B) permits recovery only "to 
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient's interest at the 
time of deat.h. Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714. The court 
concluded that, at time of her death, Ma. Barg's interest 
in the aaaete of Mr. Barg's estate that were marital prop-
erty, including a life-eetate interest in the homestead and 
a personal property allowance, totaled '68,880. Pet. App. 
50a·5la. 
c. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded for recalculation of petitioner's allowable 
claim. Pet. App. 52a-64a. Like the district court, the 
1 Respondent"s partist allowance oC '68,880 apparently rested on 
the premise that Ma. Barg (1) had a one-half 1nt.ereet in the homestead, 
valued at '58,880, at the time of her deatll. deapte the inter viv0& tranll· 
fer, and (2)was entJtJed to a persona.I property allowance In the amount 
of S5()00. See Pet. App. 49a. 
: i,rn.:1 
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court of appeals concluded that, under federal law, the 
claim was necessarily limited to the value of Ms. Barg's 
interest in specified assets at the time of her death. 
Id. at 58a (citing Gullberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). The 
court of appeals concluded, however, that Ms. Barg's 
interest in the homestead at the time of her death was a 
joint tenancy interest. valued as a one-ha1f interest in the 
propertys value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a. 
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner was not 
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Barg's estate. Pet. 
App. la-45a. 
As an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's 
contention that federal law completely preempts Minne-
sota's estate-recovery law insofar as it permits recovery 
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving 
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-30a. The court concluded that 
allowing recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is con-
sistent with both the Act's preclusion of recovery from 
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a 
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2)(A), as well as the 
purposes of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisions. Pet. 
App. 29a. 
The court concluded, however, that federal law limits 
the scope of recovery against a surviving spouse's 
estate to the value of assets in which the recipient spouse 
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempts Minnesota's 
estate-recovery law insofar as it permits the State 
to reach any other assets "that were marital proper-
ty or jointly owned property at any time during the mar-
riage.'' Pet. App. 31a (quoting Minn. Stat. Ann. 
§ 256B.15, subd. 2 (2007)); see id. at 30a-37a. 
"ON 3!0-ld 
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The court further concluded that Ma. Barg did not 
have any lnt.ereat In the bomeatead or bank account.a at 
the time of her death, because she had transferred her 
iDtereet in thoee aeaete to Mr. Bara before she died. The 
court therefore held that petitioner had no tesal entltJe-
ment to eatiefaction of the State'e claim trom thOBe ae- · 
a,et,.,. Pet. App. 87a-48a. But because re•pondent had 
partially allowed petitioner'• claim, and never challenaed 
the district court·• award or that partial allowaace of 
$63,880, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that peti-
tioner could recover that amount. Id.. at 48a-46a. 
DISCUSSION 
The Minneeota Supreme Court'• decision la correct 
and does not warrant further revie-w. The federal 
Medicaid Act permit. recovery ot correctly paid beneftta 
trom the estate of the recipient's 8Urviving spouse, but 
limf~ that recovery to the value of BBSeta in wWch the 
recipient had a lecaJ. intere•t at the time other death. 
Alt.hoagb the """'1t iD th1e cue diffen t'rom t.he reault 
in /n, n /GtJtau <if Wins, 607 N.W .2d 882 (N.D. 2000). the 
difference may not reflect a disagreement about t.be 
meaning of federal Medicaid law, but only divergent con-
clusion• about when, under atate law, an tndtvidual re-
tains a legal interut in aueta conveyed to a spouee. The 
petf tion tor a writ of certiorari ehould be denied. 
A. Th• Decltton 01 'l'b. Mlnneaota SapNDMt Court. le Cor-
r.et 
1. The Minneaota Supreme Court correctly con-
cluded that the Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from 
aeektna to recover correctly paid benetlte trom aaaeta ln 
whfoh the Medicaid recipient had no lecaJ illterest at the 
time of her death. 
~:0t 6002' 9t ·rnr 'ON ::N::»-fd 
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Undt!tr the Medicaid Act, a State generally ma.y not 
Hek to recover correctly paid Medicaid benefit&. 42 
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l). The Act providea, however, that a 
State (1) mu.at seek recovery of nursing home and re-
lated beneftta paid on 'b41ih.it of an individual over t.he age 
of 56 from .. the individual'• estate,. u defined by state 
probate law; and (2) ma11, at tta option, deftne "the indi-
vidual'• m,tate" more broadly to include any ""asaets tn 
which the individual had any legal title or Interest at t.he 
time of death (to the extent of such intereet), including 
euch assets conveyed to a survivor, heir or aaaign of the 
dece&aed individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, aarvtvorahtp, Hfe eatate, living truet. or other 
arrangement." "2 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4)(A) and 
(B). Thu.a, the Medicaid Act, which permit.a recovery 
only after the death of the reetpient'e surviving spouse, 
42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(2), aathorizell a State to file a reim-
bursement claim againat the surviving epouse's estate, 
up to the \ralue of any &Met.A in which the Medicaid recip-
ient had a legal interest at the time of her death. 
The Minneaota eetate--recovery law exceeds the scope 
of that authorization. It permfte the State to recover 
from a survtvtng spouse'A eat.ate "the value of the aaseta 
of the eat.ate that were marital property or Jointly owned 
property at Oft!( tinw during tlu ffl4rria.g•," Minn. Stat. 
Ann. I 266B.16, aubd. 2 (2007) (emphuia added), without 
regard to whether the recipient retained an interest in 
the &&sete at the thne of her death. Because a St.ate rnay 
not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefit.a except to 
the extent authorized by federal law, •ee 42 U.S.C. 
1896p(b)(1), Minnesota's statute conructa with federal 
law and fa therefore preempted. See Califm-n,ia. FtJd. 
Sav. & Loan A.s'n v. Guctrra, 479 U.S. 272. 280-282 
(1987). 
000086
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2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery 
from the estate of the Medkaid recipient's surviving 
spouse, because the Act defines the term "asseta" to in~ 
elude "all income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). Accord-
ing to petitioner, "[b]y including resources of both 'the 
individual' and 'of the individual's spouse' in the meaning 
of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's 
resources fall within the scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 
27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statu-
tory definition of "assets" does encompass resources of 
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and 
"'the individual'& spouise," the particular provision of the 
Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "as-
sets in which the indimdual, had any legal title or inter-
est at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4)(B) (em-
phasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary 
to rewrite that clause to read "'any * * • assets in 
which [either or both the individual, and the individual's 
apouse] had any legal title or interest.'" Pet. 26 (brack-
X. ets and asteriks in original) (emphasis added). But this 
editing does nothing less than make the statute say the 
opposite of what it says. The plain language of the oper-
ative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's reading.3 
• In describing the operation of the amended estat.e-recovery pro-
vision, the legislative history of the 1998 amendments al.so focused on 
the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefit.a, rather 
than the rei.ources of both the individual and his or her ~pou~. See 
H.R. Con!. Rep. No. 218, 103d Cong., 1st Bess. 835 (1993) ("At the 
opt.ion of the State, the estat.e against [which] • • • recovery is MJught 
may include any real or personal property or other assets in which t/w 
'ON 31'-0fd wa:1.:::1 
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds 
little support in the Act's other provisions concerning the 
treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As peti-
tioner notes, the Medicaid Act generally considers the 
community spouse':.'! assets for purposes of determining 
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to re-
ceive benefits. But the Act also exempts certain prop--
erty, such as the couple's home, from consideration. 42 
U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l), 1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the commu-
nity spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and 
income that are not considered available to pay for the 
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (f)(2). 
Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is deter-
mined to be eligible for beneflt.s, the Medicaid Act pro-
vides that "no resources of the community spouse shall 
be deemed available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 
U.S.C. 1396r-5(c)(4). The Medicaid Act. in short, im-
poses significant limitations on petitioner's asserted 
principle that "spouses are expected to support each 
other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accor-
dance with its plain terms thus is consistent with the 
broader statutory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity 
about limiting spousal estate recovery to the value of 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal inter-
est at the time of death, the presumption against pre-
emption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (citing Medtron-
ic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996))-even assum-
ing, arguendo, that this presumption has force in the con-
text of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative pro-
gram like Medicaid in which the State's program is sub-
beneficia:ry had any legal title or interest at the time of death, including 
the home.") (emphasis added). 
"ON :NJHd 
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j ect to r ederal approval. And for similar reasons, peti-
tioner's suggestion that the decision below improperly 
enforces against the State "[a]n ambiguous condition" on 
the acceptance of federal funds under Spending Clause 
legislation lacks any merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arlington 
Cent. Sek. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006)). 
Petitioner also errs (Pet. 20-23, 28 n.8) in a~serting 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) is inconsistent with the interpre-
tation of the responsible federal agency. HHS has nei-
ther promulgated regulations nor issued guidance inter-
preting Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) to authorize the kind of 
estate recovery that petitioner urges in this case. To be 
sure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota's state plan 
amendment incorporating ite statutory spousal recovery 
provisions. See Pet. App. 89a-98a. But CMS's approval 
is not the equivalent of binding interpretive guidance. 
Cf. 42 C.F.R. 430.lG(a)(l) (a state plan or plan amend-
ment is deemed approved if CMS does not act within 90 
days after submission). Moreover, CMS's approval fol-
lowed binding judicial decisions in Minnesota's own 
courts interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at 
time of death. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gullberg, 652 
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As set forth 
above in this brief. see p. 9, 8Up-ra, HHS also interprets 
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner. 
B. The Decision Below Does Not Warrant Further Review 
1. Petitioner contends (Pet. 24-25) that review is 
warranted to resolve a conflict between the decision be-
low and the North Dakota Supreme Court•s decision in 
'ON 3-0Hd 
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Wirtz, 8'1.1:pra.' In Wirtz, much 88 in this case, a Medicaid 
recipient had transferred assets to his spouse before his 
death, and the State sought to reeover the cost of the 
Medicaid benefits from the :spouse's estate after her 
death. The court held that the State was permitted un-
der 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of any 
assets "in which the deceased recipient once held an in-
terest," including assets conveyed to his spouse before 
his death. Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886. 
But the different results in this case and in Wirtz may 
not reflect a disagreement about the meaning off ederal 
Medicaid law. Notably, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court, stated that 
the State "[ could] assert a claim against real or personal 
4 A:, the Minneljot.a Supreme Court noted (Pet. App. 2la-22a), two 
other state court,; have concluded that s.ctlon 1300p(b) authorizes r.,_ 
covery unly from the estate of a Medicaid recipient, and not from the 
estate of his or her spouse. See HiTUJI v. De-po.rtm.ent of Pub. Aid, 850 
N.E.2d 148(Ill.2006);lnreEstateofB1'dnc,y,641 N.W2d 245 (Wie;.Ct. 
App. 1996). But those decisions and the decision below are not in con-
flict. Both Hfl'IU and Budney are consistent with the principle that a 
State may recowr from the estate of a Medicaid recipient's survivin& 
spouse ifit exercises its option under Section 1396p(b)(4XB) to define 
Lhe individual's estate mON broadly than it Is defined l,,lllder state pro-
bate law. See Hitl.68, 850 N.E.2d at 153-154 (explaining that the stat.e 
legislaw.re could have defined the recipient's estate in such a way u to 
provide for recovery of certain asset.a from the estate oflm survivin1 
spouse, but had chosen not to do »o); Budn.ey, 541 N.W.2d at246 & 
n.2 (holding that a state statute authorizing .fu.1.1 recovery from a 8111"-
viving spouse's eat.ate exceeded the State's authority under 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b), without considerini whether it would have been permissible 
for the State to recover from the surviving spouse's estate the value of 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death). Re-
spondent here, in any event, does not challenge the Minnesota Supreme 
Court's conclusion that a State is pennitted to recover from the estate 
of a surviving spouse in some circumstances. See Br. in Opp. 6, 8-9, 19. 
'ON 3-IOHd 
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property, and other assets in which [the recipient] had 
any legal Litle or other interest at his death." Wirtz, 607 
N .W.2d at 885 (emphasis added); see also ibid. ("Our 
inquiry • * • is • • "' whether [the recipient] had 
'real and personal property and other assetis in which 
[he] had any legal title or interest at the time of death.") 
(emphasis added). Although its reasoning is not entirely 
clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to conclude that the 
recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of cer-
tain assets before death, retained an interest in the rele-
vant property until his death, when the interest was con-
veyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The 
court did not elaborate on the nature of that interest, 
although it referred to the State's argument that 
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable inter-
est" in the assets at the time of his death, id. at 883, and 
noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach state·law community-property 
and homestead interests, id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court and the court below on similar facts thus 
may reflect not conflicting interpretations of federal 
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under 
state law, a spouse retains a legal interest in property 
conveyed to his or her spouse. Compare Wirtz, 607 
N.W.2d at 885-886, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (concluding 
that, after Ms. Barg transferred her interest in the 
homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a legal 
interest that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon 
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law 
"makes no reference to • • • re-defining the probate 
estate to include all marital property, even property 
transferred prior to death"). 
'ON 3NOHd 
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Even if the decisions in Wirtz and this case do reflect 
a disagreement as to proper interpretation of the Medi-
caid Act, this Court's review would not be warranted. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of federal 
law is correct, and to date, only the North Dakota Su-
preme Court has allowed Medicaid recovery following an 
inter vivos transfer of Msete between spouses. Assum-
ing arguendo that t.he North Dakota Supreme Court mis-
understood federal Medicaid law, rather than simply 
applied a peculiar feature of its own property law, the 
North Dakota court has not had an opportunity to con-
sider HHS's interpretation, and the conflict may work 
itself out as the issue is further addressed in the lower 
courts. 
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-33) is correct that 
estate-recovery efforts are important to the Medicaid 
program, questions concerning the scope of the Act's 
estate-recovery provisions have not arisen frequently, 
and relatively few States have opted to seek estate recov-
ery to the maximum extent permitted by federal law. 
See Office of Assistant Secretary for Policy & Evalua-
tion, HHS, Policy Br. No. (J, Medicaid Estate Recovery 
Collection8 tbl. 4 (Sept. 2005) (only nine States make 
maximum use of federal policy options); see also Pet. 81. 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits 
estate recovery to those assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, the 
nature and extent of such interests remain largely the 
domain of state law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has 
proposed redefining marital property interests to permit 
recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's 
Recommendation, Minnesota State Budget, 1010-11 Bi-
ennial Budget, Human Senri.ces Dep't 132 (Jan. 27, 
"ON 3tO-ld 
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2009). That. proposal has not become law, nor has it been 
reviewed by the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, how-
ever, suggests that Minnesota may be able to work to-
ward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear 
terms of federal Medicaid law. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
: SS. 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. 
McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND WELFARE'S PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM 
BARBARA K. McCORMICK, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the duly appointed Personal Representative of the above entitled estate and the 
daughter of decedent, George D. Perry ("George"). I make this affidavit based on my 
personal knowledge. 
2. On July 31, 2006, Martha Jean Perry, George's spouse (hereinafter "Martha"), and my 
long-time step-mother, conveyed all of her right, title and interest in the couple's home 
AFFIDAVIT OF BARBARA K. McCORMICK IN SUPPORT OF 
OBJECTION TO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE'S 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 1 
File #09-039 
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located at 2104 Tendoy Drive, Boise, Idaho via quit claim deed to her husband, George 
Perry. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit A is a true and 
correct copy of the Quitclaim Deed in which Martha quitclaimed all of her right, title and 
interest in that real property to George. 
3. As of October 1, 2006, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare ("Department") 
approved Martha for Medicaid benefits. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Department notice of approval for 
Medicaid. 
4. Martha's health care needs have progressively increased over the years and she now lives 
in a skilled nursing facility. From October, 2006, Martha has continued to receive 
Medicaid benefits and she receives those benefits today. 
5. Over the years, George's health situation also progressively declined. He ultimately was 
forced to enter into a nursing home after a long-struggle to remain home. By this time he 
had exhausted his liquid resources and decided to sell his home because he would be 
unable to maintain it, even if qualified for Medicaid benefits. In an effort to sell the 
home, he provided the Department with written verification documenting the fair market 
value of the home and the Department agreed that the proposed sale price of $150,000 
was fair market value. A true and correct copy of the December 16, 2008 letter from the 
Department agreeing that $150,000 was the fair market value of the property is attached 
hereto and incorporated herein as Exhibit C. 
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6. Unfortunately, delays in receiving response from the Department caused the buyer who 
had wanted to purchase the property to back out of that transaction. The home remained 
on the market. George Perry died in a nursing home on February 25, 2009, before he 
could complete the sale of the home with a new buyer who had by that time agreed to 
purchase the home. 
7. The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry consummated the sale of 
the home on March 26, 2008, for a total sales price of $160,000. A true and correct copy 
of the settlement statement on that closing is attached hereto and incorporated herein as 
Exhibit D. 
8. The balance of the house sale proceeds, minus disbursements for administrative costs, is 
now held in the Estate's checking account. Attached hereto and incorporated herein by 
reference as Exhibit Eis a true and correct copy of the Personal Representative's 
inventory of the Estate. The proceeds from the sale of George Perry's home are the only 
assets that are contained in the George's Estate. The Inventory makes clear that all estate 
assets were George Perry's separate property. The Department failed to make any 
objection to the PR's Inventory. George's personal property was of de minimus value and 
was given to charity prior to his death when he moved to the nursing home. The Estate of 
George D. Perry holds no other real or personal property. 
9. I handle Martha's finances for her. The only property that Martha Jean Perry currently 
owns is one financial account located at Wells Fargo, checking account# ending -3540. 
This account is an income-qualifying or "Miller" trust account that was necessary to 
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qualify Martha for Medicaid. Martha's fixed monthly income (social security and 
pension) is direct deposited into this account every month. Funds are then paid out of this 
account in the same month for Martha's Medicaid patient share of cost, for her health 
insurance premium and for her personal needs allowance. This account holds less than 
$2,000 at the end of each month after the above amounts are paid out every month. 
Attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference as Exhibit F is a true and correct 
copy of a letter from Paula Guenat, Premier Banker at Wells Fargo, establishing that as of 
9/9/09, this account had a balance of$1,682.96. Martha owns no other real or personal 
property. 
10. The Personal Representative stipulates and agrees that upon Martha Jean Perry's death, 
any amounts left in Wells Fargo checking account# ending -3540 are owed to and will be 
paid to the Department pursuant to its right to recover for Medicaid assistance paid out 
during her lifetime against assets in which Martha had an interest at her death. Aside 
from the funds in this Wells Fargo checking account, Martha does not own any interest in 
any other property. No other property could possibly pass from Martha to George Perry's 
Estate or to any other individual upon Martha's death because she doesn't own or have 
any interest in any other property. 
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FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this 2o'day of NdVcA-tfi-t'.1/- , 2009. 
,,1 JJJ~ I{ ~t {~>d-~ 
BARBARA K. McCORMIC 
SUBSCRI~ED ~ND SWORN TO before me this~y of 
J,./(Jlle.,u, bei/ , 2009. / 
,,,,,, ........ ___ ( II 
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Notary Public for Idaho /.L 
Residing at: ,Vf/?'U/l /'I -
My commission expires: '7- r f,, ~l/ 
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ADA COUNTY flECCROF~ J. DAVID NAVAMO llMUUNI J.UU 
BOISE IDAHO 071lf /tr. '8 PM 
~::E~~:E~:Jr~ Ill lllllllllllllllllllll!IJIIIII IEI 
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QUITCLAIM . DEED 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, M-ft":. Tilt!: ~ fl~ . Granter, does 
hereby convey, release, remlse and forever quitclaim unto 
G ~oR..a at, l> I ~rVJ . whose address is 
a.Jo 4 -~ E>,y PA fkr~L x:A ~a?Cth~_fullowing 
described premises. to-wit: 
./Cr-1 Y- -J f $: o ~ . ci, L. f.,J h'( /J ~,S JJ~ ;f' c., ./3 {) t ~ I :r t'tn.,,-lt.:Ja ,fj.._ 
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A 1U:1 ~" ~/= ·l"I-IJri. CJ.a.u 11.,)7-1,'1 ~A, · ' 
__________________ __, ______ county. 
Together with the appurtenances. 
This deed Is Intended to convey to the Grantee all right, title, and interest of the Granter 
in and to said property, now owned or hereafter acquired. 
~ . 
Date {--8/ .... ~ k , 20_. 
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-Guy A Henry 
823 Park Centre 
Nampa Id 8365 l DAHO DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH & WEI.1FARE 
We provide interpreter services at no cost. If you need help reading this letter, please call us at 1-866-262-8640. After your call is 
answered, please wait on the line while you are connected with a translator. 
Nosotros proveemos los servicios de un interprete, sin costo alguno. Si necesita ayuda leyendo esta carta por favor llamenos al 
l-866-262-8640. Cuando contesten su Hamada, favor de esperar un momento en la linea mientras le conectan con un traductor 
Martha J Perry November 24, 2006 
C/0 Sisson/Sisson 
605 E Highland View 
Boise ID 83702 Case Number 714828 
Important Information About 
Your Health Coverage 
Your Health Coverage for Martha Perry is approved starting the first of 
October 2006. 
Home and Conwnuni ty-Based Services (HCBS) for Martha Perry are appr,oved 
starting October 2006. 
You may need to pay part of the cost of your care. You will get a separate 
letter from our Regional Medicaid Unit with the payment information. 
If you don't agree with this decision about your application or case, 
please call me. We can review the facts used to make this decision 
together or you may ask for a hearing. In a hearing you and I tell a 
neutral person from outside Health and Welfare, called a hearing officer, 
about your case. This person will decide if the Department action on your 
case was correct. 
You may ask for a hearing in writing or by calling me. If you make a 
hearing request in writing you may make a copy for your records. You may 
use a hearing request form from our office or just write on a piece of 
paper why you want a hearing. Then mail, fax, or bring your request to my 
office. 
If you would like a hearing, you must make your request by December 24, 
2006. 
Guy Henry 
208-465-8444 (phone) 208-442-2810 (fax) 
HenryG@idhw.state.id.us 
Case Manager: Guy Henry Caseload: 55 Case: 714828 Field Office: 3214 1 
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We based your Health Coverage on the following facts. 
Your family size is ......... . 
Monthly Income: 
Social Security, pension and money from 
Money from work ........... . 
Total money for month ........ . 
Limit for your household size .... . 
Monthly Deductions: 
Money from work not counted ..... 
Money from other sources not counted. 
Countable Assets: 
other sources 
Such as cash, bank accounts, investments & vehicles 
Limit for your household. . ........ . 
More Information About Your Health Coverage 
1 
$1,396.77 
$0.00 
$1,396.77 
$1,056.00 
$0.00 
$20.00 
$0.00 
$2,000.00 
The first time we approve Heal th Coverage, we send each eligible p,erson a 
Idaho Health Coverage card. If you haven't already received a card, one 
will arrive in about 10 days. 
Keep your card in a safe place. If your card is lost or stolen please call 
me for a replacement. 
Always take your card with you when you get health care services. 
We do not discriminate on the basis of: 
» Age » Color » Disability 
» Religion » Race » National Origin 
» Gender 
If you believe you have been discriminated against, you can file a 
complaint at your local Health and Welfare office or at either of the 
offices listed below: 
» Civil Rights Manager 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
Case Manager: Guy Henry 
» Dept of Health and Human Services 
Region X 
Mail Stop RX-11 
2201 6th Ave 
Seattle, WA 98121 
Caseload: 55 Case: 714828 Field Office: 3214 
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I DA H 0 DEPARTMENT OF 
RECEIVED 
DEC l u 2008 
HEALTH & WELFARE 
C.L. "BUTCH" omR. GovERNOA 
RICHARD 'tj@~ffi~I.- ~.r°10()8 
Sisson & Sisson 
2402 West Jefferson St 
Boise ID 83702 
RE: George E. Perry MID# I 525875 and Martha J. Perry MID# 1525874 
Dear Mr. Sisson, 
DIVISION OF MEDICAID 
BUREAU OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
PHONE 208-287-1150 
FAX 208-334-6515 
The Department acknowledges the proposal for the property owned by Martha and 
George Perry at 2104 W Tendoy Drive, Boise ID. Upon reviewing the documentation 
you provided, and the current market, the Department agrees that the proposed sale price 
of$ 150,000 is fair market value. Please inform me who the title company will be, as the 
department will need to review the preliminary HUD 1 Settlement Statement prior to the 
closing. 
I will need to know what your client's intent is for the proceeds. Will they be using it to 
pay privately for the skilled nursing and or nursing home fees? They may only use it for 
their care and not gift any away. Your prompt response is appreciated. 
We thank you for your cooperation and continued communication with the department. 
If you have questions or need any assistance, please feel free to call me. 
{~~ 
Estate Recovery Otlicer 
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""' TITLEONE CORPORATION ..._,, 
1101 W. River St. 
Boise, ID 83702 (208)424-8511 
STATEMENT OF SETTLEMENT FOR SELLERS 
PROPERTY ADDRESS: 2104 W. Tendoy Drive, Boise, ID 83705 
PURCHASER/BORROWER(S): Karyl Hayden 
SELLER(S): Martha Jean Boyle and Estate of George Donald Perry 
SETTLEMENT DATE: March 26, 2009 DISBURSED: March 27, 2009 PRORATION DATE:March 27, 2009 
DEBIT CRECIIT 
Contract Sales Price 160,000.00 
Prorata Sewer & Trash 03/01/09 thru 04/30/09 $ 57.30 32.88 
Payoff of first mortgage Wells Fargo 66,574.75 
2nd half2008 Taxes Ada County Treasurer 861.56 
County Taxes 01/01/09 to 03/27/09 251.12 
Commissions - Total commissions: to 6.0000 9,600.00 9,600.00 
Less Deposit Retained 1,000.00 
4,800.00 Grouo One 
4,800.00 Swope Investment Properties 
Settlement or Closing Fee TitleOne Corporation 262.50 
Title Insurance Premium Westcor Land Title Insurance Company 785.00 
Recording Fees TitleOne Corporation 9.00 
Subtotals 78,343.93 160,032.88 
Balance Due TO Seller 81,688.95 
TOTALS 160,032.88 160,032.88 
The above figures do not include sales or use taxes on personal property 
APPROVED and ACCEPTED 
SELLER(S): ESCR?jV A~GN . _ ~ / 
h)e4/¼_ ~~ ~'1a,.,6&4~7J1/~~ ~ kt_ C,4fL/c} 
Martb1'Jean B~ ~oil-~...,,;,.. d'ac;[itleOne Cor~ / 
Estate of George Donald Perry 
BYJ?0--tA'k<£ ,!I Y11 r~., 
~_,/~. 
{A0982008. PFD/A0982008/21) 
000107
Exhibit E: 
000108
Schedule A - Real Estate 
Schedule B - Cash/Investments 
90-DAY INVENTORY OF PROPERTY OF 
GEORGE D. PERRY, Deceased 
Date of Death: February 25, 2009 
RECAPITULATION 
Community Property Separate Property 
$ $ 
$ $ 81,788 96 
Schedule C - Miscellaneous Other Property 
Schedule D - Expenses/Costs paid since D.O.D. 
$ $ 
$ $ (4,693.04) 
TOTAL NET VALUE 
Description 
Totals 
$ 
SCHEDULE A- REAL ESTATE 
$ 77,095 92 
Community Property Separate Property 
$ 
$ 
SCHEDULE B - CASH 
$ 
Community Property Separate Property 
Estate checking w/Wells Fargo $ $ 81,788.96 
Totals $ $ 81,788.96 
SCHEDULE C -OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PROPERTY 
Community Property Separate Property 
$ $ 
Totals $ $ 
SCHEDULE D - EXPENSES/COSTS PAID SINCE D.O.D. 
Amount 
Publication fee $ (100.04) 
Attorney's fees $ (4,500.00) 
Filing fee $ (£13.00) 
Totals $ ~4,6S13.04) 
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Date 09 t 09 12009 
To: Barbara McCormick 
FBO Martha J Perry 
2525 N Joretta Dr 
Boise, ID 83704 
us 
Regarding Customer: 
Martha J Perry 
2525 N Joretta Dr 
Boise, ID 83704 
us 
To Whom It May Concern: 
This letter is verification that the customer named above has an account with Wells Fargo. This account, number 
2578173540, was opened 01/14/2009 and has a current balance of $1682.96. 
If you need deposit information, refer to the customer named above. The account holder can provide deposit 
information from their monthly statements. 
Please call the Wells Fargo Customer Service location at 1-800-869-3557 (1-800-TO-WELLS) if you h;!lve any 
questions. We hope that this information is useful. 
Sincerely, (/ 
--=Rl~DwnJ 
Paula Guenat 
Premier Banker 
TQOM120699 
LIL d 22 << 02SS-8££-802 £L~90nV 06JB~ s11aM OL=9L 60-60-6002 
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LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE T. GOODENOUGH 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Human Services Division 
W. COREY CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
Human Services Division 
3276 Elder, Ste. B 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0036 
Telephone: (208) 332-7961 
ISB No. 3361 
[ cartwriw@dhw.idaho.gov] 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
By PATRICIA A DWONCH 
DEPUT"V 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF 
CLAIM 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter the 
"Department") and submits the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of its 
Petition for Allowance of Claim: 
I. 
ISSUES AND SUMMARY 
The personal representative has filed her "Memorandum in Support of the Personal 
Representative's Objection to Department of Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of 
Claim" (hereinafter "PR Brief') which argues, in essence, that the spousal recovery provisions in 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
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Idaho Code § 56-218(1) are invalid and pre-empted by federal law. This argument relies 
primarily on the reasoning found in a Minnesota Supreme Court case, In re Estate of Barg, 752 
N.W.2d 52 (2008), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Minnesota's spousal 
recovery law was partially preempted by federal Medicaid law. 
The personal representative's reliance on Barg, however, is misplaced. Whether a 
spouse's estate is subject to recovery is a question of state marital property and probate law. The 
Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this exact issue in the case ofldaho Department of 
Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) (copyprovided)1, and held 
that Idaho law permits spousal recovery where the property had been owned by the Medicaid 
recipient or jointly owned after October I, 1993. Because each Supreme Court was interpreting 
its own state's law, Barg is not necessarily inconsistent with Jackman, but if it is, Jackman 
controls in Idaho, not Barg. 
Jackman is dispositive in this case. Even if it were not, however, the real property in this 
estate was jointly held at the time of the decedent's death because the decedent's attempted 
transfer of the property to himself, using his power of attorney, was improper and invalid. 
Therefore, even the Barg decision does not support the disallowance of the Department's es.tate 
recovery claim. 
1Copies of relevant cases have been provided together with the exhibits as a convenience to court and counsel. 
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II. 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
George D. Perry ("George") was born 
age of 79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born 
, and died February 25, 2009, at the 
, and at the time of this 
memorandum is still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no later 
than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real 
property in Ada County. Exhibit A. At some point in time later, Martha and George were 
married. On November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as 
"Martha Jean Boyle" and the grantee as ''Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." Exhibit B. 
At some point, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying 
for Martha's care. About September 15, 2006, they applied for medical assistance, also known 
as Medicaid, to help pay for Martha's care. Martha was determined to be eligible for Medicaid 
beginning October 1, 2006. Since that date, the Department has provided payment for Martha's 
care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least $108,364.23. 2 
About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to 
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. See 
Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. As stated earlier, George died February 25, 
2009. On March 19, 2009, Barbara McCormick was appointed personal representative for 
George's estate and on March 26, 2009, Barbara McCormick executed a Deed of Distribution 
conveying the real property to one Karyl Hayden. Exhibit C. The inventory does not reflect the 
2This was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing. 
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real property, but shows "Cash/Investments" in the sum of $81,788.96, which are the net 
proceeds of the sale of the real property.3 On April 8, 2009, a Medicaid lien was filed with the 
Secretary of State's Office securing the Department's interest in George's estate. 
A Notice to Creditors was published April 8, 2009. About April 15, 2009, the 
Department filed its Claim Against Estate in the sum of$106,251.08. The Department's claim 
was presented as a contingent claim and stated as follows: 
IMPORT ANT: This claim is made in accordance with the Department's 
right to establish its claim pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-218. As long as the 
decedent's spouse survives, there is no demand for payment of this claim. This 
claim is made against any property or estate which, at any time, had been the 
community property of the decedent and decedent's spouse, or which had been the 
property of decedent's spouse. The Department will not object to distribution of 
the estate to the decedent's surviving spouse. However, the Department demands 
that, before any other distribution of the estate, adequate provision be made for the 
future payment of the Department's claim pursuant to Idaho Code§ 
15-3-81 0(b)(2). Transfers of property by either spouse (except to one another), 
including transfers by will and the failure to claim probate allowances, may affect 
the eligibility of the survivor for Medicaid services, and may be set aside in 
accordance with Idaho Code§ 56-218(2). 
About June 2, 2009, the personal representative filed a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim. On 
June 15, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
3The personal representative suggests that the Department has somehow agreed with her characterization of the 
estate property as separate property because "the Department failed to make any objection to the PR's Inventory." PR 
Brief, p. 3, 'I[ 7. While it makes no legal difference, the Department notes that there is nothing in the probate code that 
requires the Department to object to errors in the inventory. Therefore, there was no "failure" on the part of the 
Department and the Department has neither acquiesced or agreed to anything by not objecting to the Inventory. 
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A. 
III. 
THIS IS AN ORDINARY SPOUSAL RECOVERY CASE OF 
THE TYPE ANTICIPATED BY IDAHO CODE§ 56-218. 
Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept. 
While the statutes and rules governing estate recovery can be complicated, the concept of 
estate recovery is actually quite simple: 
Nursing home care has become astonishingly costly. Medicaid assists elderly couples in 
paying for nursing home care. Medicaid is the payer of last resort. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is 
not an insurance program; there are no premiums or payroll deductions. Medicaid is a public 
welfare program paid for with general fund monies from both the state and federal governments. 
Normally, a person must have exhausted their own resources before becoming eligible for 
Medicaid. A single person can have no more than $2,000 in available resources to qualify. 
When one spouse of a couple needs assistance, the healthy spouse, who will stay at home, needs 
the home, the car, and money, just to survive in the community. The Medicaid spouse is allowed 
to transfer assets to the non-Medicaid spouse to provide for his needs. 
When both spouses have passed away, the couple's assets are recovered to repay 
Medicaid, up to the amount Medicaid has paid. Medicaid assists the needy elderly. It is not 
intended to preserve an inheritance for the able-bodied heirs of Medicaid recipients. 
B. This Is an Ordinary Case Falling Squarely Within Idaho Code§ 56-218(1). 
The personal representative suggests this is an "as applied" challenge to Idaho law, as if it 
is not the law itself she attacks, but merely the "Department's application of' the law.4 Make no 
4PR Brief, pp. 4, 5, 13, 19. 
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mistake, however, her attack goes to the very core of spousal recovery in Idaho and would 
eviscerate Idaho's estate recovery law. The system is designed to assure the couple's assets are 
available for their needs and permits them to freely transfer property between themselves to 
accomplish that. If recovery were not possible from assets conveyed to the spouse for his needs, 
the only spousal recovery that would be made would be from people too ill-informed to hire an 
elder law attorney to help them transfer their assets. 
Where a single individual is on Medicaid, recovery is simple: When that person dies, the 
state recovers from the assets of her estate. When the nursing home spouse dies first, she 
normally has so little, her property simply passes to her surviving spouse and the state waits. for 
the second death, the death of the surviving spouse, and recovers from the estate of that spouse. 
When, however, the non-Medicaid spouse dies first, as in this case, there are three possibilities: 
(1) If the couple's assets pass by law to the Medicaid spouse, the state merely waits for 
the death of the Medicaid spouse and can recover from the resulting joint probate; 
(2) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the property passes to the 
Medicaid spouse, the Department must file a claim, but will defer recovery and will recover from 
the remaining estate of the Medicaid spouse; 
(3) If probate is opened for the non-Medicaid spouse, and the couple's property is to pass 
to third parties, the Department must file a claim and the estate must provide for the 
Department's future recovery of Medicaid payments. 
This is the process created by Idaho Code § 56-218(1 ): 
( 1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law 
medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
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was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the 
spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
(a) There shall be no adjustment or recovery until after the death of both 
the individual and the spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual has 
no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. 
(b) While one ( 1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be 
authorized pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under 
this section may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(c) The claim against the estate of the first deceased spouse must be made 
within the time provided by section 15-3-801(b), Idaho Code, if the estate is 
administered and actual notice is given to the director as required by subsection 
(5) of this section. However, if there is no administration of the estate of the first 
deceased spouse, or if no actual notice is given to the director as required by 
subsection (5) of this section, no claim shall be required until the time provided 
for creditor claims in the estate of the survivor. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added). 
The Department's claim in cases like this falls under Idaho Code § 15-3-810 and requires 
that, before assets are passed to third parties (not the spouse), arrangements are made for the 
future payment of the Department's claim: 
15-3-810. Claims not due and contingent or unliquidated claims. 
( a) If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or 
unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate, 
and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is paid in the 
same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same class. 
(b) In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal 
representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the court 
may provide for payment as follows: 
(1) if the claimant consents, he may be paid the present or agreed value of 
the claim, taking any uncertainty into account; 
(2) arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening 
of the contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a trust, giving a 
mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise. 
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Idaho Code § 15-3-810 (underline added). The contingency, of course, is the death of the 
Medicaid spouse. 
In this case, the entire estate is traceable to property Martha, the Medicaid spouse, owned 
at the time she married George. By rule, the Department makes its recovery only from property 
in which the Medicaid spouse had an interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 
provides, in part: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * * A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to 
the value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate 
property, and jointly owned property .... 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20. Therefore, if George had had separate property, that had always been 
retained as his separate property, the Department would not recover from that property for 
Medicaid paid for Martha. 
IV. 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT HAS ALREADY 
REJECTED THE PRE-EMPTION ARGUMENT MADE 
HERE. 
The personal representative makes the simplistic argument that federal law only permits 
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient. She argues that since Martha transferred her 
property to George before George died, and George carefully disinherited Martha in his will, 
Martha must now be left destitute on public assistance, and the heirs named in the will should 
share the estate assets free from any claim for Medicaid reimbursement. Obviously, this is not 
what the legislature intended and is contrary to the simple principle of Medicaid recovery. 
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Congress and the legislature intended to assist the Medicaid spouse and protect the non-Medicaid 
spouse. They did not intend to spend taxpayer money paying for Martha's care so George's heirs 
could have Martha's property. Were the drafters of the Medicaid recovery laws so shortsighted? 
No. The Idaho Supreme Court has already considered this question and has upheld estate 
recovery in cases such as this. 
A. The Federal Pre-emption Issue Was Thoroughly Presented to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
the Case ofldaho De,partment of Health and Welfare v. Jackman. 
In the case ofldaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaiid 
spouse. In the Jackman case the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all her property to her 
spouse, Lionel, in order to qualify for Medicaid. Hildor passed away and Lionel passed away 
two weeks later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the 
Department filed an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the 
Department's claim on numerous grounds including federal pre-emption. Exhibit D.5 The Idaho 
Supreme Court upheld Idaho's spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of 
estate permitted by federal law6 and adopted by Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b), together with the 
definition of assets found at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l), validated recovery of property that had, at 
any time after October 1, 1993, been community property. 
5So that the court can see how completely the pre-emption argument was made to the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Jackman, the Department has provided copies of the briefing in the Jackman case as Exhibit D hereto. The same 
argument the personal representative makes here was made by Jackman. See Respondent's Brief (Oct. 8, 1997), St:ction 
IV, p. 16. 
642 u.s.c. § 1396p(b){4)(B). 
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The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decided. Th,~ 
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It 
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on 
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the 
Department. Exhibit E. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision 
because the effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion 
was after the date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that 
recovery would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date 
of the federal law, "OBRA 93."7 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the 
federal pre-emption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided 
by a marriage settlement agreement in April, 1993, prior to the effective date of the law. 
The published summary of the case correctly captures this two part holding: 
... The Supreme Court, Johnson, J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual 
who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of the 
assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from the estate of the 
surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in effect when recipient and her husband 
entered into marital settlement agreement transmuting most ofrecipient's and 
husband's community property into separate property of husband, limited the 
Department to recovering any community property recipient and husband may 
have accumulated after the agreement. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 213, 970 P.2d at 6 (underline added). Justice Johnson's introduction also 
explains the court's holding: 
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that section 56-218(1) of 
the Idaho Code (LC.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, authorized the 
7This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 cited above, limiting spousal recovery to property that 
had been community property at any time after October 1, 1993. 
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Idaho Department of Health and Welfare {the Department) to recover from the 
available estate of a surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments received 
by an individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the 
payments if the individual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. We 
conclude, however, that federal law applicable to this case prohibited this 
recovery, except from any community property the spouses may have accumulated 
after a marriage settlement agreement transmuting their community property into 
separate property of each. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 214, 970 P.2d at 7 (underline added). Justice Johnson explained that the 
Department was limited in the Jackman case only because the marriage settlement agreement 
was executed before the effective date of the federal law expanding the definition of estate for 
Medicaid recovery purposes: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8. 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{e){l). "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate. as defined by LC. § 15-1-201{15). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). 
To understand the breadth of the Jackman decision and why it necessarily applies in this 
case, it is valuable to understand that the Supreme Court's reasoning is based on the interaction 
between Idaho marital law and federal Medicaid law. As discussed more fully in section V, 
below, what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state law, not federal law. 
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Idaho Code§ 56-218(4)(b) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) provided the expanded definition of 
estate. Then, importantly, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1)8 provided as follows: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to 
but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (underline added). Therefore, where a spouse divests herself of assets, 
even where permitted by Medicaid law, those assets are estate assets for purposes of Medicaid 
recovery. 
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the 
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of the OBRA '93 which 
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l).9 The court remanded 
the matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their 
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the 
property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the 
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRA '93. 
8Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) (the numbering was changed after DRA 2005). 
9See Exhibit D Jackman Respondent's Rehearing Brief, p. 28. 
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Therefore, the Jackman case conclusively holds that in Idaho, the Department may 
recover from the estate of the spouse as long as the property had been community property, 
jointly owned property, or the property of the Medicaid spouse, at any time after October 1, 1993. 
V. 
THE DECISION IN BARG DOES NOT CHANGE 
JACKMAN. 
The personal representative bases her claim of preemption on a Minnesota case, In r,~ 
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed 
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, 
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting 
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent. 
A. The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)10 significant in 
their analysis. The original decision stated the following: 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as 
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and 
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); LC.§ 
56-218(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and 
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not 
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's 
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the 
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
1°Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l). 
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of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the 
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jackman's 
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and 
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Department from recovering the balance 
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit E) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court 
did not retreat from their original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement 
was executed before the "assets" definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B) came into effect: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8. 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10. 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
defmition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part ofHildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't 
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § l 396p( e)(l ). In fact, by necessary implication, it 
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l) the transferred 
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg. did not even consider the effect of this important 
definition of "assets." Therefore, the Barg court didn't even consider or discuss the section of 
federal law the Idaho Supreme Court found dispositive in Jackman. 
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B. The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding. 
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to 
other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 
(N.D. 2000) ( copy provided). It is understandable, then, that Minnesota has already amended its 
state law to overcome the holding of its supreme court in Barg. Exhibit F is a copy of changes 
made to Minnesota law in 2009 for the express purpose of fixing the Barg decision. This 
legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets 
jointly owned at any time during marriage, even when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the 
non-Medicaid spouse. See Exhibit F, Subd. 2b. This is exactly the effect of the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Jackman. 
Obviously, if Minnesota can correct Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not 
federal law,per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. 
The personal representative here cites, with approval, the Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari. 11 In that brief, the Solicitor General 
argues that Supreme Court review is unnecessary because Minnesota is in the process of fix:tng 
the Barg decision through new legislation. In doing so, the Solicitor General recognizes that 
what property is available for estate recovery is a question of state, not federal, law: 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to 
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her 
11The personal representative claims, without any authority whatsoever, that "Idaho is legally obligated to abide 
by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law." PR Brief, pp. 18-19. She goes on to suggest that Idaho must 
follow the legal arguments of the Solicitor General in its Amicus brief in Barg. Id. This is not true. Idaho is bound by 
federal law and appropriately promulgated rules, not by legal arguments by federal government attorneys. 
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death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state 
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property 
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation, 
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132 
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by 
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal. however. suggests that Minnesota may be 
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear terms of 
federal Medicaid law. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16 
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). Therefore, the Solicitor General clearly recognized 
that state law, not federal Medicaid law, determines what property is available for Medicaid 
recovery. 
The Solicitor General, in its Amicus brief also discussed the North Dakota Wirtz case, 
and noted that the contrary holding in Wirtz could simply be a difference in state law, and not 
necessarily a conflict with Barg: 
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to 
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of certain 
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death, 
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangement." 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on 
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the 
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of 
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b )( 4)(8) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests, 
id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the 
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of 
federal Medicaid law. but only different views of when. under state law. a spouse 
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14 
(underline added) (Appendix 2 to PR Brief). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM - 16 Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd 
000127
Like the North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held 
that Idaho's law permits recovery under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not 
necessarily inconsistent with Barg. The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and 
has already been corrected by a change in Minnesota law. 
VI. 
GEORGE'S GIFT OF MARTHA'S PROPERTY TO 
HIMSELF WAS INEFFECTIVE TO ELIMINATE 
MARTHA'S COMMUNITY INTEREST. 
In this case, Martha brought the real property of this estate into the marriage as her sole 
and separate property. See Exhibit A. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, 
granting George an interest in the property. Exhibit B. George later transferred Martha's interest 
to himself. Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. However, the transfer of 
Martha's interest to George, was not performed by Martha, but by George using his power of 
attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, however, contains no provision permitting 
gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G. Indeed, the power of attorney includes some language 
clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, 11 G and H. George's gift to himself was, 
therefore, invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure 
is irrelevant under Jackman, even if the court were to follow Barg. this estate is still subject to 
recovery. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR ALLOW AN CE OF CLAIM - 17 Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance.wpd 
000128
A. A Power of Attorney Does Not Support Making Gifts Unless it Contains an Expres~? 
Authorization. 
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent 
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am. Jur. 2d 
Agency § 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal must be 
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65, 924 
P.2d 559,565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996) (copy provided), the court explained: 
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written 
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to 
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent 
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent 
principal's checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the 
power of attorney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of 
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of 
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an 
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself of principal's property; 
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a 
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing of principal's 
intent to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71,924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 
168 (Iowa, 1996) ( absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift, 
attorney-in-fact did not have that power) (copy provided); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 
(Alaska 1984) (in the absence of express authority to make a gift, none maybe made) (copy 
provided); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an 
attorney in fact to himself unless the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the 
instrument itself) ( copy provided). 
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Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are 
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 
Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929) (copy provided); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 
P.2d 259 (1932). In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 
1003 (1922), the Idaho Supreme Court said: 
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his failure 
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due 
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such 
transaction, as a matter of law, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal. 
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is, 
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the 
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal, 
either for himself or for others. 
Jensen, 36 Idaho at , 210 P. at 1005 (underline added). 
Likewise, Idaho Code § 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to 
convey or encumber community property: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, exc~t that neither the 
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement. deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent provided. however. that the husband or wife may 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
convey or encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
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Idaho Code § 32-912 ( emphasis added). 12 The title company may have recognized this defi::ct 
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal 
representative sold the real property. 13 See Exhibit "D" to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. 
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, tht:: 
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's 
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to 
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property. 
VII. 
CONCLUSION 
The question presented by the personal representative has already been conclusively 
decided by the Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998). The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in _earg 
has no application to Idaho marital property law. Even if Barg were applicable in Idaho, this 
estate is still subject to recovery because George's attempted gift of Martha's interest to himself 
is invalid. The Department's claim should be allowed in full. 
DA TED this 29th day of January, 2010, 
Deputy Attorney General 
12The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer of Martha's 
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's 
property. Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(1)(b), (c). 
13Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in 
fact for Martha. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
774SOM 
A F F I D A V I T 
- - --= -.- -.- - -
) 
} ss. 
) 
,' .. ~. ,· 
339-/016 
Blaine F. Evans, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and. c:ays: 
That he wav the attorney for Martha Jean Boyle at all 
time& mentioned herein. In that certain agreement by and 
between Martha Jean Boy~e and Henry F~ancie Boyle dQted 
Aprill, l96~Henry Francia Boyle agreed co furnish ~tba 
Jean Boyle with a residence of her choice to be located'in 
Ada county, taaho, 
~hat thereafter in an agreemen~ datec! the 13th day of 
Ja.nua~y, lj64, by and between Hen;cy- r~ancis ~oyle ana Martha 
.. ,;;.·.j.'. , . · • 
.:,~,~~,~~-~ .. ~J'"~ Boyle, ~enry francis Boyle agreed .tha~ · the house selecte~ .... ., 
in Boiae, Idaho was the aeparate property of his wife which 
said agreement was approved by the second 3udicial Ois~rict 
Court of the S~ate of Nevada, in and for the County of Washoe 
on ths 26th day of Maren, 1964, Thae the house aalected by 
l'Urtha Jean Boyle and referred to in said agreements and in 
the court decra• was and is described aa follows: 
Lo: 115 of Columbus Park Subdivision No. 2, 
according to the piat ~~ereof filed in the 
records of Ada County, Idaho, 
DATED This ~day of September, 1977. 
,~-
SUBSCRIBED ~ND 5WOM ~o before me this L8~day of 
Notary Publl.e for xaiio,;'.) 
Re$~din9 at Boi~e. ,Idaho 
•). ~- . 
.,. ..... .. 
: • ."•• 
~ 002/002 
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ADA COUNTY RECORDER J. DAVID NAVARRO 
BOISE IDAHO 11/18/02 03:52 PM 
DEPUTY Joanne Hooper 
RECOftDED-REQUEST OF 111111111111111111 II IIHIIIII Ill I I Ill 
AMOUNT 6.00 1021357~~2 
LF298-04 
R298-04 
~·~&;r 
QUITCLAIM DEED 
ulh ;\/4,ue;flbe~ , ~ 
TIDS QUITCLAIM DEED, executed this "i I O - day of O' , 20 ), ~ f) 
by first party, Grantor, /11~ {J ~ M(.., /:.J ~ k-
whose post office address is • ,/J /_ . ~ ;~{. 
to second party, Grantee, JJ1-vt;t)~ ~ a.,.c.,, T ~1 f ~e- (/ 1 
whose post office address is ,;//tJ"f Te~y I t:J p;',se J Td'C, ?3 J& .> 
WITNESSETH, lbat the said first party, for good consideration and for the sum of 
Dollars($ 0 ) 
paid by the said second party. the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does hereby remise, relf:ase 
and quitclaim unto the said second party forever, aJI the right, title, interest and claim which the said first 
party has in and to the following described parcel of land, and improvements and appurtenances thereto in 
the County of ,/J c./a , State of Z::a/a /tP to wit: 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The said fi.rst party has signed and sealed these presents the day and year 
first abov written. Signed, sealed d delivered in presence of: 
71f«<tzi.v:..., (lU£.c_ 
Signature of First Py 
;v/ tJ I' fit a Jea n 
Print name of First Party 
Signature of Witness Signature of First Party 
Print name of Witness Print name of First Party 
State of rota.ho 
County of /'.=kt C\ . 
On l 1 / t&{ o 2 before me, Lo..1.A.r 1e ~ .tra..c.....+~ , 
appeared Geor",_Q.. ~ ~e.12..ll'{ • rrtG..Y-t~ ---:Je.cr.V\.. Pt..et.j 
personally known rd me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) whose 
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the 
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the 
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument. 
W ESS my hand and official seal. 
State of 
County of 
On 
appeared 
.JA 
Affiant __ Known '/ Produced ID 
Type of ID ------"'b,,,_L _ --r,-_____ _ 
(Seal) 
personally known to me (or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person(s) wh,:>se 
name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he/she/they executed the 
same in his/her/their authorized capacity(ies), and that by his/her/their signature(s) on the instrument the 
person(s), or the entity upon behalf of which the person(s) acted, executed the instrument. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal. 
Signature of Notary 
Affiant Known __ Produced ID 
Type of ID _________ _ 
(Seal) 
Signature of Preparer 
Print Name of Preparer 
Address of Preparer 
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::~~~R;EST OP 111111111111111111111,ll(IIIIIII Ill 
TIiie One 109035011 
DEED OF DISTRIBUTION 
/trfl~Zrxk /J&Jtso BY PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE 
THIS DEED, made by BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, as Personal Representative of 1the 
Estate of George D. Peny, deceased, Grantor, to KARYL HAYDEN, an unmarried person, 
Grantee, whose current address is 2295 Sunset Peak Road, Boise, Idaho, 83702; 
WHEREAS, Grantor is the qualified Personal Representative of said estate, filed as Case 
No. CV IE 0905214, in Ada County, Idaho; 
WHEREAS, Grantee is entitled to distribution of the hereinafter described real property 
THEREFORE, Grantor quitclaims, transfers, and conveys to Grantee the following 
described real property in Ada County, Idaho: 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
with all appurtenances. 
EXECUTED this/G. day of ~~ 
t~eu-.,K.'rvt~ 
BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, 
Personal Representative of the Estate 
of George D. Peny 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
Cowity of __ (l_~---------- ) 
,20~. 
On this _2'._ day of l'?'k, d , 2~, before me, the undersigned, a notary 
public · in and for said state, personally appeared, BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, known ,or 
identified to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument, as Personal 
Representative of the Estate of George D. Peny, deceased, and acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same as such Personal Representative. 
EXHIBIT 
C 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
lot 115 of Columbus Park No. 2, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book 16 of Plats at Page(s) 1065 
and 1066, official records of Ada County, Idaho. 
Exhibit"A" 
Legal Description 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO ~---~---./ 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
) Supreme Court No. 23928 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Appellant, ) 
) 
~- ) 
) 
BARBARA JACK.1v1AN, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of ) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
________________ ) 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding. 
\V. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division ofHwnan Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720·0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
Wi11iam C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
I 
EXHIBIT 
D 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Estate of 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/ Appellant, ) 
) 
TI. ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of ) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
.__. Respondent. ) 
) 
---------------
Supreme Court No. 23928 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding. 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
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STATE:MENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case. 
This is a Medicaid "estate recovery" case. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department"). The respondent is the 
appointed personal representative of the estate of Lionel Knudson, Barbara Jackman 
(hereinafter "Jackman" or "personal representative"). Jackman is the adult daughter of 
Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both deceased. 
Medicaid, referred to as "medical assistance" in Idaho statutes, is a joint State-
federal program that provides medical care to the poor. 1 Eligibility is based on limited 
income and resources of the Medicaid recipient and the recipient's spouse. Certain 
resources (in this case the decedents' home) are excluded in determining eligibility. 
Where Medicaid pays for nursing care or certain home-based care for persons over 55 
years of age, Idaho Code § 56-218 (Appendix A) permits the State to recover its 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient or the recipient's spouse, after both 
have passed away. This case involves the State's attempted recovery from the estates 
of a deceased Medicaid recipient and her deceased spouse. 
1Unli.ke Social Security or Medicare, Medicaid is not an insurance program. No premiwns are paid 
for entitlement to benefits. There is no pool which assumes the risk of loss as an insurer does. Rather, 
Medicaid is a fonn of welfare funded directly by taxpayers. 
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B. Course Of Proceedings. 
This matter arose as a claim by the Department against the estate of Lionel 
Knudson for recovery of Medicaid payments made on behalf of Lionel Knudson's 
spouse Hildor Knudson. The personal representative failed to pay the Department's 
claim and the Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim, to which the 
personal representative objected. Hearing was held on May 6, 1996, and the court, 
William C. Hamlett, Magistrate, presiding, entered a Memorandum Decision 
(Appendix B) on January I 7, I 997, holding the Department was not entitled to recover 
from Lionel Knudson's estate. The Department appealed to the District Court which 
reviewed the briefs filed before the magistrate and accepted supplemental briefs. The 
District Court, heard oral argument on May 28, 1997, and affirmed the magistrate's 
decision by order entered June 4, 1997. This appeal followed. 
c. Statement Of The Facts. 
Hildor L. Knudson, the spouse of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, was a recipient of 
Medicaid. R. p. 25. From about January, 1993, until her death on October 27, 1994, 
Medicaid paid for most of Hild or's nursing home care. In all, the public paid 
$4 I ,600.55 on her behalf. R. pp. 25-40. 
Hildor was eligible for Medicaid because, through a Marriage Settlement 
Agreement (Appendix q, she had conveyed the bulk of her interest in community 
property to her spouse. R. pp. 63-66. Such inter-spousal transfers are permitted by 
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.__, both State and federal law. 2 Indeed, the very purpose of the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement was to impoverish Hildor so she would be eligible to receive Medicaid. 
Lionel Knudson, as the community spouse, received all of the couple's property except 
for an irrevocable burial trust and $1,90()3 in the parties' accounts. R. pp. 63-66. The 
agreement was signed, on behalf of both parties, by Barbara Jackman, who, according 
to the agreement was Hildor Knudson's guardian and the holder of a durable power of 
attorney for Lionel Knudson. R. p. 65. 
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks later on 
November 11, 1994. R. p. 10. 
On November 28, 1994, probate proceedings were initiated for Lionel's estate 
by the appointment of Barbara Jackman as personal representative. R. pp. 10-18. 
Hildor's estate was not probated. On January 9, 1995, the Department filed a claim 
against Lionel's estate. R. pp. 19-20. 
At the time of her death, Hildor was in possession of a bank account in the 
amount of $1,861.30 and her burial trust. R. pp. 58-61. As stated, above, no probate 
proceeding was initiated. Rather, Jackman obtained the money from the bank account 
2See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2); IDAPA 16.03.05.693.01. 
3For eligibility pWJ)oses, Hildor Knudson's resources had to be reduced below $2,000. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l)(B). Medicaid eligibility for persons such as Hildor Knudson is based upon eligibility for 
SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(I0)(A)(l)(l). 
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......,. about August 1, 1995, by affidavit.4 R. pp. 67-69. About August 22, 1995, Jackman's 
attorney paid $1,638.03 to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. The Department had 
previously notified Jackman's attorney that it would accept the payment only as a 
partial payment, not sufficient to satisfy the Department's estate recovery claim. R. 
. ..., 
pp. 143-147 (Appendix D). 
On December 26, 1995, the Department filed a Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
R. pp. 21-22. The personal representative of Lionel Knudson has valued the estate at 
$40,798.35 . 
4Pennitted in small estates by Idaho Code§ 15-3-1201. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
l. Whether Idaho Code§ 56-218 permits Medicaid payments to be 
recovered from the estate of the recipient's after-deceased spouse. 
2. Whether the court should have granted the Department's Petition for 
Allowance of Claim. 
3. Whether attorney fees and costs should be assessed against Jackman. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 5 O:\WCC\Ell\KNUDSON\APBRIEF. WPD 
000149
ARGUMENT 
Estate recovery has a long history in Idaho, beginning no later than 1943. The 
purpose has always been to permit elderly recipients of public aid to keep their homes -
(and in some cases other limited assets), but to obtain repayment from those assets after 
the need for them has ended. In this case the personal representative, Jackman, 
intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to impose the costs of her mother's 
care on the public, while obtaining a windfall for herself. Idaho Code § 56-218 was 
not intended to permit this injustice. 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When a case is appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's 
decision, the Court makes an independent appellate review of the magistrate's decision, 
after giving due regard to the district court's ruling. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 
840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993); In re Estate of Reinwald, 122 Idaho 401, 402, 834 
P.2d 1317, 1318 (1992); Swope v. Swope, 122 ldaho 296,298, 834 P.2d 298, 300 
(1992); McNelis v. McNelis, 119 Idaho 349, 351, 806 P.2d 442, 444 (1991); State Y, 
Woolf, 120 Idaho 21, 22, 813 P.2d 360, 361 (1991) rev. den. (1991); State v, Allison, 
112 Idaho 572, 733 P.2d 793 (App. 1987). An appellate court will freely review 
questions of law. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d 1126, 1127 (1993); 
Clements Farms. Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 188, 814 P.2d 917, 920 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 6 O:IWCC\ER\ICNUDSONIAPBRIEF. Wl'D 
000150
(1991); In re Goerig, 121 Idaho 26, 28, 822 P.2d 545, 547 (App. 1991) rev. denied 
(1992). 
In this case, there are no material issues of fact and the matter presents only 
issues of law. 5 Therefore the standard is free review of the magistrate's decision after 
giving due regard to the ruling of the District court. 
A 
II. 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 56-218 PERMITS SPOUSAL 
ESTA TE RECOVERY IN TIDS CASE. 
Estate Recovery History and Purpose in Idaho. 
In the case of State ex re!. Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
(1948) (Appendix E), the executor of an estate denied the claim of the State for 
recovery of old-age assistance payments made to the decedent. The State brought an 
action against the executor to which the executor demurred. The trial court sustained 
the demurrer and dismissed the claim, believing the estate recovery statute in question 
to be violative of the Idaho Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the 
law, pointing to the valid public purpose behind the estate recovery law: 
Provision ... for recovery against the estates of recipients has been 
part of the law of this State continuously since March 2, 1943, when 
Chapter 119 of the Laws of 1943 became effective. Section 2 of such Act 
added Section 24-a to the Public Assistance Law of the State and read as 
'Before the magisll'ate, Jackman argued spousal estate recovery is preempted by federal law. The 
magistrate ruled against Jackman on that issue, nnd Jackman has not cross-appealed. The sole issue, 
therefore, involves the interpretation ofldaho law. See R pp. 148-154. 
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follows: 
Section 24-a. Recovery from recipients6. On the death of any 
recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or relief granted under 
this Act shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of 
such person and shall be subject only to the expense of the last 
illness, funeral expenses not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of 
administration of said estate. No claim shall be enforced against 
any real estate or personal property of a recipient while such real 
estate is occupied by the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a 
dependent .... 
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. [Appendix F] 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 229, 191 P.2d at 1010. 
In examining the above provision, the court reviewed 1939 changes to the Social 
Security Act which permitted the State to retain all sums obtained through estate 
recovery. 7 In doing so, the court noted the logic of recovering such sums after the 
death of both husband and wife: 
A most generous thing for the Congress to do in this: It gives a state, for 
instance Idaho, a much larger amount of money to use in avoiding placing 
the aged and needy in poor-houses, by granting assistance to those owning 
the homes in which they live and enabling them to continue to live in such 
homes until both husband and wife have passed on, after which, of 
course, they no longer require the use of a home. The generosity of the 
Congress does not end there. It also provides more money to meet the 
requirements of the needy and destitute who are not the owners of homes. 
6 At first blush, one may wonder why "spouse" is not mentioned in this statute. The difference 
between the original old age assistance and Medicaid, however, is that old age assistance was paid to enable 
people to remain in their homes instead of a "poor-house." The practice of impoverishing a spouse to pennit 
Medicaid to pay for nursing home care did not arise until the 1980s. See infra. 
7The 1935 Social Security Act required States to pay 1/:t of amounts recovered through estate 
recovery (the same proportion as the federal share) to the federal government. Social Security Act of 1935, § 
2(a)(7) (full text available at http://www.ssa.gov/history/35actinx.html). Today, the State is required to pay a 
proportionate share (approximately 70 percent) of amounts recovered through estate recovery to the federal 
government. 
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Nielson, 68 Idaho at 231, 191 P.2d at 1011. Later, the court further expounded on the 
public policy behind estate recovery: 
The statute, in line with modern ideas, makes it possible in many 
cases to avoid placing the needy aged in institutions and contemplates the 
granting of assistance to those who may own the home in which they live 
or other property as well as to those absolutely destitute, if their income 
and sources of subsistence are not sufficient to meet the statutory 
standards. Under these provisions the recipient of public assistance is not 
required to liquidate all of his property. Ofttimes the recipient continues 
to live in his own home, which he is able to preserve for use during his 
lifetime and for the use of his widow during her lifetime after his decease. 
The method of caring for the needy aged has proven far superior in many 
cases to placing the needy aged in institutions. It has not only proven to 
be more efficient and economical from the State's standpoint, but more 
humanitarian, providing the recipient with a more normal existence, 
freeing him of much of the stigma and many of the hardships and 
disagreeable features of life in an institution. 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 232-3, 191 P.2d at 1012. 
Several years later, the court upheld successor provisions which permitted a lien 
to be imposed on the property of old-age assistance recipients: 
The old-age assistance law is to be distinguished from so-called 
'poor laws' or 'indigent statutes' in that the old-age assistance act does not 
require that the recipient be a pauper or absolutely destitute to entitle him 
to payments thereunder. 
*** 
The conditions imposed by the statute are not so onerous as those 
ordinarily imposed in private lending transactions. On the contrary, the 
law provides a fair and humane plan by which needy aged, who own a 
home, may secure old-age assistance while continuing to occupy and 
enjoy their home, rather than being required to mortgage or sell it, and 
consume the proceeds in living expenses before receiving aid. At the 
same time it preserves the property as a means of reimbursing the welfare 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 9 G:IWCC\ER\ICNUDSONIAPBR.IEF.wPC> 
000153
fund, thus giving the recipients the satisfaction of paying their own way as 
far as they are able, and with the least hardship. It also reduces the 
amount which must be continuously provided by the taxpayers of the state 
and nation, who, through their legislative representatives, have voluntarily 
assumed the moral obligation to provide such aid. It is a matter of 
common knowledge that some states have so burdened themselves with 
various forms of public assistance and old-age pensions that the threat of 
insolvency has forced a modification of their plans. In all states the 
burden of such assistance has become a major problem. Various methods 
of recovery have been devised, and perhaps none has been entirely 
satisfactory. Among such plans some states have provided for 
reimbursement by relatives, legally responsible for the care of their needy 
elders. This, however, has been found difficult of application and, in 
some circumstances, unjust. Instead of requiring the relatives to provide 
the support, or to reimburse the state. our Jaw limits recovery to the 
esta~. or the real property, of the recipient. The relatives are asked only 
to forego. to the extent of such payments, what they otherwise might 
inherit. 
Newland v, Child, 73 Idaho 530, 537-9, 254 P.2d 1066, 1069-71 (1953) (citati_ons 
omitted, underline added) (Appendix G). 
Clearly, Idaho estate recovery provisions have always had the purpose of 
permitting the elderly to obtain assistance while preserving their homes and other assets 
to reimburse the public after their deaths. 
B. Idaho Code § 56-218 Was Passed Specifically to Recover Inter-spousal 
Transfers. 
Idaho's current estate recovery law was passed in 1988. S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § 1, 
p. 73 {Appendix H). 1988 was a significant year with regard to the application of 
public assistance laws to married couples. Healthy elderly persons were under pressure: 
to divorce their ill spouses so Medicaid could pay for the ill spouse's nursing care 
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without depleting assets needed for the care of the healthy spouse. In response, 
Congress enacted the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, P.L. 100-360, § 
303, amended by the Family Support Act of 1988, P.L. 100-485. Among other things., 
these acts amended sections of the Social Security Act replacing asset transfer 
restrictions in the Supplemental Security Income law with transfer penalties under the 
Medicaid law, and permitting interspousal transfers of assets. See 42 U .S.C. §§ 
1396a(a)(18) and 1396p (Appendix n and notes thereto referencing the 1988 
amendments. These federal changes became effective July 1, 1988. Id. Sometimes 
called federal spousal impoverishment, or FSI, the effect of these changes was to 
permit spouses to transfer assets from one to the other to "impoverish" the ill spouse so 
he or she could qualify for Medicaid nursing payments. 
The same issues had apparently been on the mind of the Idaho Legislature, since 
the legislature beat Congress "to the punch" with the addition of section 209e of title 56, 
Idaho Code. S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74 (Appendix H). This new section was 
enacted 
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regulations as they 
apply to long term care costs, cause either the destitution of the entire 
family, or a dissolution of marriage carried out to prevent destitution. 
Idaho Code§ 56-209e(l). Section 209e provided for the use of community property 
principles in determining the Medicaid eligibility of a married person. The section had 
to be amended the following year to conform to the federal changes. See S.L. 1989, 
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.._. ch. 67, § 1, p. 107 (Appendix J); Opinion of the Attorney General 89-3. Both section 
209e and the new estate recovery law were passed on the same day. See Appendix H. 
. .., 
It makes sense that the estate recovery law, passed at the same time as provisions 
permitting spousal impoverishment would be drafted to permit recovery of those 
transferred assets. Logically, the new estate recovery law permitted spousal estate 
recovery: 
56-218. RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE. (1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on 
behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, 
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be 
charged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim 
for such medical assistance correctly paid to the indivi~ual may be 
established against the estate, but their shall be no adjustment or recovery 
thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any .... 
S.L. 1988, ch. 49, § I, p. 73 (Appendix H). 8 
C. The Langua.~e of the Estate Recovery Law. While Archaic, Clearly Anticipates 
Recovery from a Surviving Spouse's Estate. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) now reads as follows: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. - (1) Except 
where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who 
was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to 
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance 
correctly paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but 
8This language may have been drawn from Oregon Jaw. See O.R.S. § 413.200. 
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there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of 
the surviving spouse, if any .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) (underline added) (Appendix A). Reading this section as a 
whole, its meaning is clear: if the Medicaid recipient has an estate from which recovery 
can be made, then recovery is made from that estate, but only after the death of the 
surviving spouse; if recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then 
recovery is made from the estate of the surviving spouse. 
Jackman contends that the "if there be no estate" language should be interpreted 
as a qualifier, i.e., recovery can not be made from the spouse's estate if the recipient 
dies possessed of any property whatsoever. Since it is inconceivable that any person 
could die without any possessions at all,9 Jackman's interpretation conveniently nullifies 
the spousal recovery provisions of the statute. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218, however, is not part of the probate code. The "if there be 
no estate" does not specify whether a recovery can be made, but rather, directs an order 
for making the recovery. 
While the quoted language is archaic, it is not uncommon in statutory language. 
New York statutes contain several similar references describing to whom certain 
moneys are paid: 
9 Almost all elderly nursing home patients have some income from Social Security or another pension. 
While most of this is used for the recipient's care, a small portion is kept in an account for the patient's 
personal needs. Even if that were not true, even the meager possessions of a destitute nursing patient, such as 
a photograph or a toothbrush, constitute an estate under the probate code. See Idaho Code § 15-1-201 ( 15), 
(37) (Appendix K). 
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I . 
If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or children of the 
deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to such dependent or 
dependents as defined in section seven of this article, as directed by the 
workers' compensation board; and if there shall be no such dependents, 
then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
funeral expenses as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this 
article, or, if there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the 
funeral expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one. 
NY Vol. Amb. Ben. § 10 (underline added); see also NY Work. Comp. § 15 and NY 
Vol. Fire Ben. § 10 (containing nearly identical language); United States Steel Corp. v, 
Workers Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (citing Pennsylvania 
law with very similar language). The "if there be no estate" language is used in a 
context very similar to that here in the case of Penny v, Pritchard & McCall, 255 Aia. 
13, 49 So.2d 782 (1951): 
Under the Codes of 1852, 1876, 1886 and 1896, the fees of jurors 
and witnesses in such cases were made payable out of the estate of the 
person of unsound mind or, if there be no estate, out of the county 
treasury. Section 2763, Code of 1852; 5054, Code of 1876; section 
3695, Code of 1886; section 1385, Code of 1896. Under the Code of 
1907, section 1385, and that of 1923, section 7293, the pay of jurors is 
made out of the county treasury as under the Code of 1940. The pay of 
witnesses is required by the Code of 1907, section 3681, and by the Code 
of 1923, section 7241, to be paid as jurors are out of the county treasury, 
the same as under the Code of 1940. 
Penny, 255 Aia. at 17, 49 So.2d at 784 (underline added). 
In each of the above instances, the language in question was not a qualifier, but 
rather a designation of the order of priority. In each instance, the 11estate" in question 
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~ was either a source or a receptacle of funds. The same is true here. The language in 
Idaho Code§ 56-218 is not a qua]ifier. It simply means that if recovery can be made 
from the estate of the recipient, then that estate is looked to for recovery. If full 
recovery cannot be made from the estate of the recipient, then recovery can be made 
from the estate of the spouse. 
A person whose nursing care is paid for by Medicaid can have no more than 
$2,000 in liquid assets. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(l)(B). 10 Therefore, a person who is 
eligible because all his or her property has been transferred to the spouse will never 
have more than $2,000. The legislature was certainly aware that such small amounts 
would pass automatica1ly to the surviving spouse through the probate homestead 
allowance and exempt property allowance. See Idaho Code §§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402. 
Moreover, since Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) specifically forbids recovery while the spouse 
survives, there is never a recipient's 11estate" to serve as a source for estate recovery 
when a spouse survives. To the contrary, recovery can only be made from a recipient's 
estate if (1) the recipient is pre-deceased by the spouse, or (2) the recipient later 
becomes ineligible for Medicaid due to a monetary windfall such as an inheritance. 
In the ordinary course of things, then, recovery is made from the estate of the 
recipient when the recipient's spouse has pre-deceased (in which case the recipient 
10Medicaid is a "categorical" eligibility program. Elderly nursing patients qualify based on eligibility 
for SSI or AABD. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(I0)(A)(l)(I). 
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,__. already owns the spouse's share of the property), and (more commonly, since the 
recipient is typically the less healthy spouse) recovery is made from the estate of the 
recipient's spouse when the recipient passes away first. This is what the legislature 
intended. 
,...., 
A. 
m. 
THE INTERPRETATION PROPOSED BY JACKMAN 
IS UNFAIR TO THE NEEDY AND LEADS TO 
ABSURD RESULTS. 
Jackman Intentionally Manipulated Her Parents' Estates. 
As noted, above, Hildor died in possession of $1,861.30 and pre-deceased her 
husband. Lionel, as surviving spouse, was entitled to at least the first $7,500 of his 
wife's property. 11 Whether Lionel got it is not clear. Jackman obtained Hildor's 
money by affidavit. R. pp. 67-69. Her attorney kept some of the money for his fee, 
and sent the remainder to the Department. Of course, neither Jackman's attorney, nor 
Jackman herself, had any authority to deal with Hi!dor's estate in that fashion. Idaho 
Code§ 15-3-103 requires a legal appointment for a person to assume the powers of a 
personal representative. Jackman was only appointed as personal representative for 
Lionel's estate, not for Hildor's. If, when Jackman's attorney sent money to the 
Department, Jackman was acting as personal representative of Lionel's estate, then the 
11 A surviving spouse takes, at least. the probate homestead allowance in the amount of $4,000, and 
the exempt property allowance in the amount of$3,500, irrespective of any wilJ. and ahead of the decedent's 
unsecured creditors. See Idaho Code§§ 15-2-401 and 15-2-402. 
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~ money had already passed to Lionel's estate, and Jack.man was paying the Department 
from Lionel's estate. 
The fact that Hildor had any property, at all, would mean, under Jack.man's 
interpretation of the estate recovery law, that the Department could not recover 
anything from Lionel's estate. Then why was the money sent? In an effort to make it 
appear as if the Department had already recovered from Hildor's estate. 
There is no question but that Jackman manipulated her parent's estate to attempt 
to reap a windfall for herself. 12 
B. The Interpretation Advanced by Jackman Is Both Unfair and Leads to Absurd 
Results. 
The interpretation of the estate recovery law advanced by Jackman would make 
it so simple to avoid, that estate recovery would almost never occur. Since every 
Medicaid recipient will leave an estate (as defined by the probate code), no recovery 
will be possible from any recipient's spouse. Estate recovery would only be possible 
from unmarried recipients. A married person could simply give all his or her property 
to the spouse, obtain nursing care at public expense, and have the property passed on to 
the adult children. 
Of course, the adult children of those whose spouses had pre-deceased would not 
stand by and see the Department recover from their parent's estate. They would simply 
12The magistrate noted, in his Memorandum Decision, that "[i]t is wu-efuted the estate was 
rnanipuJated by the personal representative .... " R p. 151 (first full paragraph) (Appendix B). 
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encourage and assist their elderly parent to marry a "straw" spouse, and have the parent 
transfer all the property to the spouse, with a prenuptial agreement to pass the property 
on to the adult children after the parent's death. 13 
At oral argument before the District Court, Jackman's attorney argued that some 
property, such as the family home, was an exempt resource and did not have to be 
conveyed to the spouse to enab]e the other to be eligib]e for Medicaid. 14 Therefore, 
according to Jackman's attorney, the Department would still recover when such 
property was not transferred. All this means is that the Department would only recover 
from the estates of people who can not afford the advice of an estate planning attorney. 
It is manifestly unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional, to condition estate recovery on 
whether the Medicaid recipient can afford an attorney. 
IV. 
THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AGAINST 
JACKMAN. 
In the case of State ex rel. Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
(1948) (Appendix E), in which the court discussed the benefits of estate recovery to the 
13WhiJe some may doubt aduJt children would engage in such tactics, this is not at aJI farfetched. In 
this case, Lionel and Hildor may have been totally tmaware that Hildor gave all her property to Lionel: the 
marriage settlement agreement was signed for both of them by Jackman. R. p. 65. The Department has dealt 
with cases where an adult children have gone to great lengths to hide property from estate recovery. 
14The Department does not have the power to prevent such transfers since they are specifically 
allowed by federal statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{c){2) {Appendix I). 
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~ elderly, the court recognized that there was really no argument between the recipient of 
assistance and the State, but only between the State and the recipient's heirs: 
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy aged. 
It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other distributees of 
the estates of the deceased recipients. "The right to dispose of one's 
property by will, and the right to have it disposed of by the law, after 
decease, is created by statute, and therefore the state may impose such 
conditions upon the exercise of this right as it may determine. n 
Nielson, 68 Idaho at 223, 191 P.2d at 1012 (citations omitted). The court reiterated 
this fact in the later case of Newland v Child, 73 Idaho 530, 254 P.2d 1066 (1953) 
(Appendix G): 
Instead of requiring the relatives to provide the support, or to reimburse 
the state, our law limits recovery to the estate, or the real property, of the 
recipient. The relatives are asked only to forego, to the extent of such 
payments, what they otherwise might inherit. As was suggested in State 
ex rel. Nielson v. Lindstrom, the real objection to this lien law is that of 
the prospective heirs. 
The conflict of interest here is not between the State and its needy 
aged. It is between the State and the heirs, next of kin or other 
distributees of the estates of the deceased recipients. State ex rel. 
Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009, 1012. 
Having no vested interest, they have no right to complain. In re Smith's 
Estate, 188 Old. 158, 107 P.2d 188; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 
228. 
Newland, 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 1070-1. This case, likewise, is really between 
Jackman and the Department. 
In this case, Jackman intentionally manipulated the estates of her parents to place 
the burden of her mother's nursing care costs on the public, and retain a windfall for 
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.....- herself. She has denied the Department's claim and opposed recovery by the 
Department unreasonably and without foundation. The Department is, therefore, 
entitled to an award of its attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Because the question is certain to arise on remand, the denial of attorney fees to 
Jackman should also be addressed. A personal representative who brings or defends an 
action in good faith is entitled to attorney fees from the estate, whether the personal 
representative wins or loses. Idaho Code§ 15-3-720. This creates a "Catch 22n for the 
Department in cases such as this where the Department's claim exceeds the value of the 
estate, because the personal representative can challenge the Department's claim at the 
Department's own expense. However, in this case, Jackman, having intentionally 
manipulated her parents' estates, has not defended against the Department's claim in 
good faith and should not receive attorney fees from the estate. Likewise, in this case, 
Jackman has taken the actions she has, not for the benefit of the estate, but for her own 
benefit. The estate should not be reduced by attorney fees incurred in Jackman's 
pursuit of her own interests in the estate. Eliasen v, Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234, 668 
P.2d 110 (1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Despite Jackman's manipulation of her parents' estates, the Department is 
entitled to recover from the estate of Lionel Knudson. The language of the estate 
recovery statute, while archaic, is not susceptible to Jackman's interpretation and can 
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~ only be read to permit spousal estate recovery under the circumstances of this case. 
The decision beiow should be reversed and the Department's Petition for Allowance of 
claim granted. 
DATED this 8 day of September,.1997, 
v. 
W. COREYC 
Deputy Att ey General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing document were 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
DATED this 7) day of September, 1997 . 
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section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p. 
228; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 4, p. 520; am. 1974, ch. 233, § 8, p. 1590; am. 1978, 
ch. 74, § 1, p. 148; am. 1981, ch. 121, § 1, p. 207; am. 1989, ch. 67, § 2, p. 
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.) 
Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and . 
19171c) and (d) of the Social Security Act, 
referred to in this section, are compiled as 42 
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively. 
Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled 
as § 15·5·409a. 
Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as 
§ 56-210. 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective until 
July 1, 1998.] -(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance wii:h 
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual :who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no 
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
court. 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (5.5) 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. · 
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent' 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign. of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy i1n 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section sha]] be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate 
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against re.al 
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart-
ment is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medic:ai 
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assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form 
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3)(a), Idaho Code, in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The 
lien shall be recorded, indexed, and extended in the manner provided in 
sections 56·218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a 
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety · 
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the 
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chaptur, file the 
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Codi~. Failure 
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of claims made 
pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The.only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. {I.C., § 56-218, as added by 
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105, 
§ 1, p. 336.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef-
fective July 1, 1998, see the following section 
alao nwnbered § 56-218. 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective; July 1, 
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with ·federal 
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate: or if there be no 
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for i;uch aid 
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the · 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. ·1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an actiori_ in the district 
court. · · 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 tr .S.C, 1382c, the amount of any m·edical .assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55)°" 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate . 
;=~~~~--~ 
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. 
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5} Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any 
estate subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against 
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety {90) days 
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in 
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a), 
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 
· - 1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affect the 
....-idity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
{a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
{b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [1.C., § 56-218, as added by 
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105; 
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef-
fective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding 
section also numbered§ 56-218. 
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: "Not-
withstanding the effective dates specified in 
section 1 through 9 of this act, noLhing in this 
act shall take effect unless the secretary of 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commis-
sion that he has received a sufficient appro-
priation to provide for the development of the 
technology required to _implement the provi-
sions of this act. If the certification is noL 
made by the twenty-first day after lhe ad-
journment sine die of the First Regular Ses-
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislalure, this 
act shall be null and void." 
The Secretary ·or State has so certified to 
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the 
Chapter 205 became effective as presc_ribed 
herein. · · 
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled 
as §§ 45-1901 through 45-1910. 
56-218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec-
tive until July· I, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and _may 
impose a lien ag~inst the real property of any individual prior to his death 
for medical assistance· paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf 
• an individual: 
.__, 
•. ; 
'-. 
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(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is 
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution undE1r the 
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of 
his income required for personal needs; and 
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice 
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from the medical institution and to return home. 
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection 
(1) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home: 
(a) The spouse of such individual; 
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years; 
(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or 
(d) A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) year 
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution. 
(3)(a) In order to perfect the lien, the department shall file in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the real property of the individual is 
located a verified statement in writing setting forth the name and last 
known address of the individual, the name and address of the official or 
agent of the department filing the lien, a brief description of the medical 
assistance received by the individual, the amount paid or about to be: paid 
by the department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, the fact 
that the amount of the lien may increase over time. The county :recorder 
shall record the claim in the real property records of the county where the 
claim shall be indexed, as deeds and other conveyances are requ.ir<ed by 
law to be indexed. 
(b) The department shall file any lien under this section within ninety 
(90) days of the final determination of the department, after hearing if 
any, required in subsection (lXb) of this section, with the exception of 
property against which the department is prevented from filing a lien 
pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. With respect to the property 
described in subsection (2) of this section, the department shall file a lien 
within ninety (90) days after the department is notified in writing· that 
subsection (2) of this section ceases to apply to the property. 
(4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section 
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical institution 
and return home. · 
(5) The lien, or any extension thereof, may, within five (5) years from the 
date of filing for record, be extended by filing for record in the office of the 
county recorder a new verified statement setting forth the information 
required in subsection (3Xa) of this section, and from the time of filing the 
lien shall be extended in such county for five (5).years, unless fully rel1~ased 
or otherwise discharged. 
(6) No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance 
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsE1ction 
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6) 
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:.:::tion 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien 
may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse, 
1.y, and only at a time: 
=) When he has no surviving child who is under age twenty-one (21) 
;ars, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 
1.S.C. 1382c; or 
l) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of . 
1is section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home 
,ho has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the 
ate of the individual's admission to the medical institution: 
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was resid\ng in the individual's home 
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the_ date of the 
individual's admission to the medical institution; or 
(ii) A son or daughter of the individual, who was residing in the 
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately 
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution 
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she 
. provided care to such individual which permitted such individual to 
reside at home rather than in an institution. 
7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
,nt this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
r~c;hip waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a 
_, ure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's 
termination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be 
;charged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A, 
added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336.] 
;ompiler's notes. For this section as ef- Sec. to sec. ref. This section is referred to 
tive July 1, 1998, eee the following section in § 56-218. 
o numbered § 56-218A. 
56-218A. Medical assistance liens during life of recipient. [Effec-
ve July 1, 1998.] - (1) The department may recover and may impose a 
•n against the real property of any individual prior to his death for medical 
,sistance paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf of an 
dividual: 
(a) Who is an inpatient in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for 
the mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if such individual is 
required, as a condition of receiving services in such institution under the 
state plan, to spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount of 
his income required for personal needs; and 
(b) With respect to whom the department has determined, after notice 
and opportunity for hearing, that he cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from the medical institution and to return home. 
(2) No lien may be imposed on the home of an individual under subsection 
) of this section if any of the following is lawfully residing in such home: 
(a) The spouse of sue~ individual; 
(b) Such individual's child under age twenty-one (21) years; 
'· 
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(c) Such individual's child who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c; or 
(d) A sibling of such individual who holds an equity interest in such home 
and who was residing in such home for a period of at least one (1) y,:!ar 
prior to the individual's admission to the medical institution. 
(3)(a) The lien shall be perfected by filing in the office of the secretary of 
state a notice of lien pursuant to section 45-1904, Idaho Code. The notice 
of lien shall include, in addition to the information required by section 
45-1904, Idaho Code, the amount paid or about to be paid by the 
department on behalf of the individual, and, if applicable, the fact that the 
amount of the lien may increase over time. 
·(b) The department shall file any notice of lien under this section within 
ninety (90) days of the final determination of the department, after 
hearing if any, required in subsection (1) (b) of this section, with the 
exception of property against which the department is prevented from 
filing a lien pursuant to subsection (2) of this section:With respect to the 
property described in subsection (2) of this section, the department sha.11 
file a notice of lien within ninety (90) days after the department is notifie,d 
in writing that subsection (2) of this section ceases to ap:ply to the 
property. 
· (4) Any lien imposed in accordance with subsection (1) of this section 
shall dissolve upon the individual's discharge from the medical iinstitution 
and return home. 
· (5)" No recovery shall be made under this section for medical assistance 
correctly paid except from such individual's estate as defined in subsection 
(4) of section 56-218, Idaho Code, and subject to subsections (3), (5) and (6) 
of section 56-218, Idaho Code, or upon sale of the property subject to a lien 
and may be made only after the death of such individual's surviving spouse, 
if any, and only at a time: 
(a) When he has no surviving c}:iild who is under age twenty-one (21:, 
years, or who is blind or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 
U .S.C. 1382c; or 
(b) In the case of a lien on an individual's home under subsection (1) of 
this section, when none of the following is lawfully residing in such home 
who has lawfully resided in such home on a continuous basis since the 
date of the individual's admission to the medical institution: 
(i) A sibling of the individual, who was residing in the individual's home 
for a period of at least one (1) year immediately before the date of the 
· individual's adn1ission to the medical institution; or 
(ii) A son or 'daughter of the individual, who was residing in the 
individual's home for a period of at least two (2) years immediately 
before the date of the individual's admission to the medical institution 
and who establishes to the satisfaction of the state that he or she 
provided care to such individual which· permitted such individual to 
resi9e at home rather than in an institution. 
(6) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers, as provided in section 56-218(7), Idaho Code, and a 
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procedure for notice and opportunity for hearing on the department's 
determination that an individual cannot reasonably be expected to be 
discharged from a medical institution and to return home. [I.C., § 56-218A, 
as added by 1995, ch. 105, § 2, p. 336; am.1997, ch. 205, § 3, p. 607.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef-
fective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding 
section also numbered § 56-218A. 
Section 10 of S.L. 1997,' ch. 205 read: "Not-
withstanding the effective dates specified in 
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in this 
act shall take effect unless the !'lecretary of 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Commis-
sion that he has received a sufficient appro-
priation to provide for the development of the 
technology required to implement the provi-
sions of this act. If the certification is not 
made by the twenty-first day after the ad-
journment sine die of the First Regular Ses· 
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this 
act shall be null and void." 
The Secretary of State ha.e so certified to 
the Idaho Code Collllll.ission and thus the 
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed 
herein. 
Section 4 of S.L. 1997_, ch. 205 is compiled 
as§ 63-3051. 
56-223. Public assistance not assignable. Public assistance 
awarded under this act shall not be transferable or assignable, and none of 
the money paid or payable under this act shall be subject to execution, 
attachment, or other legal process; except that the department may transfer 
funds to another public agency in lieu of payments to recipients, said funds 
to be transferred by such agency to project sponsors for payment as wages 
to said recipients participating in special work projects. [1941, ch. 181, § 23, 
p. 379; am. 1969, ch. 30, § 2, p. 51; am. 1997, ch. 30, § 1, p. 54.] 
~ 56-224. Recovery. -The department may recover the amount of any 
public assistance obtained by any person who was not entitled thereto. If at 
any time during the continuance of assistance, the recipient thereof becomes 
possessed of any property or income in excess of the amount stated in the 
application, it shall be the duty of the recipient to notify the state 
department immediately of the receipt or possession of such property or 
income. Any assistance granted after the recipient has come into possession 
of such property or income in excess of eligibility standards, may be 
--
•. 
recovered by the state department. . 
On the death of a recipient who has received public assistance to which he 
was not entitled, or who has received public assistance in an amount greater 
than that to which he was entitled, by reason of possession or having come 
into possession of resources which he did not disclose to the department, or 
which had, or which acquired, a greater value than was disclosed, the total 
amount of such assistance paid to such recipient to which he was not 
entitled shall be allowed as a preferred claim against the estate of such 
recipient. [1941, ch. 181, § 24, p. 379; am. 1951, ch. 246, § 5, p. 520; am .. 
1997, ch. 31, § 1, p. 55.] 
56-227C. Subpoena power. 
Opinions of Attorney General. Refusal 
to provide records or documents on the 
grounds that such records or document.s are 
exempt from disclos)Jre pursuant t.o the Idaho 
Public Records Act· does not constitute •rea-
sonable cause or legal excuse" for failing to 
comply with the Department of Health and 
Welfare's administrative subpoena. OAG 
95-6. 
A document's lack of availability under the 
'· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDIC!l•,L 9~.TCT: .. 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR ·THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of; 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, 
.Deceased. 
l 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
case No. SP94-0353 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The State of Idaho, throuqh the Health and Welfare Division, 
seeks to recover Medicaid Pavments made on behalf of Hildor 
Knudson from the estate of her deceased spouse Lionel Malcolm 
Knudson. This recovery has been initiated by the state's f iliri<:7 olE' 
a Petition for allownce of claim against Lionel Knudson's estate. 
The facts are not in dispute, and the parties have exhaustively 
briefed the legal issues. 
The legal issue submitted in this matter is whether the Stat~! 
may recover Medicaid assistance paid on behalf of·a pre-deceased 
spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse when the pre-· 
deceasing spouse, who has received Medicaid payments, dies 
poss·essed of an estate. 
In assistance of discussing the issue presented, the Court: 
finds the following facts: 
. .. .. . . . - . . .. 
1. Hi+dQ~ ang ~~Qn~i Knuq~Qn w~~~ ma~~i~d pe~s.ons; 
2. On 8 November 1993 Hildor and Lionel executed a Marriage1 
....,. Settlement Agreement which defined their community property and! 
148 
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~ then altered the character of those properties making the!m 
separate. Hildor received property characterized as separate in a.n 
amount of approxinately $1,900.00+: 
3. The alteration of the character of the community property 
was done to make Hildor eligible for Medicaid; 
4. Hildor died on 27 October ·1994, and at death had received 
public Medicaid benefits in an amount of $41,600.55; 
5. Lionel died on 11 November 1994. His estate was offered 
for informal probate on 28 November 1994; 
6. The estate of Hildor was collected by procedures authorized 
by I.e. 15-3-1201 on 1 August 1995. The residue of her estate, 
$1,638.03 was tendered to the Department of Health and Welfare as 
settlement of monies due under I. C. 56-218 which the Department 
rejected as a full and final settlement; 
7. The Department filed a claim against the estate of Lionel 
on 9 January 1995 for the $41,600.55 paid as medical assistance for 
Hildor. A Petition for Allowance of the claim was filed on 215 
December 1995. on 6 February 1995 the personal representativ,~ 
objected to the Petition for Allowance. 
a. The estate of Lionel had an Inventory value of $40,798.35. 
DISCUSSION 
The initial grounds stated by the Objection to the Petition 
for Allowance was the State's claim exceeds the authority under 
Federal Medicaid statutes, particularly 42 USC 1396p(b). From that 
departure point the excellent briefing by both parties addressed 
that profoundity and also implicated the more prosaic issue of thE! 
interpretation of the Idaho statute, I.e. 56-218. 
149 
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As a predicate to participation in the Federal Medicaid 
program the applicable Federal Law requires the State enact a plan 
for adminstration, execution of the Congressional intent, and fc,r 
recovery or adjustment of payment assistance. Some parts of tlle 
Federal enactment are mandatory and some are optional. 42 USC 1396 
et. seq. In the cases of recovery, the underlying Federal statu1:e 
r42 use 1396p(b)(4)1 defines "estate" in more broad terms than tlle 
probate definition by a1·1owing the State the option of includin~p 
..• (A)nv other real and personal orooertv and other 
assets ln which the individual had anv leqal title or 
interest at the time of death (to the-extent of such 
interest), includinq such assets conveved to a survivor 
heir, or assiqn of the deceased individual throuqh ioint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
The State of Idaho elected to exercise the optional form e>f 
recovery by enacting I.e. 56-218, which at I.e. 56-218(4)(1:>) 
replicates the above-cited Federal language. 
The personal representative argues the Estate of Budney. 54,1 
N.W.2d 245 (Wis.App.1995) is authority for the proposition t.he 
Idaho statutory scheme for recovery is pre-~mpted by Federal law. 
I find that authority unpersuasive. Likewise, the Estate of Craigr. 
624 N.E.2 1003 (N.Y. 1993) is not on point to the present issue a.s 
it did not construe a spousal recovery statute. 
Based upon the specific statutes above cited or referenced, 
and the fact the Idaho law, I.C. 56-218(4)(b) replicates the 
permitted optional Federal statute language, and there is no 
compelling case authority to the contrary, I conclude that I.e. 56-
218 does not allow for recovery in excess of the authority granted 
by 42 USC 1396p, and conclude that the State can recover from the 
150 
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estates of surviving spouses under the appropriate factual and 
legal predicates. 
The more prosaic question to be addressed is whether, undE~r 
the facts of this case, recovery is allowed against Lionel 
Knudson's estate under the authority of I.e. 56-218. A critical 
fact in this case is that Hildor died possessed of an estate of 
approximately $1,900.00. It is unrefuted the estate was 
manipulated by the personal representative in a manner which would 
leave a residual after estate expenses and payment of final debts 
(i.e. no payment of statutory allowances). 
I.e. 56-218 provides in part: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance. (1) Except where 
exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older 
when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, ·if any, shall be charged 
for such aid paid to either or both; ••• 
This specific Idaho enactment, optional under Federal law, contains 
the curious phrase, "or. if there be no. estate the estate of the 
surviving spouse. 11 The State urges the · definition of estate 
include the Federal definition adopted in I.e. 56-218(4), That 
assertion is beyond dispute as the Idaho enactment replicates the 
wording of the Federal statute. The state then expands · its 
argument to adopt the Federal definition of "other assets" 
appearing at 42 use 1396p(e)(l): 
The term "assets", with rescect to an individual, include:s 
all income and resources of the individual and of the 
individual's spouse, including any income or resources 
which the individual or such individual's spouse does not 
receive because of ..• 
Clearly the Federal law intended an estate to include the income! 
151 
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135 (1990). When a statute is unambigious, it must be interpreti:!d 
in accordance with its language, courts must follow it as enacted, 
and a reviewing court may not apply rules of construction. ~:e 
v. Windmeie:r.::. 121 I 189, 191 (1991). As this is a matter c:,f 
significant public policy regarding the recovery of public monies, 
and the issues certainly demand the review of a court of record, 
this Court adopts a most conservative approach and concludes on the 
above facts and law that·: 
1. Idaho Code 56-218(4) does not adopt the Federal definition 
of "asset" appearing at 42 use 1396p(e)(l); 
2. Hildor Knudson had a separate estate of $1, 900+ at "tl'Le 
time of death". Hildor Knudson had no "legal title or interest" i.n 
Lionel Knudson's "real and personal property and other assets" as 
..., required by I.e. 56-218(4); 
3. The language of I. C. 56-218 ( l) stating "or if there be n10 
estate" is limiting language requiring an absence of estate on th.e 
part of the individual receiving assistance before the estate of 
the surviving spouse may be charged. That conclusion is made with 
full recognition of the state's argument that a toothbrush could be 
construed as an estate, though de minimus. The conclusion is 
further supported by the statutory provision appearing in I.e. 56-
218( 1) detailing the right of the State to set aside transfers 
without consideration. That provision would appear to provide the 
State with a legal method of recovering properties transferred to 
preserve estates for nonspousal heirs, though admittedly 
cumbersome. No such action to set aside the transfer is before th,e 
court and no opinion as to the voidabili ty of the transfer is 
153 
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expressed. 
The personal represent.a ti ve is directed to prepare an order 
consistent with these findings and conclusions and to sUbmi t sa.rne 
to State's counsel for approval. 
so ORDERED this 17th day of-January 1997. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILlNG 
I do hereby certify that a full, tru0 ar-t: 
correct copy of the foregoing was m~ii::.-'.~. 
to: , ~ 
,4U~pcb, 
on ttlis ~l day of $MM-Y¼'J , 191.L. 
i. G..i::)&..µ\ ~<D\... 
~.:4-R --- -
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HARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGRBEMEN'l' rtOIPV 
We, LIONEL KNUDSON and HILOOR KNUDSON, husband and wife, 
hereby enter into the following marriage settlement agreement for 
the purpose of changing the character of our community property and 
for the purpose of defining our mutual rights and "interests 
concerning our property. 
1. Our community property includes the following: 
Family residence loc.ated at 331 North Garfield, Moscow, Latah 
County, Idaho more particularly described as: 
Block 1, Lot 6 of Oylear's Addition 
1986 Ford Tempo 
Two Irrevocable Burial Trusts at Short's Funeral Home in the1 
amount of $5,000.00 each. 
West one Account# 0010615402 
West One Account# 0100426145 
West One Account# 0010070074 
First Security # 0281551186754 
First Security # 0281551186753 
Personal property and household effects 
2. We hereby change the character of the above-described 
community property to separate property by dividing the value into 
two parts as follows: 
LIONEL KNUDSON shall have as his sole and separate 
property personal property and household effects now in 
his possession; the community residence fully described 
above; 1986 Ford Tempo; the irrevocable burial trust in 
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
....,. 
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his name; all but $1,900 in the following bank accounts 
West One Account # 0010615402, West One Account # 
0100426145, West One Account# 0010070074, First Security 
# 0281551186754, and First Security# 0281551186753 
HILDOR KNUDSON shail have as her sole and separat,e 
property personal property and household effects in her 
possession; the irrevocable .burial trust in her name, and 
$.1, 900 from the above cited bank accounts. 
J. We further specifically agree that the income, rents., 
issues, profits, capital gains, and other earnings or increases on 
our separate property as described above and the proceeds from any 
disposition thereof constitute the separate property of the person 
owning such property and are not community property. The forgoin9 
also shall apply to all property that may .be separately acquired 
hereafter by either of us in any manner whatsoever. 
4. This agreement shall not disqualify either of us fron1 
serving and acting as personal representative, guardian, 
conservator, or trustee of the other's estate if so appointed by a. 
court or if so designated or nominated by the other. 
5. Notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, either 
of us shall have the right to transfer or convey to the other any 
property or interest therein that lawfully may .be conveyed or 
transferred during his or her lifetime or by will or otherwise upon. 
death, and neither of us intends for this agreement to limit or 
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Page 2 of 4 
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restrict in any way the right and power to give to the other or t,:, 
receive from the other any such transfer or conveyance. 
6. This Agreement shall be construed and enforced in 
accordance with the laws of the State of Idaho even though one o:r 
both of us may now be or hereafter·becomes domiciled in anotha~ 
jurisdiction. 
7. If any provision of this Agreement or any right waived oir 
retained by it shall for· any reason be invalid or unenforceable, 
the other portions of this Agreement nevertheless shall continue t,:, 
full force and effect. 
8. This Agreement shall take effect upon its execution by 
both of us. 
DATED this &_ day of 
J/._J..d.o.u 'iic~(] 'L/ 
HILOOR KNUO~N by her 
_yuard_ian, B ARA JACKMAN 
;y: ~ec..Lt<_ 
) 
) ss. 
County of Latah } 
on this -&:.. day of ~ , 1993, before me, a Notary 
Public in and for the State of Idaho personally appeared BARBARA 
JACKMAN, guardian for HILOOR KNUDSON, known to me to be the person 
whose name is subscribed to the forgoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to be that she executed the me. .. .. ~.'.·•,',.;. -~-
• ·11 'l l ".i (J '.:··--~.:::~ 
~~~- .. ~:>:--:r:~ 
-. ,., • ,. • • •,!1:.:_ 
. - - - .. t --~ 
.: .; I;• , ,.n :·; ~:-.· .. 
Notary Public for I_d:al1~,,.~-·-- ·:: _. .. ,._: .·{ 
Residing at Moscow.'.·· .. ;. .. '. 1.::1 · .· :-
My Commission Expires ;9./_23/93·., .- !'.:': 
0 • 1, 'I, I 'It.• 
rj ! ! • , \. ' t- • :"..;.,:· 
I, I • , '•,,.,.:I' 
MARRIAGE SE'r'rLEMEN'l' AGREEMENT Page :). ... of.,.'4'.' . .:..'! 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Latah 
ss. 
( 
on this w-- day of ~ 
Public in andor the State of Idaho 
JACl<MAN, holder of LIONEL KNUDSON' s 
known to me to be the person whose 
forgoing instrument, and acknowledged 
same. 
, 1993, before me, a Notary 
personally appeared BARBARA 
Durable Power of Attorney, 
name is subscribed to th,a 
to be that she executed th,a 
MARRIAGE SBTTLBHBHT AGREBXBNT 
66 
William c. Kirsih :· 'J' · l~ n ,.._, -.. . 
Notary Public f9r ~Idaho-., .. . .. ,. 
Residing at: Moscow.!.•,i,,;··\\·~. •._; 
• • 'a f \.al \, .J.. -· ' ' ... 
My CommJ.SSJ.On _EXJ?l~~~: ·, .. . / ·1, 
9-23-93 · '/ .,, .. ·'· \~~ · 
•• .• '" ..:· •• \ •. l "\· J'ku-
'•,,,,,: •. •J '-,l,':';,F.· 
,._ IIJpf•~ \..-":'\:. 
095109 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE ) 
OF ) 
) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. SP 94-00353 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE 
(I.C. § 15-3-804) 
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212 
COMES NOW the State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, by and through its counsel, ANN COSHO, Deputy Attorney 
General, and hereby makes claim against the above-captioned estate. 
This claim is based upon the Claimant's statutory right to recover-
the amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of Hildor L. 
Knudsen, as set forth at Idaho Code§ 56-218. The Claimant has 
paid medical assistance benefits on behalf of Hildor L. Knudsen in. 
the amount of $41,600.55 as of December 24, 1994. To the extent 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 1 ,. 19 
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that the Claimant is obligated to make further medical assistancE3 
payments, it reserves the right to supplement its claim in thi~l 
proceeding. 
DATED this day of January, 1995. /J ~ iUJ~-
ANN COSHO 
Deputy Attorney General 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Ada 
ss. 
Dora L. Morley, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
that I am the Claimant's Estate Recovery Specialist; that I have! 
read the above and foregoing claim against the decedent's estate 
and know the contents thereof; and that, to my knowledge and 
belief, the facts stated therein are true and correct. 
,sft .. c Mo?hy Ln~ 
Estate Recovery Specialist 
'""~ ,, ti~.. ,,. . ~
SUBSCRIBE~~ ~ ~ before me this CtJ day of January, 
1995. I • ..~~ _ ~ I ~OT A~ \ ~ n /1 /1 "'· f * f -·- ;,. ! § /2)~1...<..rv, . v ~{/7 .. ~ 
; i >(J C : :it-~ Notary Public for Idaho ~ • B Ll • • · · kl. 
-:. ~.A•. .• ~ Residing at: oi;1,,a--L . 
-..,,-,;: ••• ._.. .. -:_c:, ,../ Commission Expi1'."es: c;/2.3/l_cco 
, .. ~ $ Op rn ~ V ...... r I ,,, ,..., ,, .. 
''•ttm¢'!.'fiTIPICATE OF MAILING 
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES that duplicate originals of 
the foregoing CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE were mailed first class, postage! 
prepaid, on the l,~ day of January, 1995, to: 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney for the Estate 
PO Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843 
CLAIM AGAINST ESTATE - 2 
Latah County Clerk 
Magistrate Division 
PO Box 8068 
Moscow, ID 83843-0568 
ANN COSHO 
Deputy Attorney General 
20 
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marks complained of by the Company, re- MILLER, Justice (concurring and dis-
spondents insist that by such instruction sen ting). 
I concur in the first four specifications 
presented in the majority opinion, bnt dis-
the court impliedly instructc·d the jury not 
to consider the remarks, and that "lt must 
be presumed that the jury followed and 
sent to the fifth specification reversing the 
obeyed'' the instruction. It is just a little judgm<:nt for the reason that the asstrte<l 
difficult .to understand how respondents inflammatory and prejudicial remarks of 
could be right in both instances. 
respondent's attorney to the jury an: nut 
[ 16] As pointed out by the court in sufficient to warrant a reversal. 
Bandoni v. Walston, supra, that: 
"While a large discretion is allowed an 
attorney in prese~ti ng his case, neverthe-
less, wh<:re, in doing so, he oversteps the 
bounds of propriety and fairness which 
should characterize ~is conduct as an officer 
of the court, such conduct, wher<: not cured 
by a proper instruction [as in the case at 
bar]. may, if proper and timely objection is 
made [as in the instant case], be ground 
for a nC!w trial or for reversal of th<: judg-
ment by the reviewing court." 
[17) It appears to us justice will best 
be served by granting a new trial. That 
will put the parties, respectively, bC1ck in 
the position they occupied at the time of 
the original trial and give each party a 
chance to present the case anew to the 
court and jury, and, at the same time, will 
avoid the danger of doing appellant a grave 
injustice. 
The judgment is reversed and the cause 
remanded with directions to grant a new 
trial. Costs awarded to appellant. 
BUDGE, Justice (dissenting). 
I cannot concur in the opinion as written 
in the above entitled case, therefore dis-
sent. 
" o :m --~-."-.,-.-'"-,...~ 
, 
191 P.2d 1009 
STATE ex rel. NIELSON et al. v. 
LINDSTROM. 
No. 7403. 
Supreme C-011rt or Idaho. 
April 1, 1W8. • 
I. Paupers <::=:>40 
Under common law, no r<:covery of 
money paid by state £or old age assistance 
was allowable where payment was not made 
by accident, fraud or mistake, 
2. paupers e:>40 
The grant of old a~e benefits under 
Public Assistance Law is unconditional as 
far as the recipient is concerned and creat(!s 
.-~ 
GIVENS, C. J., and HYATT, J.. concur, no obligation on part of recipient to repa>'· ,,, 
. ·, 
~-~ 
,, 
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Laws 1941, c. 181, § I (m); Laws 1947, c. of Idaho and another, against Nels Lind-
237. 
3. Paupers €==>3 
The granting of aid to its needy aged is 
a well recognized obligation of the state 
and is a governmental function tending to 
promote the public we! fare. 
4. States cS=>I 19 
The statute authorizing assistance pay-. 
ments to needy aged persons and rccov.,,·y 
of such payments out of estates of needy 
aged persons is not unconstitutional as giv-
ing or loaning credit of state. LC.A. 
§ 15-609; Laws 1941, c. ISi, § I(m); Laws 
19-U, c. 119, § 2; Laws 1947, c. 237; So-
._.,cial Security Act, §§ I ct seq., 2(a) (7), 
3(b) (2), as ame11dcd. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 301 
et seq., 302, 303(b) (2); Const. art. 3, § 
19; art. 8, § 2. 
strom, executor of the estate of Frans G. 
Magnus, deceased. From an order sustain-
ing demurrer and dismissing action without 
leave to amend, the plaintiff appeals. 
Re versed with direction. 
Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen., and John 
A. Carve7, Jr., J. R. Smead, and Robert B. 
Holden, Asst, Attys. Gen., for appellants. 
State laws providing for such recoveries 
appear to ~c contemplated hy the federal 
statute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (]) (B), 53 
Stat. 136!, (1939). 
The power of state legislatures is plen:iry 
in the matter of succ<:ssion to property by 
will or inheritance. The right is created 
by the Legislature, \vhich may at any time 
aholish it. Bankers Trust Company v. 
Bloclg-ett, 1922, 260 U.S. 647, 43 S.Ct. 233, 
5. Paupers Cc>43(1) 67 L.Ed. 439; State v, ]\[oilier, 1915, 96 
The determinatiun of eligibility of appli- Kan. SH, ISZ P. 771, 773, L.R.A.1916C, 
cant for old age assistance does not de- 551; In re Bevilacqua's Estate, 1945, Cal. 
pend on whether applicant will leave an es-
tate whe11 he dies. Laws 1941, e. 181, § 
I (m); Laws 1947, c. 237. 
. MILLER, J., dissenting. 
Appeal from District Court, Second Ju-
dicial District; Clearwater County; A. L. 
Morgan, Judge. 
Action to recover old age assistance pay-
ments by the State of Idaho on the relation 
of N .. P. Nielson, State Auditor of the State 
App., 161 P.2d 589. 
Recovery provisions are creatures of 
statute. As such, they have been generally 
upheld. State v. Whitver, 1942, 71 N.D . 
664, 3 N.W.2d 457; Hawkins v. Kansas 
Social \-Velfare Board, 193.S, 148 Kan. 760, 
84 P.2d 930; Department of Social Wel-
fare v. Wingo, 1946, i7 Cal.App.2d 316, li5 
P.2d 262. 
The Constitution of the State of Id,1·hn 
prohibits the loan of the credit of the state 
to private individuals or corporations. 
i-
i 
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Const., Art. VITI, sec. 2; Const., Art. 
V[IT, sec. 4; Const., Art. XII, sec. 4. 
There can be no recovery of money paid 
for old age assistance under the common 
Jaw. City of Worcester v. Quinn. 304 
J'he prohibition of these constitutional Mass. 2i6, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 A.L.R. iO]. 
provisions is primarily directed against the 
combination of public funds or credit with \Vithouc st:'llutory authority there can be 
the capital of private persons, corporate or no recovery of money paid for old age as-
Th · · · h h' · d si~tancc or relief. In re Humphries' Will, natural. c act1v1t1es cld pro 1b1tc 
have generally involved the element of en· 125 Misc. 62, 210 N.Y.S. 253. 
terprise, or profit-making private schemrs. The loan of the State's credit is prohibit-
Atkinson v. Board of Commissioners of . ed to or in aid of any individual. At-
Ada County, 1910, 18 Idaho 282, 108 P. kinson v. Board of Cot1nty Commissioners, 
1046, 28 L.R.A.,N.5., 412; School District 18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 1046, 28 L.R . .A.,N.S., 
No. 8 v. Twin Falls County l\fotual Fire In- 412; i\lcD011ald v. Doust, II Idaho 14, 81 
surance Company, 1917, 30 Idaho 400, 164 P. 60, 69 L.R.A. 220; White v. Pioneer 
P. 1174. Bank & T. Co., jQ Idaho 589, 298 P. 933. 
The term "loan" in the cited constitutior1- The making of payments upon applicatio-;;·· 
al provisions has been construed to mean for old age assistance under the statutes, 
a transaction which creates the customary coupled with the provisions for repayment 
relation of lender and borrower. Bannock and restrictions as to transfer of property, 
County v. Citizen's Bank and Trust Com- is contractu:il relationship. Const. Art. 
pany, 1933, 53 Idaho 159, 22 P.Zd 6i 4. VIII, Sec. 2: Hawkins v. State of Kansas, Social \.Vcliare Board, 148 Kan. i60, 84 P. 
The above cited constitutional provisions 2d 930; J n re Beningaso's £slate, l6j l\I isc. 
have been held to be a bar to actions of the 459, 300 N.Y.S. 951; In re Blac:k's Estate, 
Stat~ and other political subdivisious ouly 150 .Misc. 433,269 N.Y.S. 511; In the i\b.l-
when faith or credit is pledged. Indcpeud- ter of Katie Long, 242 App.Div. 781, 174 
eat School District N,,. 6 v. Common 
School District No. 38, 1942, 64 Idaho 303, 
131 P.2d 786; Hansen v. Independent 
School District No. 1, 1939, 61 Idaho 109, 
CJS P.2d 959; School District No. 8 v. Twin 
Falls County Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany, supra. 
Samuel F. Swayne, of Orofino, for re-
spondent. 
N.Y.S. 427. 
The mere acceptance of old age assist-
ance does not give the State the right to 
recover the payments. Tn re Humphries' 
Will, 125 Misc. 62, 210 N.Y.S. 253 . 
SUTPHEN, District Judge. 
The State of lJaho, on relation of its 
Stale Auditor and Commissio11er of the De-
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partment of Public Assistance, brought this credit of the state shall not, in any manner, 
action against the executor of the estate of be given, or loaned to, or in aitl of any in-
Frans G. l\<fagnus, deceased, to recover 
amounts paid in old-age assistance to dece-
dent during his lifetime and does not in-
volve in the slightest what should be taken 
ii:ito consideration in the initial a ward of 
old-age assistance; therefore, authorities 
involving such question:; are not in point 
herein. 
dividual, asociation, municipality or corpo-
ration.'' 
· [1] Under the c•)mmon law no reco,·-
ery o( money paid by the State for old-
age assistance was allowable where pay-
ment was not made by accident, fra u<l or 
mistake. City or" Worcester v. Quinn, 30 I 
Mass. 276, 23 N.E.2d 463, 125 /\.L.R. 707. 
The complaint, in brief, sets forth: Thus, any right the appellant may ha\'c to 
that Frans G. }.fagnus d_uring his lifetime reco"cr in this action must be based upon 
-:i.<le application for and was granted old- our statutes . 
._,; assistance; that commencing in 1farch Provision, however, for recovery against 
1943 the Depar:ment of Public Assistance 
the estates of recipients has been part of 
the law of this State continuously since 
:March 2, 19-U, when Chapt~r 119 of the 
paid him, in monthly installments each 
month to and including july 1946, the sum 
total of $1,651 ; that Frans G. :Magnus died 
L:-tws of 19-B bec:1mc effective. Section 2 
testate August I, 1946, leaving an est:-tte: of such Act added Section 24-a to the Pub-
that respo ndent was duly appointed a nd lie Assistance Law of the State and read 
qualified as executor oi the estate; that ap-
pellant duly filed claim \Yith the executor 
for the amount of assistance paid; that the 
executor reje.:tcd the cl:-tim, and this suit 
properly ensued as provided by section 15-
609, T. C. A. Id:1ho Trust Co. v. Miller, 16 
Idaho 308, 102 P. 360. 
The trial court sustained respondent's de-
murrer to the complaint and dismissed the 
action apparently accepting respondent's 
contention that the alleged transactions be-
tween the State and deceased amounted to 
a loan and that such a loan is unenforceable 
because repugnant to the inhibition con-
tained in Section 2 of Article 8 of the Con-
stitution of this State that: "* * * the 
as follows: ''Section 24-a. Recovery from 
recipients. On the death of any recipient, 
the total amount of assistance paid. or re~ 
lief granted under this Act sh:ill be allowed 
as a pre fer red claim against the estate of 
s11ch person and sh:i 11 be subject only to the 
expense of the last illness, funeral expenses 
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of ad-
ministration of said estate. No claim shall 
be enforced against any real estate or per-
sonal property of a recipient while such 
real estate is occ11picd by the recipient, a 
surviving spouse, or a dependent, but the 
Statute of Limitations shall not begin to 
run against such claim so long as the col-
lection thereof is prohibited, as hereinabove I I 
I' t 
I ~· 
I ~ J, 
I 
!, 
l 
I 
f, 
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/Provided. "Such claim shall be made by the 1945, Chap. 109; S.L.1947, Chap. 237) falls 
-county or, in cases of cooperative assist- within the inhibitions of Section 2 of Ar-
::ance, by the State ori behalf of all partici- tide 8 of the Constitution of the State of 
ip,ants contributing to such assistance." Idaho. 
Chapter 119, 1943 S:L. 
By an Act (Chapter 237, S.L.194i) the 
1947 legislature repealed the above quoted 
It is insisted an action cannot be main-
tained against the- estate of a deceased re-
cipient for the recovery of the amount of 
section and in lieu thereat enacted the fol- assistance granted such recipient during his 
lowing provision for recovery from estates Ii fetime. Old-age assistance began in Au-
of recipients: "Section 24-a. Recovery gust, L935, by the enactment by Congress of 
From Estates. On the death of any rccip- the Social Security Act, Title I, Chap. 531, 
ient of old-age assistance, the total amount Act of August 14, l935, 49 U.S.Stat. at 
of assistance paid such rccipeint under this Large, p. 620, <12 U.S.C.A. § 301 et seq. 
act may, in the discretion of the State De- Section 2 provided for old-age assistance. 
partment, be allowed as a claim against Paragraph (7) of Subdivision (a)-a part 
the estate of such person after reasonable of Section 2 of the Social Security Act-
funeral expenses, the expenses of the last read: "(7) Provide that, if the State or 
illness, and the expenses of administering 
the estate have been paid. No claim shall 
be imposed against any real estate of the 
recipient while it is occupied as a home by 
a surviving spouse, or against any personal 
property of less that $100.00 in value. The 
State Department shall ceni fy, to the State 
Auditor the amount recovered from each 
estate as above provided, and a proper dis-
tribution thereof shall be made by the State 
Auditor in proportion to the amount of as-
sistance contributed ~y the state and the 
federal government for such assistance." 
Chapter 237, 1947 Session Laws. 
Thus, in view of the statute, the ques-
tion before us is whether the granting of 
old-age assistance under the terms and con-
any of its political subdivisions collects 
from the estate of any recipient of old-age 
assistance any amount with respect to old-
age assistance furnished him under the 
plan, one-half of the net amount so collect-
ed shall be promptly paid to the United 
States." 
It will be 11otcd paragraph (7) did not 
- make it manc..latory upon a state or any po-
litical subdi\•ision of a state to collect any-
thing whatsoever from the estate of any 
recipient of old-age assistance. That para-
graph simply provided that if a state did 
collect from the estate of a recipient of old-
age assistance, then and in such case, one-
half of the net amount collected should be 
promptly paid to the United States. Thus, 
ditions of our Public Assistance Law (S.L. the state WilS left absolutely free to drter-
1941, Chap. 181; S.L. 1943, Chap 119; S.L. mine whether it would, or would not, col-
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lect from the estate of a recipient, but if it state from the estate of a deceased recipi-
decid~d to and did collect, then it was made ent of assistance. A most generous thing 
mandatory that one-half of the net amount 
collected should be promptly paid to the 
United States. 
About four years after the enactment of 
the Federal Social Security Act; to wit, 
August 10, 1939, the Congress amended it. 
By the amendment, paragraph (7) above 
quoted, was omitted; but a provision of sim-
ilar import was included in the amendment 
in that by paragraph No. (2) of Section 303 
(b) U.S.C.A. 42, it was and is provided as 
for the Congress to do in this: It gives a 
state, for instance Idaho, a much larger 
amount of money to use in avoiding placing 
the aged and needy in poor-h()uscs, by 
granting assistance to those owning the 
homes in which they live and enabling them 
to continue to li\•e in such homes until both 
husband and wife have passed on, after 
which; of course, thq no longer require the 
use of a home. The generosity of the Con-
gress does not eml there. It also provides 
follows: "Pro\'ided, That any part of the more money to meet the requirements of 
amount recovaed from the estate of a de- the needy and destitute who are not the 
ceased recipient which is not in excess of 
the amount expended by the State or any 
~ political subdivision thereof for the funeral 
expenses of rhe J~ceascd shall not be con-
sidered as a basis for reduction under 
cl a use ( B) of this paragraph." 
owners of homes. 
Morgan v. Department of Social Securi-
t_v, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, is cited 
in support of the contention that a state 
cannot recover from the estate of a de-
ceased recipient of old-age assistance. It 
In other words, by that amendment, the appears the opinion in that case also cov-
Congrcss still left a state absolutely free ered the companion cases of Laura M. 
to collect from the estate of a deceased re- Camfield and \Villi am L. Jacobson v. The 
cipient if it chose to, but provided that any D<.'partment of Social Security of the State 
part of the amoulll recovered, not in excess of \Vashinglon. The question was· not pre-
of the amount expended for funeral ex- sented to the Washington court in the Mor-
penscs should not be considered as a basis gan case, supra, as to whether the legisbture 
for reduction under clause (B) of the same of the State of \-Vashington could, or could 
paragraph. 
not, under the Washington Constitution, 
The sole purpose of omitting paragraph provide for the collection or recovery of 
(7) above quoted, from the amendment of assistance granted a deceased recipient in 
1939, was that Congress intended that a his lifetime. That this is true cannot be 
state should no longer be required lo pay to questioned, because all three ot the above 
the United States one-half of the net named persons were very much alive, mak-
amount of whatever was recovered by a ing application for and demanding assist-
~~ 
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ance under \Vashington's Senior Citizens 
Grants Act, which the \Vashington court 
passed on. 
While the humanitarian purpose of our 
Public Assistance Law, which grants as· 
sistance to the deserving and needy, is not 
directly attacked, it is, however, indirectly 
~ttacked upon the ground-among others-
that the law is unconstitutional; becat1se, it 
is argued in effect that the transaction by 
and through which Frans G. Magnus, now 
deceased, was granted assistance, created 
a debt which amounted to a loan-hence, 
was rcpt1gnant to the inhibition contained 
in Sec. 2, Art. 8 of our Constitution pro-
provide for any relief whatever to the de-
serving. and needy, and that would be sim-
ply absurd. 
[3] The granting of aid to its needy 
aged is a well recogniz~d obligation of the 
state and is a governmental function tend-
ing to promote the public wclfarr. Ala-
meda County v. Jamsen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 · 
P.2d 11, 130 A.L.R. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690. 
[4] Tht\S, its character as to all eligible 
recipients having been determined to be 
public rather than private, it follows that 
the grantini:; _of such aid is not within the 
constitmional inhibitions unless the recov-
ery features of the law above quoted made 
viding that: "The credit of the state shall 
the law subject to such inhibitions. Wil-
not, in any manner, be given, or loaned to, 
Iiams 1·. Baldridge, 48 ldaho 618,284 P. 203; 
or in aid of any individual, association, mu-
nicipality or corporation.'·'. State v. Snyder, 29 Wyo. 199, 212 P. 771; 
Alameda County v. Janssen, s~pra. Un-
[2] The grant of old-age benefits under doubtedly the state has the authority to pro-
our Public Assistance Law appears to be vide for public assistance for its needy 
unconditional as far as the recipient is con- aged, and the governmental nature of the 
cerned. It creates no obligation on his 
part lo repay public assistance to which he 
was lawfully entitled. There are no provi-
sions therein which condition the grant ou 
either the non-ownership o [ property or 
the ownership of less than a prescribed 
minimum of properly. 
If respondent is right m his contention 
our Public Assistance Law is unconstitu-
tional, even though it creates no obligation 
on tlie part of any recipient of relief to re-
pay any part o( the relief granted, it would, 
of course, carried to its logical conclusion, 
rnean the legislature would be powerless to 
service determines its character as not giv-
ing or loaning the credit of the stale. Sup-
pigcr v. Enking, 60 Idaho 292, 9l P.2d 362. 
The law (19-H S.L., Chap. 181 at Sec. I, 
S11bd. (m) defines that: "(m) 'Needy aged' 
shall mea11 any pcrsoi1 65 yi::ars or older, 
whose income and sources of subsistence 
are insufficient to supply him with the com-
mon necessities of li[e commensurate wifa 
his needs and health, • • •" 
The statute, in line with modern ideas, 
makes it possibl~ in many cases to avoid 
placing the needy aged in inst\tutions and 
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contemplates the granting of assistance to difficult to see how the recovery feature,s 
· those who may own the home in which they of the Public Assistance Law can be said 
live or other property as well as to those 
absolutely destitute, if their income and 
to be giving or loaning the credit of the 
State. 
somces of subsistence are not sufficient to The liability of the State is in no way in-
meet the statutory standards. UnJer these creased by the presence of these recovery 
provisions the recipient of public assistance 
is not required to liquidate all of his prop-
provisions in the Jaw. The State dQes not 
oblig.1te itself to do anything more because 
erty. Ofttimes the recipient continues to of such provi,;ions. Howe\'er, it does re-
live in his own home, which he is able to ceive the benefit of the provisions in ques-
preserve for use during his lifetime and for tion and should, it seems, be classed a recip-
the use of his widow during her lifetime icnt of creJit rather than the giver thereof. 
after his decease. This method of caring The conAict of interest here is not between 
for the needy aged has pro\'en far superior the State an<l its neccly aged. It is between 
in many cases to placing the needy aged in 
institutions. It has not only proven to be 
mor<' cfficirnt and economical from the 
State's st:111dpoint, but more humanitarian, 
..., pro,·iding the recipient with a more normal 
existence. freeing him of much of the stig-
ma and many of the hardships and dis-
agreeable features of life in an institution. 
[5] These recovery provisions, supra, 
have nothing to do with the determination 
of the eligibility of any applicant for assist-
auc._.. \\'hcther he will or will not leave an 
estate when he dies makes not one iota of 
difference. The benefit received by the re-
cipient who leaves an estate is no more 
than that of the recipient who happens to 
have none. 
In thr light of our determination that the 
granting of aid to the needy aged by the 
State does not fall within the inhibitions of 
the constitution against giving or loaning 
the credit of the State to an indi,·idual, it is 
the State and the heirs, next of kin or other 
distrib11tees of the estates of the deceased 
rec1p1ents. "The right to dispose of one's 
property by will, and the right to have it 
disposed of by the law, after decease, is 
created by statute, and therefore the state 
may impose s11ch conditions upon the exer-
cise of this right as it may determine." 
Bankrrs' Trust Company , .. Blodgett, 260 
U.S. 64i, 43 S.Ct. 233, 234, 6i L.Ed. 439, 
quoti11g Id., % Conn. 361, 114 A. 104. 
Respondent s.iys, however, that: "To 
sustain the repaym..:nt of old age assista11cc 
by virtue legislarnrc plenary power to regu-
late descent and inh('ritance, is to violate 
Section 19 of article 3, of the Constitution 
of the State of Td:iho because this (is) 
class legislation, placing burdens 011 the 
aged-needy not imposed upon other recip-
ients from lhe State." 
The section of the constitution last re-
f erred to prohibits the legislature from 
t' 
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passing local or special laws in certain enu-
merated cases, among which is listed: 
"a fleeting estates of deceased persons 
* * •" and "changing the law of de-
scent or succession." 
The repayment of old-age assistance pro-
vision of our Public Assistance Law ap-
pears to be gen~ral rather than special in 
its terms, as it operates upon all the aged 
it must clearly appear to be so." Bannock 
County v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 53 
Idaho 159, at page 176, 22 P.2d 674, 680. 
The case, therefore, will be reversed and 
the trial court directed to overrule respond-
ent's demurrer to the complaint. Costs to 
appellant. 
GIVENS, C. l-, HOLDEN, J., and l\lc-
needy and their estates in like situations. DOUGALL, D. J., conc11 r. 
"A statute is general if its terms apply MILLER, Justice (dissenting). 
to, and its provisions operate upon, all per-
sons· and subject-matters in like situation.'' 
Jones v. Power County, 27 Idaho 656, ISO 
P. 35, 37; In re Bottjer, 45 Idaho 168, 260 
P. 1095. 
On August 14, 1935, the 74th Congress, 
Sess. I, Ch. 531, enacted the Social Securi-
ty Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § JOI et seq. Title I 
ther.:of provided, "Grants To States For 
Old-Age Assistai1ce." When used in Title 
"A special Jaw applies only to an individ- I of said Act the term of old-age assistance 
ual or number of individuals out of a. single means money payments to aged ind.ividuals. 
class similarly situated and affected, or to Section I of said Title made an appropria-
a special locality. A law is not special sim- tion and the sums appropriated and made 
ply because it may have only a local appli- available under said Act were to be used in 
cation or apply only to a special class, if in matching payments with states which ~a·d 
fact it does apply to all such classes and submitted pl,ms to be approved by the So-
all similar localities and to all belonging to cial Security Board as established by Title 
the specified class to which the law is made VII of the Act anc! under state plan for 
applicable. Mix v. Boa rel of CCJunty old-age assistan·ce. 
Commr's, etc., 18 Idaho 695, 705, 112 P. Section 2 provides for state old-age as-
215, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 534; Hettinger v. sistance and subsection (a) thereof is as 
Good Road District No. 1, 19 Idaho 313, follows: "(a) A State plan for o_ld-age as-
318, I 13 P. 721; In re Crane, 27 Idaho 671, sistancc must (l) provide that it shall be 
.at page 690, 1 Si P. 1006, L.R.A.l918A, 942." in effect in all political St1bdivisio11s of the 
Ada County '-v. Wright, 60 Idaho 394, at State, and, if administered by them, be 
page 403, 92 P.2d 134, 138. mandatory upon them; • • •" 
"The rule is that before a legislative en- Other provisions of subsection (a) arc 
.actment will be held to be unconstitutional, enumerated. 
------------------~----~ 
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Paragraph (7} thereof is as follows: ner that assistance was no longer neces-
"(7) provide that, if the State or any of its sary. 
political subdivisiuns collects from the es-
tate of any recipient of ol<l-age assistance 
any amount with respect to old-age assist-
ance furnished him under the plan, one-ha If 
of the net amount so collected shall be 
P.rornp!ly paid to the United States." 
From section 2, subsection (a) it mani-
festly appears that the State plan for old-
age assistance is mandatory and must con-
tain certain prescribed requiremciits in or-
der to entitle a state to "Grants to States 
for Ol<l-Agc Assistance under the Socia I 
Security Act." We pariicularly invite at· 
tention to paragraph (7), which authorized 
'illlllr1 state to i:ullect from the estate of a recip-
ient of old-age assistance any and all 
;imounts paid under the pl.in. In other 
words, any right :rnc! .iuthority of a st;,te 
to collect from the estatl! of a recipient of 
old-age assistance must come from and 
The complaint in this case shows that it 
is an action in debt. It also shows that the 
dece:tsed (Frans G. Magnus) was paid the 
aggregate sum of $1,651 for old-age assist-
ance, and that no part of the said sum has 
been repaid to the state, and that there is 
now due and owing the state of Idaho the 
said sum of $1,651. 
The statutory provision under which the 
action was commenccci and is so11ght to be 
maintained is as follows: "Section 2-.-a. 
Recovery From Estates. On the death of 
any recipient of old-age assistance, the total 
amount of assistance paid such recipient 
under this act may, in the discretion of the 
State Department, be allowed as a claim 
against the cstak of such person after rea-
sonable funeral expenses, the expense:, of 
the 1:ist illness, and the expenses of admin-
istering the estate have been paid." 
throl1gh the provisions contained in para- In the case of State ex rel. Dean v. 
graph (7) afores.iid, anJ without such au- I3ran<ljor<l et al., 108 Mont. 447, 92 P.2u 
thr,rity a state is not entitl~u to file a valid 
claim against the estate of a deceased recip-
ient or maintain an action for any am,)tlllt 
wh;ltsoever, irrespectin! of the manner in 
which an estate of a recipient of old-age as-
sistan..:c was ;icquire<l, that is, whether the 
recipient had Co\'erc:d up property or in-
come at the time of making application for 
273, 279, being a mandamus procecdirig- 10 
rompel payment of full amount of monthly 
oltl-agc assistance, it is said: "When the 
whole subject of relief for the aged indi-
gent is taken imo consideration, when the 
history of federal and state legislation is 
given proper effect, when the national 
plans :ind the subsequently enacted state 
assistance, or after being awarded assist- plans of the different states are understood, 
ancc he had come into property and in- it would seem that none of the state plans, 
come which he did not report and which including our own, were ever devised to 
was sufficient_ to provide him in such man- stand or operate without the cooperation 
· I 
,-
000195
23f. Ga IDAHO REPORTS 
of the federal government. [Authority J. age assistance is no longer authoriz~d b:; 
If this be true, and we think that it is be- the Social Security Act, anJ; which is 11:,: 
yond question the outstanding theory of the 011ly source of authority of states and/o: 
whole matter, then it is obvious that our 
law must be construed, 11ot as a11 i1,d,•pc11d-
ent Act, but in. co11j1rnclio,1 willt /he feder-
al Act, that is, the two Acts must be admin-
istered togdlic-r as a 1111ificd code (If lows 
enacted by Congress a11d tlzc stale frgislu-
t11re for the complclc a>id co111prcl1e11sii 1c 
control of t/,c subject." ( Emphasis ours.) 
We have indicated that authority for any 
activity by a state incident to reco\·ery or 
the collection of payments from the estate 
of a deceased recipient was embodied in sec-
tion 2 of Title I of the Social Security Act 
as originally enacted. Section 2, of the 
original Acr, was subsequently designated as 
Section 302, and the provision contained in 
paragraph (7) of section 2, as originally 
enacted, was repealed and in the case of 
Morgan v. Department of Social Security, 
14 Wash .2d 156, 127 P.2d 686, 693, it is said: 
"It is evident that there is a conAict hetwc~,i 
the provisions of the FeJcral act and those 
of the st.He statute. In the portion of the 
Federal act above quoted is found the fol-
lowing: '(a) A State plan for old-age as-
sist;u1ce must • • * (7) effective July 
I, 1941, provide that th(; State agency shrill, 
in dctcr_mining need, take into consideration 
any other income and resources of an in-
their political subdi,·isions, any claim of the 
state against the estate of Frans G. i\bg-
llUS, deceased, or the commcncc-rnent of an 
-
action againsl Nels Lindstrom, the execu-· 
tor of his estate, is a nullity, and cannot be 
sanctioned. 
In support of the st,ttemcnt that any at-
tempted recovery is a nullity because unau-
thorized by the Federal act, we here men-
tion that there is also, another reason why 
no reco\'ery :s permissible and that is that 
the act io11 was a direct action aJdresscd to 
the original rather than the appellate ju-
risdiction of the court. Thus, we arc con-
fronted with two propositions, (I)· that no 
recovery can be had for the reason that 
there is no authorization therefor by the 
Federal act, :ind (2) that the court had no 
jurisdiction in that the only right the court 
had in the premises was under and through 
its appellate jurisdiction. 
Tn the case of Bowen v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 \Vash.2d 148, 127 P.Zd 
682, 684, it is said: 
''l\t the time the constitution [State] was 
adopted, civil procedure was governed by 
the practice act of 1881. Code of 1881, p. 
35 Section 1, chapter I, pr01·idecl that: 
dividual claiming old-age assistance.'" 
'The common law of England * * * 
Accordingly, any former provision that a (LC.A. 70-116) and the organic net aud 
state or its political subdivisions might col- laws of Washington Territory shall be tile 
lect .fro~ the estate of a recipient of old-. rule of decision in all the courts of this 
,. 
:I 
.,. 
1· 
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Territory.' And § 2 provides that: 'There 
s:i;ill be in this Tcrrit,.Jry hereafter but one 
form of action [I.C.A. 5-101] for the en-
forcement or protection of pri\"ate rights 
and the redress of pri\'ate wrongs, which 
shall be called a cii·il actia11.' * • • 
. "It hardly requires argument to demon-
strate that the court proceedings provided 
for in § 9 of chapter 1, Laws of 19.J.1, the 
senior citizens grams act, do not come with-
in these provisions of the practice act of 
1831. The cotirt proccdi11gs provided for 
in th(1l oc/ ore 1101 co11rn1c11cL·d i11 any court. 
Tire_\' /w,.·r t/rcir i11ccptio11 i11 tire dcparl111c11t 
of social s,·curit_1·, and find th,·ir way la the 
cor,rts thro11gh appcal-110/ by ?t·ay of the 
issr1a11cc of s1111111ioI1s. [Emphasis ours.] 
"f"tirthcr than that, the functions now cx-
erciscJ by administrative bodies under leg-
islative authority were practically unknown 
to Amcrci.,11 jurisprudence at the time our 
co11stit11tio11 was adopted; and, so far as we 
can asccrta in, they Wl're wholly unknown 
to 011r tcrritori.tl jurisprudence. To say 
that court proceedings arising out of the ex-
.:rcise of such administrative functions are 
ci\'il actions in contemplation of the limita-
tion on this court's jurisdiction, contained 
in § 4, art. lV, of the constitution, would 
make that provision 'e:-<press purposes 
which were never within the minds of th~ 
people in agreeing to it.' People v. Hard-
ing, supra [53 Mich. 481, 19 N.W. 155], 
What pertinent authorities there arc on the 
arising before administrative bodies are in 
no sense civil actions as they were under-
stood at common law. 
"Colonel 0. R. McGuire, a member of the 
American Bar Association's special com-
mittee on administrative law, in an article 
published in 26 Georgetown L.tw J ourn;d, 
574, 589, says: '• • * administrative 
law is a separate and distinct branch of the 
law. It is not common law, equity, or ad-
miralty law • * * '" 
The c;ise of illorgan v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 127 P.2d 
686, 692, 708 deals extcusively with Title I 
oi the Social Security Act, and the adoption 
of the plan submitted by the state of Wash-
ington through the pro\·isions of initiative 
141, and in accordance with the r~quire-
rncnts of the act and the approval of the 
Soci.tl Security Board as provided ir) Sec-
tion 302 of the Act. Contained therein· it 
is said: 
"A transcript of the mi1llltcs of the meet-
ing- of the Federal social sec1trity board at 
which i11itiative 141 was cousider,:d, con-
t;:iins the following: 
" 'Section Three, subsections (g) and 
(h), of this initiative me;:isure are in viola-
tion of the prO\·isions of the Social Secu-
rity Act, which became effective, July I, 
1941, in 'that the state agency may disre-
gard certain "income and resources'' in de-
termining whether an applicant is eligible 
subject lend support to the view that court for old-age assistance; and may also be in 
proceedings ,flowing from controversies violation of presently effective provisions 
{ ,-
"., 
••• 
'<':: 
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-:.-.;; to allow recipients certain income and 
.sources, and independent of Grants-In-
.\id, which was not provided for in Title I 
)f the Social Security Act, and that such 
,eemingly inconsequential provisions as 
:ontained in ,ubparagraphs (g) and (h) 
recognized obligation of the state and is a 
govt:rnmencal function tending to promote 
the public welfare.'' In support of such 
statement we are cited tc the case_ of Ala-
meda County v. Janssen, 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 
P.2d ll, 130 A.LR. 1141; 41 Am.Jur. 690. 
:ire in violation of the Social Security :\ct, Said case deals with an Act of the legisla-
du.: evidently to the closely knit adherence ture of California of l929, providing finan-
to the coop<:rati\·e legislative effort of state cial assistance to needy aged who met cer-
iind national governments in carrying out a tain requirements, and whose property did 
public purpos.: common to both. If the not exceed specified values. Th.:re were no 
board held that the provisions contained matching funds available or in\'olved. It 
in subparagraphs (g) and (h) which al- is of no assistance in determining whether 
lowed certain income and resources not al- a state may col.lect any or all of th.: amounts 
]owed by the Social Security A.:t to be dis- paid a recipient of old-age assistance. 
regarded in determining the amount of as-
sistance to be awarded a recipient then 
•here is no need to speculate as to what 
.-aid board would hold on the question of 
The majority opinion treats the Public 
Assistance Act as the only legislation in-· 
volv..:d, and that Section 24-a, Session Law.~ 
1947, as th.: sole and only measure of deter-I 
the validity of the state of Idaho to file a mining the right of the State to recover any 
preferred claim against the .:state of Frans payments made to recipients of old-ag.:: as-
G. !vbgnus, deceased, or to institute a suit sistance. Said opinion does not take into 
in the District Court against his cxccutor account th;i.t payments of old-age assistance' 
under the provisions of section 24-a, s1ipra, is a cooperative function and that without 
for the full amount of Grants-In-Aid law- such cooperation the State would be power-
fully paid Magnus as a recipient of old-age less to act. 
assistance, insttad of handliug it as a ck-
partrnental matter in accordance with l.lw, 
or that the State might assume that any 
such provision was legal since paragraph 
(7) providing for recO\'ery as contained in 
-the original Social Security Act had not 
been lifted therefrom and is still contained 
therein_ 
The majority opinion states that, "The 
granting of aid to its needy aged is a well 
In the case of Bowen v. Department of 
Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 148, 127 P.2d 
6S2, a proceeding wherein the respondent 
Bowen made a dcmand upon the Director 
of the Department of Social Security of 
the State of \.Vashington, to increase his 
award of $34 a month to $40 a month and 
demanded "a fair hearing" under the pro-
visions or section 8, p. 7, of the act, which 
provided that said hearing should be had 
l 
,, 
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not more than 30 days after the receipt of visions of the Social Security Act and not 
notice. More than 30 <lays having elapsed in accordance with the state Act allowing 
Bowen gave notice of appeal to the superior income and resources in addition to the 
court of Grays Harbor county. A motion payment of sums for old-age assistance, 
to quash the notice of appeal was interposed but more particularly for the purpose of 
by the department and the Supreme Court emph:isizing a matter heretofore pointed 
in passing upon the matters involved said: out, th:it is, that any controversy between 
"To the extent, at least, that it is composed a recipient and the department of social 
of 'federal matching £unds' the fund from security must be determined in the first in-
which 'Senior Citizens Grants' are paid is stance in the department an<l find its way 
essentially a trust fund, for the proper ex- to the courts only through appeal and not 
pen<liture of which the state department of by war of issuance of a summons. In this 
social security is responsible to the federal case the department had deducted ~l l from 
government." each of the recipients because of home 
, The fact that 24-a, Laws of 1947, author- ownership, combined living and the use of 
izes a recovery of all amounts, without water without payment. The recipients 
reservation, theretofore paid recipients of sought a hearing before the Pierce County 
'old-age assistance, it is apparent that the \Velfare Department which rccommcn<lcd 
'payment of assistance to recipients, which the deduction and the recipients being d:!--
may subsequently be recovered, must be satisfied with the amounts of grants, rec_-
,charactcrized as a loan, otherwise there ommendcd by the County \Vcl fare Depart-
ment, requested a fair hearing thereon 
before the director of the state department. 
could be no provision for _recovery, a.nd 
under those conditions, of course, would 
be offensive to Section 2 of Article 8 of The hearings were had, and thereafter the 
the Constitution which inhibits the loaning director approved the recommendations o·f 
of the credit of the state to any individual. 
the Pierce county we! fare department, and 
In the case of Burgdorf ct al. v. Depart- awarded each applicant a grant in the sum 
ment of Social Security, H Wash.2d 209, of $29 each month. "The recipients, being 
127 P.2d i09, practically the same ques- of the opinion that they were each entitled . 
tions arc involved as in the case of Mor- to a grant in a greater amount, appealed 
gan v. Department -of Social Security. I from the departmental orders to the supe-
quote therefrom, not so much for the pur- rior court for Pierce county. After a 
pose of showing that grar1ts-in-aid to reci- hearing, _the trial court reversed the depart-
pients under the Washington Public As- mental orders, and remanded the cases to 
sistance Act, as embodied in initiative 141, the department, with instructions that each 
must be made in accordance with the pro- grant should be increased, an<l payment 
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thereof in the incrcasccl amount be made partmcnt, 110 nC\11' evidence having been 
retroactive to date from December 4, 1940. offered by either party." 
From these jud):'mcnts the dcpanmcm of The controversy gnw out of the fact 
social security has appealed. The cases that each recipient sou~ht a grant oi ;S40 
han· bcen consolidated for hearing before and there was deducted from said amount 
this court.'' 
The jml)!t11cnts in thc cases ar bar were 
rcverset.l with instructions to enter judg-
ments affirming the orders of the depart-
mcnt. 
$i because of home ownership, and $3 bc-
caus..- of comhin..:d (i,·in~. 
Further quotin):' from Halsell ct al. v. 
Department of Social Security, supra: 
"• • • Ju accordance with the con-
ch1sions of law, the court entered its de-[n the case of Halsell ct al. v. Dcpart-
ml·nt of Social Security, I~ \Vash2d i09, 
127 P.2d ii I, something of the same prop-
cn:c remanding the proceeding to the de-
partment, with <lircctions to revise the 
osition as contained in the case of Burg-
awards by diminatini;; therefrom the dc-
dorf v. Department of Social Security, ductions al10\"C referred to. From this dc-
llillll"' supra. was up for di:termination. The 
crcc the <lcpartmcnt of social security of 
Grays Harbor county wcl fare department 
recommemkd that a grant be made to l\Ir. 
Halsell of $30 per month, and that a simi-
lar grant be made in favor of ~(rs. Hal-
sell. "The recipients, being dissatisfied 
with the rccommcnc.l;ttion of the county 
the state of \Vashi11gton has appealed to 
this court." 
"The trial court was evidently of the 
opinion that the dcd1tctions a!io\·c rcfcrrc<l 
to, made by the director, were not in ac-
cordancc with the provisions of initiati\·c 
we! fare department, rc!]ucstct.1 a fair he:ir- • • • 
ing befon: the <lircctor of the department, Hl. 
which hearing was granted and the testi-
mo11y reduced to writing. Based upon 
the rccon.1 so made, the director rendered 
his decision June 19, 1941, affirming the 
ac:ion of tile county wd fare department, 
"\Ve ha\"C detcrmi11cd this question con-
trary to respondents' contention. As statc<l 
in our opinion in the consolidated cases of 
~!org:in ct al. v. Department of Social 
Security, (14 Wash..2<l 136], 12i P.2d 686, 
and awardin):' a grant to each recipient in we arc convinced that initiative 141 by its 
the amount of thirty dollars per month. own terms must be construed in connection 
Feeling aggricvc<l by the <lccision of the with the F cdcral statute, an<l that certain 
director, the recipients appealed to the provisions of the state statute arc not in 
superior court, where the matter was harmony with the Federal Jaws and must 
hearc.J upon the rccor<l made before the de- be disregarded." 
G.~ 1 u,\ 110-lli 
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The judgment appealed from was revers-
ed with instructions to enter judgment af-
firming the order of the department. 
In Vol. 42, Am.Jur., p. 698, sec. 254: 
"The Federal courts have established 
a set of princi pies known as the 'primary 
grant an injunction against rates alleged to 
be unreasonable or discriminatory. The 
doctrine is applied in the face of statutes 
which expressly purport not to abridge or 
alter existing remedies on the ground that 
such a provision cannot be construed to 
continue rights which would be absolutely 
jurisdiction doctrine,' developed in cases inconsistent with the statute.'' (Innumer-
construing the Interstate Commerce Act able amhorities are cited in support of the 
[49 US.CA.§ let seq.], but given general foregoing doctrine.) 
application to Federal administrative bodies In support of the doctrine that an action 
other than the Interstate Commerce Com-
may not be instituted in a district court be-
mission, and applied by the Federal courts 
in relation to state administrative bodies. 
[\\"oodrich v. Northern Pac. R. Co.; 8 Cir., 
71 F.2d 732, 97 A.LR. 401.] 
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction 1s 
that the courts cannot or will not determine 
a controversy involving a question which 
is ,..-ithln the jurisdiction oi an adminis-
tratiYe tribunal prior to the decision of 
that question by the administrative tribunal, 
where the question demands the exercise of 
sound administrative discretion requiring 
the special knowledge, experience and ser-
vices of the administrative tribunal to de-
termine technical and intricate matters 
cause of a controversy arising before an ad-
ministrative department, we cnc the case 
of Peterson v. Livestock Commission, 
i\font., 181 P.2<l 152, 157, wherein it is 
held: 
"It is generally held that a Statute which 
attempts to place the court in the place of 
a commission or board to try a matter anew 
as an administrative body is unconstitution-
al as a delegation to the judiciary of non-
judicial powers. A few of the many cases 
so holding are the following: Steenerson 
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 69 Minn. 353, 
72 N.W. 713; State v. Great Northern Ry. 
Co., 130 Minn. 57, 153 N.W. 247, Ann.Cas. 
of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is es- 1917B, 1201; In re Hunstiger, 130 Minn. 
sential to comply with the purposes of the 474, 153 N.W. 869; State ex rel. Dybdal v. 
regulatory statute administered. The prin- State Securities Comm., 145 Minn. 221, 176 
ciple is derived from a consideration of the N. W. 759; State Board of Medical Regis-
nature of the question and of the inquiry !ration v. Scherer, 2?1 Ind. 92, 46 N.E2d 
and the action required for its solution. 602; In re Fredericks, 285 Mich. 262, 280 
The courts will not take jurisdiction even N .W. 464, 125 A.LR. 259; Mojave River 
ternporarily, pending an investigation be- Irr. Dist. v. Supreme Court, 202 Cal. 717, 
fore the administrative tribunal, so as to 262 P. 724; Borreson v. Department of 
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Public Welfare, 368 Ill. 425, 14.N.E.2d 485; 
In re Opinion of Justices, 85 N.H. 562, 154 
A. 217. 
Referring to the c:-:.se of Alameda Coun-
ty v. Janssen, supra, that was an action in 
mandamus to compel Janssen as Chairman 
of the Board of Supervisors of Alameda 
"Statutes providing for appeals somewhat 
County to execute certain releases of liens 
similar to that under consideration have 
been held valid by interpreting them as not 
granting trials de novo in the full sense of 
that expression but as conferring authority 
for the court. to pass upon the lawfulness 
only of the order of the board or commis-
sion. Examples are: ;\·[organ v. Depart-
ment of Social Security, 14 Wash.2d 156, 
._,2i P.2d 686; Investors Syndicate v. 
Hughes, 378 Ill. 413, 38 N.E.2d 754; Lloyd 
v. City of Gary, 21-l- Ind. iOO, li N.E.2d 
836. 
and cancellation of restrictive agreements 
with respect to real property of the recipi-
ents of financial aid granted under the pro-
visions of old-age security act of the state. 
In 193i the California Legislature amended 
sections 2224 and 2225 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code, into which section 4 of 
the Old-Age Security Act had been incor-
porated, to eliminate the provisions of such 
liens as well as the provisions making the-
aid a debt of the recipient to the st.ate and 
county. Section 2225 was amended to pr<>-
"The only proper questions that may be vide that, "all liens and mortgages hereto-
tried by a court on appeal from an order fore created under the provisions of said 
such as the one here involved is whether chapter are hereby released and the board 
the commission acted capriciously or arbi- of supervisors of each county • • • 
trarily or without jurisdiction or authority arc hereby directed and authorized to exe-
under the law. People of State of New 
York ex rel. X ew York & Queens Gas Co. 
v. :'llcCall, 245 U.S. 345, 38 S.Ct. 122, 62 
cute and record appropriate instruments 
of release." Janssen, as chairman of the 
board of supervisors, refused to execute 
said liens and releases on the grounds that L.Ed. 337; State ,·. State Board of Equal-
it ,·iolated section 31 of article IV of the 
ization, 56 l\lont. 413, 185 P. i08, 186 P. 
69i." 
California Constitution, prohibiting the 
legislature from making or authorizing any 
Since the majority opinion has been re- gift of public money and also that it do lat-
\\'ritten, there is included therein the case ed prohibitions in the United States am! 
of City of \Yorceste-r v. Quinn, 304 l\fass. California Constitutions against the pas-
276, 23 N.E.2d -163. 125 A.L.R. 707. I fail sage of any law impairing the obligation 
to see wherein said authority is of any as- of contracts. The court in passing 011 the 
sistance when applied to the majority opin- question, construed the constitutional pro-
1on. I will rder to said matter later. vision as follows [ 16 Cal.2d 276, 106 P.2d 
, 
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14]: "Section 31 of article IV of the Cal- of this court? Is it because of there being 
i fornia Constitution prohibits the legis- a. public assistance a.ct, or because the leg-
lature from making or authorizing a gift islature has seen fit to amend said act by 
of public money or thing of value to any including therein a provision for a re-
individual or corporation. The next clause, covery of the amount of assistance paid a 
however, provides that nothing in this sec- rec1p1cnt, Section 2-l-a, supra, is not a 
tion shall prevent the legislature from part of the substantive law of this jmisdic-
granting aid pursuant to s~ction 22 of ar-
ticle IV which amhorizes the granting of 
aid to indigent aged. Therefore the re-
lease of a lien by a county, pursuant to sec-
tion 2227 of the \Velfare Cod~, does not 
constitute a ,·iolation oi section 31, article 
IV, if (1) it is a gift of public money or 
thing of ,·alue, or (2) it is a grant of aid to 
indigent aged under section 22 of ;rticle 
IV." 
It will be observed that section 22 of 
article IV of the Constitution, authorized 
the granring of aid to indigent aged. We 
have no such pro,·ision in our constitution 
and it w:1s b<!cause the liens, mortgages and 
contracts establishi:d an existing debt, that 
Janssen, even in the face of section 2:2 of 
lion. But, to the contrary, is purely pro-
cedural, and, incidentally, is the first re-
sort in an attempt to establish a collection 
agency of the Public Assistance Act. The 
majority opinion observes, "[f respondent 
is right in his contention that the Public 
Assistance law is unconstitunonal, even 
Lhough it cre:i tes no oblig:uion on the part 
of any recipient oi relief to repay any part 
of the relit:£ gr:imed, it would, of course, 
carried to its logical conclusion, mean the 
legislature would be powerless to provide 
for any relief \1·hacever to the deserving 
and needy, and that would be absurd." 
Prom the forcgoi ng, it is made to appear 
that section 2-l-a is superior to all other 
phases of the Public Assistance Act. I 
article IV, aforesaid, and the legislation know of no one who asserts, or insists, 
that was enactt:d, rdused to sign releases of that the payment of old-age assistance, in 
the liens that had been incurred by the the first instance, violates the credit pro-
recipients of aid to indig-ent aged. The vision of section 2, article VII[ of our con-
majority opinion recites, "Thus, in view stitution. It is the enforcement or attempt-
of the statutes, the question before us is cd enforcement of the recovery provision, 
whether the granting of old-age assistance written into the Jaw, that is the "fly in the 
under the terms and conditions of our ointment." \\"ithout such r·ecovery pro-
Public Assistance law * * * falls with- vision no one would contend that the act 
in the inhibitions of Section 2 of Article is offensive to the constitution. The en-
s of the Constitution of the State of Idaho." forcement of the recovery provision, how-
What brings the question to the attention ever, is questioned and objected to because 
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its enforcement.of necessity shows that the collected shall be promptly paid to the 
payment of old-age assistance to a recipient United States.' * * • The only mat-
is in the nature of a loan. If it were not 
in the nature of a loan it could not be re-
covered and the contention, as I sec it. is 
that section 24-a, the recovery provision, 
is unconstitutional and a nullity, and there-
fore incapa hie of enforcement. 
I submit that before the State can re-
cover from the cstate of :i deceased reci-
pient of assistance there must exist an ob-
ligation on the part of the estate to pay 
·-~ amount sought to be recovered. In 
~er words, a contractual obligation m 
some form or manner between the State 
and the decc:iscd recipient, during his life-
time must be cst:tblishccl. In sµcak1ng of 
said matter, rdative to the right of a 
state to rcco\·cr from the estate of a de-
ceased recipient of old-age assistance, the 
Social Security Act of August 1~, 1933, 
49 U.S.Stats. 620, Title 42, U.S.C..-\_ s§ 
.301-306 was mentioned in the case oi 
City of \Vorccstcr v. Quinn, supra [304 
:\lass. 276. 23 '.'J.E.2d 465), and therein it 
is said: 
"This act of Congress provided for the 
grant of F~dcr:il funrls for old age assis-
tance to such States as should adopt an old 
age assistance plan containing certain re-
quirements, one of which was that 'if the 
State or any of its political subdivisions col-
tcr co,·cred by this provision of the act of 
Coni;r~ss and by our own statute which 
incorpor:itcd it was to pro,·idc for the 
«[lp•lrtwnm..:nt anJ distribution of sucl'\ 
proceeds as may be realized from th~ estate 
oi a r~cipicnt oi :.id, and both en:tcrmcnt; 
left umouchcd any liability upon th~ part 
oi the cst:itc of a recipient to reimburse 
the city. .-\ stzttute is to be iair!y anJ rea-
sonably construed and its scope is not to 
be C'XtenJcd by construction beyond its 
;:q,µarcnt limits. [ Citing ;wchuritics J. 
"Both Congress and our own Legisla-
ture w~rc content to let th:tt liztbiliLy con-
tinue to r~st upon the principks <Jf com-
mon law an<l to share in the proceeds of 
actions , .. hnc payments had heen made 
throug-h ,1ccidcnt, fraud or mistake. The 
mere right to share in one half of the net 
amount collected fr<:>m the estate of a rcc1-
pienc oi aiJ, without establishing any obli-
gation upon the part of the estate to pay 
;rnd without creatmg any new remedy, 
must be construed to mean that the collec-
t1on from the estate must be had by present 
remedies under our existing Jaw. This 
eonclusion is also supported by the rela-
tionship existing between the Federal and 
State go,·ernnients in the establishment and 
maintenance of old age assistance. * * * 
lects from the estate of any recipient of "Report No. 6l3 of the committee on 
old-age assistance any amount with respect ways and means recommended the passage 
to old-age assistance furnished him under of th~ social security bi,1 (H.R. i260). The 
the: plan, one-half of the net amount so bill then contained s. 206, captioned 'Over-
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payments during life,' which provided that 
'If any recipient, through error or other-
wise, has received benefit payments in ex-
cess of the amount to which he is entitled, 
and dies be fore such overpayments have 
been adjust~d,' then his estate shall repay 
a certain amount to the United States. In 
the same report, at page li, it appears that 
the purpose of this section was to secure 
from the State one half of the Federal 
contributions paid to recipients from whose 
estates the State has recovered on account 
of payments 'because those persons had 
been defrauding the State.' The commit-
accident, fraud or mistake." (Emphasis 
ours). 
If it is said that Section 24-a furnishes 
the right of the State to reco,·er from 
estates "the total amount oi assistance 
paid" to a recipient under the act ( Ch. 237, 
Laws 194i), and that the applicant for as-_ 
sistance was informed of the provisions 
of the act and acquiesced therein ancJ there-
to, there is then established the relationship 
of debtor and creditor_ and Sec. 2 of art. 
8 of the Constitution, extending credit to 
an individual,· is violated. And, again, if 
it is said there is no violation of the cn:dit 
tee on finance, report No. 628, recommended provision of the Constitution, where then, 
the adoption of bill H.R. 7260 containing we ask, is the obligation upon the part of 
said s, 206, and gave (page 29) the same the estate to pay. If the recipient of aid, 
explanation of the purpose of this section during his lifetime, did not consult and 
as did the committee on ways and means. agree, expressly or impliedly, to repay the 
It is cl.:ar t/iat Congrej·s merrly provided amount paid him, how can any obligation 
for rt'imbursi:ment from tl,e estate of a attach to the estate. With these observa-
dcce,r.sed rccipic11t wlio had through error tions must we not conclude, that the only 
or fraud received ov.:rp<1y111c11ts during his recovery that is permissible "rests upon 
life time. And the only purpose of our the princil)les of common law and to share 
Legislature in enac:ting that portion of in the proceeds oi actions where payments 
what now is section 4 of c. 118A relative have been made through accident, fraud 
to reimbursement, other than from bond or mistake.'' There is another matter I 
or mortgage, from the estate of a recil)ient 
o( ai<l, was a declaration of_ the public 
policy of this· Commonwealth that when 
feel di~posed to mention, and which our 
legislature seemingly overlooked in enact-
ing Sec. 24-a, supra, and is unnoticed in 
the majority opinion, and that is this: This reco\"ery was had one half of the proceed, 
would be paid to the national treasury. 
[Citing authorities]. 
jurisdiction is one oi the eight community 
property law states. All property acquired 
after marriage by either husband or wife,. 
"Under that law there can be no re• (Sec. 31-907, LC.--\.) is community prop-
covery where payments were not made by erty, 
. ': ·~ 
• i,4;, ~· 
·.:;• 
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Hu~band and wife are equal partners The demurrer to the complaint says that 
in community estate. Kohny v. Dunbar, it does not state facts sufficient to consti-
21 Idaho 258, 121 P. 54-+, L.R.A.,N.S., l!Oi, lute a cause of action. The trial court sus-
Ann.Cas. 19!3D, 492; Peterson v. Peter- _tained the demurrer without leave to amend 
son, 35 Idaho 470, 20i P. 425. and dismissed :he action. In so doing the 
\Vife's interest in community property court was right. He had no original jur-
is vested interest of same nature and e."<- isdiction of the controversy and could en-
tent as that of her hush.ind. !1-luir v. Poca- tertain the same only in his appellate capa-
tel10, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P. 345. 
No distinction is made between husband 
and wiie as to degree, quantity, and nature 
or extent oi interest each has in commun-
ity property. Ewald \'. Hufton, 31 Idaho 
3i3, Ii3 P. 247; Peterson v. Peterson, 
.supra. 
Upon the death of either husband or 
city. Furthermore, Section 24-a., Session 
Laws 1947, was void in that there is no 
proYision for recovery under the Social 
Security Act which is necessary because 
of the cooperative functions and efforts 
of go1·ernment and state laws. The afore-
mentioned state statute is not in harmony 
with the Federal social security laws and 
for that reason must be disregarded as all 
acts of the Social Security Act, and the 
Public Assistance Act, must be administer-
ed together as a unified code of laws en-
acted by Congress and the state legislature 
wifo, one-ha! f of all community property 
shall go to the Sur\"ivor, subject to the 
community debts, etc. In case no testa-
mentary disposition shall have been made 
by the deceased husband or wife of his 
or her half O f the community property it for the complete and comprehensive con-
shall go to the survivor, (Sec. 14-113 I.C. trol of the subject. "The matter in the 
A.) subject to the community debts, etc. final analysis brings us to the fundamental 
A recipent of old-age assistance cannot proposition that the subject of relief in 
create a liability against the community its \·atious phases, as provided by law, was 
property without tne husband or wife, if strictly within the scope of legislative au-
.such there be, joining in the encumbrance thority. That branch of the government 
.incurring such liability. very properly and necessarily assumed the 
In the instant case the doctrine of prim- function of pro\·iding the amount to be ex-
ary juriscliction is particularly applicable pended for that purpose, and the manner 
for the reason th,1c section 24-a, Session and method of distribution. The judicial 
Laws 1947, providing for a recovery from department has neither power nor inclina-
a recipient of old-age assistance places tion to usurp that authority. If inadequate 
the discretion thereof within the state provision has been made for the meritori-
1W' . department, an administrative jurisdiction. ous necessities of the unfortunate people 
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, 
of the state, we may sympathize personally ceased, for approval as follows: • • *" 
but we are powerless to intervene official- The Department of Public Assistance of 
ly." State v. Brandjord, supra [ 108 Mont. the State of Idaho granted and paid old-
4.:/i, 92 P.2d 279]. age assistance to said deceased, as per 
Plaintiff's action 1s instituted under the 
provisions of section 2+a, supra. The rec-
ord shows that the first payment of old-
age assistance was made in i\'Iarch 1943, 
and that Magnus died about August I, 1946. 
the following itemized statement ( following 
is the monthly date and monthly amount 
paid Magnus as per the creditors preferred 
claim which is ;ittached to and made a 
part of the complaint.) "This c!aim 1s 
made and filed as a µreferred claim against 
The Departmem of Public Assistance, evi-
said estate under the provision of Section 
section 24-a, supra dently in construing 
says, no cl.1im may be 
2, Chapter I 19, [daho Session Laws 1943." 
filed against a home 
while it is being used as a residence by a 
surviving spouse. There is nothing in con-
nection with the application for old-age 
assistance, or otherwise, that discloses that 
said applicant in becoming a recipient, 
either expressly or impliedly, contracts to 
repay any amount paid him by the state. 
Section 24-a. supra, in the instant case, is 
retroactive, both as to the 194i act and, 
likewise, to the Act of 19-13. There is 
It will be observed that the record disclos-
es that the complaint was ~ul:Jsequently 
amended to show that the ;1mount claimed 
to be due and owing to the state of Idaho 
was under the provisions of th.: Public 
Assistance Laws as amended by Section· 
-l, Chapter 237, Session Laws 19-17, and the 
provision contained in the claim as being 
under the Laws of 1943 was not stricken 
therefrom.· The record also discloses that 
the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs 
nothing in the complaint, or the record, to complaint was argued and submitted for 
advise us as to whether there is a surviv-
ing spouse in this case, nor, as to the nature 
of the estate, if any, of which Magnus was 
possessed at the time of his death. The 
'"Creditors Preferred Claim," filed by the 
Department of Public Assistance of the 
State of Idaho, In the .Matter of the Es-
tate of Frans G. Magnus, deceased, recites, 
"The undersigned creditor of Frans G. 
Magnus, deceased, herewith presents its 
claim against the estate of said deceased 
decision. and sustained without ka \'e to 
amend and the acuon dismissed s~prember 
26, 19-!i. Thar there was a stipulation 
allowing the am~ndment showing that the 
a~tion was prosernted under the µrovisions 
oi Sectio11 -l, Chapter 237, Sess1011 Laws 
l94i", nunc pro tune by intcrlincation and 
ll'ithout the same having previously been 
submitted to the trial court asking that 
the complaint be reinstated. 
We submit that the order of the trial 
with the necessary \·ouchers to l\els Lind- court sustaining the demurrer and dismiss-
strom, executor of the estate of said de- ing the action should be affirmed. 
'' .,.,, 
' ,. 
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knowledge of the real purpose of the public assistance pro-
gram· and the administration thereof. 
· (d) To recommend to the State Department of Public 
Assistance such rules, regulations, policies and procedure, as 
in the judgment of the Council, shaJl increase efficiency, 
effect economy and generally 1mprove the administration of 
public assistance. _ _ 
-- .... · '' ·,. 
_;-;:: · _: · ( e) The Commissioner of Public Assistance shall pro-
1_:_,_._;_~::_~_:_:_:::_,-.li:_:.,;_t_{t • :~1!:~~;:~;~~~~;~~I:~~~~~:~~;~~:~;::~ 
. fair hearing before the State Department of Public Assist-
. -, ance as provided by Section 16, · Chapter 181, Idaho Ses-
~\.;'.'. sion Laws of 1941; nor as preventing the State Department 
.
'· ... ·,·,:_::~·:.'.~.--. of Public Assistance from administering the public ysist-
, ance laws of this state as a single state agency. . 
;_;,~~,:·.r 
:_l_-.{.J,,
1
'._}_;_:::_.-:-·,- SEc. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE - EMERGENCY. An 
~~-., emergency existing therefor, which emergency is hereby 
~,~..;;:£.·.'':-':- · · · · declared to exist, this Act shall be in full force and effect 
.',q.')i~.:: . .-.... -.. · from and after its passage and approval. 
?~~;>,·!··:~ , .. '. . -
~ir i(-~. . . Approved March 2, 1943. 
·)~~;; __ ,,::: .. · 
,•~s: L. '43 .;:-uo- · 
~if1:,Jfc1st'i.si · 
i:.;c: 32 Sec. 1 .,., · . 
·~tD,_ ~ .'.:;,.:: ,-_ .. i ~ .. ;,-.o;?;,:--· 
CHAPTER 09 
(H. B. NO. 191) 
~;J,.'-•,\·-·l/f?t·. AN ACT ff~\-'X•i}\. _ AMENDING SECTION 14 OF CHAPTER 181, IDAHO SESSION 
''"trh~;r,;;:J,;/, ·. , LAWS OF: 1941, PROVIDING THAT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE 
!/'!f/}_1.\/_:f,·;.~~:\, · . SHALL NOT BE GRANTED TO ANY. PE~_SON .A.SSIGNINQ 
:91,&~;i..;;,;'.t>}~'-: OR TRANSFERRING HIS PROPERTY FOR THE PURPOSE 
~i';~~''.',~:,,;~;·,;,y .:·. !;OF .. RENDERING H~MSELF ELIGIBLE FOR ASSISTANCE; · .. 
;_~ _ .. ,,&:{·\/·:.· FUR~HER_ AMEND.ING ~HAPT·ER 181, IDAHO .SESS!ON_.': . · -
;· ·- - . '·;,)<·,, . -LAWS OF 1941, RELATING.TO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE BY .... '· 
-ji~{ :: :. :,\ADDiNG FOUR NEW SECTiONS IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOW--:_:; .. ;. 
_ .. ~;;·_.:"':_,-= ·. · .:I.'~G};_ECTION 24, TO BE NUMBERED .. SECTIONS 24~a; ~24-b:<. ,·. 
:..:~::;::?{ei'!./t . .-~· -~ ·: .~24:~-\.tY{p: 2~-~, ·RESPECTIVELY;. PROVIDiNG ,-_FOR __ ::.R¥1-;-.'-( ~ . ·. 
. J!":J-;7'i:." ;· _ COVERY·FROM -RECIPIENTS OR THE ESTATES OF.RE-:·:-.:1.: .. 
: ·----- l~.1\f;/:_:;:. ~IPI~NTS i°N. CERTAIN CASES AND. THE DISTRiBUiI9Nt ·. ·. 
:11& ,?~if:1:\ ~, '0)1' SUCH. RECOVERIES; DEFINl~G FRA:t.JDULENT ,ACTS:_.'. . ·1 m tfi:.?;;: .·.·. 1N ·SE~UR_I~~ PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AND .PROvn;n_NG .· ;· 
~-·;c.1~~4t~jit;$~1-·;::,tf,½t:t,J~ I:}t,)i.~i-;;iJ~:_x;.ittZj~~;; 
. ,, .... .. :·": :..a--~..,. 
-~ 
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PENALTIES THEREFOR; FIXING ·THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF THIS' ACT AND DECLARING AN EMERGENCY. 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1. That Section 14, Chapter 181, Idaho Session 
Laws of 1941, be, and the same is hereby amended to read 
as follows: 
. . 
SECTION 14. AW ARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. 
Upon the completion of the investigation, the state depart.: 
ment shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for 
public asistance under the 'provisions of this act, the type 
and amount of public assistance he shall receive, and the 
date upon which such public assistance shall begin. Public 
assistance shall be paid in the manner prescribed by the 
state department. Public assistance shall ·not be granted-
under thi..s act to any person who has made an assignment 
or transfer of property for the purpose of rendering himself · 
eligible for assistance under thi..s act. 
SEC. 2. That Chapter 181 Idaho Session Laws 1941, be, 
and the same is hereby amended by adding four new sections 
thereto immediately following Section 24, to be numbered 
Sections 24-a, 24-b, 24-c, and 24-d, respectively, and to read, 
as follows: · 
SECTION 24-a.-Recovery from recipients. On the death 
of any recipient, the total amount of assistance paid or re-. 
lief granted under this Act shall be allowed as a pref erred . 
claim ·against the estate of such person and shall l,e sub-
ject only to the-expense of the last illness,· funeral expenses 
not to exceed $100.00, and expenses of administration o/ 
said estate. No claim shall be enforced· against any real 
estate or personal property of a recipient while such real. 
estate is occupied qy the recipient, a surviving spouse, or a · 
dependent, but the Statute of Limitations shall not begin 
to run against such claim so long as the collection thereof is 
prahibited, iz..g hereinabove provided. 
/ Such claim shall be made by the county or, in cases of. 
cooperative assistance, b·y the state on behalf of all partici-
:i:.~.3 •. 11911 
•ec. 2 (24u/ 
reoealed · 
S.L. '47 c. 23i i 
, •e<:. 3 p. 586. I 
pants contributing to such assistance. . 
SECTION 24-b. Diftribution of recover_ies. The ~~a.~e .,_;iis.i:·,,3·~:·m1 
Depart~ent shaU certify tq th~ .s_ta_te Auditor the amou?1-Lf1::e!1~-r' I 
recovered from each estate of recipients, and a proper _d'!,!17 ;··.-. ·s.L. •47 c. 2a1 
tribution thereof shall be· made by the State Auditor in pr9.;'::~· ~-~c~!~~~~--­
porticm -to the amount of assistance contributed by the'··. ,~'-!t-''-'.h.'/' 
state, the counties and the federal government for such ,,· ·.- .' .. · .. · 
assistance. · · · · ·· ·· ·, _. · ·. ··· 
'!' ~ j 
· \ 
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SECTION 24-c. Fraudulent Acts-Penalty. Whoever 
knowingly obtains, or attempts to obtain, -or aids or abets 
any person in obtaining, by means of a wilfully false state-
ment or representation, or other fraudulent devices, assist-
ance or relief to which he is not entitled, or assistance or 
relief greater than that to which he is justly entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof 
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for 
not· -more than s-ix months, and be both so fined and im-
prisoned in the discretion of the Court.,,, 
Whoever sells, conveys, mortgages or otherwise disposes. 
of his property, real or person,al, or conceals his income or 
resources, for the purpose of rendering him eligible for any 
· · form of relief, theretofore or .thereafter applied for and re-
ceived, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof 
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned for 
not more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned 
at the discretion of the court. , · 
·.-~ Every person who · knowingly aids or abets any person 
· in selling, conveying, mortgaging o·r otherwise disposing of 
his -p1·operty, real or personal, or in concealing his income 
or resources for the purpose of rendering him eligible for 
any form of relief, theretofore or thereafter applied for and 
received, to which he would not otherwise be entitled, shall 
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof 
shall be fined not more than $900.00, or be imprisoned ·not 
more than six months, or be both so fined and imprisoned at 
the <!,iscietion of the court./ · . · . · 
SECTION 24-d. EFFECTIVE DATE-EMERGENCY. 
An emergency existing there/ or, which emergency is hereby 
declared to exist, this Act shall. be in full force and efject 
from and after its' p_assage and approval. 
Approved March 2, 1943. 
CHAPTER 120 
(H. B. NO. 158) 
AN ACT 
TO AMEND CHAPTER 20, TITLE 39, IDAHO CODE ANNO-
TATED, BY ADDING THERETO TWELVE NEW SECTIONS, 
NUMBERED CONSECUTIVELY SECTIONS 39-2021 TO SEC--
TION 39-2032, INCLUSIVE, WHICH NEW SECTIONS AU-
THORIZE THE DETACHMENT FROM'A .STATE HIGHWAY 
000210
I 
I 
I 
1-
l 
!· 
iU.!1 
\ 
I 
I 73 IDAHO REPORTS 
I 
:i. los$. The loss 11111,t Le 
pru,rco::t i ,·e. 
:i.ctual and nut This uL,·i:11,·s <:011,i,kr:1tion or Jetcrmi-
1 11a1i1111 , , f wh.11 "'""1,l h;l\·c l,ccn thc :i.mount 
[4. 5) The ,·al11..- of the pa,ture nr i:-ra,s 
ch::-trnyrd W.:t5 tit:,·.,_•r rl·pnrh·il as in~onh .. ", 
an<! to :i.llnw the l,;,s cl:limcd w,111ld. in cf-
it:c:. all11w a doubk ,h:dm:ti1111. i11 a11 :1111111111t 
in ,·xccss oi the .1ct11al ..:o~t ur lu,s ,us-
tai:1cd. 
The cnst oi the ('rnp,·rty ,1.-strnycd wa~ 
shnwn to he Sl.:1) whidt ha,[ alr,•:uly h,·,·11 
cl1;ir;:e,t off as a lmsin,-~, o,p,·n,,·. I knee 
it iollnws that iur in~umc t.lx 1111rpuscs 
th..::rc was no l,,s,. 
S:mil.1r si111atill11S wlwre a In,~ wa! 
claimed were dcci,kd a,h·,·r,cly tu the L1x-
('ayer 1n llarl•l\\' v. t: .. 111111i,sin11,·r uf ln-
t..:r:1:.I E-:c\'ennc, i 11.T .. \. !.!.I.!; S1,·,·cr,u11 
v. (um111issio11a ,;i lml'rn:d J{c\'l:llllC, .!.! B. 
T .. \. 4.'i.'; c;rant "- C.i1111ni,,i,,11n ui l11-
tcmal Rn·cm1c, 3() 11.T .• \. lU.!ll. 
The j11d1;mc11t oi the trial court 1s thcre-
iore arl'irmet.! with ..:u~ts l0 rcs('u111k111s. 
l'•JRTER, C. J., :111J T.\ YI.OR. J .. CUii· 
cur. 
Cl\'EXS, Ju~tice (~pccially conc11rri111,;). 
Tl:c n·cord cl,,.., not sh,,w the 1kstrnc1i11n 
oi the crn(' was 1lw lo,;,; ,,i ;1 capit:,I a~,l"t 
nor :h:u 1hc an11 was i11,·cnt<1ric1l s,•11:irah:• 
ly or rcf11,rtcd as incu1111!. Thcrdorc, lhc 
In,, was not ,k,luctihk. Juh11s,111 ,·. (um-
mi~~inncr o( Internal RC\"CllUC, 10 n:r .. \. 
'JS. 
ui ,lcd11cti"11. if :ill,>w:il,k. Th.:rciorc, I 
c,1111:ur ,rnlr in th.- atlirm:111ce oi thc judg-
mcnt ,li,:i.ll"" ::,;.: l h,· ,k,lu<:tiun. 
Tllu:-.t.\:•, J., cu11..-ms.. 
·-----0 ;m•- •m1'111 
r 
I 
.. , 
'' 
" ., 
11 
:(. 
:\ 
,, 
I 
J: . 
.J: 
2'.'>-J P.1d 1063 
NEWLAND 11 111. ,. CHILO, 
No. i869. 
·.,.:t. 
~lllll"l·llll' 1 ',111rr ,,r l,l11ho. 
... 
J'l,'f'L1r,,1 .. ry Jwli.:111,·n! 1.r,,...-,..,1111~ 1>1 re<:IP-
l,•11111 ,,r .. 1i1-11,_.,. """b!am,._ :itt11c-kltqt lll'll pro-<·;; .,· 
"1"1011.• ,,r 1:,·,1 111111•111hm•11t to 1'11hllc A.'\.ih1t· ·-·~, :_· 
nnni I.JI''"· Tiu~ :,;,,,·,•n!h Jmllrll\l District.,. - -~ · 
l.'1111yu11 1.\111111,-, JJ,.nal,1 B. .\nilc~u, J,, eu-·_._.: ::. 
r,,r,..,I J,1,l,::11w11t <111 ,h•mnrM'r ,U:<111l~ri,: pl11l;t-, · .. \ ;; 
• I 
IIIT":' 11,·11 .. 11. nn,I t•l:1i111UT at•IN'Rlt'\L Tbc_Su~ ·--~·- ·: 
1,n•m,• 1:,,11r1, T:l)'lor, J,, ll••ld 1h11t fll'O\'ISIOll~:~i. 
,·•· 
t,,r 11,•n ,,u rr11lrr nf ""'lt•l•?ut ,,t altl-aJ'e as-:-:·, 
,.1.-i:11wc 114 11 J11~rlll:1ht.i lh11lt1111t111 upoo ~--:~/~ 1 
11r111••rt)· rh:ht:-1 uf ,.11.-11 n-,•l11h•11L", la t.bat ~ :·~f . 
hi In l11,i 11111•1"1-,..f 11f lhc L'UllllllllU \\~lfaN.. ~-1~ 
I. J~:::::·:~:·::~:~:d P•Ollo W•II•" 2;:i 
l'm!a pN,·i~i,111 ui Xation:11 SQci~- ( 
S,·i:11ri1y .\i:t prnd,lini: for re1l111:tion f~ _ ,, 1-
pa~·m,·uts tu ;::itl: oi pro rat:i :1h:are -~f 
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Cnited States in amo11111s reeo\'c~nl by 
State with n·spc..:t to uld-:i;:c: a,;:,:an..:,: 
:urni~h,d, wh.:11 prac:1cil ,,pna::,;n of 
~tate pl:111 was sue!l th;it pru r:.1:1 ,:-..;.~, ,,i 
:eeon·rics ,:11c frdcral i;-01·c·~r1mr::: was 
.::c,litnl Ill ::s ac·euunt in ,-,:1,,· :1::h! ;;.::J ::s 
.:ontril,1111u11s rc<lncc,l :i,,11r•:::1;:-:y. ,t::te 
:'uhli~ .\::~:~tJ.11.:c.: L:t\\. \\.·;,:-. ::.,: ~-.::,_:,:c: 
:o a1:a..:k on J.:-fOllnd t!'::it it •.!:d f!L'. ~pe-
.::ficall~· pro, :,:c for pa:;mc:111 ui ;,~o ~:ita 
si,t;inc~ prorisiu11s of Public ,\ssi,tancc 
L.111·. I.C. §§ St>-201 ct seq., :(>..21):, :<>-
:?O:-. 
5. So,;l;il Securtty and Public Welfare ~31 
In 1·icw ui ia..:t th:it ~r:1111i11g ui ;iiJ 
to :he 11c·c:tiy aJ,:·:cl is a well rccol!r1izeJ 
.,IJ!il!:iti,m oi the ,tatc an,) is a i,:u1·cr11-
:11r:nal innc:iun te11Ji11,; tu pru1111Jt,: p11Llic 
w.:'i.,re, pru1·i,iu11 of 1'111,lie :\,,i,ran..:e 
l...1w ior li.:n 11].><.)n the r,·al property ul 
,hare Jirrc: :o i,·dcral :.:0,·,.·rnir.,-:,1. ::,,.·:al n·c:picnts is cCJ11St1t11tiu11:dl~· jus1i1iaLI.: 1,y 
11__,ec11r:::-· .-\..::. ~~ I ct ;,·•1., .:,li,,~-- a, :he puulic purpos~ uf pr11m1Jti11i: the curn-
:,:ncmkJ, 4..; C.S.C.:\. §§ .i'll c: ,,·•t, _;_.J,_1,; mon wcli;,rc". J.C. g Sij...:!IU, 5t>-2.?-k1; 
· ~). c~,nst. ar:. s, ~ 2. 
:?.. Con,t11ullonal Law C::8, 6. States C::,119 
The ri"ht to own ;,r.d <':1_1•')' ;.:-:,·:i1e l'al,lic · a,si,1:1111:c: law is sal'cd from 
,'~"pcr:y is iund:1mcntal. ~11,! :, ,m,· 0: :!1c ~.,1::!i.:1 with .:1111,titution:11 proYi,iun that 
::;i111ral. inhcrcnr :in,! i11.1li, 11~1,lc :::.:':11s i:r,dir CJi "t:itc ,hall 11111, in any m~1111cr. 
·Ji ir.:c 111,·11. whi.:h pre-c·x,,:,·,i ,·,.::,::tn- !,c ;:1n·11, ur lo:l!lnl tu, or i11 aid oi any 
·.:<)II~. (u11,t. ;.rt. 1, s~ l, l.i I 1.C. 1 ::r,- 111di,·id11:d, !J~· f.1ct that ~uch a»i,1a11cc is 
,·:1joy pri\·;1t,· prn('t"TIY, alth1J11:,:h :i 11:,::ir:d, 
:::hc·rcnt aml :nalic·nahle r::;:u ui ifl'< ::icn, 
i~ rnl>,iccl 111 :c:af1111alilc li1:m:11io:1 and :t\!11· 
!::.:iun br the ~1:11c in tho: i1111:r1:fl; u: the 
,t,:11111un wdi:in·, .ind :my ~tallltt· imv;;ing: 
a :imira:ion u;,.,11 ~11ch r:::?u 11111;1 l,,· ,up-
i"'~t.-.1 hy 1h;1: p11rJ11J~l'. 
l. 13; 1.C ~ :,,-..,;..;4;1. 
(Jn~t. art. :. H 
~. Social Security .and P11bllc: Welfare ~43 
fur pul,lie puq,u,.: vi pru111u1i11~ the cum-
111,>11 w,:I fare. J.C. ~§ :&-2 IU, 5t>--22·fa. 
Cun,1. art .. ~. § :!, 
7. P:auper1 ~3 
En-11 as tu p;u1pa~ :iml indiK,:nts, th,·re 
1s nu C1J!lsti1111i1 mal or cum,non-la,v Jnty 
fl'>lirtJ.:' up,111 the state to prv,·iJe support, 
l,111 any ul,lii;a1:on ui ~tat,: in such respect 
is moral rather th:111 .1 ma:1.J.itury one, ant.I 
rii:ht tu recl'i,·c s11.:h a»i~1;111ce is a crea-
ture of ,tatutt·, \\·hit·h inay Le ,::,ctcn,lcJ, 
,!i111inish,·d. co111li1i,,11,..,l or .11.Jruga1~·1l 1,y 
the lcJ.:"i,l:111m:. LC'. §~ 5~2 IO, Sf,- 224:1. 
One is not rt·1111ir,·d ti> la· a ;1~·;'.,t:r 8. Social Security and Publlc Welfare c:=22 
,r ab~,llutdy ,:,·;titut,: ;i~ :i prc-rcqu1,::~ 10 In ,·ii:w ui fact that slate has no 
~eceiJ>t oi payment~ un,lcr th~· oid-aJ;"·: as- m:111,la1,,ry ol,li~:1tiun, eithl'r constit111io11al 
f 
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or hy cum mun l:i w. to pr,l\·id..: ,111•1 1"r: t0 
its citizo.:ns. one whu bSl'rtS ri,:ht Iv .1,• 
sistancc u11dl·r st:1tut,·~. mu,t c.-111ply 11 ith 
,111 rca,un;ihl,: :ind no11di,crimi1utory c.m-
ditio11s inip,Jscd liy tho.: k~i,l:itin: :,uthu~:ty_ 
LC. §~ :rl--210, 5o---2~h 
9. Constitutional Law C:·tl 
The pri,~po.:cti1·c l1<·irs oi r.-cipi,·nt ,,i 
old-:igc as,.i~t:lllcc, ha1 :11..:- 11,1 1·,·,tl·,I 11::a-
c~t in pr11pa1y lli th..: r,·(ipi,·nt. h:11·" :111 
n~ht rn c11n1pL1i11 ,Ji lint pr11,-i:--1t,n tit' \1:,1 .. 
:1L!'c a,~i,1:111c.: l:1w. LL. ~~ 51,-..:tn. ~..,_ 
22~:i. 
10. Constitutional La"' ~191 
12. Ci>nstltutlon.,F Law ~208(16) 
Socl:il S~urlly :and Publlc Welfare ~31 
In ,·icw oi fai:t that old-~..:.: pro\'isious 
uf P11hlic .\;si,1:111ci: L,w cont,·mpbtc that 
1wnly .11;,·,I p<'r,,111 ~h:111 rcccil'e :issist:rnce 
:1,·,:11r.:i11i:- 10 i11di,·id11:1I nc:l·d:i, with rcg:trd 
to r,·,,111rc,·, ., ,·.1ibhle to him from wh:it-
,.1'.:r ,,,ur,·,·. i11.:ludi11..:-, hy p,·rtincnt rcgu-
l.ttit111, prr~,,nal pri1p,-r1y or such person, 
pr11l'i,i1111 i,,r li,·11 11p1111 r,·:d prop..:rty of 
r,·.:ipi,·nt ,, 1 ,,ld-:11.:,· ;1,,i,t:111.:c is not dis-
-~:111111:.t,,ry .,, iol'111c,·11 p,·r,ons owning real-
ty a11,I :h,.,l. ,1\\'11i11!:' ,111iy pas,111:ilty, since 
t!:..: l'•·~-,,oal::· 11w11,·d ha, h..:..:n t:ikcn into 
Social Security and Public Welfare C:11 l·o1n,1. .trL 1. ~" 
:\pplic:nrnn oi li,·n prm·,,i,,11~ oi ,,,J. 
:\L!'C ;i,si,t;inc,· pr11l'i~i11:1, oi 1'111-li,· .\-,:,:• 
:1110.:0.: I.aw to rl·cipirnb ,ii :ii.I pri"r :,1 
;iml·ndmo.:m pro,·i.lim: i,,r li,·11, ,·:rn11,11 ,·.,n-
stitt1ll' .l rctr,1,pl'Ctirc i11v:1,ior1 11i a ,.<',:~d 
rli.d1t. :--ince n:~ipit:nt.s qf i>Jd.a::.: .1'.'.':,;i~Lll!(...: 
c;in ,1op11rc no ,·.:~t~,I ri;.:ltt thereto. u.:. 
~~ :r,-2\0. :tl--22-fa. 
II. Constltullonal La"' ~208(1) 
The lq:-i~l:tturc h.1s lm1:i,I ,ti,,-~I'.'· 
tin11:1ry pf)\\"l'f to n1:1kc i.:L1,'.'-itl1...·:1t1011, l,c-
pcr,,,:i, and property i11r ;di p11rp11~,-~ wh1,·:1 
it may lawfully ~,·ck 10 :1.:c11111pli~h. anLI :-,J 
l,,ni: as rite ..:las~iri,·;iti1111,; arc 1,a~,·d ,111 ~,111:c 
1.-;!irimatc gro11111l oi ,lirT,·rcnl·c !1,•1w,·,·:1 
persons or ohjccts cbs~i,i,·,I. and l>e:ir J. 
rca~onahlc relation to rhc k;:i,dati,·c pur-
pose, ;iml arc not ur1n·a,;,111altlc ,,r :irhi1rary, 
they do not ,·iul;itc the .:on,ti1111iu11. l 0 011,:. 
art. 1, § 2. 
J'. 
I J. S1:ltut1n C:,,7(1) I' 
.\1:1,·11>111:,·111 ui 1• 1_~1 1,1 r11blic A~i~t- .'ij 
:111,:,: L.1w. 1':,J1"1di11!,!' i11r (jl'II :1L!'ai11:;t rc:iJty .-~\ 
o:' rn·:pil'lll, oi a~~i~1;1n.:,.•, ~ing by its·_: If 
tt':m, :1p1•l:,:il,lc alik..: to :itl p.:-rsons _· .;l· 
rhro1ui..:l-:11ut 11~~ ,t:1.h:. "dt,1 e<)1tlc within the I 
r,·;p,·.:::'"c , 1:t,~l·S thcr,·in pro"iJ,..J for," . \· 
and 1,,·i:t!,!' h:t _..,t up,111 a n·a,,,nahl.: cl:issi- .·· .... 1\ 
1i,·.11i1111 wit l1i:1 :1111h,1rity oi tile l,·gislaturt, '. . I 
i; ll"t 1·i,,L.1i1·.; ,,i .:nn~tit111in11al inhi~ition'· .. _ -:< \ 
:IL;:1111,1 !,,,·:.! "r ~p,·,·1;il law;. I.C. §§ 10- · 
I I 13, ll'-11 P. 56-.!HJ, 0:(}-:2~. So-2.?-la;, "".._ I 
. . ' 
C,,11,1. ;Ir{, J. ~ l'). '. 1 
• • •• , ., I 
I.&. Saelat Security :and Publlc Welfare $:132.: :_-.. ~.:11 
• 1 <::jl 
l'rt1,·i~i,1n ,1i 1'151 a111,·11<lm,:11t to ~b-: · ·~·1i 
. ___ ,,. ';!.; 
lie .\,~1,:;111.:c Law. n·L11i1·c to lien on ~~,: ·. :i 
ty ,,i r.-.·:pi,·111;. oi old-a~c assis1:mcc, is D(!f:- ~: 
in .:,,1111:.:t wi:h. ,111.i 11':t~ not n•p,::i[,..J b.Y · --1:{' 
... 
prn\'i,ion ~111,~,·,111,·nth- ,·na.:rcJ ;it s:intc ~.: __ r.,-. 1 
• • • -~~~ I 
si,,a. 11r,n·idi11;: for n·,·u1·l·ry oi asmt~ .• 
. . . ~
... 
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t::r ... ~:-1.d 7:; hl3ho ~:!O 
p.1id :1J one not entitkd thereto, by :ne.ins oi Kibkr & TI,·,bc. \".1111pa, for arpdl;int:;. 
a pr.::crrcJ claim a,::":iinsc his estate. ;ince The St:it<.: oi Lhiln is enjoined lJy our 
d11"i.:c.:nt .:';,,:s,:s oi recipients :ire J.:alt ,:011,t1tutio11 irom ltJ:min::- ib credit in th<: 
wi:!1. l.C. ~~ lt~l I IJ, 10--1 l l4. :6-ZI0, aid oi an,\' indi"id11:d. In this case th.: 
:!)-.:.!-t. :(, ... 2,2-t;i: Con,t. art. 3, § 19. :i~r..:,•mc:it "E:--"hihit :\'' cr,·.11.:s a detinit,~ 
15, s0c1 31 ~curlly and Public Welfare C::31 cut1tr:1ctu.il r.:l:1tiun,hip 11.:tw<:cll the 1,:ir-
.\im:n,:mcnt to Puhli.: ,\,,i,t:ir.c.: L.iw tio.:s. Th.: :i~rccmcnt ;;tat,·s th.,t it i~ ;:ivc11 
rr·"·,,'in~ :or ju,lr:mcnt ti,·n on rc:li'.y <>i ior the rurpo,c <>i "<Cl'.ltrity'' ior rc-im· 
rc.:i\':,:nt 0: ohl-:i~c :issista11cc and ?ro,·i,l- burscmcnt oi .ill ,ild :i;::-c :i"si,t:incc ;uy-
111~ :or cc-~:iti.::itc oi total anioimt ,Ji lien 1110.:ms rcc.:ircd aitcr Jul~· 1st. 1931 :in,1 :i 
· 1 · · L "nic,k.: :111d :i,:,i;..~1m,·m·· oi :ill •'ri,.ht. titlc 
,imc·l. r::,,:lnscs lc~1:' :lt!\·c 111:c:-:~ ::iat ,. -. 
1lllllllll[lt1 :'::•J11ld t,,: ~uhject to rl'k:i~c.: 11:10:i ?J.Y· 
m,·n: 0i a:::,mnt oi certiri,:itc. in ::::inr:cr 
;:ir,l\·;,;e,I b,· (;i\\· i,1r rel""'~ oi J. ;n,:r:· 
:nr:11. :ind :s not dd.:cti\'c 111 :hat ::0 ;iru-
vi,iun :s :-:::.,k i,Jr rdo.:a;,: ui lien ::i ose 
oi sa.1:,iac:;.in pr,,,r tu ,\,:;11h ,,i ro:c:pio::11. 
J.C. ~3 ]( .. ;\IJ, l•J-111•. ~,,-..!10, :,>-22•, 
:11--..:.!~:1; ( 0:ist. :irt. .3, ~ l'J. 
16. Co11tracl~ C::95(1, J} 
T" he ,·.,i,l:ilik 1,,·c:in,,• .,f ,lure;;, :rn 
.-1~;-c.:..,-:-'!:1...·nt r::u::--t 11,:,t l111ly he oltt:t1nl·1i hv 
::i,·ans oi prc,;11r..: hr,nu,:lit to lic:ir. liut 
t'~c.: :ic:~c·,·111,·::1 i1,:d f mu~t lie 1111ju~:. un· 
..:,m~c:nn;.l,k. or ilk~;,!. :rnd it c;uu:r,t !),: 
prcdi.::it,·,I u;>-111 d,·mand,; which .,re !:i.w-
i'.11. or the :hn:at to ,IQ th;ll whic:t the 
~..:man,l:111: plrty h;is :i lq~:,1 right to t!o. 
Ii. Social Se<urlly and Publlc Welfare c=JI 
In ,·icw 0i fact that ,lcm:111,l oi ;:ate 
iur rkn u1M111 rc:il pr11pcr:y oi ,,ld-ai:e rc-
.::pil•nt :; la" :111. fair J.11<! just, there .::i.n 
be n-> ,:ur,·~~ ,Jr bn::in..:,,; ,:,,mp11l,io:1 in· 
"OiwJ :11 the ul11:i.i11i11~ •>t li.:11. l.C. H 
,~.=l11 ~~ seq .. :r,-.,!0~. :1,-,!•J;". 
;incl intcrr,t'' in :irnl to dcscrd,.:d rc-:d prnp· 
cr1y, hut n,lt l:mi:,·d to the ,kscrihcd prop-
cr:y. The tr:tn<ac:inn under the prO\·ision~ 
o i Ch:iptcr H;". 19~ I S,·s~io11 L.,ws, thus 
liL"L'am.: a ";,:curity" :r:,n~acii,m :11ul :is snch 
;L "'morr::::1:::(" nMn the pr...pcny ior th.: :icl-
,·.111c,·111l't1ts mad.: l>y th.: Stat<: ,,r td:ih,> i,1r 
uld :i~I! :i;,i,ta111:c with m:11.:hc,l S1:i le an,I 
FL·1kral f-1111ds. If the rrnp,~rty ,,·:i.s at~ 
tc:nq>t..:d IQ b<: ~111,1 or ,li,rn'L'1! ,,i prior to 
,k:\lh •Ji al'pdlanl~. ,'\ method oi iorcClllSllr<: 
,,·0:; pron,kd. :ind .1 mcth,,.\ oi re-payment 
tu the ;St;11c: in lhc C\'<:nt oi ,lcath. This 
purp<Jrtcd l,11si110:ss tr:i11sa<:t10J1\, althmn;:h o!, . 
t,,111e<l nn,kr hn,111c:~s c,irnt•111:iio11, cr.::1tt:<I 
the cm1om:irr ri:1:,tion~hip oi h:1111.:r :inol 
borrower. ,\rtidc ::;, :-;cc. 2. lilah,, Cm· 
stimti•m; Chapt,:r Hi, I~·~ l :-cs~ion Laws; 
H:1111101:k C.mttt~· v. Ci1i1.c11s Bank & Tru~t 
Comrany, :., Idaho 1.:'J. Ii:, 22 P.:z.i 1ii-t: 
::51:111.: ,·. Li111btrum, 61:> ld:1ho 226, l?l P.2d 
1009 . 
ln l,l;iho it is :ill -:stal,lish.:,I g-uarantcc l)t 
our constit11ti()t1 th:it c\'crr person h:is m· 
;1lic11;1ult.: ri;;hts Jnrini,: his lif.:timc to :i.c-
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quire, possess anJ enjuy rirop.:rty. The re-
quireJ cxl·cution of the "Exhil,it :\'' J~ a 
conJitiun pn·Cl·1k111 to n•cc·i\'i11t." i11rtlll'r .,1,1 
age :issist:incc a1·lt:r _l11ly 1st. lq:I, is in dc-
ri,gatiu11 oi such cu11~llll1tiu11;il right. Hy 
al!u,,·in;: p.-rsons rcn·i,·in~ ul,l a1:i: ;1~,:st· 
anct: to control ;inJ tnjuy thi.:ir uwn prt1p-
crty, fac:lit:1tcs_ the public int<:rl'St and wcl-
fan·, :ind .iiJs the indi!:l'III :q.:,·d ;1s w,·!1 :i~ 
a Jirec: grant oi mu11c·y. Uy l.,,.·in;; al,k tu 
sell the property ur uht:tin loans ,h,·rrnn, 
it is possiiJlt: fur Jir<·Ct ;lid lo he ,·I :111i1L1tcd 
for J. timt:, :ind thi.: pul,lic trc:"11r:.· rclil·\'c1l 
to the nt.:nt rhat the recipient i, rda·,·,.J 
l,y cxt:rcise of bis in:i.li,·n:il,J., right tu ,un· 
trol his own propl·rty. :\rti..:lc l. Sec. I, 
)Jahu Cumtihaion; :\bmcd;i 1.",rnnty v. 
_lansscn, 16 Cal.2J T.6, 106 P.2il 11. UO :\. 
LR. I l·U, 1147; ll Am.Jnr., Cunst.uw, 
1145, 1146 anJ 1147, ~ 3.l.::. 
To achic,·c cons1it11ti011;il 1111i iormity re-
q111n:s th;1t a law OJJl'r:,ti- ;dike upun all "ho 
come \\'ithin the scupe uf it5 provision~. 
Such uni iurn,ity t.lucs not appt.·ar as to 
all pcrsuns as a class whu n·ccin:J :h.: 
variuu, typ,s of puLlic ;i~,i:-t.111cc. } lcrcin 
a ;peci:il da,s i~ sini;lo:J unt, 1. e., thu5e rc-
cci\'ill~ "ulJ ;1~1: a~si,tancc'' who own ,l·;il 
R11l,cr: E. 5mdie .. \tty. Gen., :md \Vil-
li:1111 If. Hak,·s. :\~~t. :\tty. Gen., for rc-
~pt,111lc:11t. 
TiiL· r1i:ht to Ji~puse of 011c':1 property 
:iilt r ,k:1th ;s a r1~h1 ,n·:itcJ lly statute, and 
the ll·;!islarnrc 111:ty i111pu~c such cunJitions 
upun tho: l·X<:n:i,c ui the ri~ht as it secs, 
:it. :::al<.: ,·., rel. :--:icl,011 v. Lindstrom,. 
\•.q:,;_ 1,--; hLhu .:.:r,. !qi l' . .!,I \!)JI; Bankers·:._· 
Trm: (u. \', Blud~t·t\. :!titJ l:.S. 6-17, 4J S.' 
,I 
Ct. .;.1.3. r,:- 1.. bl. -:..i 1.> 
i' 
Th, lt-p,ht11re ha, thl· right to classify : 
pt·r,1111s :mJ uhj,·,t~ ior the p11rpo~e of ler-' I,: 
i~l:ltion wh:,h cLls~i1i,::nirn1 will not be uP:,·\l 
~et unk~, it 1s pal11alily ;irl,itr;iry. Crom v.~ · 
Fr:d1rn. 1'1-'t1. JJ !d:d10 314, 193 P. 1013;·1_ 
:5tatc , .. (;dlnw:iy. l~l\16, ll Id:iho il9, 8-t' 
P . .!:. 4 1..l.: .. \ .• >,;.~ .• 10'.>, 114 .·\111,St. 285{~ 
Bii:: \\·,,.,.I C.lllal Co. v. 1.'h:q1111:in, 1927, ~-; 
J,l;dtu .,'il!, .;t)J l': 45. •'; 
l'ru\'lsiuns fur the rl',un:ry of mane,~,- J. 
~r;111t,'\.I fur puhlic a,:;i,;ta11cc purpo:ics f~:,' 
th~ nt;1tc ui the rc.:1picnt after Lkath ~"'_: 
not \111..:Un>llt\ltl<ln:II J.~ 1,,·ini, ;1 Ivan of tlici'-
!:-t:,to:'s crcLlit to an i11Ji\'icl11:1I. State _Y~~. 
L111t1~m,111. 1•.qs, ,~-; ltl;1l10 2.?6, 191 P.2cr . 
lQ~.>: \\":tll!oeri.: ,._ L"tali l'uhii,: Wdfm;-, 
Lv11m1:~,ivn, 1949, l l~ Ctah .:42, 203 P.2d'·. ,· 
estate, ur some interest tho:rcin. Su .\m. ~1.i5. 
Jur., St:nnh:5 76, § S:; l3i~ ,v uuJ C;rn;1I 
Co. v. 01apm:111, 4: IJ;1hu 3l:i0, 403 . .!6.3 P. 
43; St;itc \'. Li111btro111, ~ ld:1ho :!.!6. 191 
l'.2i.l 1009, :inJ casl:S citcJ illi t\) 0cm:ral 
and special law5. 
To\ \'LOR. _T11~1icc. 
:\1'1'.-lla111~ ar,· hu,:b:iml an,I wife, 
rl'C1\11cnt:s oi vlJ·:t~c :is~i:;t:1111:c um.let the 
state Public .-\ssi~t:incc Law, This la,v, ~ 
-~·..l . .. 
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Cito! ns ;3 [Ju h,;, ;;,, 
ac~,·,: in J()4J, creates the state De?artment 
oi l':zhlic .\,sist.ince as the agency oi the 
st:uc gm·crnmcnt to cooperate with the 
fclk~:il :;:,11-cr11mc11c in c:irryin~ out the 
purJ"Js,·s ,,i icdcral :i.m.l state ac:s ;,crtai11-
i11~ :o p11l1li..: assistance, and prn\'iJin; the 
ten~;. conditions an.-! m..:a11s oi ,arryin~ 
into cril'ct the public assistance t!i.:rci11 
pro,·:dcd i0r. The :i..:t pro,·,d,·s 1t-.:1: ··Puhlic 
a,;i;:ance shall be aw:1r1k,l 111:,!a :his 
;1-:: :o pl'r:-ons :1t1cl iamili..:s who do :'.Ot h:\\'e 
··1.:0:n..: :i.n,i :1.v:1ilahli: resources sur. . .::cnt to 
·--r,ro,·:,\c a rea,011:1hl.: st:1.11,l.u,l o: he:tlth 
and ·,Hli-kin,:-". !.C. ~ .~6-..?0.~. an,! :·unlzcr, 
that ,Jl<l-;ic:c :i,s1,t:11Kc ",hall h.: :i.wa~•k<l t0 
nee,::.- pl'npl.: wh,, ha,·c att:1ini.:d t:-:·: :11:-: nf 
rl3 y~:ir<'. rnh.ic~t to ..:utai11 li:-:-.::ati,,n,. 
l.C. ~ :6--..?ll;-, ~,:<:ti0n 51.)-2\1), LC. _pro· 
vidc~: 
-Thc- an1nn11t of .:l~Si:,t:.,11ct.: wh1.:":--.. a:iy 
rcc,picnt ,hall he c!i1:ihk to r•·=ci,-c 
,;ha.\\ he ,\ctermini.:u. 111 accur-i,ncc 
w::·:i the ruks and re:.;ulati<>ns •Ji the 
:;1;;.:.; 1.kp,.rtmcnt, with due rq:a~,! t<) 
his rr<111:n:ments, J.ml tl1c cr,11,::ti,ms 
cx~stini; in his cas.:. aml to thc ir:co111c 
an~ rcso,m:l's a\'ailabl~ to him from 
whatc\'.:r ~,rnrcc, ;111u whidt ,.hail he 
:;u:::cicnt. when a,l<it:c.l to the i::c,m1c 
a1:,: rl'~,mrcl'S dc1<:rminl.'.1[ to be ;-.\'ail-
abic to him. to rirO\·iilc him \\'::h :i 
ri::i~,mahk ~ubsistcnec cumpa:il,k • ..,.ith 
hca!th an,! his Wl'll-bcinit: • • • " 
vcsti!;ation by the dcpartme11t of the cir-
cumstances ni the applicant, a dctcrniina-
tion 0£ eli~ihilit:·, and the type an,\ ~mount 
oi public assist.111ce m case ,)i au :t\\·cml. 
As ori!{inall)' enacte,l the act pr()\'i1kil 
for rc:coHry oi any puhlic a~sisi:rncc paid 
to any pcrso1t who w.1s not c111itlc1l thereto. 
Jntl for rccn\'cry irom the estates •li ,lc-
cc:iscd rr..::ipic111s 1111.tcr certain co11dit1,m~ 
,111<! in the ,liscrl.'!1011 oi th..: st;itl! deput· 
lllC!ll. 
111 1'1~1. the ruhlic .-\,sistance Law was 
amended hy atldi11~ thereto, § ~o-~.!h. l.C.. 
thc material parts ,ii which an: a, i,illqw;: 
"Et"11:c1i,·c July l, 19~1 all oid-;i~,: 
assi~1;111cc aw,v<ic,t 1111rlcr tllis act ;,J 
pi.:rsons o\\·lli111(' real pr,,perty 0r any 
iuternt; 111 n·:il prnpcr:y ,ha II h,: 
:;uhjL't.:t t11 rL'Co\·cry. ~lt1.:!1 f\;~f1Yt:ry 
shall he .,ccninpli,i1,·d in acc1iril:1m:c 
with the folluwi11;: pro,·isi,ms tu bl! 
cli'cctivc thcr,·a it..:r: 
"t:zl E.1ch rccipirnt or or ,1pplicam 
for ,,1,1-;i~c assi~1;i11cc who) owns real 
11r11p,·rty qr any imcr,·~ts in real pmpcr-
tY sh;dl he n.·,1nirc,l to enter intn a;rcc-
n1,•11L in the m;umcr allfl inrm prc~crih-
ctl hy the: st:1tc •lc:r,anmrnt by wh10:!1 
the recipient shall a\.:rcc that :;uch n·al 
prnpeny or any intcn·sts in real pr"JI· 
cny has hccn as~ii.:nccl as security ir,r 
th.: rcc0vcrr oi all oltl•agc ass1stanc,: 
lhcrc:iftcr aw:urkcl lo him. • • • 
The act iurthcr pro"i,lcs for J.n ,pt,li- "(h) Upon makin!; an aw:ir<f oi olo!-
aite assistance the state dep.1r1111c11t 
,,..,.ation by a. pmspccti,·e rccipii:nt, J.n in-
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73 IDAHO REPORTS 
:;hall forthwith file such :tgrccment £or 
n·.:urilini.:- with the county recorder of 
the comuy in whid1 the n·al flr11p•·r1y 
1h·:<critw.1 in su.:h a!tn·1·11w111 is ,it11al•·•I 
;1111I the filiui:- :11111 r,·,·ur,Jini,: oi ,11.:h 
;,:!rl'<·nl<'nl ;h:111 h:1•·.: the ~:11111· .. 1i'n·t 
a, a li•·n hy j11,l;:11w11t un ,::1i,I n·al 1m•1!· 
,·rty. From the rim.: ui 1ili11;;: 11i ,uclt 
a;.:rn·tm·m :tll oi rh.: r,·:il pr,,p,·r:r 
tlwn·in •h·,:.:rili<·d ,hall h,· ;111,I h,-.·,,m.: 
ch:1 r;:.-,1 with :i 1:.-:1 i11r all .,,,i,1.111.:c 
r•·.:.·il'l·d l,y Ill<' :q,pli,·:mt :1,- lwn·:n 
pr11,·i,!.-,I. "hid, 1:l·n ,hall ha••· l'r:uruy 
111·,·r :111 1111r.·..:11rolnl ..:-m·n:nl,r:.n,·,·s. 
• • ••• 
Tiw s•·,·1i11n al,o pr11•·i.inl j,1r c,·r,111.-:1-
1:,,:1 hy 1h .. ,t.·p:1rtm,·nt. 111•1111 n·,1111·,t, ,,i I h•· 
:01;,I :11111111111 p:1i,I ;i r,·.:ip1<·:11. and i,,r whi.-!1 
a li,·n is .:l:1im•·d. 10 rlw ,l:111• 11i 1111: .:erllli· 
tr:,n~ii:r ui the l'rll(fl'rlr ,,rior IU n••·ipi.-11:·, 
ol•·:uh: aml for p:1ynwnt 11111 <Ji 11w ,·:olat•·, 
of d,-cl'aS\'ll r,·cipi,·111~. :<uhj.·cr 111 :1 pr111r 
c:oi:i:m11ti11n of $,JIJO. All rc&:1J1·,·r:,·~ :ire re-
quired to lie ,lq1u~i1,·1I in the Cuop1·r:tti•·c 
\\"clfare F1111,J in rhc s1at.: tn·a~ur~·- This 
inrul was cr,·:it,·il It~· th,· ,1;1rc lq:i~lamr,· ;u 
a m,·ans o{ i11rthcri11:: 1h,· ._..,,..,,.ration hc-
:w1·c11 the !it:11e ;11111 frd.-r;1I ~· 11·,·rmth"lll :i 
in math'rs of Jmhli.: a~,is1;111,·c. F.-.lnal 
an,! ~,arc fmul!i appr11pri:11<·d :111,I :11·ail:1l,tc 
iur pnhlic ;1s~i,1;111<',: arc •h·p11,ih'd 1lwr1·in 
:iml paymcnrs ti> rc:cipicm:i :,re ma,lc rh,·re· 
from. 
[1 J F•·J,·r:11 i:r:1111~ to th,• !'l;ih·s (,,r ,1ld-
:tgc :issi:-tam:c :irl" 111:idc 1111<lcr rhc p~o-
visions of Tide 1 oi the ~ati:,1..11 Soda? 
S,·.:uri1~· A.:t, 42 li.5.C..·\. § .301 ct seq~ 
\\'hilc rhis :1.:t it~,·li rnak.·, nn pr,,,·isinn 
i11r rr,·11n·r~· irrn:. rlw l'r11prr1r 11r c:state\l 
ni ,h-n·:i>i·,1 ri·c11'i•·111,:, it ,lors r,-.,nirc tb:tt 
th.: fc,lnal ,:nwrnnwnt be n·imhur~cJ for-
i1, ,hare ,_,i any n·c,11·,·rit-~ m:uh• 11111ler 
~, ...... l.1w l,r ~!1,_· pru\'i:--i,u1 111 ~,-~:i .. ,n JOJ, 
,111,,n·: : .. n I h 11.! ,, whi,·h rrun,1.·s that 
-_.,. 
1'=•~ :11<·111< :1,·,·r:m1~ :,, th•· ,1:1:,· iru:n the 
11:11:un;il ;:•11·,·r::mr111. ,lull I,,· "r,·dn.:,·I! by a.-~-~ .. : 
,11111 ,·,111" .1h·11t 10 :h· pr11 r.1::1 ,h.irc ro ·.:·<• 
\\ 1::,h :lw l'11i:,·,l ~1:11n ",·,p111ahly ,mtitl- :·_ · 
•·•I. :1, ,l,·:,·r111i11,·,1 I,,. :h,· .\.l111:ai,1r::1:1>r, of':_-_' 
1h,· 11.-i .,1au1m1 r,·.:·••·•·r,·,1 d11r:a:: .111y prior- · ~-
•11:.in.-r l•y :h,· ~,arc 1>r .111~· ;,.,li;i,:i.l sub-·.:._:·.::· 
,Ii• :,i1111 :lwr.·"i wuh r•·'i"' .. : h> 1>1,1-a~ • S,-..: . 
:.»1,1::th·,· i11r111,hni urn!.-r th•· :-:::11.: plan_~-,:;,~; 
• • •" In :1,·:ual 11p•·r:1::.m. und~r_,",' 
:u:r,·,·n1r1U h,·1 \\ ,·,·n the ic.·,IL·r:1i ~u,J ,t:i~J,,-~.· · 
i:n,·,·ri111w1:t~. •h•· 1•r,, r:11:l ,h:irc ot re--:; 
..:-o,·,·r-!,·~ ,!th" r~• tlu· ir,l,·r:11 .:u,·,·rnmc-nt is.";:., 
• r.· • 
.-r,·.li11·,I 111 it~ a.:.:1111111 in rh,· wdfarc fund)". 
;11111 it~ ~11h~1·•1m·111 ,·,1111rih111i,,11~ rNUC:«f' 
;,,.: .. r,li11::h·. Tlwr•· i,. t h,·n· inr,•. 111> merit; 
i11 :1ppdl.,;11,· :itra.-1, 11p,111 ,1,.. ~lat.:· J~,,;:; 
1111 th,· i,:rmm,I 1ha1 it ,lo,·~ '!111 $p,·.::iricaiif-N 
pr,1\·i,I,• i11r l'a~ mrm ,,i rill' 11ro r:,t:i sha~: 
,lir.·.:t t1> th,· inkral i,:,t1·•·rm111·1,"1. 
1•1:,i111i1T~ all,·::1· :har tlwy 1n·rl!' 
m:,rri,·d al \ ·.il,I" ,·II. in \ ·:111.-.111 Co>ttnl)'~' 
• r, 
l,lah11. ~r1111·mh,·r I. l'lil11 ; 1h:ll $C\"ti!: 
chiJ.lr.·n •• ,·r,• l111n1 th•· 
ri;ii:•·: t h.11 th,·,· ar,· :-•1 :111,I ;"ll n·:ir~ oi age, 
. • r .. •. 
r,·~1w.-til"l·ly; and rlw~· ,,wn :,~ tlu:ir so!~· 
,·111111:mniry 1•r,1p,·rry .:.-rt:1i11 n·:1I c~t:1~j 
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C.:~ :is:-: l1lnhu 5.!0 
.::i:· oi Cal,lwcll, wli:.:h th,·y occ·~;;y as out Jue proc.:,s oi law, in ,·i,ilatioo of art. 
.ir :1L,m.:: :hat th<'~' made ;ip;>lica:;;:, to I,§ 13, Idal,o Cnmt. The rit.:ht to own wJ 
. Dc~;i.nmcnt oi Puhl:c :\,,::;tar,c~ anJ c11.ioy pri,·atc property is il111cla11wntal. le 
re :\\,·:1r,:cJ. ;i.n,l ha,·.: bccn r:iid, ,·,:.:-.1:::c is one oi the 11at11r;i.l, inh.:rc11t and i:1alicn-
;i~1:1nc.:, se,·.:r;il yc;irs pri,Jr ~·J th~ :0 :1 ;il,k ri~hts ui ircc men. It is 1101 a ~iit oi 
.,·n,;nicnt: :hat in J11:1<', \tl~I. t::t •!c· n11r co11sti1t1ti1111~. hcc.1usc it ,·:-.i:<t~·rl h,-i .. rc 
·,d:int. ;is 1...\m1mi~~io11c~ of :~c Dc-; .. r:-
·:1t oi Puill:C :\:'::i;1;111cc. ,kn::111,kc '.:-::it 
,·y e:-.cn1tc :tnil ,k!ivcr :0 the ,,cp:1:-:::-:c::t 
" .1~~.:c:i1cnt prnnd,·,I inr in the '.~': l 
::c11.i::1,·nt. c~,·:1tin:; a l:.·:1 111'"11 :!,,·:~ ~-::ii 
r,· :is <..:,.;ur:t,· i0r :hl'. r"·l'.o,·...::--: ,)f 
1W'. . . - b . : 
i)"nl\·n:~ thvr~:tl!t.·r to t: ;n:1,:.: 1,-, :.:-=~-
.1 p:1111 <1t b,-::1~ ,k:1i,·il :::nh,·r a,,,,::c.:::·:~ 
Our constit111i,H1s ,·111hr:1.cc :me! 
prn.:bin1 it :1.s .,11 cs:'c11tia! in our ,:11n,:,.p1i1111 
oi ircl·d,un. 11 :\m.Jur .. C.u1;1i111ti,111:il 
L:l\\-. ~ .i.\3: ~l':11111 ,·. lhlb~. 111 T,·:-. . .l:<1 . 
.!.i5 :-;.\\' .. ~u. l'J .\.I..R. l.1.'-!;-_ This ri:.:ht ,,i 
pr,,perty, th11n~h 11i s1u;h 111_:.:!i ,,r,kr. IS 
n,n:~:h,·1,·-s ,11h_i~ct to r,·a,:<>11al,h: Iimita-
1i .. 11 .,11,I r,·_:.:111.u:1111 lty the ,l;ltl' 111 the i11-
::,·r _T11ly I. l'-1: l: th:1.t t'c.cy we~<' wi·.:--,•:~ tu,·,1:1 ,1i th.: .:11111111 .. 11 \\'cl iarl'. lndct·d. 
1..:on!l' di rv~t>Ur1:l':i :l1 prnvid..: ;1 :-1.::1:-:1·,:-..i:1i•..: a ::t:1t11t~ itlllhJ~in~ :1ny lin1it:1tion upou thl· 
jJt,hni ,)i lwa!th :rnJ l\'cl!-h,·111:.: :·,ir ,:-,7.· ri;!ht rn11,t In.: supported l,y ,11,:h p11r;ir1,c 
St:Hc "· 0111:1"ch.:\'l'iaria, 27' ldah11 i'.r;, 
15.! I' . .!~l: :?+,i L" . .S. 3-13 . . ,s S (·1. 32.,. ti.! 
ld:rh,, ;-~. 2:-2 11. ;-o;-; Drnuis ,·. ~111,n. ts 
\\'.1,-h. .-.i7, ::2 11. .\33, ·+O L. R .. \. _;().!; 
:h·c~: .,:,d th:.!. hn::i11,c ,;: :'lll'h :1n:,·~.,:::: 
1:,: ,11rl1 .:,1m:ntl,i1111. th,·:: ,·x,·c:::ed ":'.d 
'--::\"l'r\·1: ~h'-· ;J:_!:'l'"-'l1h.'t1t pll··.h!'iu~ ::,,.:ir ·-i:d 
,':,; ;1r,,p.-~t\' .l:' ~cc·11d1y i,,~ tile rc·mh1:~:·:· 
1l':~: .)I :ii1 :t~~::o:!:tnt.:..: ;>:1yn1l·:1t:, r,:.:i..·i,·'-·:..: ·°J/ 
h,·::: :,:·:,·~ July i. l'.151. 
l'ul,!ic ~en-ice c .. 111111. ,·. 1·;ri111,h:,w, -I'> 
[2. 31 The !•)~I ,t:1.t11:c i~ :i,uc~:-: \\"yn. 1.=.~. 53 J'.:?,l t. t1l'l .\.!..!~. ~-;~: 1,; 
tp,\:l \';\r: 1JtlS ~·,~:~titu~:1)!1;d ~r1n1tab. F::-~:A CI ' ' ' . I r ' 
· ... ~ .• l•>ll>tlllltl'lll:l .aw,§ ,,n __ 
lwy :i~~c~: it y:,1bt,·s :irt. I. ~ I. ,Ji .r~: 
u11:-i.:-.,:::1J11. ,v~!~h ~~c..:lart·~ ~1s 11uc 1,i :.-:-: 
n:1.l:c:1;,\l!c ri;::1::,- oi man thc r:~ht 
h~ :i~~l'::'tc,l lil'!l ;11:iccs :1 c!,nul 11p,m th,-::-
itl~ wh:c:t rl·,;1r:c:, their r:::nt ltl .:011\'c·:· 
•1:c:m:hc, or llt::,•rwi~.: ili~;,,,;c ,,i th,-::-
1r,1rcny. :\ppl·!!.,1115 forth.:~ a~~,rt I~.! 
-~ ·•:t oi :he law:; t,1 •lcrriY.: :h,·m rii th,·::-
~~:r ;,t!tl the ,·11j,,~·:11cnt :hcn·oi. wit:J· 
[ 4 j The 111tl-a~c ;i~si~t:1.ncc l;nv is to I>,: 
,li,1i11g-11islic,I ir,1111 ~o-,:;i.llc,I "rnc,r bws" 
rir ··iucli;:,nt st:1tntcs' in that th.: •>fd-a~·: 
recip:l':ll 111: .1 pa11p..:r or :1.h .. 11lt1tl'lr 1h·~ti-
1111c 111 l'lllitlc him 111 p;1y111<:11I~ 1hcrc111ulcr. 
:O:tak l'lt rel. [Tclpnu:y.:r , •• :--hrny,•r, Ohio 
.\p11., :;-,! \".E.'.?d 77-1; Lci~h v. Cont"r •li 
l'uhli.: lll•alth & Charitit·s of T.:1.wrcm:,·, 
JIii ~hss. J-1.1, 37 N'.E.2,1 lOii; \\"arrcn 
·Tlf_·-.,_ ·~ . ,,,t 
.( 
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County, .. Decatur County, 232 Iowa tilJ, 5 to paupers :11i.l in,ii;;-cnts, thL·re is no con-
~'. \\" .. :.'i.J S-17. ,1:mli,,n;il or .:un11:1v11-l;I\\" d111y n·stini; upon .1,. 
[ 5. 61 \\'e held in Sr:11e c:<: rd. \"icl,nn 
'"· Liod~trom, 6S Idaho 226, 191 r.:,1 \11()(), 
1012, th:it "Th.: ;:r;intin~ of aid ro its 
nccJ_,. al,:'ed is a well n·~m:ni~,·,l .,f,\i:,::.tinn 
oi the ,talc anti is :i g,1n·r11mc11tal i1111c1i1111 
tenJin!,:: to promote rhc puhlic w,·liar.:.'' 
.-\n)· !imu:ition upon the propaty n:.:hts of 
n:c:pirnts in the :ippli.::ition ,1i thi: !i,·n law 
is :implr 5upported I>~· a p11hlic p11rp,1sc, 
n:imcly to promote th<' "common w,·li:1rc." 
Pfl·:imlile. It is thi, ruhlic p11q1e1~,· t,1 whi.:h 
:ill lKndici:ui .. s mu~t luok to jn,tiiv th.: 
p:.ymc111s they rc,~i\'<', It is thi~ \Hililic 
p11rpose which s:iws the entire p11hlic .1s-
si,1:1ncc bw from direct cuntlict with ~,·c-
tinn 2. art. S. l.laho Con~t.. pruvidi11~ lhat 
"The cretlit ui the s1:1tc ,lull not. i11 :iny 
m;innc:r. hr g-ivcn, or lo:tncd to. or in aid 
oi any i11<1i,·i,l11al, • • •" State ex rel. 
>."icl:,011 ,·. Lin,btrnm, supra; .-\1:im,·,l:i 
Cu1:11ty ,·. Janssc11, 16 Cal.1,l :!;'(,, ltxi 1•.::,1 
11, Lio .-\.L.R. lHI; :olori.::in , .. lkpt. oi 
Suci:il 5crnrity, 1+ \\'a;h..2,1 1.31;, 12;- l'.2J 
c,.')(",: Lus Angele~ County v. L., Fuc11k, ::!\} 
Cal.1.J 8iU, 129 P.:?cl Ji8: l[d\'erini: , .• 
D;n·is, Jf.11 L".S. 619, Si S.Ct. ~11H, Sl I..EJ. 
J.il.•i. 
[i. 81 The "oblii:ation of the stare·• 
rcicrrcJ to in the Lindstrom ~a~c is h.> be 
un.krstuoJ a~ :i mor:il r:ithcr than ;1 m:ind:1-
tory obli~ation. Thi: theory of th.: :\meri-
c:in political system is that the citiz.:n sup-
ports the state, not the re,·erse. En:n :is 
the ,1:111: tu pr,n·i,k ,upp0rt. T!w recipient 'I'• 
'.1 
h:i, n" Yc,tL"d ri~ht to a,,1't:1110:.: payments.. :[. 
l)11 the• cu11tr~ry, his ri..;ht thnct~ i_s cmi~ely -:~'.\ \, 
,'\ .:r,·at11rc o_l ,1;1t11tc. .-\, ;11ch 1t 1s subJect. .' 
10 b,·ini.: c:--t,·11,kd. Ji111i11i,h,·d • .:on,litioned j ·.:· 
or alir,,~.1tcd 1•1· th1: k).!i,larnrc. T LI entitle. ~ ._, 
him tu .,,s,·rt -;11c!1 ri1.;l1t. he· n111~t comply .-_ l.:.. 
w11h ;ill r1·:i,,111;il,k a11d 111111,ii,,riminatory.•·~ ·,. 
co111li1i .. :1, iu1i''"'-,i ;,y th,· ln:i,lativc author-.,.'-
i1,·. lln1111c L"v1111t\·. ,·1c.. , .. :'\[\"hrc. 1-19 NcI>:~;i 
,;i;11_ 32 ~ .\\' ::i1 ~r..::!: :-=cnl,,:1. ,·. Fair, ;o' .' 
. ' 
t >hio1 .\,,p. _:1_ ~~ \".1-:.!,l 1.l'>: Di\'isio11 of, 
:\iJ iur :he .\::ed . .-to.: .• ,·. I !n~:rn. 1-U Ohio:. 
~t. 1:--i,. 54 :S:.E.2.1 ;-~1: .\11111>. S6 :\.LR.~, 
~11..!: 41l .\111.Jur., !'C'11,iu11::. § i, p. 966. 
--\\'h;1t ;ipp,·l!.,m~ arr,·~r entirely to~}':·~. 
O\'l'r'.,-.k i, :h .. .-:1ct th.,t tla·y ha,·e no ~,)t 
,·l'":--h·d ri~hts in (,1d ~1\!.t: hc:nerics or\.' ........ 
in ;111\· oth.:r iurm ui rdid. The state'-::'·,.;: 
. ' h b • b : -~· ' 
m;1y. :1s 1t a~. i,:-rant su,!i cni:nts, ut 1 .::... 
.... ~:.-1 ,._· t: 
it i~ 11ut rn111iro:d to Jo su. In gn,nt- __ : 
in).!' th-111 it may impu,c ,11,:h conJitions--/.;,; 
a~ it dn·111, ;,rop.:r :111J _iu,t. It' :l per-;-·"':·., 
~J11 :h:,,·1•1, :1 J.:ra111. ho: 11111st :iccept it'!';_'\ 
s11h1t·~: !u the i:0111li1 iuni-."' Dimke 'f. ;'-!'(:-
. . ·- ~~ Finke .• ,l', ~!inn .• '•), -".15 :,,:,\\, ,:,, 1lt7=:,"' 
pa).!'c ;,J, -;,:·~o'J. 
-, ~-;. 
--~ 
[9] Th,· .:vnditi,m~ imrol'.:J by the s~;~-: 
lltl.:' ;ire :1vt ~" 011,·rvm :is tho:;c urdinani:,j' 
t· 
intpo~~·,l in pri\'ate len,lina:- tr:u1sacti~~-
On the cuntr:iry, the law pruYidc:i A f~~-
1..:..--.. 
:mJ '111111:111~· plan by which n.:cJr :i~. "'~; 
vwn a humi:. 111;1y secure ol,1-a.gc assi~~~ 
000219
NEWLAND v. CHILD 539 
C,:e u il lduho 530 
while contiuuin~ to occupy and enjoy :heir the real ohjcction to this lien law is that of 
home, r:ithcr th:m being required to ::i'lrt· 
;;:\~e or sell it, and consume the proc~s in 
li\"in~ expenses bciorc rccci\·ing :iid. ,\t 
the same time it prcsen·es the pr'lpc~y as 
a mc::111s oi reimbursing the wet fan: ::incl, 
thus i;i,·ini; the recipients the s:itisiac::o:i •lt 
p:iy111i: :heir own w:iy :is far :is th~:,- :ire 
;ibk. ar.d with the least h;1rdship. I: :i:sl) 
rcdn,,·s :he amount which n111>t b.: cc:::::::u-
the prospective heirs. 
"The conflict oi interest here is not 
between the St:itc :in1l its nce<lr :i~c·I. 
It is ll\:twecn the State :ind the heirs, 
11c:tt oi kin or other Jistributecs oi the 
e,:;i.tes oi the <lcce:iscJ r,.:cipicnts." 
State ex rel. ~ic!s0n ,·. Lindstrom, ll-i 
1,1..ho 2'.?6, 191 P . .?J 11)()9, 1012. 
[lOl Appd!ants also contcnrl th:it, since 
their ,t:itus .u clig-ihlc recipients oi 01<1-a~e 
t:ic moral ob!ii::itio11 to ;,ru,·iJe ,uc~ :iid, 
h is a :natter oi common knowlc,Ji;~ :!lat 
,vme st:itcs h:i,·e so bunkneu thcm~:,·cs 
w:th ,·arious iorms oi public :issistanc.: :in,i :i.ssist:incc w:is cstahlishcd :in,! rcco~nizcu 
uiil·a!!C ,,cnsions that the threat oi :=-<-01- prior to the 1931 amendment, the a:,plic:i· 
\",::1.::y h:is iorcc:'1 :i. modirie:ition oi :hc:ir tion oi the new jiro,·ision to them w011lri 
pi:ins. In :ill states the \Jurden oi sue:. :is- crmstitute retrnspccti\'e in,·asinn oi :i. ,·cstctl 
si:t:1111:,: :,as bceome :i. m:ijor prrihlcm. \':ir- rit;ht. ,\s alreacl~- n'ltc•I, recipi.:nts can :ic· 
iou~ methods oi rcco,·ery h:in: been ,icv-:!ed, quire no ve~ted riy;;ht under the statute. The 
lei;i~laturc may mndiiy the conditimts 0i 
assi~1:11h:c, or Jcny it :iltogcthcr, :i.t :i,ny 
time. 
;u:J rc~:-.;1ps none !l:is been entirely !J.tis-
fact,,ry. .·\moug such plans some 5:..:cs 
h:i ,·e pro\"iued ior rcimhur~cment by ~t!:i.-
t:\·es, k'.,;ally responsible ior the car~ 'li [II) It is :ilso contenclcrl th:tt appellants 
their need:, ducrs. This, however, h:i, j,,:,:n :ire ,kniccl c1111al protection of the law. .\rt. 
iv~11u ,!i:ni:ult oi ;ipplic:11:011 :111.J, in !•Jm.: 1, § 1, l,l;iho Con~titntion, The contention 
c:~c11mst:1nc,·s, 1111j11s1. lns:cau oi r,·qu:~:n;; is that they, :is owm:rs oi n·al pr,,pcrt~·. :ire 
the rd:iti\'CS to pro\"idc the suppurt, -=~ to iliscrimin:ited ag:iinsr, in. th:tt they :ire re, 
re:mh11r~,· the s1:11c, our law limits rcc')'l·ery iuirc<l to gr:i.nt :i lien upon their proper!>', 
to the estate, or the rc:il prnpcrt~·. o: the wherc:15 neeily :igccl who ha\'e 110 re:11 cs• 
rcc:p1en1. The rclati,·es :ire :isl.:ccJ on::, :" 1:1tc, hut m:iy own personal prripcrty, 
iorc~. to the c:tt<'.ltt oi $UC:l rnymcms, -:.h:it :ire ,zr:intcil :ii<l withrmt such rciuircmcnt, 
they otherwise might inherit. ,\s w:is !'.Ii· :inu :ire therefore prcforrc<l. It is reco~-
stcu in 51:ite e."I: rel. Xiclson v. Linust~m, nizctl that the lcgisl:iture h;is bro:i<l dis· 
._, 
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oi p1.:r~,111s :ind prnpcrrr rur all pur-
P"~,·, ""hi,·h it 111:ll' b\\'iu11_,· ~,·d, to :1c-
cumplish. So lllll:.;' as thc ,·l:":<i11..::i I i,,n, 
art )Ja~1.·tl 11pon :--t>TllL' h·;.:-itl111:lh: :-:ru11n1l qi 
di 1f,·r.:11c·,: lJ.:!W,<:ll th,: p..:r;,JIIS ur ,1l•_r,·,:t<; 
..:!:1~~iti,·d. :iro: nut i:11r,:1rn11:1l1I,· ,,r :irhitr:iry. 
a11d h\.·:tr a r"l":1:-:011:ililc re!:ltii,11 tn ~ht.• lt·;-:l~· 
]~1ll\·t· p11rpu"!1.\ su'"·:1 1.~!:1....:~li"1,::Hi,u:~ 1!11 n11t 
1·i.,l:11c th,· .:1111,1i1::ri11n. ll:,: \\',,,1,\ 1 .. .'.111;,I 
L'u. 1·. (ll:lprn:111. -t~ l.J:ih,, _;_-:11_ ~1,.i l' -l; · 
h,1·.1·.: ,·. L'ity lli l',i,:;11.:ll,1, ;-n l,i:1h,1 3l.,. 
21:-{ l' . .?,l 1i'!~: S!.1to: ,·. E\'.111~. :-.1 l.l:1h,1 
:iJ. :2-t3 l'.?,I ;-~-..:; :ti ;\m Jnr., =::1:11,:'.,·,. 
sss.11.,,. 
r 12 I Our pulili.: :i~~i-t:lllcC l:iw ("llh'TTl• 
pla11.:s !h;ic :ill 11n:,iy :1~ui ,h:dl r,·..:1:11·,· :1s-
~i:it:,ru:v ;1~\.'.'11rdi11~ ·,., ~he i111~1'"idu:d 11\'l'd ,,i 
,·.1d1. "with due rc-.::1nl • • to the 
\\'. ;-_,: lln,llll' l~,>1111ty ,·1,· .. ,·. :0-lyhn·, 1~9· 
:\, I,. <•i'1. ,;:'.'. :\'.\\· . .:,1 _;i,_:: ln r,· l)pinion of 
tile .Tu,ti..:,·,. ~3 :'\.If. 311.:. 1,q .\ • .:t~; .-\n-
110. ~o .\.T.. I~. ~11.!; ,\1111u. 1.!5 .-\.1-R. 712. 
[ 131 .-\ppdl;1111s furrh.-r .:nmn:d th:it the 
l'. 1.'I .\,;ti, :i local :iml ,.p,·,·1al law l'iul:iti\·e 
ut ,,rt. 3. ~ lq. [J;d1n ('.,11>titt1ti,,11. Since 
I,,· it,. :crm, it is ;1ppli,·alik :dil..: :o :ill pcr-
01111, thr,>1::.;hnut 1hc ,1;11,-. who .:t•mc within 
tit,· n--r•·,: 11·.: d;1,,,·, r hn, i11 pr, ,ndcJ ior, 
;t11d. :h.: ,·1,,,.,-i1i,·a1i,,1t ht·i111.: r,·:i,nnahk·. :inJ 
witlt.11 th,· :1111hority oi the lt-:.:1,!at11re, it 
i~ 11 .. 1 :n .111~· ,,·n,c ;1 ln,:il ,,r ,p,:,;i.1 I law, 
",cl1:11 tht· m,·.111111,.: oi :hi.: \·,,:::;tinn:on. 
~t:,i.- ,·.\: r.-1. :'\icl•,111 Y. Li11,btr,•m, supra. 
[ 14 I l:,,mpbi11t i; :il,11 ma,i,· tlt:it the 
pr<1\'i,1,111, ,ii th<.: 111.-1 ;1111,·11<ina·::1, § :e>-
_:_;-l,1. 1.( .. :ir,: i11 ,·0111li.:t with. ;ui,; :h,·rdor,: 
r .. l',·:tkd hy. Lhapt.-r :!~11 oi 1~:,· :-:,·s~ion 
L111< ui \• 1_;1, which wa~ p:t,,,·d l,y ·.11.: ;:imc 
irn:urnc a11, I n·s1111r,.:, :l\·ail,.ld..: to 111111 : r .. m 
wh:11,·1-.:r ~<111n·e". I.L. § .,.-,_,:1, 1• L'11,kr 
it, pro"·i,,.,ns ;rnd 1111,kr 1h" n·-.:q 1;1\:.,u, 
w Ii icl1 it ;i 111 norii,·s. p~r,011:d pro(krl y. as ,,·,,11,11 <> i the lq.;1, lar 11r,·. h111 ,1:i•,,·,p1..-ntly 
""<.:II ;IS n·:d prop~rtr 1)\\"t11:d u~- Liu.- n.·t..:ipi1.·11t (0 ~ ~h-~~--Cl,. r.c. .._~h.;1p11.·r .!-'"· 1 q~: ( Lau,·s, 
is 1:ik .. 11 into con,i<1 .. r:i1i,111 in ,kt,·r:11inill<:- :111w11,ls ,,·rt:1i11 >'l'l'lions ot th,· i''.d1lic .-\s-
th<: type ;rnd amu1111t ui a,,-i~t:1111:1·, ~,i that :tll ~i>lan,c L1w. i11.:l11din!!' § .'r>-2.!J. !.C. This 
;ire 1rc;1t,·d fairly and wi!hutl! ,li,..:ri111111a- l:t~! "·..:1i1111 is the ,111,: whi,·h or:;:11:;tlly pro-
tiun. Th( classi1ic:1tiu11s ;ire nut q 1111rr:t· ,·i,lc-d i,ir r.:co,·er:· ,ii p11hli.: ;1,,'.,:;11·,,-c ..ii>-
1,lc 1,, th" ,ibjl·i:tiuns made. Star,· ,. ~ rel. 
:'\i,·lsun \', 1.i11,l~trum, ,~-; l,lahu .!.:o. \(I\ I'. 
:!ti [1109; lla\\'kius ,·. :-1,11,· .. i l\a11s1s ~t>-
cial \\'clfarc 1!,mnl. 14~ Kan. ;-,~1. :"4 11 • .:,1 
~·.m; I.us :\n;;-,·I,·~ t:,11t11ty ,·. ~,·.:11r:1y Fir,t 
Xat. Bank oi T.u\' .\lll~l'I.:~. S4 C.,1..\pp . .:d 
:-i:-, I'll P . .:!,I i~; \\"a!ll,.·ri: , •• L"tah 11111,li.: 
\\"clfarc Comm., II~ L"t:1h ~~.! . .:o., P . .:J 
l:1i11t·tl hy :i pt·r,,111 wh,1 \\';1:; 11,,: ,•ntitl~I 
1h,·r,·1,1. The :1111,·ut!ment :1<!.k,! :,1 it by 
Cl1;1p1,·r .:~,i. pr<1\'id,·; 
i-11.-lt a~~i,1:1m:c, p;1id 
th,·r,·to. hy llll':1t1s oi 
:1!,!':1i11~1 his ,·,rate. Tt 
r ,,r 
"' 
:\ 
1~ 
the: :-n.·~•,·l~ry of 
1111,• :1• ,r ,·111itk-tl 
prd,·~~···1 cllini 
1.1ln·l,1~:~ f r11 ,m :a 
n·:1di11i,: ni tlw;c tw11 ~,·ctiun, :!::It th,•y 
;arc not III c,mrlict. Tlh'y ,l,·:1I wid1 Jii• 
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C~:e :is 7 J IJ:ihu 5J0 
ft-rent cla~scs or recipients. 
thcrdore. \'aliJ and etTcc:in•, 
is nu implied rcpc:il. Swr,cth 
B0~:: arc, b:-· Jltr,ss, spc·(i1i(ally "business co1np1d-
;;.::ci :here ;iun," :lnd for that r<·a::011 is u11ct1 iorce:ilik 
5::uc, This .:un1<·11tio11 is likc\\'isc "·iti1u11t mnit. 
D;ilton, 7~ lJaho 451. 243 l'.~J 5~. 
[15] It is :ilsu cunt,ndL·J :h:1t ~ ,:',j..~-b 
is Jeicctive in th:n no pron;iun :s :::a.de 
therein iur the rcle:isc o i the !icn ::: .:.:a:ic u i 
~atisi:i(tion thcrcoi prior to th<' -'.e;i::i. oi 
th<· rc-:ipicnt. To this we th111k :: :s :id· 
ticw11t to say that it l,.::ng- ~iw:1 th,· :::cc: vi 
'i<·n by juJ,;:n1cm, :int.i ,nh,c·.::i•m -: , ?ro-
V.uini,; for a .:,·rtitica!I.: by the C:<·;.:.:-::-:.cnt 
oi the t<,tal a111•J111l! ui the lic:1 -:::.:::icd 
th,·rc11n,kr to tht: date ui the cc~:1ric:.:c, ;;.nJ 
that: 
•
1 
• • • ~ny pt:r~on de:iiin~ -.,·:::'1. 
the rccip1c11t may rely upun rnch c:c:::i-
L'Jll: as .:,·i<kncin~ the am.,11111 v: :::e 
t':-.:i~t1ng- lien .:i~:ilnst :he rt".:i.l i:~1::.:~ oi 
the recipient'', 
the !q;-islaturc intcn<lcJ that it shc.-~:,i be 
subject to n:k:isi: by th<.: dq1:irtmc::: :.;-;iun 
payment of the amount oi the .:cnif.n:c. in 
the manner pro\'iJc<l by bw ior the :,-!.-Jse 
oi a juJi,rmcnt, un<lcr §§ 10-11 lJ .,:;.; 10-
11 H, I.C. Cook v. ~lassi:y, JS IJai':ll ~,H, 
220 P. 1088, 35 .-\.J_R. 2(-); ~lt. \"icw :..::.;~al 
Tel. Co. v. Intcrst:lte Tel. Co., 55 (c.;i.ho 
514. ~ P . .:!J i'23. 
111<·11! muse nut u11ly l>c obtained hy n1,a11-, 
llt the pressure bruugltt rn bt·~r. hut tl1c 
:t!!n:,·mcnt i1°,·I i mu,t be m1j,1st. mu:<111-
e.:iu11:il1k, or ilk:,::il. The cs,o:11cc ui ,i11r,·•s 
:s the ,11rr,·11,icr :o unbwiul ur t111co11;,:in11-
:ibk ,k111;111ds. It c:11111,,t hc pr,:di,·:11.:d :1po11 
,k·m:inds which arc lawi11I. ,,r the 1hr<·.1t 
:o Jo 1h:it whicl1 the Jl'ma1ulim: p:1rty lta~ 
.1 1.-;,:;tl r:)!'!tt to do. Inland Empire !,,:-
:·:lll·ri<"S \', _11111,·•, 69 ld:illn 33.5, 21111 !' . .!d ,:l"; 
:::t:111,,rrl \'. F:vl,I. ;-o fd:1ho .331, 211:1 I' 2d 
33::S: lb::1p B,1:hli11gs Corp. ,·. Xorthwc·~t 
ll111ldi11g Lu .. l<'.4 \\'a,n. 1ilH. 4 P.:?d :n;-, 
;-9 .\.L.R. 1i:l; R:11kr ·;. llarn<.:r. 1;-2 Or. 1, 
139 l'.:?,l l.31J; .\11n111:1ti(}n. l\u~i11..:ss ( .. m. 
r,ul,inn. 79 .\.I..lt 655; 1;- :\m.Jur .• Durn,, 
~§ -I, G, ;utt.1 7; 17 C.J.S., Contracts.§ 172, 
}Ja:.,::c :J:?. 
:\s 1n· ha\'c not,·,I. the demaml or the st:1te 
for a lir11 upnn the rc:il property of ol<l-ag-c 
r~cipil'Jlt:i is l:iwi11l, fair an<l just. Hence, 
there is no Jurcss ur business cumpulsiuu 1u-
,·uh·cJ. 
JuJi;m<·nt atiirmed. 
Xu custs ;illuwcJ. 
[16. 17] 1-'l!tly, :ippcl!ants contcr.c :!:at PORTER, C. J., :u1J GIVE::-.!S, TilOll-
t.hc lien ai;rccmcnt was ob~incJ by the ,w:c A:; anJ KJ::J::TO:-:, JI., \:Uncur. 
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CHAPTER 49 
(H,S, No, 451) 
AN ACT 
73 
Ut,ATINC TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; AMENDING CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IOAHO 
·_-,,. COOK, BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 56-218, IDAHO CODE, TO PRO-
J.i VIDE FOR THE RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE; ANO REPEALING 
'~•-· SECTION 56-224c, IDAHO CODE • 
. 'l"/ 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
1· .. SECTION 1. That Chapter 2, Title 56, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
l• hereby amended by the addition.thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
kslovn and designated as Section 56-218, Idaho Gode, and to read . as 
.follows: 
-~ 
56-218, RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL ASSISTANCE. (1) ~edical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual 
·vtio was i;iicty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual 
: r~ceived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there 
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be 
.-cbarged for such aid paid to either or both; provided, however, that 
. claim for such medical assistance correctly paid to the individual may 
be established against the estate, but there shall be no adjustment or 
·recovery_thereof until after the death of the surv1v1ng spouse, if 
any, and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who 
la under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled. Transfers of real or personal property by recipi-
ents of such aid without adequate consideration are voidable and may 
be:aet aside by an action in the district court. 
1}'· (2) Except where there is a surv1v1ng spouse, or a surviving 
~Ud who is under twenty-one ( 21) years of age or is bl ind or perma-
nently and totally disabled, the amount of any medical assists.nee paid 
~der this chapter on behalf of an individual who was sixty-five (65) 
.,.ars of age or older ~hen the individual received such assistance is 
·-a:claim against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship pro-
·- ceecliiigs and may be paid from che escace. 
·>· (3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the al!IQunt 
· ~f tllyaid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient t;o the 
bteiit that the need for aid resulted from a c-.dme committed against 
-~• recipient. 
"·. SECTION 2, That Section 56-244c, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby repealed. 
Approved Harc:h 21, 1988. 
t• '.-, t, 
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74 IDAHO SESSION LAWS 
CHAPTER 50 
(H.B. No. 562) 
AN ACT 
c. 50 
RELATING TO MEDICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM; 
CHAPTER 2, TITLE 56, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION Of A NEW SECTION 
56-209e, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE A PROCESS FOR DETERMINING MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITI FOR MARRIED COUPLES; AND REPEALING SECTION 
32-915, IDAHO CODE, RELATING TO A WifE 1S DUTI TO SUPPORT AN INFIRM 
HUSBAND, 
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
SECTION 1, That Chapter 2, Title 56 1 Idaho Code, be, and the same 
is hereby amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
kno.-.m and designated as Section 56-209e, Idaho Code, and to read as 
follows: 
56-209e. ELIGIBILITY OF MARRIED CO~PLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
UNDER THE MEDICAID PROGRAM, (1) It is the intent of the legislature 
in enacting this section to reduce the number of situations in which 
medicaid regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause 
either the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar-
riage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further the intent of 
this legislation to protect the conmunity and separate property rights 
of a married person whose spouse applies for medical assistance 
regardless of whether they are living together, 
(2) (a) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or dis-
abled married individual or of a couple for medical assistance 
under title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income 
and resources to be counted as available to such individual or 
couple shall be calculated in accordance with the community prop-
erty prov1s1ons of chapter 9, title 32, Idaho Code, or should it 
be to the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance 
with the methods utilized by the federal supplemental security 
income program under title XVI of the social security act, 
(b) I/here both spouses are applying or are covered by medical 
assistance, the same method of counting income and resources shall 
be applied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability 
of each for the cost of medical care; however, for any month for 
which either spouse receives a supplemental security income pay~ 
ment or a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-208 or 
56-209a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed 
sequently approved, the •ethodology of the supplemental 
income program shall be applied, 
(c) The presumption of the availability of income under eithe 
the community property or supplemental security income method 
be rebutted by either spouse. 
(d) The department of health and welfare shall furnish to eac 
medical assistance applicant who is aged, blind or disabled, 
clear and simple statement in writing advising them of the 
000224
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.hi, section. 
y provision of this section or the application thereof 
nor circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity shall 
1er provisions or applications of the section that can be 
~ithout the invalid provisions or applications, and to 
rovisions of this section are severable. 
!. That Section 32-915, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
.d. 
1 21, 1988. 
CHAPTER Sl 
(s.B. No. 1402) 
AN ACT 
riE BEAN COMMISSION; REPEALING SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO 
~NDING CHAPTER 29, TITLE 22, IDAHO CODE, BY THE ADDITION 
SECTION 22-2919, IDAHO CODE, TO PROVIDE FOR THE DEPOSIT 
URSEMENT OF FUNDS OF THE COMMISSION; AND AMENDING SECTION 
._, IDAHO CODE, TO STRIKE OBSOLETE REFERENCES. 
. by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
That Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
.ed. 
2. That Chapter 29, Title 22, Idaho Code, be, and the 
y amended by the addition thereto of a NEW SECTION, to be 
ignated as Section 22-2919, Idaho Code, and to read as 
DEPOSIT ANO DISBURSEMENT OF FIJNDS, (l) Immediately upon 
moneys received by the commission shall be deposited in 
eparate accounts in the name of the commission in one or 
or trust companies approved under chapter 27, title 67, 
s state depositories. The commission shall designate such 
t companies. All funds so deposited are hereby continu-
,riated for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of 
ls can be withdrawn or paid out of such accounts only upon 
Jer orders upon such accounts signed by two (2) officers 
Y the commission, 
right is reserved to the state of Idaho to audit the 
commission at any time. 
or before January 15 of each year, the commission shall 
t~e senate agricultural affairs committee. the house agri-
:1rs committee, the legislative budget office, the state 
· the division of financial management, a report showing 
I' . ;I. 
:i< 
.,., 
l ,. 
·1·,-
1 
•'r 
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"Note·2 
" · . · Wheri atate vohultarily elecu to partldpate In . -• State and f.edel"III. regulati0118 ariritru:ily and 
Medicaid prugram. it must comply with requir&- .' l!apridoualy limited to $1,,LiOO the automobile a-
111ents of the ut amt appliaible regulations. . d11&on in Q!cu!ating r.mily' reaourcea for Pll'-
Morga.n v. Id.e.b.o Dept. ·or Healt.h. lllld Weltan,, c .n..n..m r, .,d Famillea "th 
.Idaho_l991,SllP.2d_ 346_ ,120_ldaho6. •. , .. ·-.· lJCll!el o _., ty or"' to wi: 
• ~ent Children (AFDC) and . Medleaid in _ 
··:,.'~Ellri1>Ultr ._. ... ,,, ··_;: ·'· ·' · -. .-._ ...... ·tJiatrmonlnltiallyolfered!orautomoblleuaet ii 
OmnitNs Budget Reconcillatlon kt' doei iiot . limitation, In allowing ~ta lo l"Nin poa,- _l.f. 
· prevent otherwile eligible prtgn&Dt women who eealon ol a car, could DO longer provide rational ·1 
an, not pe:rmanemly residing In thia eouDQ')' . baslA tar the regu)ation In light ot lnllatlon. m!ll -~ 
under color ot law (PRUCOLJ trom n,c,emnir though Congre,,a did. not mandate rmew to ~ 
Medlcald ilJ)ODMITI!d prenatal CBnl when, their adjust (or lnllat.lon. · Ha:.ard v. Swlivan. . : 
children. if born in the United Suites, will be- M.D.Tenn..l993, 827 F.S,mp. 1348. reverse<! ,w _ ~-; 
COtne United States ci~ Lewia v. Grink.er, ¥" _ 
· C.A.2 CN.Y.) 199'l. 966 F.2d 1.206. .. A ,,·: . F .3d 399 .. .- .._, "· : .. ·,:·,::.: . .... . . ~ 
· r,l. : •. ·..:1.· 1 •• 
I .1396a. o;· State plans for m~cal aiabrtance: :':': .. 
.: .•.•• ·'' .... \ .. : .. ,:. ,1:. . ' .... : • • . . • . . ~~ •. ' 
.- ; .; --~·· ·.: • 1.' -·., ; ·,; (a) Con~~~:/'·;'_;:_'~t:~.:,<~ .}':_:;'.:i':··: _1,.,, .'..' · ·,;c· f: 
:_. A State plan for medical a.ssistance_muat- .:, : .'. ., . . - -· . ·, ·· · 71' 
_ ... ::--·, :.:·><1> provide ~at _it shall be in effect in aD political subdmsioils or the State. arid. if ~' 
·· · 'administere'! by the~ !:>e IIWl,da~~ upon them; ·· ··· ·. ·• ·.· · ./' ·'.' -,~~': ~-
.- .... : (2) provide f!)r financial Pm:t!c:ipation by the State _equal __ to not 1esa than 40. per , 
-,; centum oft.he non-Federal share oft.he expe.cditures. under the plan with. respect to 11 
which paymenta under section -1396b of this title are ·authorized by this ilu~~ 
and, effective July 1, 1969, provide for financial participation by the State. equal.to ~ 
all of such non-Federal share or provide for distribution of funds from Federal or '' 
State sources, for can-ying out the State plan, on an equalimtfon or other baais i 
· ; .- which will usure that the lo.ck of adequate funds from local sources will. not result -~ 
·•· :·m lowering the amOWit,· duration, aeope, or quality·of care and services available f 
; .,,,., imder<t,he p1an;...:,· ... _.r~~ .. ,:;:·..;-, :'"~. --::::· '·<•,•' J,,·· .... ·.·: ..... ·". =< 
.:/ ..... (3) provtde1'qr'.~t1ng an.opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency ~ 
·:; , .. to any individ\.al whose claim for medical assistance under the plan ia denied or ia fl 
not acted upon with reasonable promptnesa; . • . . . . . · .. ~ - _ · _ ·.. _ · · ¥ 
- ·-. -. ' •' ~ '•- -~-'' ., ••. I •. ,,... ,. ( 4) . provide W such methods of administration (including methods relating to the j 
. eatabliahment and.maiJltenance of personnel atandards on.a merit basia, except that ~ 
·. the Secretary shall exen:ise no authority with respect·to the selection, tenure of ~ 
•·. office, and c:ompeusation of any individual employed in accordance with such R 
'" '' methods, and including provision for utilir.ation o! professional medical personnel ·in 0 
the a.dminisfrat:fon and, where administered locally, au~on ·or administration of f 
t.he plan) as are found by the Sec:reta.ry to be necessary for the proper and efficient l 
•'·operation of the plan;)B) Cor the~ and efl'ecave use _of paid Bllbprofessionalj· 
etaff, with particular_emphas!s on_ the full-time or part.time employment._of recipi-
ent.a and other persons of low.Income, aa community service aidl!ll, in the adminis-" , 
tration· o! the plan.and for the·~-or nonpald or partially paid voluntetll"a In a aoe!al j 
a: . service volunteer program in providing services to applicants and recipients and In i 
-: · aaaiBting any advisory C1lmmitteea established by the State agency, and (C) Uiat., 
·, · ·. each State or local· om~ or employee ,-who ia respoD811>1e for the ~ditme ~of 1_ 
BUbstantial amounta or funds under the State plan; each Individual who· Connerly ti 
. ·waa such an omcer or employee; and each partner of auch an officer or employee ~ 
.. ·. shall be" prohibit.ed _t'rom"c:ommitting any ad, in n!lation to any activity under thel 
. ··· plan, the comrmssion of which,' in connection with any activity c:oneeming t.he United C 
. ·. ·: States Government, _by an cimcer w:· employee of the. United States Governinem. an"' 
Individual who was mch an ofllcer'"or employee, ·or a partner of auch an officer or f 
. employeelsprohihited!>Yaeetioii207or208ol'l'itlel8; '·' ·,: _..,_ .. : '.,f· ,rn,.1 f1 
· . -· · <5> either provide r~ the eirt.abliahment.· ~ d~iptio~· rii ~ diiahl State-~ \o 1 
·. · administer or to supervise: the administration .af the plan; or _proride for thel 
· establishment or designation of a· single State ageney to administer. or to supervise 
. the administratio~ oC,the·plan, ·except that the determination ol eligibility for 
medleal assistance under the. plan shall be made by the St.at.e ·or local ·agency 
· ad.ministering the State· plan appro,ed undez- subchapt.er I or XVI of this chapter I 
(Insofar u it relat.ea to the aged) i! the St.at.e ii ellg1ble to participate in the Statel 
plan program establiahed wider' iubchapteJ: ~of~ ch.apt.er, or by_ the ageneyJ 
:-;·.·. : or apnc:ies administering the supplemental security ineome program utablished 
under subchapter XVI or the State plan approved UDder_part A of subchapter IV . 
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· ~ .. tJiis chap~-:~i~ Sb 
_ est.ablishe<I wider- 'subcl 
.. ,·.·,_:,., (6) Providei;that the 
·: .• ~ .. co:ntaining sudvmtomr 
. co1:nply With ~)rov· 
:,,; to IIIBUre_µie COJTec:1:zl.:.. 
»:,:·-, (7). provide,,_w_ 
,:.c,:ee:r'l'ling appH~ta and 
tratlon or the plan; · 
. · :·· (8) provide thii.t" all i· 
· under the plaai-a.iall h 
furirlished with reasonab 
',u:·',: ('n provide-·-:-r, 
. ···:,!·,,: ·. <AHha°ithlsta• 
•1 ·· · · (whiclievei-·&, 1ltili"' 
~-: - :,, ~-. eentence"'or section 
· · · · and ma!ntalnin he 
. . g 
recip1enai of medic· 
·: ·.... (B) for the''estat 
-., ·:-.r-
::.~:~::i::·t~~u::. 
.',.·:.·.- ·'·_'_(C) tki'aii'fiaoc 
" _ . · by a laboratory v/~ 
. :,: < ,or this title 'or p 
- . t.b.e c.ase or··/j ;,-
.. · ... . : 1396X(aa)(2)(G) · ' 
.· •. : (lCI) provide-:::::: ... 
,) ;·~ t, , • • , .-J ~1 I •• • 
• ':·.: •.1; .:.<A> Cor ~ .. 
: .-· ,: f ·,. •. • Beryices listed ll1 )HI'• 
: tbie _title,~;~/'; 
. ; , ·•5: -~ ~ ·:; (i) all individ• 
-~-.-_,,.. - (I) who: 
.·;, ·,:.::' ..... ' __ ·approved ll 
... , .. _ _ A or part 
· ... _<II!.. ·,.c:: .-,ellgiblew,c. 
-=~-···~ ... ,._. .";; or 673(b) 01 
- -~ ·- aid as autbt 
cm wj,Ji 
--. .-:: ,::: · are beinf; 
' .... ,.; • • .r';: qtla.Wied Be 
'/~ ~.::··~·-. :, i oft.his title, 
'~' .. . " . ' (Ill) ~rh,. 
seetionB9t 
.·:;:.:. · .-... ;. ,, .. ,:, (IV) uh, 
•. ·. .·, ·· . ·· ;~r • (l )(I). of ti-. 
. .. . . . . . mmimW!l ii 
tion (l X:?X, 
__ ;._~ ,,,; ".--, ; · . •CV). 'll'hO 
--~ :-,::' 21::•, .. ·. 1396d(a:r,)(l: 
· :,_, :·,: ;,,· ,: ·.·. • ··(VJ) wh, 
·-' : ~ · ..... ·, .. this sec-t:ion 
. . tbe St.ate i 
.. · · ·' • ·=·section for 
. .. . . . :. . ::. CVD) wJ. 
• ;.! .. :.:.- ·· -~ this Be(:tion 
·: ·.:::, .... ,. .;tJie St:it.e i 
:.·· •···· =aectionlor 
'· · fii) at · tl1e or 
; "''.:·described in ee 
. descnhed iil ae<: 
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: (16) provide for inclusion, to the ext.ent required by regulatiollB preac:ribed by the 
Secretary, of proriaions (conforming to such regulations) with respect to the 
··(-1,furnishing of medical- usistance under the plan to individuals who are reaidents of 
•. _ the State but are absent therefrom; . 
,_k ( 17) exeept as provided in subsections (l )(3), (m)(3), and (m)(4) of this section, 
} · include reasonable standards (which shall be comparable for an groups Md may, in 
. ~ ,acconiance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, differ with respect to 
,.,,inC{)me level&, but only in the case of applicants or recipients of assistance under the 
~;v plan who are not receiving aid or aaeistance under any plan of the State approved l·under subchapter I, X:, XIV,.or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV of this chapter, and :with respect to whom supplemental security income benefit. are not being paid _ under subcbapt.er XVI of thi.e chapter, based on the variations between shelter costs ;in urban areas and in rural areas) for determining eligibility for and the extent of 
cmedical assistance under the plan which (A) are consistent with the objectives of 
atlcLthia subc:hapter, (B) provide for taking into account only such'income and resoureea >:~1= 88 are, 88 determined in accordanee with standards prescribed by the Secretary, 
;~1 available to the applicant or recipient and (in the c:a.se of any applicant or recipient 
-f,:,~.-wbo would, except for income and resources, be ellgilile far aid or asaistance in the 
·-;~.form of money paJID&lts ,under any plan of the State approved. under subch.apter I, 
~oh.X. XIV, or XVI, or part A of subchapter IV, or to have paid with respect to him 
lt):srsupplemental security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter) as 
/lb:would not be disregarded (or set aside for future needs) in determining his 
_if religibility for such aid, assistance, or benefits, (C) provide for reasonable evaluation 
,'!if· or any such income or resourceB, and (D) do not take into account the financial 
\3,i, · r responsibility a! any individual for any applicant or recipient of assistance under the 
,_.~·-pla.n unless such ·applicant or recipient is such individual's spouse or such individu-
k_· ·'1,~·al's child who is under age 21 or (with respect to States eligible to participate in the 
~- State, program establiahed unde.r aubchapter XVI of this chapter), ia blind or 
t~ .permanently and totally disabled, or is blind or disabled 88 de.filled in BeC'tion 1382c J;~x1 ,.of thia title (with respect to States which are not eligible to participate in such 
\',lo : · program); and provide for flexibility ii! the application of such standards with 
:tJJ?,,.-re.spect to income by taking into account, except to the extent preacribed by the 
>f"..j~: Secretary, the costs (whether in the form of inBuranee premiums, payments made to 
,./inc-·. the State under section 1396b(f)(2)(B) of this title, or otherwise and regardless of 
:~:ati whether 81.lch costs are reimbuned under another public program of the State or 
\,•. political subdivision thereoO incurred for medical care or far any other type of 
-~i: remedial care recognized under St.ate law; · , · .. 
f~;:. (18) comply with the proviaioll!l of section 1396p of this title with respect to liens, 
~~- acljustments and recov_enes of medical ~ce corTedly paid, transfers of aasets, 
,~.._ and treatment of certain trusts;· -· · · · '· • · · -. -
>'"-'~'- ·- '··- ·. . . 
q-,b!oh$:, (19) _provide such safeguards as may be necessary to· usure that elig2bility for 
~,,,.care and services under the plan will be det.ennined, and such care and services will 1f · be provided, in 11. ma.nner consistent with simplicity or administration and the best 
:Jt interesbl of the recipienbl; · · 
:f1tt , (20) if the State plan ini:Iudes ro~dical ~ce in beba;1f of individuals 66 yeani 
!~ ... of age or older who are patients In institutions for mental diseasee-i~_::~·_;_::· . (A) "provide for having in effect SU!!h ~ta or other arrangements with if,ir., -, .. · State authorities concerned with mental diBeaseB, and, where appropriate, with t, · · --: . · such institutions, as may be neeessary for cairylng out the State plan, includlng 
. 
· ·_ · arnmgeinents for joint plaruting and for development_ of alternate methods of 
_ care. arrangement.a providing assurance of immediate reM.mil:tance to institu-
; 'f1:t,;·; ''.,' tions where needed for individuals under alternate plans of care, and ammge-~ ~--:-.: ·•• ments providing for aeeeu to patient.II ad facilities, far ftumahing information, 
un,.~ · .. and far making reports; 1'· 1 • •• ,. .... •• .. • • •• • •• , · ·: · 
~ ·"'<B(prcwide for an individual plan for eacli such patient to 88BW"f! that the 
· ,r. · ·, :, ,! institutional care provided to him ia in his best int.erests, illcluding, to that end, 
•1'. :: aasurances that there will be· initial and periodic 1'e9ietr of his medieal and 
• : other needs, that he will be given appropriate medical treatment within the 
. ~-.· :-,:: · .institution; and that there -will be a periodic. determination of his need for 
· -::,,.-,·. ,-'."continued trealment in the institution; and :• ., .,_ . 
tu:. ,, ::: <C> provide'for the development of alternate ptaaa of care, maldnr maxunurn 
ti:.. ,. ::' utilization of available resources, for recipients 65 years of age or older who 
;; .1 would otherwise need care in such institutions, including appropriat.e medical 
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~~a,,,ape-pregnant ·wamazi. l'l!lllde:ntl In-, . z.· CaplllJ am111111t ---·~:; . ·:- 11 ., ,. - • 
'.·~ residences of Of!lee of Mental Retar-,,_. - Medimld regulatioD estahllahlDg maximum co-
. ~ ar Of!lee _ of Mental Health, and thoee _ .. payment far in-patient hospital lleJ'V!res at 60'I, 
_ , lll)llble to pay; oote bvm pregtlllllt. woman's of payment lta1e maka far flnt day al !JI. 
:~? was auftldent f01' pharmaellt and oth- palient hOaJ)ltal eare, did not violate_ Mednld 
. · csre pn:,vfden, res!denta WBn! idenW!ed by · atawte requiring eopaymenta to he". "nomL..J Jn 
· .,;41 at CO!lll!ll1lllty rea1dentei, and statement of . _ IJII.OUl1t~; ·Congress adopted by leglsl&tlve reen-
~ to pay waa sufflclent. Sweeney v. actment and nititication, regulatory deftnition 
:~ C..U (N.Y.) 1998, 996 F .2d 181W. _ . promulpted by 8eeretary of Health a.nd HumaD 
·_;_r-.r~: _• NJe1ebru!m_-.. •a ~~lion ~ ·nat-~ ~~t·:. ~~,_sly;:° ~ 401~\ "· Whiteman. 
'. e!iirae for Medicald redplent.e' pmcr! !Jon -~-
, clnip, in wliicb av~ method uaed ~ed · · Hoepltala e!tahllahed that they would be !1'-
-J.f!'iim• cslcul•tlnn 'Med!Clld n,clplenta not - :r= ~ ~t~ ln!:' 
_,~qidred to make CDp&yment. constituted_ vioJaUon W1!!l'e alio'lled to iaka effect, U required f01' 
· ·ttdf_regalmklll requirlllg at.ate to determlne aver-_ temporu-y remaining order, hoepltala could not 
: ~ or typical payment fCIJ' a eervlce; lnduakm deny aervtccs to eligible benutlc:wte. due to 
- ~.fllll ~ al peno01 ~ Medlcald pre-_ their blablllt;y to pay required capay amount, but 
.: , icnplioii uaiatance WU rwquired In determ1lling ,. W'0UJd be baned from auing atate lrom ciamqe,i 
d--,.. Nebruka Pharmai:lsbl .ua'n, Inc. v. if It lmlled out that propoeed copay requirement 
- IINebnllb l)ept. ~ Sodal Sen-feea. D.Neb.1994, . W1111 eueutve. Kamw BOIIP- _Aaa'n v. Whfte-
)d1611 F.&pp. 1087. ,;,-- - - :-: c·.~- -- ··- - • man,D.Kan.1993,886F.Supp.1648. ,,. ; 
/~~·~.:!····· ""!,··· .. 1.,•,t .. ·.,:.;:-· :.-:·~·· • .i~-:--:; .. ,:·\.,1\;,,::_·.",·:-.~· .. · ... ·· 
-~~p::. ~~~--~~~~ and-~riee, 8:'d ~U:-~~~ets ... "' - ,, ; ' 
J}~~-- U:-i!:~ o~~~~P=- :~:: ::.adJv~d~ on ~~-~t _of m,edical 
~,- - - · - -· - .. -- • - . - . -- . · ~- ., ·1:;::; n;; 9~1r::i~· • {! · 
· {: (1) No lien may be impo&ed against the property-of-any-individual prior to hia death 
·:' on account of medical ll88istance paid or to be pald on his behalf under the State plan. 
·,facept- - .. - ., . . . .. --. . .. ~.":!_·.:-.. :::('~- --/~:~~~:-.:~: .. -~: :-·· \: ; 
1;;,f~, (A) pursuant to the judgment of a court ,on -~UJit_'o!,.!ienefita incorrectly paid 
-; · on behalf ohuch individual, or· " : ··· . · : · ~ · .,. · .. · · · 
~QI'..!. . . . . -1·· ., , -· ,- ··-· .•. ,q,. r •.. , . . ... " -· • 
.i1: ;~"i:.,:,,.,;· CB)_ in the _caae_o_f ~e.real pro~/J!. on in~-~~/~ . .':~·:i.--· ;: ::, _;,:_: _ 
~-~~:!.;.: · (I) who iA on inpatient in a nursing f'acility,-Jntermediate care facility far the 
; , \d":. mentally retarded, or other medical insdtution. if' such individual iA required, aa 
-aWfo·•;_ a condition of receiving aeroces In such inetitution under the State plan, to 
. ~~'~"°• apend for costs o! medic:al care all but a minimal amount !)f his income required 
,. I i nal eeds, and , 
·wisrr.r: _or~ .. n__ ..... ', ._., ... ,.,, ... · 
•'uahi-;.. CU) with respect to whom the State· determines, after notice and opportunity 
PP. ··,f.a,;;, for a hearing (in accordance with procedures esta,blillhed by,~ State), that he 
162 ~ . . • cannot reasonably be expected to be discharged from the meiiical institution 
-;.;._. ~1~_i,::·:· ,Sfd~_retunihome, ;~·.:.:_' . .-~.'---''.'.- ----~·--':' .. · .. ,. ... ·, ·,.,,.,., '·' :-,, 
.zw4~ · 1 ... !:• ·iJ":"·n;~ r- ·-:,:·, -~r:~,J~: itu. ~ ~pt !IA provided 1n paragraph <2>. __ ·_·. __ - .• _ , ._ .. , ,- _ _ , ;.- .. _ .. 
. .• . . • • . "·· •· •• i. ..... _ .,>.•• -<--1 .... 11 Iii ,L,1. \ ,i-t , · · 
~"(2) No lien may.be Imposed under paragraph (l)(B) on such individual'• home if--: .. 
; :~
1
:: ~ :~=!~:~~~der~1~.~~~'.~"~;~w~le 
Jer ~-, to participate In the St.ate' program establillhed under 8Ubchapter. XVI of this r:. .. _ ~: chapter) is blind or permanently and totally diaabled, or (with relpeCt 'to Staw 
Jde ~" ~ !I" not eligibll: .to partidi-.te ~-~ pro~),_is b~,~~ ~~ ,s ~efined 
_, -~::msed:ion~ofthiatitle,or .. ;.,. , ... , ..... ,,·--.-, .. --·~·" __ ., _ .. 
~; -~~11.•• · (C) a idbling of BUcli lldvidual ~o bu ~ ~ty--blt.enatin aiich1ho"me and :who 
.J&S ,f•f waa residing in auch indivldual'a-home for~ period of at least one year ~te!Y 
we, ~';, .. _ bef~the7-~-~f,~e~~~·-~~-~-t,h~;'~~~l-,;~.~~~, ,,r!' ·,p ,:· 
:_1_1s lawfully residing In such home. . · · ~- --,:. .· . 
"'I">: '-··· ..... 
1ar "3 (S) AJtY lien impoaed .with respect ~ an Individual pur&Wlllt_ t!) paraarapa (l)(B) llhall 
~~ ~so~ upon that lndividiJal'a diacharp from the medical lnlltltution and retum home. 
a.al.'\ •· · 1 ,'·~ • ••• ,.· 1. •, •• • I.., -,,,it•• ,.,1,. ~ I.' ••' 
ia (b) Aclj111tment or recovery of medical_ UBistance. correctb': paid under 8 State plan 
•t:.'•I,' '• ·- •· · • • '- ,._',, -·J•,! • 11~,.'.~.:,1,.,..•, I ~ ••• I: , ",•, , 1 ,. };.J, (1) No ad,ju.stment or-l"ellONl'J of 1111 medbl ..iatance comctly.paid 011 behalf of 
Jiid lin. indMdual under the State plan.may.be made,es.cept··that.tbe State ahaU seek 
011- f&(ljustment .. or recmery of any medical.asaiatanee·-COffl!Ctly.paid on behalf of an 
'1 individual under the Stat.e plan In the cue of the fallowiug individuals: - . -. 
1 
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(A) In the ease of an individual 'described in· aubeection (aXlXBl ot this aec:tion,~ · 
.... ' .• ·. the State shalt aeek adjustment or recovery from the Individual's est.a~ or upon aal~' 
· ·:.;"of the property mbject to ·a 'lien imposed on account ot medical aaalatance paid 'on · 
. !~.•.\~~l~~(~~~ ~ ~-~--~--~ :.; ·.~; ~./:·/~-~- • .-,.~!:,.~·.:\ ~-.· .. ,· ·-~~~-- ~-, . 1. :· ... ·--~~~.ti: 
· i '.~ .:·:·.u:(B) In the eue-.ot _an. inctividual who was 66 years of.. age or older . when· ~11 
'" -1 ··individual- recemid nch --medical uaiatance, the State aba1I aeek adjustment-_or 
.:, '--~-~:recove:rt!rom the individual's l!llfAte, but only tor medical.asaiatance corisistmtrof'-- . 
. ~ ... ·· ·.: ;· · (I)' ri~ tadlity lieriicea, ·home and co~unity-based se:vices,1 and relat.e:1 
· h~ and ~ption dnigaervi~, ~ ., :: :.·?. · .. ,, .. - ·: --+· · - 1i~J~ 
., .. ,,., .. JI~>. 8;. ~!. '>Pti!'1 ~th~ St.ate, any i~ ~-servi~. under t~~ ?~te pl~.;~;-
. - (C)(l) In tlie cue ilf'an individual who ·has received (ar ia entitled! to l'f!leive) 
. benefits under a long-t.erm care iwrurance policy in connection with which 8SlletB o:~ 
. resoun:es are disreprded in the manner described in clause (il);eitcept'as provide,I 
· : in such clause, the Stace BhaD seek ;uijuatment ·or recovery !roni the! btdiridual~1 
... ·· =rtyon ~tlofintermedical lllllliltan~ ~d-,o~ behalf ~f the individual,!°'~~: 
-~- ·- &n ~ ~ ong-_ . ~sernces .. •[ .··-· .•...... .- .·-:- j° .,., •• -r,1, 
, .:- · · (II) Clause (i) abaD not appJy in the cue of an indmdual who n!Ceived medical 
aaaiatance under a State plan of a St.ate which had s State plan amendment 
_.. approved 88 ol May 14, 1993, which prov:ided tor the disregard at any useta or_ 
resow,,.-.,-; ·•iJ ·~:'i ~!:!:- :· .. -: :r::~ · • · .".·"'.'~~ ·: ·; .:~~;r::~."' • . · .. ·. .. · : .. : I ::·':··:! ~ ;:, . 
• • I _,, 
(I) to the extent that payments are made 1111der a long-t.en:a care lnauranc!° 
·; __ : · • polley;-;or ·::' ___ ..,::&lr '.'.:t: .. • _ .•• · :..,;_ ,.; 'i .. , .. : ;_ ·_ . : ,. _I ·:: ·, •. ·;:1~; .. 
cm became an individual has received (or ia entitled to ireceive) benefits 
. . nm!er_~--~~ ~-~~ policy. ::··-_, -·.:: -. 1· ._;. t 
. ·c2) -Any·acQustme~ ··or· recovery" under paragraph (l)'raay be In8'fo only alter, th11 • 
.. ,.~ea~-~!µi_e_in~~1!;'-l:'11.~~ s~use~ !f ~y, an~-o~y at a t:mie-;:-_ . 1. · .-.-:::.:i.f_ 
1 (A) -when he liait riot;~ "child who 'la 'wider age 21,"or _(wftJi·respect ti, 
Stat.es eligible to participate. in the State program· established widerl aubchapter_ 
XVI ot this c:hapt.er) ia blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect to -
· · · Stat.ea which are liot"etigible to participate in such program) is blind or' disabled iii: 
.:· ; :· "defined in-~ 1382c ot_this tttle; and·. ,,4: ;: .· . .--~ ~ .... •1 . ·:-,: .-,~, ·····:it1i· 
· . • ., ··,-·4 CB) in'the -caae·;ot i.· Hen on' an individual's home under subsei:tion (a)(l)(B) ol this 
• ·.-..!;.sectlob, wtien-::. ,.u.;,:;r...i. •• ;i"UL;,~: ~ ... ; ! .J: ·1·-~·. ·:.;.?:~1~n -~ .· .··<· .; ·-~··n.~~~(. ·:,.~:~r-~ 
. . ,- . ,. . (i) no sibling of th_e Individual (who was residing in the individ~'s home !of I 
: · ·· • · - . a,.period · of at leaat one year immediately before the date of the individual's, 
-~ _'-_ ._ <~on~~-~~~cal~~n),:~d.:~~·;·::~ :·" ··- ~: ·· --.) ._.:~E, 
(if) no 10D or daughter of the individual (who was residing in the individual',!._-. 
home tor & period of at least two year&, ill!ln~tely before 1the i date of -~~ • 
. · .. - individual'& admission to the medical institution,· and who establishes" to du _ _-
.. -·- · >,:atfsfa.c:tion:of the State that he or she prov:ided care to such iiidividoal .~c\· 
. permitted auch individual to reside at home rather than In an /lnatitutionl, 
. ,,•:·. ts lawAilly residing ID 1111ch .home ,who ~--br.~y. reaitiei ir(~.cll home ·o~~l: 
-.:;·_. :-,eontlnuous·.,basia since the .. date .. at the- individual's admission t;o the medic.1d 
_ .i_.: lmtiblti~--~?;'_-:_:>0 .~::.".,~ ·;!.~.: .. :~ ~::,s.-~':i~.·:::;,.;:,-•··: · ·, •;,;:.:: ._·_ . .',;~,::. ;~~1-; 
· · · (3) The State agency· shalhiatahliah proeeda:rea (in accordance with Slllndarda SJ:ll!Cli. 
fied by the Secretary). wider which the agency shall waive the application _ot. ~S: 
·aul>aed;ion (other ·than·-paragraph (l)(C)Hl such application Vl'Oald w·ork.an .. widu? 
.• bardahip·~--~~:.1~n ~! ~ ~t~~-estab.~~ ~-the Secretary.I..;\'., ::~jf~ 
(4) For purposes of this iiuliaeedon, ·tlie term _"est.ate .. , _with respect ~-s· deceased 
.. indivi~ual- . . _,_·,•c,; ::·.: : ,:; _:_:·: .. (";:~.•1J!_~-f· 
: :,:-: ·.'.:· (Ar-ahall include all rea1·ind peraonal property and other 111111ets ~uded within 
·_ · ··,: the Individual's estat,e, as defined to~ purposes ol State probate Jaw; i~ ···: )a!!il?_J-
. , . . (B) may includ~ at, the. C?PtiO~ of the State (and ~ ~ude, in th!! case ~Jl:m 
. individual to whom · paragraph' · (l)(C)(i) • applies), any· other real and · peraom~ · 
•. property and other assets in which·the individual bad.any legal title or interest~! -
"the time of death (to the extent ot auch.,interest), illcluding·auch a.sse1ta,'conveyedJt 
a survivor, heir, or aasign·of the deceased individual through joint teuaaey, t,enallC,_ .. 
in common, smvivorship, lire estate, living trust, or othu anangem.ent.,I:.,.: ... , .~i!l!t I 
~ ·-258 I ·} 
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(U) in the case of periods.of ineJisibilitY determmed under dause,(ii):. by .the 
, · :·"··number of 1110Dtlw.ot.iD.eligibil,ity applieable to the illdividaal mul~ clawle' (i) u .. a 
. - . ult of ll1ICh ,11__;,:_.1 . • . .... . .. . .... ., .•• , •••.• ,...... • • ~- . J .. • ,. • • ,· 
· .. , .. ;··. rm . ""- wao~ J~:.··.:-~.t 4·:-;1t::-. • • .:'.:f~~ ~~.1;,-~· ;.jJ .!::.~: .!..!: ·:·: ,!..! Hl~_-il.,~::.fl":1 
(2) An iDd1Yidual 9hall not be iaellgible tor medical aaalatance by reason of paragraph·. 
(1) to the extent tha~ '· -.. ;--,.:; ;:_:-~.J;:·!:1ru ;:;; ;:..1!!11··: .• ;.::_:;.·;,· ;.·'.; ·::~· t;,;;,:.·- .::c:.:·~:.,~'ii!.·1!J!t-)t 
,_.: : • ;,,<A> the . ._,etidra~1~r~ ·....;;1• :h'ome''iind witto·tlie homi,:wai triiiat~" . 
';'.-.:~::~t~·~:f~4~,:~;\f ~J~~:~~:~~::.~!;:~::?;£~~;~~: ;:1:!i-:tC;;;~,_ .: 
(Ii) a child ahucb.indmdual wbo.(D la·Wlderage 21,.or(ll) (witb ~~-~·~·· 
_... .. . St.atea ellgihl.! to partlcipat.e µi. ~- State program estab~ ander aubchapter , 
·: . ·:. XVI of. this ~> ia 'blfnd.'or'·permanentlj' _and-to~ di.sabled.• or:. Cwitla~ -,: 
.. _. ... : . respect to'Statea which" are.Ji~t eligible'to·~pate In mdl program) ii blhid,· r~ 
. " • or dfaabled II def!ned fluediOD 1382c a.(thia title: ::··. '" •' ' .. ,1·f-'_';,,~.,_,~; 
, (lil) a an,ifni'oi'such indi\liqual 0wh~·ha.i;';t.'-·~1:y:~ in·~-h~~r:Ja-1.'r 
· · who was residiag in aiich fndivfdaaJ'a home· for a period al at least one· year"lf~ 
· ' · · · · immediately before the dat.e the fudivfdual beeomes·Bll inlltitutlonaued individ- :fl\ 
.:i: : .,:.~ aal; •or,.~; ;:.:1.e,.11 )": ..!•~,r:;i. ::i. u.-:.r;. ,S:.-r-:1·.:..i;..,_;.;:, :-.. ;;.,. -· .• _., .. :!: .- ':l!;,j ( 
. . /.. ., ., 
. U•> a sou or daughter of such ladividwil (otber than a 1:hild desmbed fa , 
·' · clauae'(bl) 1mo·was·remdin1fin eueh lndividul'a home tor·a petjad;cit at leaat~'~ 
two years immedlat.el:, before the:dat.e the bidmdual become• an imt1tutio~- ~'.' 
ized individual; and who· (ia: determilled by the- Stat.e) pl'V\'lded ea:re to such'\; 
... . indivi~ ~ ~.IIUCh iadividual to reside at hon:ie.~er_tb!IJl 111:~-
such an iDstitution or Cacilitv; . . . , · .. ~ .. , ._ I. . .-. , __ " ., ..,.,... 
·
11 1 , • • ~ •. f -··-' . ..., .... 1a 
(B) the uaeta- · .. , · · - , -~ · 
• • ·'.; •• :-·:,,.:;, -::;..,: ... , "~•· ••• •• I • t!1° 
(I) wen· tranaferred to tbe. iDdiYtdaal'a · apaue or to aaotber tor. , the -~~ 
bene.8.t _ol the ladividual'a apouae, · . . . . ; -,~ , • ;~'.: 
, ·. · . : • · ·· (U) were •tnmlfen-ed .hm the indtvidwil'a spouse: to· 1110ther tor the aoL~t 
beJ1e8t~the iadividual'aapouae,. 'c• .. :•~~i :;,,i.:;,;;,';, 0'.•'.w I! •. \.'.~a·::1~:-:·. _:;1i1Ji::: 
··:·:: · · =-: (ill) 'ftre:tranafl!ffed·. to.·,.or.;to:,a .trust (lncludiag ·a:Jz'!Jat deacribed tiif. 
·· .. ·~:: subeedion,(d)(4).of.·tbia .aec:tioa) establiahed::aoleJy for.th-I! benefit. 0 01,::,!,!la?. 
.. : . =·· . iDdividua.fa child deaeribed In subparagraph- CA)(ji)(ll), ar ~-; .;,· ... , ;/ ;~r.:-r:w~b,;;;'. 
~ (ht) ftl'9 tralllferred" to a trust Ciacludlng a ·trust deaaibed bi aubaec:tMln-5 
(d)(4) of thla eectfon)" establlahed solely tor the benefit. of an mdtridual under E6 ,-
·-: -. :-- :-years_ot.aae -~OJia,~ (3!1 ~~.)n ~n -~~)(3L~-~-~tlej~f 
· .-~. .. (C) a aatialactory. ibcnri.ag· fa;made to tbe State (ID I.Cl:ordaula1 with .ngulatio1uiji 
promulgated· by tbe· Secntar.,) ._ (I) tbe' tndtridual int.eaded to· dispose, ot t:ie. 
· -uaet.s either at lair market value, or. for otber valuable consideration. (ii) the. asse~~ 
·· were tranalemid eicluiively · lt?i' .:a: purpoae· ·other:::than. 'to: quiwty1· tor .. inedl~:a!.; 
· aiatance or (iii) ill aasetii trinsfem!d tor leaii'tlwi f'air·mane1: value bave beiii' 
... • returned td the"iiidfvidaal•' or'·,:·: '~.:.·-~::.::;::-i-r,.!.U :-··!J~:.;,., .• :, • ,.J.:,'., ,-.~. :;: , ~: 
...... • ,. •.&... • ... ~ ..... we., .~. -~·:.: ·•·,i" ·!ii •· • ., 119' • .J 'il'i,••. ···,-:I· ...... ',,(:;.,:.·;;, ·:!f!4l/ (D) t.he State determinea, wider procedures 'establi8hed by tb,e Stat.e (hi: acc,,ro.:_;_ 
•. dance with atan~a~ by th~ Secretary), ~t_the den~ri:1f eligl1,ijity'wo,ild • 
• .',WGl'k aif Wldlie]i.ai'da.bip ila'det.ermined 011 the buia of criteria 'establlahed by i;he 
,. ,,,_Seeretary;""• .. •••• •~• •:,,c .... -~·-· Ja. 1:;. ;,',~,:~.i.:::.~.~:b1,l ~ ... :·:--·.-:·.··.:.-:· :7-., !.~.'
1 
•• ~~7'~~ •. ~·-~l.: ·t· 
.. ~3) For purposes of thi3 subsection, hi. it; ~e ~t ~ ~ass~t ~):i'·~ iii°dividual In 
. common vyith another ~·011 or pe.r!l0118 in. ,a 'joinqenancy, tenancy in common,;~ 
aimilar arrangement, the asset (or the afJ'ected portion"of 1111ch aaaet) aball1be considered 
. to'be ~erred by auch individual.when any action ia taken, either-by such _indivictual 
_jir by any :othe, person; that n!duces or -~~t.es such individual's ownership ~r coritrl'.ll 
"~f lftJdf.~(~ J • .• •, '·~·,.~' ,·.. • :_t..1,._ -1~-. , ~,· - ~'-' I ~4~:.;~:~-~.i:t.\~/: ~,·\~~ ', ~: 1,J;;~~~;~·-/f ;.-.~ ~--~-
\; ,(4) A ~ta~. (incl1:1ding a Stat.e which baa elected. treatment under eiection 1396a(J:} o! 
, this title) may not.-FO"ide_!~ ~ period.of ineligibility for IUl il@vidual ilcie tiitfansler 
of resources !or less than fair market ~ue. eice~ In accordance _with. t.hiB liub"seci::lon. 
. _In the case of a transfer by the apouse cir an individual which results rm ·a. perio:i o! 
ineligibility tor medical ·aasistaace under a ·state plan for auch lndividLUII, a State shall. 
uaing a reasonable methodology (as specified. by the Secretary>, apportion such peri,,d of 
· Ineligibility (or any portion of such period) among-the individual and the indivul.aal's 
: spouse ii the spouse otherwiae:becomea eligible t~. medical 111!8istancr~ under. the Btate 
plan., , · :··,·. .-.. - .. •,. ·: · •' . ·.:;• · ;·- ·-'· :~·.,· c:::. ,;:.:-..: .. :e::,·i ..:.:·: :'-..:--,!1~-!"-"! . :. 
::200 . I 
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In this Sllbsect.ion, the· t.erm "resources". has .the meaning given IIUCh ,term in 
1 1382b of this title,.without regard to the exclwlion desaibed in subeectlon (a){l) 
f.. -.:..ti iBa~.~,i:-:i:i 11.t 1i:· :":!•:n::•l ~i!.; ;.c"r ~.:::!~ .: ;;·:.-.i~_;t1i".'~~-~ ... , .. ,:- f 1 : ~' 
:-ei1~e~t"iif ~·amounb{ .:i,;'i~c.;,i"~:; ·::::" ;_ .,,,. :-- ,·.i·')'~i' ,,;;;-:'; -(i" ·', 
:· i -. ! ,,,.- :·; , •• , __ '. :- "i .. • ,.~ -.,,,h,.',: .... ~.: ~·:··.. ..· . 
For porposes of det.ermiiling an Individual's eligibility for,· or amount o(. benefits 
a State plan arider thia"ihibcluipterfirubject to'paragrilph (4),·the rules specified in 
-aph' (S) shall apply· to 'a_ trust established by such individual. · ,. · . :. ·· .: · . . . 
~".'f}l. ·-.~;r-~.::.,_;.\,." . '•'-•r",, .. , ,T!' t '=<),.:•..- • .. -~••: 'IC~,. ,; •• •.~, ·, -·, .. 
A) For 'purposes ·orthui· iiutiiedion, an individual shall be. corisldl!N!d to have 
shed a trost if wet.a of the Individual were Wied to form all or part of the corpus 
trust iind if any of the following indmduals established suclJ b'u8t other than by 
: .- -• "'; • :,-:,- • .. I ••• ".f.; ·!".: -:.::: •• '• ' ~ .'_';', : • .: 
(I) The individual. .. ··• '' ' .. , •. :,! .',, · · ~;'.,·-, '•",-·.· .-.,~·-
(ii) .TbEi° !ndivfdual's -~ . ·. ::'.; :.,; · ' '.- · • · · 
(lli) A ~;:_hlcluding'a'~uzt'or ~ttve ~. ~-lepl autllority to 
:t in place of or oil behalf of the Individual or the lndtvidual's spouse. , 
(Iv) A person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the direction 
• upon the request of the individual a? the indtvidual'a.apouse. .. C• :' •·• j .r. 
In the cuie of a trust the corpus of which includes assets ol an individual (as 
1U1ed under" subparagraph {A))· and BSSeta ol any other person or persons, the 
'ona of thla subsection shall apply. t,o the portion of the trust attributable t,o the 
of the individual. ·; ,:.:,;::·.•:::.:::, ::·;: .. , .. · ,.t; .. ~;,·.1. •· .. · _:;.·. ·:~: .. :i:··:! · . 
Subject t,o paragraph (4), this suhaection shall apply without regard ·to,:..;. 
(i) the·purpoaes for which II tiuat'ia establls}ied ·: ::·.::': .,L :':' '-·' 
. ·,-~ ., ·,, ...•..• ,·.·.··.':, .. - .. ,,d ... "-J- . 
whether the trustees have or eurdae any discretion under the trust, 
••,....K>· ~ restnctions 'oii when or 'w!ietha' distributions i1iay' be made from the 
ust, or . . . . . . .. . . • .. ··-
. _.. . !-;: ·~-:·-.;~': •. · .. ,: -~;1!.J:ru c; ... !1 
.f~t~~~~~-~~~~,~~~~~~?.~.~~~~;,. ;.;,, ... ?. >: .- .. 
A)• In the csse ol a ~le trust--., ... :·;::: ,; .. ·, -~ .. .,r.:,. i· · :-;-m,·!.!'~:!. ·.i; .. .. ,-: 
(I)· the corpua ol tJie t:nitt;shall be cori.Bidered reiioarces available t,o the individu-
~ ::. ?J4;r.:· .. :,_' ,·, __ i~..:.:J!I::'l"··-!'.r.:.:4 i:Lil;-r:::,;:t ·,-:, :::1 .:·-~.::~,!t! •]'.;!'":..'.! • .. :· ,·,· 
(ti). payments from the trust t,o or for the benefit of' the individual shall. be 
insidered!ncomeoltheindfvidual,~,!i:'...:.:.i~ 1 (.:.:• •. ;:.:-· ... ;.,_-1;·· ~ ·-: :· L'· 
(iii) any other payments from the trust iihall.be consldered·uaeta disposed ol by 
,e individual for Purpo&eS of subsection (c) of this section. ·-.. --. -
In ·the cue ol an irrevocable t:i.iat- . 
(I) if then!' are any circumstances under ~hich payment from uie"t7wit -;;,uld be 
JMie to or foi: the benefit ol tbe !ndfv.ldual, the portion of the corpua from whicb, or 
.e lncom.e pn the .~ue. from which, payment to the indlv:idual could be made shall 
1 considered resources ~e to_f:he ~dh::id~ ~~ ~t:8 ~L~-~~ ~on 
. the corpua.~ .. inCQ1:U~[-" 1 . ... :\:..:;b~u 1;,1 ~ . .,_ ... ,.:.t-":1.:,,i;-.... , rli' ,1• -;,·,:·.······ _..,._-.. 
(I) t,o or for the bencl'ii"of 'the lndivid~ .siu;,n' iie' consideretf tricome' of the 
·individual.and .··r. i·--:-~:r -!°"!::r;:,-;.;·,"'.'·~.:=- • :,.:·; ~-- ·.-·J·:tt-::i~·:,. -~:·. ··:·l ! ·-:. · · . 
, .: .. (ll) for any other purpose. shall be conaidered a transfer:of uaeta by the 
' :·· individual liulijec:t t<> subsection (c) ol this. aed:ion; and ::: 1-' • '· ·.· • · · 
' • ~,,;;.i"; • , ......... , -·~ ·:,.; ;,:,'. ,. "j· ,· ........ ···: -.~·-.--..--r~ .... . ' (Ii) any portu>n of the trust from whic!i, or lily Income on tlie. COIP,III from which, 
, . payment, could ~der aey cimunatancea be made to the individual llhall be 
,DBidered, as of the · date of establiahnient ol the trli.st (or, I!' lat.er, the date on 
bicli payment 'to·· the !nclMdail was' forecloaed) to be :uaeta -clfspoaed by the 
•iividuaUor purpoaea of 81lbaection (c) of this section, ,and the ~~:o( the tnlat 
,an be determined for purposes ol such· &11baec:tlon by indwting the amowit !)f any 
.ymenta made tram such ~OD ol the tnlst after sucli date. l r· 
' 
0 
•:• ••' • •••·• ', - ,,..,,~ ,,..,..,.: ,:•• •• .... hi JI,• o ! •• .;!",!:.:....1 •,.•,.._.., •• : 
·l'hla aubaec:tion shall not apply to.any of the following trusta: ,·,;:,:. ,l · ,i · ;:-: :, · 
(A)··.A triiit'con~ir the aaaets'·or ab lndividual"under age 65 who. ia disabled 
s defimed in' section' '1382c(a)(3): of°l;hil'tit!e) and ·which is est.abliahecl'for the 
·•.-olaueh-tndfvfdaal by a·parant;:grandparent, ~-~_oltbe.illdlvidual, 
,11,...,.ut if the Stats will recme all amountB ~8' *1!.~ trulltupon the.death 
. :_261 
·~ ... ,~, ... ~-:-..,_...,. , ..... ...,_,..._;. .... ~.... ~:""·-·'"'·=--~--.~€-•• -, ~-·--·· . --j. ··.:./--'~~~.~· ~:·:. ;~.·.~-.;/·· I· . 
. ...... .. '~· 
- J ,. 
.:· ..... 
I" 
I 
. : ' ' . '\ i}tt? ,?:: 
I 
' I 
:_.·. i "j}i'.,',;,\:.:·.· ,, ~=~i}t~;· 
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· or auch individual up to an· amount equal to the total medical aaaiatan~ paid on t: 
· behalf of the Individual under a State plan under this auhchapter. :.u:;-: -.~,,·:: ,0 ,. --,,,,:ij 
I • , 11-
(B) A b'ust establlahed in a State for the benefit of an individual if- 1 •• •· 1-JJ 
(I) the trust la compoaed only of pension. Social Security, :ind. oth~ _in~'. 
··>- ~the indtridual (~ ~~~--~me_ln,~~ ~J~. \i; .. ~~r- .. :,.1•,,c; ; , :;, 
· .:..··. '' (ll) the Stats will receive an amcnmta In the tnst upon the death'. 
of such individual up to an amount equal to the total medical, Ulliatm:e paid .oi1 
behalf of the individual under a State plan under this BUbcha·pter, an.ii ·.• · -. --t_ · 
. . . . ~ ". I .• ..: . . . ..,.( • ; -· . ,. ., , .... ,, '. I .• I I ' ....... J . 
. (ill) the State makes medical asaistance available to Individuals described b1· 
'J, · aection 1396a(a){l0)(A)(ll)(V} of thla title, but does nofmalte such 8116UJtanoi· 
available to Individual.a for nuning · facility services mider sec:tioh 
· 1S96a(a)(10)(Cl of this title.-·· · · · ,t,~,. _, .. :i ~-!it . , :·,;!; 
(C) A trust containing the 8811eta of an Individual who ia dl.aabled (as defined h 
aectio~ l~a)(3) of this Utle) that :meet.a the _fo~ ~-~~~~-Ii:~~- · , ·i;, r), ;.;_;; 
(() The trust !s estahlWied and managed by a nonprofit BR~n. ~ . _."' .. : . 
(II) A separate account la maintained tor each beneftclar:r of the trust, bt:.t, 
for purpoaes of inve.stment and management ot 1'lmda, the trwrt.1 pools tbei111 
~ ... :: ,-._::··':--..:r:,.·~ .. -· ·· _--.,,·,l.' -._. ... :- .··~· -~:·i\ft~· ·. ··1·~-~~·,-
. · (WJ kccunta In the trust 111'8 estabUahed solely for the bene& of !ndlvidtu:ls 
who are di&abled (as defined In aection 1.38'«(a)(3) ot this tttle) by the pare:ut, 
grandparent, or legal guardian ot such individuals, by l!llch trldfviduala, .or b) _ a 
court..·.. . ,· ·:·.····· ·: .... · . ··. •::: ·-:· · .. -~ .- : :· ; -./.-· .. c,\ 
(Iv) To the extent that amounta remaining In the beneficiliey'B ,account upon 
the death otthe ~ciary are not retained by the trust, th,e trust pays to the 
State from such remaining amounts In the account an amoun1( equal to the tot.al 
· · amomit of medical auiatance:pakl on behalf of the benetlcla:-y under the Stnte 
plan under this subchapt.er. . · · · · . > · · ·' · 
.. - • .• ~. •. .•. . · .• l• , , . .• • . I. -, -(5) The State agency &baJl estahliah procedure& (In accordance wit.b atandards spod-
~ by the Secretary) under which the agency waives the applieat!on of tbfa auhaectlon 
with respect to an Individual If the !ndtvidual establlahes thllt such, application wtuld 
work an undue ba.rdahip on the lndfvidua1 u determined on the buia" of ¢teria 
estal)llahed by the Seeretary, ':·. _' :-1:: 'icl:'_ :-,; ,,~·:1: '. ': :'~j ,:--• .!'• _'!;'.+I; :i'.; I 
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal lriatnment or devfce that ls, afmilar to a tl:ust 
but Includes an umwty only .to,imch extent .aru:Hn sudl manner· aa_,jthe _Secre1.iry :~o:t!~na .. · ·.·:~,, -~ '_r, ·:,: .:::-~:~~:-:~}~;:~:~_:'._~-~:·,:~~~::~;~~)~;~--~/-~~., . 
. --·· ,-. ~· .. .- ·._·--: .:~~--·.r 't':"i,:-1!; .··.--::.;..- ;,i.il~:.:.;: . :.:ta.,··_.u.~.-~n~_:r..; £.,..: : .. -~ 
< Inthiaaecdon,.thefollow!ngdeftnitfonaahallapp)T- ::. ,;;, .. , -·.: ··.,, {-- ., .. :::-: 
.'.: ': ., . (1) The term '"aueta", with respect to 'a:ii"fndividual,' incJudE!S "all income anc 
· , .. ruourcea of the Individual and"af the Individual's apouae; !ncluding:·any lncon:.e 01 
reaources which the !ndfvidual or such indfvtdual'B spouse iB ent1Uedito but "does no 
,.-•• i receive becaQ8e of acijon- :. ·:,;:;;;;.-;:;,:: :i,u ;.; :i~:. ,,. ,- ·,.:: :r:\ ·,, ~ y-. ;_, 
(A) by the Individual or such ln.dividual's BpOW!e, · :,,;; _;,. • .-!:J.-,:,;r..' · 
~: 
01
•' .-},\ r•., , ,, •• • ~ 'f ,.. ~.t ;-•j'..) , .. •' •-• • I~ , .,~ •,,; ~r •·• 
CB) by a peraon. including· a ccwt or administrative body, with 1eg:o 
· . authority to. act In place of or on behalf of the indlvidual or· liuch Individual' 
.~:·.: -"::• r,. -~ '9".·:, • • :~ :·••:: -~·.-: ~·;· :~ :.~:;::~.~: .. : • ~f•lo o :: ••:• ~ :; ~ ,: •. ~;;,:••'~•" -~~?.>;.I •. • ,• • 
. ~- - ,,:., .. : ,(C) .by any penon. Including any court or adminimative body; acting :at tl: 
.r,, · • .:,direc:t:ion or.upon the request .of the Individual or ·weh Individual's l)IOUB• 
: .. .:::=. ·-'(2)"The term''.'ln~. bu the~~ irve~ ~ch t.erm'.in ~~n-'1• nf th 
·:. ·t1:t1e.·"" ·:·· ._.. ·_;:-.·~.;:~·:!•: ·:~ ~-lt.~1:::-,::: ·":.:.---=· -~ -::i:~::,:r,.:,ii. ~~- ;.~:.:~~r·~;;.!f!·, ·:, .. ' .:.,.;:{~: 
. (3) The term "lnstitutioiiauied "fu~---meana· an indmdual.-wbo' 1a·--u: ~ 
Uent. in a nursing facillt;y, who la:an Inpatient in a medical imtitlltion and wi 
,., - ·:: Nlpect to wbo~ payment ia .made ~ on a level of care ~ed in .a nlll'Bi: 
,, : radlity, or who II deac:ribed in-section J396a(a)(10XA)(lil(Vl) af tbia' title. . : .. 
·. .;. .. . . ., . . . . : . . . . . . . : } ·~·· . ·":··· 
· · --~- '·· (t) · The term "noninatitutionallr.ed individual" -meana an lndmdaal receM!llJ ai 
.-.: . ·'·of the services specified in subaection (c)(l)(C)(il) of thl.a eeetion;,I.: )i .T"l!:".•J .: ·" 
. 262 . 
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· (5} ·The tenn ~esources" has ilie meaning given such term in section 1382b or 
··is title;: without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual} tD the· 
-du.siori described in subsection (a)(l) of such section. -· ---r, , • < ,_ +. ·;,), : 
...•.• •i.,, .• : :•• ·,.· . ·.:· •. J,·"' .. - '. ... ,• ... 
4, 1936, c. 681, Title XIX, I 1917, aa added Sept: 3, ·1982, Publ...97--?A8. Title U 1m>. 96 
·o, IIDd amended Jan. 12, 1983, Pub.I.. 171--448, 11tle m. f "309(b)(2n (22), 96 Stat. 2410: Dec. 
7, Pub.L. · 100--203, Title IV. t 4211(h)(l2XA>. 101 Stat. 133IO-a77; Dec. 22,'' 1987, Pub.I.. 
·, TitJe IV;.f 4211(h)(J2)(B). aa amended July I, 1988, Pnh.I.. 100-360, Til.le IV, § ,Ul(l )(8)(1). 
:. 800; July 1, 1988, Pub.I.. 100-360, Title Ill, I 30.1Cb), 1112 Slat. 7~ 0d. IS, 1988. Pub.I.. 
·, Tille , VI,. I 608(d)(J6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. 111, 1989, Pub.I.. ,01-;i9, Tule VI, 
e)(l). 103 Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1993, J>u.b.L. 100---M, Title XID, ff 13611(1) to (c), 13612(a) ~ 
Stat.622to628.) .:- .·· . -., : . < · · .. ·,, .. ,-; ·, .. :. ·.: ·.·· :-:;,;;,;;,_-.;.,_ .--,,:; --·.•j:,r. 
,Li~~-=::· L .•r.·,-,!~ ,i'1~.,,· · · , • ;.,,:( •· .,,,, .,. ·• - --- "!:.1 ,'1 1,,J ... ~:::-,"."'~~~ot~'.:;\G":\J,.q 
-. . ...• • .. ,,,,. HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES , __ . ,,,:,~·_;1;;-, ,:,: :,,.:., 
n Nata e.nd Lepalatne Reporta -~ · ,, ·-"(B) the l'8IOUJ'ee8 were tnn&tem!d (I) to or 
A..:-ta. H~- 0R.cport No. 1~111 and 6-om (or- to anotha for Ule 80le b=dlt ol) the 
Anference Report No. 103-213 see 1993 lndividua!'s spouae. or (ii)· to ·the lndtvidual'a 
-le Cong. and Adm. Nl!WII, p. 378. cbild dtllrlibed in lllbpangnph(A)(U)(Il);": 
,wnw 
-- . ,-Subsec. . · (cX2)(C)... Pub.I..".· ·1~ 
.tmenclmenta. Subiiec. (b)(I). Pub.L. 
t 13612(1); lowered threshold age to 56 
for Individuals from whom the State will 
1dlald emte recoveries, Lnd expanded 
mediald eentces for whJch rerover., it 
ougilt, Including 'esate recovery· fnlm 
·lies or loair-tenn care lnsul'IUlt'e. ' -
•. (bl(3).,. Pub.L.. I 03--&l. I l3812(b), 
~'.(3>.:.: : . 
.• (bX4). Pub.L. JW-68, § la61.2(c), 
~- (4). 
·- (c)(l).. Pub.I.. lto--66, § 136ll(aXI), 
'y rmaed pu. (]). Frio!' to the amend-
'1) read u follows; 
.,, _ __,,.nler to meet the requirements of 
1 ""'lecUon (for purpoeea of aection 
:· l )(B) a( thla title), the State plan must 
for a period of Ineligibility for n11J1W11r 
avlcea 1111d !or a level of c:Bn! In 1 
I l3611(a)(2)(C), IUbstitu~ •uaeta• 'ror "re-
·. ~~ ~ ~d~ cl(~;;., '.;,:~;;'"',. ;~ .:· .. ' ,! 
Subsee. , (cX2><D). -• -Pub.I.. . l~ 
t 1S611(a>m(I)), pnenlly · amended.: mhpar. 
(D). Prior to amendment su.bpar. (D) read aa 
foDowa:: : ·)..,. ":: :: ·~-· .. :, ·.:.·. ,:; :.---.:: , ~ .. _., :: ... J 
u(D) the Stare det.ermines that denial of ellgi-
bility wvulc:!,nri: .Ill undue hardahip! · - · · •: -
SuDlll!C. (c)(3). Pub.I.. 100.:00: 
I 136ll(a)(2XE>, generally amended par.(3), 
Prior to amendment par. (3) read u follows: 
"(3) In this 1111bsection, the term 'hlstitutioll-' 
alJRd fndfvidual' meaml ID Individual who la .Ill 
inpatient ill a 11ursing facility, who la an ill~ 
dellt in & medicaJ fnalitution IDd with respect_ to 
•.. whom paymem la made bued on a level of c:Bn! 
provided ill a _ IJllJ'IIDI( . racility, or _who, la de-
acribed in iiection l396a<aX1 OXA)(IO(Vl)" of thla 
~tis:~/-:· ;~X~>i;' -·. -:° ~b.L'. . ·:.;:'i~, 
§ ·13811(aX2)(F), added provis101111. relating to 
appartfonment o1 period of ineligibility amonpt 
spomea.. ::> ':":'l... . ~- - : .• : . ,: .. :. '~":. ~.1J ~ 
Subsec. <dl. 'Pnh.I.. 1m..u, f 136ll<h), added 
whaec.(d). ,, -: 
. . . .• ,. . '•'".-'"I·. - ..) 
Suh6ec. (e). · Pub.I.. I~ f 1381l(e), added 
subaec:. (e). - .. · · · -.i , . ; . ; 
· .sdtutlon · equlvalent to that of nUl'llillg 
,r,,tcea and for ae:rvices under seetlo.n 
of thia atJe in tile caae of an lnstitudon-
Jividual (u d~ed in . pa.nigrapb ra» 
wilose spouse. at any time during· or 
, 30-month perlod immediately before 
the lndtridaal becomes an inadtutional-
v-idual · (If the individual la entitled to 
.aalatanee llftder die State plan on 911ch 
If the !Ddfvidua.l la POt so endUed, the 
individual applfea tor auch llllllilltaru:e Effecttft i>aia .,-.-~ ~~: <' · - ·. :_.,_; .. 
lnadtutlonalW!d Individual cilspoeed of · '"·'' .- '- ·• ,,..., 
!or less thac &Jr market value. The ,· 1993 Acts." Section 13811(e) ·of Pub.I..· 108-M 
lnallgibility il\aJI begin with the IDOlllh pnmded that: .. _ a ... ,!· : ·: ._ 
1111ch rl!IIOlll'Ct'1I were transferred and · "(I) The amendmet11J1 made· by 'We ·ll!dion 
le!' of months ill 1111ch period &hall be [imendl.ng !lllbaec. (c:) and enading aubaecL · (d) 
he leaser of- · _, ··• ·, &nd (e) of thia aectiOll and amendillg aecdon, 
30 !IIOllths, "or ._ ,,: 1396a and , l396r-o of thla tit.le] . ab.all apply, 
(i) the total uncompenaated value· of ~pt u provided In t.hia sul!a&c:t:i®. to pay-
<IUfflll! 1o lnDs.fured, divided by (ii) merits llllder title XIX of the Social Security Ad 
nee cmt, to a private patient:at the. . CWa. mbdiapterl for alendar q_uartera begin-
the application, ol nW'llillg facility ser- IWl8' on or after October l, 1993, without regard 
the Stat.a, or, at. State option, ill the to whether or 11°' flnal :regulll1ou to cany ovl 
jty in whith the mdividual ia inatitu- · · 111ch ametldmenta have been promulgat.ed by 
~~ ·,~.,,:,.·,,.:,. ·:· ., •::. auclida&e. ..•. 
-:, .- (c:)(2XA). . .Puh.L. 103-a, · "(2) The ameadme11ta made by this eeetlon 
)(2)(A),_ 111badwted ."uaeta" for '.'re- (1111endillf IIUbaec. (c) 111d UIICti.Dg 111baecs. Cd) 
. , .. _ and (e) ot tllia aection and amending aectiou 
, ,· (c)(2J(B). ,: Pub.L. IQ3..68, - J396a 111d 1396H of l4ia title] shall not apply-
12)(8), generally amended par, {2)(B), •, . .- M(A)° t.o.;,ectieal uaiatan~iiprfflPid~"for eer-
,IDeDdment JIii"; C2XB) niad u followa: .... vices ~:bef!!:re.~ 1, 1~;,;,: · _: · 
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42 § 1396p 
.:t!=":-'. :· HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
ri'ewialon Nota and Legislative lleporu community spouse, as defined in section 
. i,, J982 Act. Senate Report No. 97-494 1396r-5(h)(2) of this title,.". 
'~d · House Conference Repon No. Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.I... 101-239, 
(97-760, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and § 641 l(e)(l)(B)(ii), struck out cl. (iii) 
· dm.News, P· 781. which contained material relating to 
•·., i983 Act. Senate Rc:pon No. 97-592 transfer of resources to person other 
/f~d House Conference Report No. than a spouse for less than fair market 
-'97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and value . 
. Adm.News, P· 4149. 1988 Amendment&. Subsec. (c)(l). 
,&::,i987 Act. House Report No. 100-391 Pub.I.. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i), sub-
U,arts I and ll) llJld House Conference stitutcd "period of ineligibility for nurs-
"• · port No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code ing facility services and for a level of 
. 'Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1. care in a medical institution equivalent 
'. y~."i988 Acts. House Report No. to that of nursing facility services and 
05(1) (II) d H c nf for services under section 1396n(c) of (\')lo; 100-l • an ouse O erence this title in the case of an institutional-
. ·~~port 1~61, see 1988 US.Code Cong. ized individual (as defined in paragraph 
· :and Adm.News, p. 803. ( )) h , d · -"-- th 
,,.. . 3 w o, at any ume unng or 11.rn::r e 
;t, Senate Report No. 100-377, House 30-month period immediately before the 
Conference Report No. 100-998, see date the individual becomes llI1 institu-
•· 988 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. tionalized individual (if the individual is 
77_6. · entitled to medical assistance under the 
-~1.989. Act. House Report No. 101-247, State plan on such date) or, if the indi-
House Conference Report No. 101-386, \1dual is not so entitled, the date the 
and Statement by President, see 1989 individual applies for such assistance 
· U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906. while an institutionalized individual" for 
l:i:l,: ·. "period of ineligibility in the case of an 
~calloDJI · institutionalized individual (as defined 
· :Pub.L 100-203, Title · IV, in paragraph (3)) who, at any time dur-
'§i42ll(h)(l2)(A), Dec. 22. 1987, IOI Stat. ing the 30-month period immediately 
J330-207, provided that subsec. before the individual's application for 
"(c)(2)(B)(i) is amended by striking out medical assistance under the State plan". 
"skilled nursing facility, intermediate 
· caie facility" and inserting "nursing fa. Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b), substituted 
P.!!cility, intermediate care facility for the provisions establishing a period of ineli-
._ mentally retarded" in lieu thereof, and gibility for institutionalized individuals 
Wnl>u.b.L I 00-203, Title IV; who, at any time during the 30-month 
'!lt 421l(h)(12)(B), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. period immediately before the individu-
~1330-207, as amended Pub.L 100-360, al's application for medical assistance 
ti J JV § 4 1(/)(3)(1) J J 1 1988 102 under the State plan. disposed of re-
-- , _it e • 1 ' u Y ' ' sources for Jess than fair market value ASuii.· 803, provided that subsec. 
•(c)(2)(B)(ii), is amended by striking out for provisions. for denial of medical as-
~ ~lied" each place it appears, which sistancc for any individual who would 
-.amendments could not be executed in not be eligible for such assistance except 
....... liiew of complete amendment of subsec. for such disposition. 
. c) by Pub.I.. 100-360, § 303(b). Subsec. (c)(2). Pub.I... 100-360, 
• i:,. § 303(b). substituted provisions that an 
endmeata . individual shall not be ineligible for 
989 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l). medical assist:snce by reason of par. (I) 
_fub.L. 101-239, § 641 l(e)(l)(A), inserted to the extent that the resources transfer-
-=.zg.!'. whose spouse," following "an institu- red were a home and title to the home 
~onalized individual (as defined in para- was transferred to certain individuals, 
-~Ph (3)) who,". the resources were transferred to (or to 
~$'ubscc. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L 101-239, another for the sole benefit of) the com· 
,ff~ll(e)(l)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or munity spouse, or the individual's child 
~l?t (or to another for the sole benefit who is blind or permanently and totally 
~ r,i}'. !he individual's spouse, or" for "(i) to disabled, a satisfactory showins was 
.. ror: to another for the sole benefit of) the made to the State that the individual 
~1-.. ,. 
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42 § 1396p SOCIAL SECURITY Ch. 7 · 
intended to dispose of the resources ci- been so eligible if the State plan require-
ther at fair market value or for other ments with respect to disposal of re:· 
valuable consideration, or the resources sources applicable under paragraphs '(I) 
were transferred exclusively for a pur- and (2) of this subsection had been_ ap-
pose other than to qualify for medical plied in lieu of the provisions of section 
as.sistance, or the State determines that I 382b(c) of this title. · ·. 
denial of eligibility would work an un- Subsec. (c)(4). Pub.L 100-360, 
due hardship for provisions which em- § 303(b), added par. (4). 
powered States to est.1blish periods of 
ineligibility in excess of 24 months in Subsec. (c)(S). Pub.L. 100-485, 
any = in which the uncompensated § 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii), added par. (5) .... :. 
value of disposed of resources exceeded J 987 Amendment. SubseC:' 
$12,000 or the propeny was disposed of (a)(l)(B)(i). Pub.L 100-203, · 
for less than fair market value. § 42Il(h)(l2)(A), substituted Hnursing 
Sub=. (c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub.L 100-485_ facility, intermediate care facility for the 
d)( 6)(B}( ') d mentally retarded" for "skilled nursing § 608( 1 ii • esignated e:iti5ting facility, intennediate care facility''. · provisions in part as subcls. (I) and (II), ) 
respectively. 1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B). 
Subscc. (c:)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L 100-485, Pub.L. 97-448, § 309(b)(21), substituted 
§ 608(d)( I 6)(B)(iii), substituted ·the in- "who" for "and" preceding "has lawfully. 
dividual becomes an institutionalized in- resided'._ ~-, 
dividual" for "of the individual's admis- Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L 97-448,: 
sion to the: medical institution or nurs- § 309(b)(22), substituted in subd. (I) 
ing faciliry". "can~ for "cannot" and deleted from 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L 100-485, subcl. (IV) the: introductory word -~ · 
§ 608(d)( l 6)(B)(iv), substituted "the in- Fifectlve Dates . - • 
dividual becomes an institutionalized in- 1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.L 
dividuaJ" for "of such individual's admis- 101-239 amending subsec. (c)(l) and· 
sion to the medical institution or nurs- (2)(BXi), (ii) and striking subsec 
ing facility". (c)(2)(B)(iii), applicable to transfers oc-. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.I- 100-485, curring after Dec. 19, 1989, see section 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(v), designated aisting 64 I l(e)(4) of Pub.L 101-239, set out as a· 
provisions in pan as cl. (i), added cl. (ii), note under section 1396a of this title;! 
and struck out ''or the individual's child 1988 Acta. Amendment by Pub.L -
who is blind or permanently and totally 100-485 effective as if included in the'. 
disabled" following "section enactment of Pub.L 100-360, see section 
1396r-S(h)(2) of this title,". 608(g)(l) of Pub.L. 100-485, set out as a 
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub.L. J00-485, note under section 704 of this title. · 1 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vi), qualified definition Amendment by· section 303(b) of· 
of "institulionalized individual· to pro-- Pub.L 100-360 applicable to resources · 
vide that inpatients in medical institu- disposed of on or after July 1. 1988, 
tions must be those with respect to except that such subsection, as · so 
whom payment is made based on a level amended, shall not apply with respect to 
of care provided in a nursing facility. inter-spousal transfers occurring before 
and included within the definition per- October 1. 1989. and to payments under 
sons described in section this subchapter for calendar quarters be--
1396a(a)(I0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this ride. ginning on or after July J, 1988 (acept 
Pub.L J00-360, § 303(b), substituted in cenain situations requiring State leg-
definition of the tenn "institutionalized islative action), without regard to whc:U!· 
individual" for provision that in any case er or not final regulations to carry out · 
where an individual was ineligible for such amendment have been promu.1-
medical assistance under the State plan gated by such date (with an exception 
solely because of the applicability to for resources disposed of before July 1, 
such individual of the provisions of sec- 1988), sec section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L 
tion J382b(c) of this title, the State plan 100-360, set out as a nore under section 
could provide for uie eligibility of such 1396r-5 of this title. .. 
individual for medical assistance under 1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.L · 
the plan if such individual would have 100-203 applicable to nursing facility 
764 
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CHAPTER 67 
(H.B •. No. tl7) 
AN ACT 
107 
- ,':AID E!,ICI!ll!,ITY FOR KARRIED PERSONS AND TO PENALTIES 
3FER OF PROPERTY; AMENDING SECTIONS 56-209e AND 56-214, 
~. 10 CONrORN WITH SECTION 303 Of PUBLlC LAW 100-360. 
d by the Legielature of the State of Idaho: 
1. That Section 56-209e, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
ded to read as follows: 
e, ELIGIBILITY OP MARRIED COUPLES FOR MEDICAL ASSISTANCE 
MEDICAID PROGRAM, (1) It is the intent of the legislature 
ing this section to reduce the number of situations in ~hich 
regulations as they apply to long term care costs, cause 
~k~he destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of mar-
·ried out to prevent destitution, It is further the intent of 
;rsratton section.to protect the community and separate prop-
1te, in!ofa~ch rights are not specifically preempted by 
law, of a married person whose spouse applies for medical 
:e regardless of whether they are living together. 
Ca) In determining the eligibility of an aged, blind or dis-
I married individual or of a coqple for a,edical assistance 
· title XIX of the social security act, the amount of income 
resources to be counted as available to such individual or 
e ahall be calculated in accordance with the community prop-
prov1s1on~ of chapter 9, ~itle 32, fdaho Code, or 9hould it 
, the advantage of such individual or couple, in accordance 
the methods utilized by the federal supplemental.security 
~ program under title XVI of the social security act, 
Where both spouses are applying or are covered by medical 
tance, the same method of counting income and resources shall 
•plied to both spouses and utilized to determine the liability 
ach for the cost of medical care; ho~ever, for any month for 
either spouse receives a supplemental security income pay-
or a state supplement under section 56-207, 56-208 or 
9a, Idaho Code, or for which an application is filed and sub-
ntly approved, the 111ethodology of the supplemental security 
1e program shall be applied. 
The presumption of the availability of income under eicher 
ommunity property or ,upplemental security income method may 
butted by either apouse. 
?he department of health and welfare shall furnish to each 
~ 111edical assistance a·pplicant who ia aged, blind or dia-
, a cle&r and simple statement in writing advi1ing them of 
rovi1ions 0£ this section, 
Ci.) The provisions of paragraphs (a) through -(d) of chis 
~bsection shall continue co aeply on and after September 30, 
,!?89. to aiarritd couples who are living together, 
000237
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(ii) Be innin Se tember JO 1989 eli ibilit for an ma 
ried erson livin in a medical institution whose souse doe 
not live in a medical institution shall be determined 
evaluatin income first b attributin such income to th 
indiYidual or individuals in whose name or names such 
is aid and if such attribution exceeds the maximum 
bility limit, secondly by attributin income 
with the .convmmit ro ert rovis1ons of 
32, Idaho Code. 
(iii) Be Se tember 30 1989 the 
determined 
income was 
a on and after Se tember to cou les se arat 
because one 1 souse entered a medical institution for· 
continuous sta on or before Se tember 29, 1989; and the r 
visions of section 1924 c of the social securit act sha~ 
a l to cou les se arated because one l 
medical institution for a continuous sta 
ber 30 2 1989. 
(3) If any proYision of this section or the application 
to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such invalidity 
not affect other provisions or applications of the section that 
given effect without the invalid provisions or applications, 
this end the provisions of this section are severable. 
SECTION 2. That Section 56-21.4, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
hereby amended co read as follows: 
56-214. AWARD OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE -- INELIGIBILITY UPON TRANSP 
OF PROPERTY. Upon the completion of the tnvestigation, the sta 
department shall determine whether the applicant is eligible for pu 
lie assistance under the provisions of this act, the type and amou 
of public assistance he shall receive, and the date upon which su 
public assistance shall ·begin. Public assistance shall be paid int 
manner prescribed by the state department. 
ill Pub~tc-asststance Aid to dependent children shall not. 
granted under this act to any person who within six (6) months r1 
to applying for or at any time during which such assistance , 
received, has either made an assignment or transfer of property f 
the·purpose of rendering himself eligible for assistance under th 
act, or who has divests!!!_ himself of any interest in property witho 
adequate consideration which interest or proceeds therefrom could re 
sonably be expected to contribute to the support and maintenance , 
such person and his family, except that any person who is ineligi~ 
for public assistance due solely to such assignment or transfer sh~ 
'. 
~ 
l' 
. ., . 
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a showing that such person has caused such property 
'or transferred back to him; or 
a showing that the person to whom such property is 
transferred has, subsequent to such assignment or 
subsistence and medical care costs eaclusive of any 
ir support, of such person or £amity, according to the 
assistance standard, equat to, or in excess of, the 
of the property ao assigned or transferred; or 
s a showing that the subsistence and medical care 
:uch person, according to the department's assistance 
.·bsequent to such assignment or transfer, equat or 
market value 0£ the property so assigned or trans-
ility for old age assistance under section 56-207 1 
lr aid to the blind under section 56-208, Idaho Code, or 
manently and totally disabled under aection 56-209a, 
,all be determined by continuing to consider as available 
that was transferred prior to July l, 1988 1 until such 
.lly accounted for under the provisions of section 
the social security act as such section read on June 30 1 
ibility for medical assistance under section 56-209b 1 
hall continue to apply the regulations of the director of 
nt of health and welfare concerning transfer of property 
ations read on October 29, 1988 to transfers that occur 
11 1989, to persons other than to the spouse of the per-
g or applying for medical assistance, and to interspousal 
t occur rior to October l 1989. 
provisions of sec~ion 1917 c of the social security act 
by public la~ 100-360 and further amended by public Law 
s hereafter amended shall apply as of July l, 1989 1 to 
assets other than to the epouae, and as of October 1, 
sfers betveen spouses, except that such provisions shall 
her to transfers that occurred before Jul l 1988 or to 
at have been fullz accounted for under subsection 3 of 
ny provision of this section or the application thereof 
on or circumstance ia held invalid, such invalidity shall 
her provisions or applications of the section that can be 
without the invalid provisiona or applications, and to 
provisions of this ,ection are severable, 
h 27, 1989. 
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15-1-106 L'Slt"OR.\I l'kOBAn: com: .w 
I l.'.'>-1-106. C.1hoon v. S.-.ot.cn. 10'.! lil-'lho -~:!. 
,;JJ I'. :.!d IJ()7 , 191! I ,. 
15-1-106. Effect o( fraud 1md ev~ion. 
l-"r;:aud upon 1hr rourt. 
T1mrhn,.... of ,1n1on. 
f'roud L'pon ,h,. C:-,un. 
n,r ,1ur•l1on a( '4'hrthrr .. n r1l..l!r m.1y br 
n-oJ>"nr<i for f.ulufl" of !hr ~n,on~I , .. p,..,..,n, 
t.ot,\•p a( :Ill r1L2t.! lo not16· th,. hr.1rs .-nd 
<JI"'\-....,.. upon hu .1pphc.:i110n for ,nfonn.:il 
.ippo1Rlml'RI Of to not.(y ..JI ,nlr,.....i.-.1 J>"T· 
,oft.I U\.11 hr l\.;uJ .,pphrd lo form.:ilh· ci- 1h.-
r1t.1r.- -.·:u not 1pr,n6c:ilh· 1rr.2i,.J ,n t11r P">' 
b.:at.r rorlr; ho,,,.·.-,,·rr, l.uho Q.IM" IJw, •·hich 
.,...,uld Jpplv undrr t \.',. \. }Ol. r"'C'<JC7\11r• 
th•! "GUI(~· :'Jl.*r !r,-.ol .a!lr-c".llh<>tu o( J.1~Jt o/ 
rwlJo- or f.ldl.ltP lo duel.- ,,...1-,.nt inform,,, 
!1<,n u Cl)tulAIULI~ (r.a..d upan t..hr CIIUrt or 
U,r unnot.ti..d plll"!y ;ind. ,u:-n.rtlinclr. an .. ~. 
tJon ....-lun11 °:ippropn:1r.,o >ction ia.~111rut U'.r 
fl"rf)rlr:ll<>r of th~ fr:iud" -..·u ;a\'lllfobll! undu 
thu .....-!Jon. C: .. hoon \'. S.-.t1ton. l!T.? :ldllho !'>-1:!. 
PiJJ r::J r;()7 ()'.llll). 
Timrllnru of AL-tion. 
W'hrfl" !hr /in.al .an:vunW\4r and Ji,.u,buw.1 
o( olll rst..it,- ocru~ ,n .,·.,,..,.mt.-r· 1975 • .u.. 
:1rt1on rnmm.-ncrd '-ll )f.ar lr.'6 which ~t.-p,J 
(12ud ~ thr P""""n.J fl"Pft-111.Jat.\-.. ,.. .. 
tJmrlv f1l..d l"'\.,.n rhouch .ac1wal µ.t"Oa""'C1.11Jon al 
LIM! Action d...J nae :....i.r pL.c-r unul 1978. •i.ncw 
thr Cl)mmrn<"Pinrnt al !hr .artJGa 11'1 19-:'6 w-u 
w,th,n th<' ,....,, '!¥Ar lu:n.1C..W>ft p,·N>d t'Dt'· 
1.a.iflrd ,n uu. ~- C.a.hoan v, S.·•&an. 10'2 
Idaho S-1:?. 6l.l l'z.d 60:' •19'11•. 
l.S-1-107. E\·idence u to dl"ath or status. 
Pl-oaf of 1-. 
·J-.,.,.,( a( lo.a" ,...,..u1rrfflrftt.a urujrr ) 4 I· 
I :.,.l'J c-.umoC br ;in)· .,-rrar.-r tl\.lll r.i>r r;,qu,n-
mrnu !or .. 01.:1bluh11\1; .a pnm.a faor c.a.- of 
dr.11th undrr \hu -,,en. Thom.u ,. John 
l!.annxll )Cut. l.;f.- lOJ i;.,, IU l<i>ho 91;, 741 
l':d ~J· ·CL ,\pp 1~;;7. 
n,... ,n!·=1..1on (1.1rnuh,,d ,n thr -S1.>r.--
_.nt o( ~PP".an.nn-" ~ uJ.r1'l,c,,,nl al 
tnal lo r,!Jlbl ... h .a prun.a !~r c~ for dr<J..ar-
Llllf 11),p brMb.OAl1'1 bwband dl'.Jld .-u .~. 
Ol'nt to ~ utu tr pr,»( o( 1- ,mdrr t 41 , 
l.'i.39. Thom.a. V. John IIJJ\C'Oell 3.41.1L. w .. In.a 
c ... llJ ld.aho ~. ~•l P.:!d ':34 •CL A~ 
19'.'\~I 
U-1-201. ~nl"rul ddlnitionll. - Subjoo to .1ddition.al dciiinitioru 
conLJin,-d m lhe 11ubMcquent ch:ipkr.1 which arc :ipplic:iblt! to lfp('Cific 
chaptc-N or pan-i. 3nd unlt:K-" the contt."Xl othcN·i.~ requirn. in thi.11, code: 
1 lJ "Applic.:1t.ion· means .:a "'·nttcn r,_,qu~t ta thl.1 ~tr:1r for :an <>rdcr of 
inform:il probotc or appointment undcr piirt J of ch.ipt.er 3 of th1~ c-odc. 
12> "Augmented L'lll.Jtc· m1.•:in.<1 the t."fft.ate descnbi..-d in &«tion 15-~!-202 of 
thi..i code. 
1 J, "Jkndiciary." .J.'I it relate~ la trust bcncticiari~. includt.'11 ii pcnion \lo'ho 
h;Lot .:iny pre.iMmt or future mtt.•r1.~t. v,~u.-d or contin~l'nt. and n!Ao i1,cludCA 
thL· o\lo·ncr of ~n intcrc$t by .:1S111t,,rnmcn t or al.her tn:uu{cr .utd iu it relates lo 
;1 ch:iritabll' tru11t. include:1 any pt.'r.lOn entitled to cnforn:! the lrullt. 
1-11 ·Child. include.'! any indi,·idual cntitlt.-d to LJkc WI a child uncler thia 
cod~ by intcst.1tc ~uccc.uion from thl' P,M't!nt whOfl.C n..f.1Lioru1hip i11 invoJ,..c.-d 
and i:xdude11 any pcrll011 "''ho ill only a sl4:pchild, a fo11tc:r child., .1 grandchild 
or any more remote dl.!l&Ccnd.1nt. 
<M ·claims,· in re11pcc:t la ciit..-it1..-s t>( dL.'CC.'dcnta .:ind proc.cct.ed pcr110na, 
indudcJ1 liabilitic11 of the dL.'('(.-dcnt or protectc.-d pcnion ,.•hcthcr ari11ing in 
ronlract, in tart or otherA·i11e, ;and li.abi)itiL.'ft of th~ cllt.11': which :1ri1ie at or 
after the dcnth of the dL'<'L-dent or .::ifter the appointment of a conJM:·rvat.or. 
000240
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l :1- l -·IO 1 1::--;n--n1e,t l'R< m,,n: <'om: -l-1 
'!l'.!l ·\\"ill- 1:- :1 tl':-L:imenlary in:-trumcnt and includ1!s codicil :ind :iny 
'.,•,-1:1m1·nt:ir, in,-trunwnt which merely appoints an e:-c1..·cut11r or rcvrikl':• ,,r 
~·-·n·'"-~ :in111her will. 
:1:l, -~ .. -par:ltL· prnperty· includes all property of eithl.•r thl.· hu:;b.ind ,,r 
:h1..· wif1..• ownL'(i by ltim nr her before marria~c. and th;H :1c4uin-d al1.cr.,·ard 
•.·1thl'r ll\' ~ift. 114..'<\UL':-l. dc\"isc or descent. or that which either he or ~h1..· 
:1cq11irl',: with pr•1CL'1.:<l" 11fhis or her scp:uatc property, by w:,y ofm11ncy•; ur 
,itlwr prnpL·nv. 
, ;i-4 1 ·1 '.,,mm unity pro~rty- incluJcs all nther property acquiri.-d ancr 
:n:1rri:1i.:c hy t.•ithl:r husband or wife. inc!udin~ the rcnL-1 :ind profas of the 
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,_, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The issue presented in this case is whether the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare may recover Medicaid assistance! 
from the estate of a recipient's spouse when the recipient died 
possessing an estate. The petitioner/appellant is the Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department"). The 
respondent is Barbara Jackman, the personal representative of the 
estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter "Jackman''}. 
Jackmar. is the adult niece of Lionel and Hildor Knudson, both 
deceased. 1 
Hildor L. Knudson (hereinafter "Hildor"} received medical 
41-, assistance ("Medicaid") from the State of Idaho for about twenty-
two months prior to her death in October, 1994. The value of her 
estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was paid to the 
Department pursuant to Idaho Code§ 56-218, which permits the 
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a 
recipient. Hildor's spouse, Lionel Malcolm Knudson (hereinafter 
"Lionel"}, died in November, 1994. Unsatisfied with its recovery 
from Hildor's estate, the Department is attempting to also 
recover from Lionel's estate. The Department's attempted 
The Department is mistaken in identifying Jackman as 
Lionel and Hildor's daughter. Compare Appellant's Brief, p. 1. 
with R. p. 6. 
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recovery is contrary to its regulations, state law, federal law 
and federal regulations. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The Department brought a Petition for Allowance of Claim 
against the estate of Lionel Knudson for recovery of Medicaid 
payments made on behalf of Lionel's spouse, Hildor Knudson. R. 
pp. 19-20. Jackman objected that, because the Department had 
already collected from Hildor's estate, its claim against 
Lionel's estate exceeded its authority under state and federal 
law. After a hearing, William C. Hamlet, Magistrate of the 
District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for the 
County of Latah, found the Department was not entitled to recoVE!r 
,,.,., from Lionel's estate. R. p. 158. The Department appealed to the 
District Court, which reviewed the record and supplemental briefs 
before hearing oral argument. R. p. 175. District Judge John R. 
Stegner affirmed the magistrate's Memorandum Decision. R. p. 
176. 
c. statement of the Facts 
Hildor L. Knudson, wife of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, lived the 
last few years of her life at the Moscow Care Center, Moscow, 
Idaho. In December 1992, an application for Medicaid was filed 
on her behalf with the Department. The eligibility process for a 
married couple involves the reporting of income and resources tc, 
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the Department and complying with the Federal Spousal 
Impoverishment Act (FSI). Under FSI, the community spouse is 
allowed to keep various items of exempt property (one's home, 
car, and personal belongings) and a Department-determined portion 
of the couple's assets. 42 u.s.c. § 1382(a} (l} (B). The 
institutionalized spouse is allowed to keep only $2,000 of non-
exempt resources. Id. 
Hildor was found eligible for Medicaid as of January 1, 
1993. Both state and federal rules required her, as the 
institutionalized spouse, to transfer her interest in all but 
$2,000 of her non-exempt resources including her interest in 
community property to Lionel, the community spouse, through a 
•tit., separate property agreement entitled a "Marriage Settlement 
Agreement." 42 u.s.c. § 1396r-5(f} (l); IDAPA 03.05618,07. 
Interspousal transfers of exempt resources are not required, but: 
are expressly allowed. 42 u.s.c. § l396(p} (c} (2}; IDAPA 
16,03.05.693.01. Hildor and Lionel entered into a Marriage 
Settlement Agreement on March, 1993. R. pp. 63-66. The 
Agreement was recorded in the County of Latah, Moscow, Idaho andl 
forwarded to the Department. Hildor received Medicaid payments 
for her nursing home care from January 1, 1993 until her death on 
October 27, 1994. R. p. 25-40, 
In February 1993, Hildor was found to be an incapacitated 
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~11_, 
and protected person in Latah County Case No. SP-93-0004. R. pp. 
48-49. Barbara Jackman, Hildor's niece, was appointed guardian 
of her person and conservator of her estate. Id. When Hildor 
died, Jackman notified the Magistrate Court. Then, pursuant to 
Idaho's procedures for small estates, Idaho Code 15-3-1201, 
Jackman collected Hildor's personal property by affidavit. R. 
pp. 67-68, Jackman paid Hildor's funeral expenses and her legal 
fees and then forwarded the remainder of the estate ($1,638.03) 
to the Department. R. pp. 70-71. Finally, Jackman filed a 
closing inventory. R. pp. 58-59. 
Lionel Knudson died on November 11, 1994. R. p. 10. He was 
not a recipient of Medicaid. Probate proceedings were begun on 
November 28, 1994. R. pp. 10-12. Jackman was appointed personal 
representative. R. pp. 14-15. Lionel's estate was valued at 
$40, 798.35. R. p. 149, In January, 1995, the Department filed 
a Petition for Allowance of Claim against Lionel's estate for 
$41,600.55. R. pp. 19-20, 
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ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does Idaho Code §56-218 permit recovery for Medicaid 
costs from the estate of a surviving spouse when the recipient 
spouse dies possessed of an estate. 
2. Whether the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
regulations allow for recovery of Medicaid costs from a surviving 
spouse's estate when the recipient spouse dies possessed of an 
estate. 
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a 
recipient's Medicaid costs from the estate of a surviving spouse 
beyond a tracing of the recipient's assets owned at the time of 
death. 
4. Whether Respondent's attorney fees and costs are to be 
assessed against the Department. 
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I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court makes an independent appellate review of the 
magistrate's decision, but should give due regard to the district 
court's ruling. Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 840, 864 P.2d 
1126, 1127 (1993), If the magistrate's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, the findings 
should be upheld. Id. This Court freely reviews questions of 
law. Id. 
The Department has not challenged any of the magistrate's 
findings of fact. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. This matter presents 
issues of federal and state law. 2 
•1111t, II. IDAHO CODE § 56-218 DOES NOT PERMIT RECOVERY FROM THE ESTATE 
OF THE SURVIVING SPOUSE WHEN THE RECIPIENT SPOUSE DIES POSSESSED 
OF AN ESTATE. 
A. The Department has collected from Hildor•s estate for 
the Medicaid payments made on her behalf. 
Jackman, as custodian of Hildor's estate, complied with 
Idaho Code§ 56-218 by paying to the state a11 funds remaining in 
her estate at death following payment of funeral and estate 
2 The Department asserts that Jackman may not raise the 
federal question. Appellant's Brief, p. 7, n. 5. Jackman 
prevailed before the magistrate and district court and seeks no 
affirmative relief. Jackman argued the issue before both lower 
courts and may properly raise the issue before this court. IRAP 
§§ ll(f), lS(b); Walker v. Shoshone county, 112 Idaho 991, 739 
P.2d 290 (1987). 
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administration costs. R. p. 149. Idaho Code 56-218(1) states.: 
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf 
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for 
such aid paid to either or both .... 
At death Hildor had an estate valued at $1,902.30. R. pp. 
59-59. She had no interest in jointly owned property or property 
subject to a right of survivorship that would pass at death to 
her husband or anyone else. R. pp. 152-153. Just prior to her 
death she did not have an interest in any "life estate". Id. 
All of her estate, after funeral expenses and legal fees, was 
paid to the Department of Health and Welfare within a reasonable 
time following her death. R. p. 149. The funds were accepted by 
the Department. R. pp. 70-71. Nothing of Hildor's estate passed 
to Lionel or other successors or heirs. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218 authorizes recovery "from the estate, or 
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse". 
Hildor had an estate from which Idaho has recovered all that 
remained following payment of her funeral costs. Idaho is not 
permitted under this statute to recover from the estate of the 
surviving spouse since the recipient had an estate. 
B. The clear language of IC§ 56-218 preconditions 
recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse on the 
absence of a recipient's estate. 
This case presents a simple issue of statutory 
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interpretation, which always begins with an examination of the 
literal words of the statute. Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 
Idaho 819, 822, 828 P.2d 848, 851 (1992); Local 1494 of th~ 
Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Couer d'Alene, 99 Idaho 
630, 596 P,2d 1346 (1978). As explained in Magistrate Hamlett's 
thoughtful Memorandum Decision, the clear language of I.e. 56-
218(1) does not permit the Department to recover Medicaid 
payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse when the 
recipient died possessing an estate. R. pp. 151-154. Because 
Hildor died possessing an estate of $1,638.00 which the Deparment 
has already collected, it may not further collect from Lionel's 
estate. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) specifically limits the Department to 
recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient unless there 
is no such estate: 
[M]edical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf 
of an individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or 
older when the individual received such assistance may be 
recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate the 
estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for 
such aid paid to either or both .••• 
(emphasis added). This language is also reflected in the 
Department's own regulations which provide that "If the deceased 
recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made from the estate 
of his surviving spouse." IDAPA 16.03.09,025.15. This language 
is unambiguous and, as held by the Magistrate and District court, 
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does not allow for recovery of Medicaid payments from the estate! 
of the surviving spouse if the recipient spouse died possessing 
an estate. R. pp. 153-154, 176. 
This Court has repeatedly held that it "must assume that the 
legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute." ~atter 
of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 822, 828 P.2d at 851; 
Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 254, 805 P.2d 452, 460 (1991). 
The language of Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) may only be logically read 
to allow the Department to recover from the estate of a surviving 
spouse only if the recipient left no estate. Effect must be 
given to every word and clause of the statute. Matter of Permi1~ 
No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852; Wright v. Wille~, 
111 Idaho 474, 725 P.2d 179 (1986). Since the statute is 
unambiguous, this Court must follow the law as written and then~ 
is no occasion for the application of the rules of construction. 
State v. Wiedmeier, 121 Idaho 189, 191, 824 P.2d 120, 121 (1991); 
Sweeney v. Otter, 119 Idaho 135, 804 P.2d 308 (1990). 
The Department argues that the language "or, if there be nc:, 
estate," is archaic and does not have its clear meaning. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 13-14. The Department cites no authority 
for this proposition. The Department refers to similar languag€~ 
in various non-Medicaid statutes of New York and Pennsylvania, 
but fails to recognize the clear meaning of the language in each 
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example. Id. In all of the statutes, the language designates to 
whom benefits would be paid upon the death of a covered 
individual. See NY Vol. Amb. Ben. §10; NY Work. Comp. § 15; NY 
Vol. Fire Ben. §10; United States Steel Corp. v. Workers 
Compensation Appeals Board, 536 A.2d 515 (Pa. 1988) (Appendix A). 
All have nearly identical language. ~ In each example, the 
language is exclusionary. If there are surviving dependents, the 
money goes to them. If there are 11 no such dependents," then the 
money goes to the estate of the deceased and "if there be no 
estate" to whomever pays the deceased's funeral expenses. 
Contrary to the Department's assertions, none of these statutes 
contemplate an "order of priority'' in which part of the benefits 
would be paid to the dependents, some to the estate, and some to 
the payers of the funeral expenses. All of these statutes 
condition the payment of benefits to each subsequently-named 
party on the absence of the prior party. Each is similar to IC§ 
56-218 1 s use of 11 if there be no estate" as a qualifier. 
Even if the Department's interpretation of§ IC 56-218(1) is 
plausible, it cannot be preferred to the clear meaning of the 
statute: 
A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a 
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary 
meaning, in the absence of any ambiguity. Higgins v. 
Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51 (1979); Nagel v. 
Hammond, 90 Idaho 96, 408 P.2d 468 (1965). The plain, 
obvious and rational meaning is always to be preferred to 
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any curious, narrow, hidden sense. Id. 
Walker v. Hensley Trucking, 107 Idaho 572, 573, 691 P.2d 1187, 
1188 (1984). There is no ambiguity in IC§ 56-218(1). "A 
statute is not ambiguous merely because an astute mind can devise 
more than one interpretation of it." Matter of Permit No. 36-
7200, 121 Idaho at 823, 828 P.2d at 852. The proper reading of 
the language of IC§ 56-218 is consistent with the Magistrate and 
District Court's interpretation of IC§ 56-218. The Department 
may not recover from Lionel's estate. 
c. Neither the history nor the purposes of Idaho's 
Medicaid laws supports the recovery of Medicaid payments 
from the estate of the surviving spouse. 
1. Idaho has historically not authorized spousal 
estate recovery . 
The Department contends that the history of estate recovery 
of old-age assistance payment in Idaho supports the ability of 
the Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid 
recipient's spouse. Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-10. Nothing cited 
by the Department supports this contention. The o1d statutes 
discussed by the Department are not Medicaid statutes. See 
Chapter 119, 1943 S.L. (Appellant's Appendix F). 
Moreover, to the extent the authority cited by the 
Department is analogous to Medicaid law, it refers only to 
"recovery against the estates of recipients." State ex rel. 
Nielson v. Lindstrom, 68 Idaho 226, 191 P.2d 1009 
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(1948) (Appellant's Appendix E). All of the authority cited by 
the Department indicates that it has never had the authority to 
recover from the estates of recipient's spouses. In Lindstrom, 
the statute discussed by this court provided that "on the death 
of any recipient of old-age assistance, the total amount of 
assistance paid such recipient ••• may ..• be allowed as a 
claim against the estate of such person ... " 68 Idaho at 230, 
191 P.2d at 1013. Similar language is used in the statute 
reviewed in Newland v. Child, 73 Idaho 530, 535-36, 254 P.2d 
1066, 1071-72 (1953) (Appellant's Appendix G), which led this 
Court to hold that "our law limits recovery to the estate, or the 
real property of the recipient." 73 Idaho at 539, 254 P.2d at 
1070-71. Jackman has never contested the ability of the 
Department to collect from the estate of a Medicaid recipient. 
The old cases and statutes also undermine two keystones of 
the Department's arguments. First, the primary thrust of the 
Department's arguments is that the recovery provisions would be 
nonsensical if the Department might sometimes be unable to 
recover Medicaid payments. Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18. This 
Court in Lindstrom made it clear that such provisions have never 
created an expectation of recovery from every recipient, only an 
ability to recover where authorized. 68 Idaho at 232-33; 191 
P.2d at 1015-16, Second, the Department has argued that the "if 
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there be no estate 11 language is only a corollary to the 
provisions requiring that the Department may not recover from the 
home (or other exempt assets) of a deceased recipient while they 
are still being used by the recipient's surviving spouse. R. pp 
20-22. This analysis is belied by the existence of similar 
delayed recovery provisions in the old statutes that make no 
reference to recovery from a spouse's estate. 
2. The purpose of Idaho's spousal impoverishment statutes 
is to protect the estate of the surviving spouse. 
Speculation about the intent of the legislature in enacting· 
IC§ 56-218 should not override the statute's clear language. 
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853; 
Unity Light & Power Co. v. Burley, 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 
(1961). To the extent, however, that this Court considers the 
purpose of the statute, it should affirm the holdings of the 
Magistrate and District court. 
The Department asserts that the legislature specifically 
passed IC§ 56-218 to allow recovery from the estates of 
recipient's spouses, but the authorities the Department cites 
support the contrary. Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-12. The 
Department does not refer to any of the legislative history of IC 
§ 56-218. Id. Neither of the session laws cited by the 
Department refers to an intent to maximize the state's ability to 
recover Medicaid payments or to allow recovery from the estates 
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of surviving spouses. Appellant's Appendixes H, J. To the 
contrary, both session laws explicitly state that the legislature 
wished to protect spouses's estates: "It is further the intent 
of this legislation to protect the community and separate 
property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for 
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living 
together." S.L. 1988, ch.50, § 1, p. 74; S.L. 1989, ch.67 § 1, 
p. 107. 
III. THE DEPARTMENT'S REGULATIONS DO NOT ALLOW FOR RECOVERY FROM 
A SPOUSE'S ESTATE IF THE RECIPIENT DIES POSSESSED OF AN ESTATE. 
The Department's own regulations adopted to enforce IC§ 56-
218 explicitly forbid its recovery from Hildor's estate. In the 
Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted provisions 
for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to Sections 56-218 
and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of liens against 
property of deceased persons, and the filing of liens against the 
property of permanently institutionaiized recipients." IDAPA 
16.03.09.025. These provisions are contrary to the Department's 
position in this case in several respects. 
First, the Department's regulations reflect the language of 
IC§ 56-218 in placing a condition precedent to recovery from the 
estate of the surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15 states: 
"If the deceased recipient has no estate, recovery shall be made 
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from the estate of his surviving spouse." If, as the Department 
contends, the statutory language was poorly drafted and contrary 
to legislative intent, surely the Department would not have 
adopted essentially the same language. Because Hildor had an 
estate from which the Department recovered, it may not recover 
from Lionel's estate. 
Lest the Department claim any ambiguity in its regulation, 
another provision is even more clear. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 
states: 
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a 
deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and 
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a 
surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to 
the value of the assets of the estate that were community 
property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate 
property, and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not he 
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a 
spouse . . . 
(Emphasis added). No part of Lionel's estate was community 
property or jointly owned property or Hildor's share of separate: 
property. R. p. 152. Judge Hamlet found that "Hildor had no 
'legal title or interest' in any part of Lionel's estate at the 
time of her death. Id. The Department has explicitly acqui.esce,d 
to this finding. Appellant's Brief, p. 7. The Department is 
barred from recovering from Lionel's estate by its own 
regulation. Further, this regulation reflects the Department's 
understanding that it lacks the authority under IC§ 56-218 to 
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recover from Lionel's estate. 
The Department's regulations highlight the important 
difference between the tracing of assets from the recipient's 
estate and a direct claim against the separate property of a 
surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09025.03(c) and IC§ 56-218(4) (b) 
define the recipient's estate to include only that property and 
assets "in which the recipient had any legal or beneficial title 
or interest at the time of death. 11 IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 defines 
"assets in estate subject to claims 11 to include only those assets 
"the deceased recipient owned or in which he had an ownership 
interest. 11 The Department is entitled to trace these assets that 
the recipient owned at the time of her death into the estate of a 
surviving spouse. The Magistrate specifically held that Lionel's 
estate contained no such assets of Hildor 1 s. R. p. 152. The 
Department cannot make claim to separate property of the 
surviving spouse. 
IV. FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW DOES NOT ALLOW IDAHO TO RECOVER 
MEDICAID BENEFITS PAID TO THE DECEASED SPOUSE FROM THE ESTATE OF 
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE. 
A. Idaho is required to comply with the federal 
government's Medicaid regulations as a condition of 
participating in the Medicaid program. 
The Medicaid program is optional to the individual states. 
Under the federal Medicaid Act (42 u.s.c. §1396, et seq.), states 
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that subsidize medical treatment of the poor are provided federal 
funds to defray the costs. As a condition of participating in 
the program and receiving these funds, states are required by 
federal law to promulgate legislation that complies with the 
federal mandate. See 42 u.s.c. § 1396a(a) (18); Harris v. 
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 301 (1980). This Court held in McCoy v. 
state of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110 
(1995) at 112 that: 
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once 
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the program, it 
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and 
applicable regulations. 
See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 289 n. I (1985). 
B. Federal statutes and regulations allow states to 
recover Medicaid only from the estates of Medicaid 
recipients. 
State medical assistance programs must comply with federal 
Medicaid statutes in order to receive federal grants of money. 
Specifically, 42 u.s.c. §1396(a) (18) mandates that state 
programs comply with the provisions of 42 u.s.c. §1396p with 
respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of Medicaid 
correctly paid. The relevant portion of 42 u.s.c. 
§1396p(b) (1) (A) reads as follows: 
(b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN. 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State 
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plan may be made, except that the state shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the 
case of the following individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a) (1) (B), the state shall seek adjustment or recovery from 
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject 
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the individual. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The clear meaning of this federal statutory provision is 
buttressed further by federal regulations found at 42 C.F.R. 
433.36 (h). The relevant portion of these regulations reads as 
follows: 
(h) Adjustments and a recoveries. (1) The agency may make 
an adjustment or recover funds for Medicaid claims correctly 
paid for an individual as follows: 
(i) From the estate of any individual who was 65 years or 
older when he or she received Medicaid; and .•. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Neither 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) 's plain language nor that of 
the regulations state that recovery may be made from the estate 
of a surviving spouse. To the contrary, the plain wording of 42 
u.s.c. § 1396p(b) and 42 C.F.R. 433.36 (h) allow for recovery 
only from the estate of the recipient (individual). Congress 
has provided that recovery of Medicaid costs can only be made 
from the estate of the individual/recipient. 
The United States Supreme Court in K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 291-192 (1988) stated that 
"(i]f the statute is clear and unambiguous, such language 
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must be regarded as conclusive, and 'that is the end of the 
matter, for the court, as well as the agency, must give 
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress"' 
(Quoting Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984)). The federal statute expressly 
limits the recovery authority of the Department. Even if the 
state of Idaho has authority not preempted by the federal 
statute, IC§ 56-218 should be interpreted to not conflict with 
the clear language of 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b). 
c. Congress specifically rejected legislation that would 
have allowed Idaho to recover from the estates of surviving 
spouses of Medicaid recipients. 
Congress specifically rejected a provision in the federal 
law that would have allowed states to recover from the estate of 
~~~ a surviving spouses. This proposed legislation, which was 
rejected, was part of the 1993 Omnibus Reconciliation Act (OBRA) 
which contained amendments to the Medicaid recovery statutes and 
was passed in August 1993. See, H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 208 (May 15, 1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News 535. 
The language rejected read as follows: 
•.• (c) (i) The program provides for the collection 
consistent with paragraph (3} of the amount not to exceed 
the amount described in clause (ii} from 
(i) the estate of the individual; 
(ii) in the case of an individual described in 
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subparagraphs(B) (ii) from the estate of the surviving 
spouse; or ... 
Subparagraph (B) (ii) refers to an individual who receives 
nursing home or other long term care services and is married at 
the time of receipt of said care. It reads as follows: 
(ii) in the case of such an individual who was married at 
the time of death, when the surviving spouse dies. 
This statute would have clearly authorized states to recover 
from the estate of a surviving spouse. Congress could have made: 
this authorization mandatory or optional. Congress obviously 
knew the issue. Instead the final bill allows only for recovery 
from the estate of the recipient of Medicaid. 
D. courts have limited states•s ability to recover 
Medicaid payments from the estates of surviving spouses to 
the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at the time of 
her death. 
Federal statutes regarding recovery of Medicaid from estates 
have been in place since 1965. The vast majority of the language 
these statutes have not changed since originally enacted. Little 
litigation occurred in this area, however, because it has only 
been since OBRA 1993 that states have been required to have 
recovery programs. The 1993 amendments also expanded the ability 
of states to trace assets of recipients that transfer to spouses 
upon the death of the recipient. In several recent decisions, 
courts have held that states may only recover Medicaid payme.nts 
from the estates of recipients and traceable assets in which the 
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recipient had an interest at the time of her death. 
In the Matter of Estate of Budney. 541 N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 
1995), the Department of Social and Health Services for the State 
of Wisconsin made a claim to recover it's Medicaid costs from the 
estate of the surviving spouse of a Medicaid recipient. R. pp. 
112-114. The Court of Appeals held that the state statute 
authorizing recovery of medical assistance benefits from the 
surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authority provided b~· the. 
federal Medicaid statutes. The Budney Court held: 
Because the statute does not counter the initial blanket 
prohibition by specifically authorizing a state to recover 
medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of a recipient 
from a surviving spouse's estate, we conclude that§ 
49.496(3) (a), STATS., which allows such recovery, exceeds 
the authority provided by the fed·eral statute. Accord 
Matter of Estate of Craig, 82 N.Y. 2d 388, 604 N.Y.S. 2d 
908, 624 N.E. 2d 1003 (1993) (Federal law does not expressly 
provide for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a 
predeceased spouse from the secondarily dying spouse's 
estate) . 
R. p. 114. 
The logic of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' decision i.s 
supported by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit's holdings in Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 (9th cir. 
1997) and Citizen's Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.3d 1003 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Although both cases concern the interpretation of 
the term "estate" in the pre-1993 federal Medicaid statute, the 
relevant portion of both decisions is not changed by the 
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substance of the 1993 amendments. 
The Ninth Circuit rulings make clear that "under 42 u.s.c. § 
1396p(b) (1), states •.. may not recover medical assistance 
amounts 'correctly paid on behalf of an individual' except, as 
relevant here, 'from bis estate. 111 Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925 
(emphasis added). Federal Medicaid law expressly limits "a 
participating state's ability to recoup benefits." Kizer, 887 
F.2d at 1006. To the extent a state statute "seeks to reach 
further than§ 1396p(b) (1), it cannot stand." Bucholtz, 114 F.3d 
at 925. 
In both cases, the Ninth Circuit held that, under the then 
existing definition of estate in the federal statute, the 
•111~., California Department of Heal th Services could not recover 
Medicaid payments from recipient's property held in the form of 
revocable inter vivas trusts. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928; Kizer, 
887 F.2d at 1008. The 1993 amendments expanded the definition of 
"estate" to allow states to recover a broader range of assets in 
which the recipient had an ownership interest at the time of 
death. The 1993 amendments did not make any additional 
provisions for recovery from the estates of surviving spouses, 
except for the tracing of property interests of the recipient 
which transferred to the spouse upon the recipient's death (i.e. 
community property, joint tenancy, and property held as a tenant 
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in common.) 
Recent United States District Court opinions confirm that 
states may trace assets the recipient owned at the time of her 
death, but may not make any other recovery from the estates of 
surviving spouses. In Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D. 
Cal. 1994) (R. pp. 127-142), the United States District Court for 
the North District of California explained: 
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its expenses 
only from those persons who are holding real or personal 
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal 
interest at the time of death. See [42 u.s.c. §] 
1396p(b) (1) (requiring state to recover from decedent's 
"estate'') and§ 1396p(b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount 
of expenses the state may recover from such persons is 
capped by the amount of decedent's interest in the property. 
§ 1396p(b) (4). In other words, the federal statute only 
contemplates that the decease4 recipient's assets will be 
trace4, not that other persons can become liable to pay over 
their own assets. 
R. p. 133 (emphasis added). 
V. FAIRNESS AND REASON DENY THE DEPARTMENT'S CLAIM TO RECOVER 
MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM THE ESTATES OF BOTH RECIPIENTS AND 
SURVIVING SPOUSES. 
The Magistrate and District Court's holdings preserve the 
ability of the Department to recover Medicaid payments from 
recipient's estates, while preserving the integrity of the 
surviving spouse's property rights. The Departments objections, 
even if persuasive, are almost purely policy arguments which are 
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not so compelling as to overcome the language of the statute: 
This court has stated that when the language of a statute is 
definite, courts must give effect to that meaning whether or 
not the legislature anticipated the statute's result. Unit~ 
Light & Power co. v. Burley. 83 Idaho 285, 361 P.2d 788 
(1961). Moreover, "the wisdom, justice, policy, or 
expediency of a statute are questions for the Legislature 
alone .... It is the duty of the courts to interpret the 
meaning of legislative enactments without regard to the 
possible results." Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 369 P.2d 
1010 (1962). 
Matter of Permit No. 36-7200, 121 Idaho at 824, 828 P.2d at 853. 
A. Jackman and the Knudsons have acted in good faith and 
in accordance with the law. 
The Department's ad hominem attacks on Jackman and the 
Knudsons should not credited. Appellant's Brief, pp. 16-18. The 
insinuations are false and the arguments are newly raised on 
'"I• appeal. The Department has never previously questioned the 
legality of the Marriage Settlement Agreement, Hildor's 
application and eligibility for Medicaid, Jackman's management of 
Hildor's estate, or Jackman's management of Lionel's estate. 
Hildor and Lionel's estates have been managed in strict 
accordance with state law and the Department's regulations. 
The Department has admitted that the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement between Hildor and Lionel was not only legal and 
proper, but required by law. Appellant's Brief, pp. 2-3. Any 
and all interspousal transfers are permitted by Medicaid. 42 
U,S.C, § 1396p(c) (2) (C). Further, federal and Idaho law require 
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the institutionalized spouse to transfer her interest in all but 
$2,000 of non-exempt resources to the community spouse followinsr 
the state's agency finding Medicaid eligibility or lose Medicaid 
eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(f) (1) and IDAPA 03.05618.07. 
IDAPA 03.05618.07 reads in part: 
... The long-term care spouse must state in writing, his 
intent to transfer the resources to the community spouse, 
within the protected period, before he can be Medicaid 
eligible ..... Resources not transferred to the community 
spouse by the end of the sixty (60) day protected period are 
counted available to the long-term care spouse, toward the 
two thousand dollar ($2,000) resource limit, effective the 
date of entry into the facility. 
The Department, having required Hildor and Lionel to enter into 
the Marriage Settlement Agreement, should not now castigate them 
for doing so. 
The Department contradicts itself in casting aspersions on 
Jackman's management of Hildor's estate after recognizing that 
she acted ethically and legally. Compare Appellant's Brief, pp. 
2-4 with Appellant•s Brief, pp. 16-17. Jackman was legally 
appointed Hildor 1 s guardian and conservator prior to her death. 
R. pp. 60-62. The Magistrate specifically found that Jackman 
properly and legally collected and distributed Hildor's estate. 
R. p. 149. It is absurd to suggest that Jackman was not acting 
for Hildor's estate in reimbursing the Department for Medicaid 
payments made on Hildor's behalf. Payment was tendered to the 
Department because it was entitled to recover from Hildor's 
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estate under IC§ 56-218. 
The Department's contention that Jackman "manipulated" the 
Knudson's estates is irrelevant. The Magistrate concluded that 
Jackman was able to pay Hildor•s debt to the Department because 
she did not use the statutory allowances to drain the value of 
Hildor's estate into Lionel's estate. If the Department were not 
set on collecting from Lionel's estate, it might commend, rather 
than condemn, the actions of personal representatives that 
provide for the reimbursement of Medicaid payments from the 
estate of the recipient. The United states Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit recently held that there is "nothing sinister" 
in people "utilizing the options that our sophisticate system of 
·•11.- property law" makes available to Medicaid recipients and their 
spouses to protect their estates. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 928. 
See also Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1008 ("Congress wanted to encourage" 
the shielding of assets from recovery by use of joint tenancy 
and, even if such action is taken "merely for reasons of 
'shrewdness,' there is nothing improper or inappropriate.") 
B. The Department's ability to achieve reasonably expected 
recovery of Medicaid payments does not require confiscatin~1 
spouse's estates. 
Medicaid is a medical assistance program for low income 
members of our community. There is almost always a significant 
spend down depleting both community and separate property 
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resources prior to a spouse being found financially eligible for 
Medicaid. Potential recipients are required to private pay for 
their care costs that arise during the spend down period. Both 
federal and state law require the transfer of assets to the 
community spouse as a condition of the receipt of Medicaid. 
The result of the eligibility process is that once Medicaid 
eligibility is reached the state's expectation of there being an 
estate of any substance to recover from is small, The reality is 
an expectation to recover from the recipient's personal needs 
account (the up to $2,000 personal exemption) and any interest 
the recipient retained in her home, if any. There is really very 
little else the recipient can legally possess and be eligible for 
Medicaid. The eligibility rules established by Congress and the: 
State purposefully and intentionally limit the value of the 
recipient's estate, Certainly Idaho's legislators anticipated 
the de minimis nature and value of the recipient's estate and 
enacted legislation with this in mind as reflected in I,C. § 56-· 
218 (1). 
The Department's arguments about the amount it could expect 
to recover from a recipient's estate are contradictory and 
confused. The Department has argued that every recipient will 
have an estate, but that it will be insignificant. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13. It has also argued that, because recipient's 
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estates will normally "pass automatically to the surviving 
spouse," there will never be a recipient's estate. Appellant's 
Brief, p. 15. It has also argued that single recipients and 
recipients without estate planning will leave substantial estates 
for recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 17-18, Whichever of thesei 
arguments is accurate, if any are, the Department has given no 
reason for this Court to conclude that the legislature did not 
foresee and desire this result. 
The Department's arguments about the potential for abuse of 
the recovery provisions and the effect upon those who do not plan 
their estates are similarly ineffectual. The legislature in 
passing the spousal impoverishment provisions enunciated a clear 
,,1...,, preference for the preservation of recipients' marriages. 
,1....,. 
Although the Department worries that the proper interpretation of 
IC§ 56-218 may encourage fraudulent marriages, it overlooks the 
impact that its interpretation of the statute may have in 
encouraging divorces to protect the separate estates of spouses 
from recovery. similarly, many state laws, including the areas 
of probate and taxation, have different effects on those who do 
or do not plan their estates. The Ninth Circuit recognized this 
fact and dismissed its importance in Bucholtz: 
[P]eople who engage in proper estate planning often achieve 
results different from, and better than, those obtained by 
those unwilling or unable to do so. Those results often 
flow from the form of holding title to property. 
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114 F.3d at 928. 
c. The vast majority of Idaho's sister states do not 
attempt to recover Medicaid payments from the estates of 
surviving spouses. 
The premise of the Department's arguments is that a Medicaid 
recovery statute is absurd if it does not provide for recovery 
from the estates of surviving spouses. Not only is this premisEi 
unfounded and contrary to the clear language of the statute, but. 
it is also contrary to the judgment of the overwhelming number c,f 
Idaho's sister states that do include surviving spouse's estates 
in their Medicaid recovery scheme. 
All states participating in the Medicaid program have some 
type of program to recover Medicaid payments from recipient's 
estates. The overwhelming majority of these states make no 
provision for recovery from the estate of the recipients 
spouse. 3 Alaska Stat. § 47.07.055 (1996); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-
76-436 (Michie Supp. 1995); Colo. Rev. stat. Ann. § 26-4-403.3 
(West Supp. 1996); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-83g (West 1992); 
Del. Code Ann. Liens§ 5003 (Supp. 1996); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
414.28 (West Supp. 1997); Ga. Code Ann. § 49-4-147.1 (1994); Haw. 
Rev. Stat. § 346-37 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. § 249A.5 (West 
3 Respondent was unable to locate the Medicaid estate 
recovery provisions for the states of Alabama, Arizona, Kentucky, 
Michigan, and Vermont. Of the 44 state statutes reviewed, 3.3 
limit recovery to the estate of the recipient of Medicaid. 
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Supp. 1997); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46:153 (G) (Supp. 1997); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. Human Services 22 § 14 (West Supp. 1996); Md. 
Code Ann., Health-General§ 15-121 (1994); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 
118E, § 31 (Supp. 1997); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-13-120 (1993); Mo. 
Ann. Stat. § 473.398 (Vernon Supp. 1997); Mont. Code Ann. § 53-6-
143 (1997); Neb. Rev. stat. § 68-1036.02 (1996); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 30:4D-7.2 (West 1997); N. M. Stat. Ann. § 27-2A-4 (Michie 
1997); N.Y. Social Services Law§ 369 (McKinney 1997); N.C. Gen. 
Stat. § 108A-70.5 (1994); N.D. Cent. Code§ 50-24.1-07 (Supp. 
1995); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5111.11 (Page 1996); Okla. Stat. 
Ann. Public Health and Safety 63 § 5051.3 (West 1997); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. Public Welfare Code, § 1412 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws. § 40-8-
,11_. 15 (Supp. 1996); S. c. Code Ann. § 43-7-460 (Law Co-op Supp. 
1996); Tenn. Code Ann. § 71-5-116 (1995); Texas Probate Code Ann. 
§ 322 (West Supp. 1997); Utah Code Ann. § 26-19-13 (Supp. 1997); 
Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-327; Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 43.20B.080 (West 
Supp. 1997); w. Va. Code§ 9-5-llc (Supp. 1996). 
Of the few states that make any reference to collection of 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's spouse, most 
limit recovery to the tracing of assets owned by the recipient at 
the time of her death. Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code§ 
14009.5 (West Supp. 1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 12-15-9-5 (Burns 
Supp. 1997); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 256B.15 (West Supp. 1997); Nev. 
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Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.2935 (Michie 1996); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 
414.105 (Supp. 1996); Wyo. Stat. § 42-4-206 (1997). The 
remaining statutes are ambiguous, may not provide recovery in a 
case such as this, or exceed the authority granted to the states 
under federal law. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 35, para 3-9 (Smith-Hurd 
Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 39-709(9) (Supp. 1995); N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 167:16-a (Supp. 1996); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 28-
6-23 (Supp. 1997); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 49.496 (West 1997). 
Wisconsin's statute, one of the handful that clearly provided for 
spousal estate recovery, was invalidated by the Wisconsin Court 
of Appeals in Budney. (R. pp. 127-142). 
VI. JACKMAN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS. 
As a personal representative defending the interests of 
Lionel's estate, Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs 
from the estate whether she prevails or not. IC§ 15-3-720. The 
Department, even if it prevails is not entitled to attorney's 
fees because Jackman's defense is not frivolous, unreasonable, or 
without foundation. IC§ 12-121. Because the Department's 
position is contrary to the clear language of state and federal 
law and the Department's own regulations, Jackman should be 
awarded reasonable attorney's fees and expenses. IC§ 12-117(1). 
A. Jackman is entitled to attorney's fees and costs from 
Lionel's estate. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 provides that a personal 
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representative who "defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good 
faith, whether successful or not, ... is entitled to receive 
from the estate [her] necessary expenses and disbursements 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred." Jackman is the 
personal representative of Lionel's estate and any expenses and 
attorney's fees incurred in this action are incurred in good 
faith. The Department's insinuations of a lack of good faith are 
newly raised and have not been reviewed by a fact-finder. The 
record as it stands, however, contains copious, uncontested 
evidence of Jackman's good faith. 
Jackman has defended Lionel Knudson's estate against the 
Department's claim in fulfillment of her fiduciary duty to the 
estate. Jackman's opposition to the Department's claim is in the 
interests of the estate. Unlike instances where Idaho courts 
have denied reimbursement of expenses to a personal 
representative, Jackman is not litigating any issues to her 
personal benefit to the detriment of the estate or any other heir 
or devisee. The Department's suggestion that Jackman would best 
fulfill her duties to the estate by forfeiting the entire value 
of the estate to the Department's claim is absurd. Regardless c,f 
the ultimate outcome of this litigation, Jackman is entitled to 
her expenses and attorney's fees from the estate. 
B. The Department, even if it prevails, is not entitled t;o 
attorney's fees and costs from Jackman. 
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The Department may only recover attorney's fees if Jackman 
has opposed its claim unreasonably and without foundation. IC§ 
12-121. As discussed earlier, Jackman's actions in this matter 
{and the actions of the Knudsons) were intended to comply with 
state law and the Department's regulations. The Department has 
not challenged the Magistrate's findings as to the propriety of 
the Marriage Settlement Agreement or Jackman's management of 
Hildor or Lionel's estates. The Department has only challenged 
the denial of its claim against Lionel's estate. Jackman's 
denial of the Department's claim is based on the clear language 
of Idaho statutes, the Department's regulations, and federal law 
and regulations. Jackman has prevailed on this issue before the 
Magistrate and the District court. Jackman's claim cannot be 
held to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation and the 
Department cannot recover its attorney's fees. 
c. Jack.man is entitled to an award of attorney's fees 
against the Department. 
Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) provides that a citizen prevailing in 
a civil proceeding against a state agency is entitled to costs 
and attorney's fees if the state agency "acted without a 
reasonable basis in fact or law." The Department admits that 
there are no factual disputes in this appeal. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 7. The Department's pursuit of its claim against Lionel's 
estate is contrary to the clear language of state and federal law 
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and the Department's own regulations. The Department's position 
was completely rejected by the Magistrate and District Court. 
Because the Department has acted without a reasonable basis in 
law, Jackman is entitled to an award of her attorney's fees. 
CONCLOSION 
Based upon the above, the decision of the Magistrate and 
District Court denying the Department's claim should be upheld. 
The language of IC§ 56-218 is clear and unambiguous and allows 
the Department to recover Medicaid payments only from the estate 
of the recipient if the recipient dies possessed of an estate. 
Under federal law and regulations, the Department may only 
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient. The 
Department's Petition for Allowance should be denied. 
DATED this 4th day of October, 1997. 
WilTamc.Kirsch 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the_ day of October, 1997 two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing document were mailed, 
Postage prepaid, to the following: 
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1. In the case of disability partial in ch.ar~ter, but ~rtDM)~D~.Nl quality, 
the volWlteer ambulance worker, iJ\jured in the line oC duty !l~.aJJ. ~fl.paid one 
hundred fifty dollars for each week for the period specified ~.AA -~~-~vision, 
provided, however:, that when the volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the 
line or duty on or after the effective date or this chapt.er ~ aiif~c{l!mng June 
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety, and provided further that wtie~ -the v<>lun-
teer ambulance worker is µyured in the line or duty on oiifter.'July first, 
nineteen hundred ninety to and .including June thirtieth,. nineteeD .hWldred 
ninety-one such payments shall be two hundred eighty dollars.for each week, 
and provided -further that when the volunt,eer arnbp]ance worker is btjured in 
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three hundred fifty dollars for each week; and provided Curth~ _t}la~ ~en the 
volunteer ambulance worker is il\jured in the line or duty on or: .~r. July first, 
nine~n hlll)~ed ninety-two such p~yment.s shall be four ~'ll.1~.~~Ao~lars Cor 
e11ch week as Col19ws; .. 
a.·. Loss of member. '•I• :: •,• 
Member lost , . :; · _ ~u~~_er:_ofweeks 
~d: : : : : : : : ::'.: ~ > :: : : : : : : : : : : : ; :•::: : : : : : : : : : : : ·:.: t :·: J!! 
Foot ......... .' ................................... · . .';:· .. :·205 
. ~~.;::::: ::::: ::: :: : : : : : ::: :::: :::::: ::: :: ::-::::·:·:: :-: :1: 
~~:;/:!~~::: :: : : : : : : : : : :: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : ) ::'-/;: :_:: 
Second finger ......... .' .......... : ............. :·:--:;·; ·. :: ·:·: 30 
Third finger ........ · ............................ ,·:·: . . ·: . .-. : 25 
Toe other than great toe .......... _. ............ : .......... 16 
Fourth finger ..... : ....................................... 15 
If-more than one phalange or a digit shall be lost, the period.shall be. .thr ~-· ee 
as for the loss of the entire dlgil IC only the first phalange shall be I ,-n 
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period s~. ~e ('ne-hal_r the period for loss of the entire digiL The period for 
~oss l>r _l~s~.-~.r ~.se .. ?f two or- more digits, or one or more phalanges or two or 
more d1git.s, of a liand or foot; may be proportioned to the period for the loss o'f 
use or the hahil'br foot. occasioned thereby, but shall not. exceed the period for 
tlie·Ioss ·ora liand·or foot. If an ·arm or leg shall be amput.at.ed at or above the 
wrist or ankle, the period for such loss shall be in proportion to the period for 
the loss.of.the. IU"JD..Or leg.; In .the case of loss of binocular vision or or eighty 
per cenwm. or .~Pre. of the vision or an eye, the period shall be the same as fo1: 
the loss oHh~_eye, 
b. Loss of hearing. In the case or the complete loss of the hearing of one 
ear, ·sixty weeks; for the loss of hearing of both ears, one hundre~ fifty weeks. 
c. TQtal loss· of use. In the case of permanent total loss of use of ». 
member;·the"compensation'shall be the same as for the·Ioss of the membet. 
_d. Parual, loss or partial_ loss of use. Except as above provided in this 
subdivision;· in. the· case of permanent partial loss· or loss of use of a member 
the period shall be for the proportionate loss or loss of use of the membet: 
CompensatJon· fi)r pennanent p~ loss of use of an eye· shall be awarded oh 
~e. ~ls ·of ~tll!Orre«:~ loss of vision o~ co~cted loss'of vision resulting from 
an UlJUl"j'which ever IS greater.· ·· ,- . 1 ·• . • 
; e. -~~~e~~t. .In the case ol ;~~~s 'racial0 ~~ head disfigurem~nt, 
mcludmg a ilisligurement continuous in l~gth which is partly in the facial area 
and also extends into the neck region ·as described in 'this 'paragraph; the 
volunteer -i!.iribulance worker : shall , be ·paid· in. a ltunp · sum · a proper and 
equitsbl!""'aMo\mt, which shall be determined by the workers' compensation 
board. If the earning capacity of the volunteer ambulance worker shall have 
~n irnp~.ed •. or. may in the future be impaired,· by-any serious disfigurement 
m the ~gion · above the ilf:e~o clavicul:ir articulations· anterior to and including 
the region of the -~terno clei.do· mastoid muscles on either side, the volunteer 
am~ulance worker·-shall be paid-in a_ lump Suin a proper and equitable amount 
_which shaU-_-_!>e·determined by such··board. ·Two or more serious disfigw1!-
ments,. not -e~n!iJl!JOUS in length, resulting from the same injury, if partially in 
the facial area- and -partially in such neck region, -shall be deemed to be a facial 
disfiguremanL .. ,An award, or the aoregate of the awards;to a volunteer 
ambulance worker under this paragraph shall not-exceed twenty ·thousand 
dollars._ _ .... . · 
f. . 'Fota!· -or-partial loss or ,loss of. use .of more than one member.· In any 
case m which there shall be a loss or loss of use of more than one member or 
parts .~-~ .. ~o~e ~~ o~ !'°ember set forth above in P:U-~graphs a to e, both 
mclus1ve, or Uiis subd1v1S1on, but not amounting to penninent total disability 
th~ periods for loss or loss of use of each such member·or part thereof shali 
nm consecutively.. . .. 
' 'g. ~ ~ses. In all other cases of permanent partial disability the 
volunteer ambulance worker shall be paid for each week, during the continu-
ance thereof,-as follows: 
(1) ltthe percentage of loss or earning capacity is seventy-five per centum, 
or &:ea.tl!i:,.he. Qr .she shall be paid one hundred fifty dollars for each week, 
proVIde4,.l\9.Wey~r,._that the volunteer ambulance worker is injured in the line 
of_ d~ty __ o!:1._.or .. ~ the effective date of this chapter to and including June 
thirtieth,._!!1!1e_~~-n _hundred ninety, provided, however, that when the volunteer 
a.mbulanc~_\\'_<_>r~.e!.is injured in the line of duty on.or after July first, nineteen 
hundre_~ !'11!!_eo/ -~ _and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety-one 
fUCh P7;;-;~nt shall~ two h!!!!d!-~d ~ighty dollar!! for ~?rh WPPk. :1nrl nrnvirle<l 
further _ _!:l:i:l~ -~~~n: the volunteer ambulance worker is -~~d · in th1 line of 
) on or after July first, nineteen hundred runety~ne to and including June ' 
• 1'"' · · I 
. "' .......... ____ ........... -~-- .. 
t,hirtieth,. nineteen hundred ninety-two such' payment shall be, ~- _hundred 
fifty dollars for each, week; and provided further that when the volunteer 
ambulance worl,(er is injured in the line of duty on·or after July fint. nineteen 
):iundred · ninety-two such payments shall be four hundred dollan for each 
week. .,_. . ·' .. ... ... '.' 
· • (2) If the percentage of lose of earning capacity is fifty per -- centum, or 
greater I but less ~an: seventy-five per cenfum, he Or she shall' be paid, one 
hundred dollars .!or- each week, provide<t however.-that the vohiiiteer ambu-
le.nce worker is injured in the line of duty on or after the effective date or this 
chapter to' and· including ·June· thirtieth, nineteen hundred ninety, provided, 
however, that when :µie volim~r ambu~ce worker is injured in the line or 
duty on or after :July first,''nineteen hun~ ninety to ;and ·including June 
thirtieth, nineteen hundred ~ety.:One, 11Uch '_paym~nt. shall be one hundred 
~ghty~six_ dollars and ~E:1!ty-ii~ cents for each week, provided, however, that 
when the volun~r. am,bulan~e worker is.injured in the line of duty ori-or after 
J'.u)yfirst, nineteeii,himdred_'.ninety;-0ne to and including June thirtieth, nine-
teen hundrecf..ninety-two, .s~ch payment.~ be two hi.mdrecl'.'thiity-four 
dollars ,and fifty cents for. each, weeli(_'provided,. however,· that.when the 
volunteer ambu1ance worker ia iJuured iri't'.he line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred ninety-two,-such payment'ehall be two hundred sixty-eight 
dollars for-~-week. ;: ,: . .' _','· :·.• ·. ,.. . . _ .. . . ·: ·. ·_;. : ·· ... 
(3) If the pel"Clentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty_-~ve.wcent.um, or 
greater, but less than riny per centum; he .or she aha1l ~ paid. thirtY. dollars 
for each week. "· ., , .. · ·.· , .. ,., . ;,;. ; · :· . . . .. . . · .. : . 
(4) ir the percen~ge onoss·· of earning- capacity ia leas tJuiri tinirity•flVe per. 
cent.um, he or she· shall not pe_ paid any '11'.eeklf benefiL ... · . :·: · · · · - ·. ·. · 
. · Permanent partial disability,-, within the ·me~g of this . paragraph, shall 
exist only if-the earning capacity or the,volunteer ambulance.worker has been 
permanently and partially lost 88 the result of the injury ... The workers' 
compensation board shall determine · the :degree or such disability and such 
board may reconsider: such, degree on Its own motion or upon application or 
any party ininteresL · · - : · . : · .. : .... . .... 
2. An award· made to a clailnabt. under this section shall in case of death 
arising from causes other than the ir\jury be payable t.o and for the benefit of 
the persons following: . 
a. If there be a surviving ~use' and'~~-- cluld of the deceased' under the 
age'ofeightienyean;'tosuchspouse;· (•:.- ... . .. . .·.-:, '. "·:. ·.·.:.·.:: 
b. If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or: children or the 
deceased under the age or, eighteen yeru,, on~half shall _be.,payable to the 
surviving s])Ouse and the other .. ~alf_ 11to. ~e surviving . child or .children. 
c .. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under the age or 
eighteen_ years, but no .surviving spouse,· ,then to such child or children. 
d. If th~ be n~ surviving spouse and -n~ surviving child -~r children of the 
deceased under ·the age or eighteen ,years,· then to such depeiid~nt· or depen-
dents as defined in section seven '.of ·this article, as directed· by the workers' 
compensation' board;:' and if there shall be no' such dependent.a; 'theri to the 
estate of such deceased in an ' am_ount ' n'ot exceeding; reasonable funeral 
~nses as provided in su~ivision one of .sectio~ s~ep ,of. ~s ~articl~. or, if 
there be n6 esi.aie,-·w tht: pei-ovu ·u~ pc..~on~ p~:r .... ~g L~e·fbne..l"'Q.J ~n~ of 
such deceased in an amount· not exceeding reasonable funeral- expenses as 
orovided in such subdivision one. . ,': -, ' .. .. ) . 
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candi"date for rehabilitation; such rehabilitation shall constitute 
~ treatment· and care as provided in this chapter. 
w. Other cases. In all other cases in this class of disability, the 
compensation shall be sixty-six and two-thirds per centum of the 
difference between his average weekly wages and his wage-earning 
capacity thereafter in the same employment or otherwise, payable 
during the continuance of such partial disability, but subject to 
reconsideration of the degree of such impairment by the board on 
its own motion or upon application of any party in interest. 
4. Effect of award. An award made to a claimant under subdi-
vision three shall in case of death arising from causes other than 
the injury be payable to and for the benefit of the persons follow-
in~ · 
a. H there be a surviving spouse and no child of the deceased 
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse. 
b. H there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children 
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be 
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving 
child or children. 
The board may in its discretion require the appointment of a 
guardian for the purpose of receiving the compensation of the 
minor child. In the absence of such a requirement by the board the 
appointment for such a purpose shall not be necessary. 
c. If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under 
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse then to such child 
or children. 
d. If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or 
children of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to 
such dependent or dependents as defined in section sixteen of this · 
chapter, as directed by the board; and if there be no such depen-
dents, then to the estate of such deceased in an amount not 
exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided in subdivision 
one of section sixteen of this chapter, or, if there be no estate, to the 
person or persons paying the funeral expenses of such deceased in 
an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses as provided 
in subdivision one of section sixteen of this chapter. 
An award for disability may be made after the death of the 
injured employee. 
4--a. Protracted temporary total disability in connection with 
permanent partial disability. In case ()f !empcr~-y :otal <lisabiiity 
and ~- )anent partial disability both resulting from the same 
~ ~ 
COMPENSATION 
Art. 2 
§15 
injw-y if the temporary total disability continues for a longer 
period than the number of weeks set forth in the following sched-
ule, the period of temporary total disability i? exc~ of su~h 
number of weeks shall be added to the compensation penocl provid-_ 
ed in subdivision three of this section: Arm, thirty-two weeks; leg. 
forty weeks; hand, thirty-two weeks; foot, thirty-two weeks; ear, 
twenty-five weeks; eye, twenty weeks; thumb, twenty-four ~eeks; 
first finger, eighteen weeks; great toe, twelve weeks; second finger, 
twelve weeks; third finger, eight weeks; fourth finger, eight weeks; 
toe other than great toe, eight weeks. 
In any case resulting in loss or partial loss of use of arm, leg, 
hand, foot, ear, eye, thumb, finger or toe, where the tempo~ary total 
disability does not extend beyond the periods above mentioned for 
such injury, compensation shall be limited to the schedule con-
tained in subdivision three. 
s. Temporary partial disability. In_ case of _temporary partial 
disability resulting in decrease of earrung capacity, the co~~nsa-
tion shall be two-thirds of the difference between the mJured 
employee's average weekly wages before the accident and his wage 
' earning capacity after the accident in the same or other employ-
ment. 
5-a. Determination of wage earning capacity. The wage earning 
capacity of an injured employee in cases of partial disability ~hall 
be determined by his actual earnings, provided, h~wever, tha_t if _he 
has no such actual earnings the board may in the mterest of JUSti~e 
fi.x such wage earning capacity as -shall be reasonable, but not m 
excess of seventy-five per centum of his fonne~ ~ll. time act~l 
earnings, having due regard to the nature of his mJury and his 
physical impairment. 
5-b. Non-schedule adjustments. Notwithstanding any other pro-
vision of this chapter, in any case coming within the provis~ons of 
subdivisions three or five of this section, in which the nght to 
compensation has been established and c<_>mpensation_ has been 
paid for not less than three months, in which the contn~uance _of 
disability and of future earning capacity ~annot ~ ascertam~d "'.1th 
reasonable certainty, the board may, m the mterest of J~shce, 
approve a non-schedule adjustment a~eed to between the claim~nt 
and the employer or his insurance earner. The board shall r~qu~re, 
before approving any such agreement, t~at t~ere be an e~mmation 
of the claimant in accordance with section nineteen of this chapter, 
and such approval shall only be gi~en when it is fo~d !hat ;he 
adjustment is fair and in the best mterest of the claimant. The 
' rd may, in such case, order all future compensation tfl ¥ T"~, 
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Art. 2 
loss of use of each such member or part thereof shall run consecu-
tively. 
(g) Other cases. In all other cases of permanent partial disability 
the volunteer fireman shall be paid for each week during the 
continuance thereof, as follows: 
1. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is seventy-five 
per centum, or greater, he shall be paid ninety-five dollars for 
each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is 
injured in the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen 
hundred seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth, nineteen 
hundred eighty-three, such payment shall be one hundred five 
dollars for each week provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred eighty-three to and including June thirtieth, 
nineteen hundred eighty-four, such payment shall be one hundred 
twenty-five dollan for each week provided, however, that when 
the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after 
July first, nineteen hundred eighty-four to and including June 
thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one 
hundred thirty-five dollars for each week, provided, however, that 
when the volunteer fireman is injured in the line of duty on or 
after July first, nineteen hundred eighty-five such payment shall 
be one hundred fifty dollars for each week; 
2. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is fifty per 
centum, or greater, but less than seventy-five per centum, he shall 
be paid sixty-three dollars and thirty-three cents for each week, 
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in 
the line of duty on or after January first, nineteen hundred 
seventy-eight to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred 
eighty-three, such payment shall be seventy dollars for each week, 
provided, however, that when the volunteer fireman is injured in 
the line of duty on or after July first, nineteen hundred eighty-
three to and including June thirtieth, nineteen hundred eighty-
four such payment shall be eighty-three dollars and thirty-three 
cents for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in the line of duty on or after July first, 
nineteen hundred eighty-four, to and including June thirtieth, 
nineteen hundred eighty-five, such payment shall be ninety dol-
lars for each week, provided, however, that when the volunteer 
fireman is injured in i.hc line of duty on er ::.fter July first, 
nine ) hundred eighty-five such payment shall be one hundred 
' ,. . ..:_ ........ , .......... , .. 
, 
COVERAGE AND BENEFITS 
Art. 2 
§10 
3. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is twenty-five 
per centum, or greater, but less than fifty per centum, he shall be 
paid thirty dollars for each week; 
4. If the percentage of loss of earning capacity is less than 
twenty-five per centum, he shall not be paid any weekly benefit. 
Permanent partial disability, within the meaning of this paragraph, 
shall exist only if the earning capacity of the volunteer fireman has 
been permanently and partially lost as the result of the injury. The 
workmen's compensation board shall determine the degree of such 
disability and such board may reconsider such degree on its own 
motion or upon application of any party in interest. 
2. An award made to a claimant under this section shall in case 
of death arising from causes other than the injury be payable to and 
for the benefit of the persons following: 
(a) If there be a rnrviving spouse and no child of the deceased 
under the age of eighteen years, to such spouse. 
(b) If there be a surviving spouse and surviving child or children 
of the deceased under the age of eighteen years, one-half shall be 
payable to the surviving spouse and the other half to the surviving 
child or children. 
(c) If there be a surviving child or children of the deceased under 
the age of eighteen years, but no surviving spouse, then to such 
child or children. 
(d) If there be no surviving spouse and no surviving child or 
children of the ·deceased under the age of eighteen years, then to 
such dependent or dependents as defined in section seven of this 
chapter, as directed by the workmen's compensation board; and if 
there shall be no such dependents, then to the estate of such 
deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable funeral expenses 
as provided in subdivision one of section seven of this chapter, or, if 
there be no estate, to the person or persons paying the funeral 
expenses of such deceased in an amount not exceeding reasonable 
funeral expenses as provided in such subdivision one. 
3. An award for disability may be made after the death of the 
volunteer fireman. 
(L.1956, c. 696; amended L.1956, c. 697, §§ 2, 3; L.1958, c. 9, § 2; L.1959, 
C. 502, §§ 5, 6; L.]960, C. 781, §§ 4, 5; L.1962, C. 175, § 4; L.1965, C. Jll, 
~§ 4, S; L.1968, c. 933, § 4; L. ! 970, c. 2!!3, §§ 4, S; L- 1Q74, c. S~4, §§ 4, 5; 
i L.1977, c. 675, §§ 84, 85; L.1978, c. 597, §§ 4, 5; L.1982, c. 346 i_ 2; 
';; L.1983. c. 654. ~~ 4. 5.) J 
~ I:: 
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things. that damages for wrongful death 
are not recoverable against DOT as a mat-
ter of law. The Court or Common Pleaa of 
Montgomery County &118tained DOT'a pre-
liminary objectionB, and, for the reasons 
below, we affirm. 
Appellant& argue that the trial court 
etffd in it.a analyaia of the sections of the 
Judicial Code pertaining to aovereign im-
munity (Code), 42 PLC.S. H 8521-8528. 
Specifically, appellanta asaert that future 
loss of eaminp and earning capacity and 
Jou of COIUIOrtium are recoverable in a 
wrongful death action. 
Section 8628(e) of the Code provides: 
(c) fwe, of damagu recoveralJ/t. 
Damages &hall be recoverable only for: 
(l) PBSt and future loas of earnings and 
earning capacity. 
(2) Pain and sufferiDg. 
(8) Medical and denial expenses includ-
ing the reasonable value of re1111onable 
and neceMUY medical and dental servic-
es, prosthetic devicies and necessary am-
bulance, hOBpital, professional nursing, 
and physical therapy expenses accnied 
and anticipated in the diag11oaia, care and 
recovery of the claimanL 
(4) Losa of consortium. 
(6) Property losges, except that property 
losses ahall not be remverable in claims 
brought pursu111t to section 8522(b)(5) 
(relating to potholes and other dangerous 
conditions). 
The Superior Court of Penmylvania stat-
ed in McClintori "· While, 285 Pa.Superior 
Ct. 271, 277-78, 427 A.2d 218, 221 (1981): 
In a survival action, the rause ariaes out 
of the injury, not out of the death. The 
utate ia substituted for the decedent., 
and it., recovery ia based upon the right.II 
of action which were posseaaed by the 
decedent at his death. The eat.ate may 
recvver for the loss of decedent's past 
and future ea.ming power, for the dece-
dent's pain and suCCering prior to death, 
and for the CQllt of rnedieal aervices, 
nUl'lling and hospital care provided to 
decedenL The elltate may not, however, 
recover iuui:iG} C'Ap,,iEI~ :i:::e, ~bv~t!!· 
ly, yecedent could not have brought 
an act.ion for these expenses at the time 
of his death. (Citations omitted.) 
In footnote No. 6, the McCliriton court 
stated, in comparison: 
Jweoverable damages under the Wrong-
ful Death Act have been held to include 
'the present worth of the deceased'• 
probable earnings during the probable 
duration of the deceued'n life, which 
could have gone for the benefit of the 
children, parent, huaband or wife as the 
cue may be; the value of such servkea 
aa the deceased would have rendered to 
the named beneficiaries, and such gift.a 
aa the deceased would have been reason-
ably expected to have given the benef'1-
ciaries. The Wrongful Death Ad itself 
alao apecifically provides for the recov-
ery of medical expenses and funeral ex-
penaes. The cost of the tombstone and 
the eost. of administration of the estate 
have also been held to be proper items of 
damage.' (citations omitted.) 
The damages whi~h appell.a.nta seek in 
Count I. paragraph 34, of their complaint., 
which would be included in a wrongful 
death act.ion, are not enumerated in 42 PL 
C.S. t 8528(c) of the Code. 
Therefore, Judge Albert Subera in the 
inst.ant case correctly stated, "we conclude 
that Section 8528(c) clearly is limited in 
scope to the type of damages properly re-
coverable in a Survival Act.ion, not a 
Wrongful Death Action." The types of 
damagei; which are recoverable in Section 
8528(c) of the Code are recoverable by the 
decedent's estate beause they an: clearly 
expenses incurred by the decedent, for 
which the decedent could bring suit had the 
decedent survived. 
Finally, appellants incorrectly state that 
loss of consortium is "an item of damage 
recoverable under it.a Wrongful Death Stat· 
ute .... " The Superior Court of Penm1yl· 
vania recently held in Linebaugh v. !Alir, 
351 Pa.Superior CL 135, 139, 605 A.2d 303, 
305 (198'3), "a surviving spouse cannot 
maintain a 8€parate cause of action for loss 
of consortium resulting from the death of a 
•muse but musl instead recover damages 
for loss of the deceased spouse's aociety m 
11 ~-) ' 
U.S. STEEL CORP. v. W.C.A.B. Pa. 615 
Clio u SJ6 A.lei SIS (Pa.Cmwltlt. l,U) 
an action for wrongful death." (Emphaais were not identical in initial action in whi<:h 
added.) claimant wu detennined to be entitled to 
Accordingly, we aft1r111 the order of the diafigurement benefita on weekly baaia and 
trial court and remand the cue to the in subsequent proceeding in which claim-
Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery 1111t'11 estate aought unpaid disfigurement 
County for further proceedinp Oli the re benefits, ao that doctrine of res judice.ta 
maining count... was inapplieable. 
ORDER 
AND NOW, this 28th day of J1111uuy, 
1988, the order of the Court of Common 
Pleu of Montgomery County in the above-
captioned matter is affirmed and the t'.ll.lle 
ia remanded to that court for proceedinp 
eonaiatent with thia opinion. 
Jurisdiction relinq11iahed. 
UNITED STATES STEEL 
CORPORATION, 
PeUUoner, 
v. 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AP· 
PEAL BOARD (KAMINSKY), 
Reepondent.a. 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. 
Argued OcL 5, 1987. 
Decided Jan. 28, 1988. 
Eatate of workere' compensation claim-
ant wa.e awarded benefits for facial diafig-
11ttment sustained by claimant du.ring 
coune of employment. The Workmen's 
CompeMation Appeal Board affinned the 
referee's order, and the employer appealed. 
11ie Commonwealth Court, No. 1671 C.D. 
1984, Colins, J. held that: (1) estate of 
claimant, who waa not survived by depend-
ent lpouae or child at time of death, was 
larnd by 1tatute from re<:eiving previously 
awarded compensation be nefit.11 for diafig. 
llrement in exce&11 of rel80nable funeral 
expenaee. and (2) subject matter, parties, 
and capacity of parties auing or being sued 
Reveraed and remanded. 
1. Worbn' ComperwaUon Pli06 
Eat.ate of workera' compensation claim-
ant, who was not sumved by dependent 
spouse or child at time of death, was 
baned by statute from receiving previollBly 
awarded compenaation benefit.II for disfig-
urement in excess of reaaonable funeral 
expense&, which are limited by atatut.e to 
$1,600. 77 P.S. ff 618(22), 641, 641('1), 
&61(7). 
z. Worken' Compenaatlon ~1789 
Subject matter, parties, B11d cap,a.city of 
partiea suing or being 11ued were not identi-
cal in initial action in which workers' com-
peneaUon claimant was determined to be 
entitled to du,figurement benefit., on week-
ly basia and in subsequent proceeding in 
which claimant's eatau, after claimant'a 
death for nonwork-related reason&, sought 
award of unpaid disfigurement benefits, ao 
that doctrine of rea judicata was inapplica-
ble. 77 P.S. H 513, 641. 
3. Worken' Compensallon ~1791 
Any question regvding entitlement of 
workenr' compensation claimant's estat.e to 
award of disfigurement benefit.II wu not 
ripe for consideration during time of initial 
proceeding in which elaimant had sought to 
establish entitlement to disfigurement ben-
efit& on weekly ba.eia. 77 P.S. ff 618, ~l. 
Paul A. Robb, Robert C. Jones, Pitts-
burgh, for petitioner. 
William Lowman, Ronald Zera, Ada Guy-
ton, Daniel D. Ha.rahman, United Mine 
Workel"B of Amerim, Dial # 5, Belle Ver-
non, for respondent.II. 
Before MacPHAIL and COLINS, JJ., 
and KAi.iSii, Senior Judge. 
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!.JNS, Judge. 
ited Stat.ea Steel Corporation (employ· 
·re appeal& an order of the Workmen's 
oenution Appeal Boanl (Board) which 
ned the order of a Referee awarding 
IDl!n'1 eompe!IMtion benefita to the ell· 
of its fonner employee, John C. Ka-
(f (Kaminaky) for a facial disfigure-
1uatained by Kaminaky during the 
·.e of his employmenl 
February 8, 1979, a Referee iasued an 
· awarding Kaminsky 200 weeka of 
l!Dl&tion for a facial disfigurement 
1 reeulted from a depreaaed fracture 
e 1kull which he sustained on JUJ1e 7, 
while in the course of hil employment.. 
;Dlky waa receiving workmen'• eom-
1tion benefita for total disability for 
iea he had 1ustained in the same acct-
which reaulted in the disfigurement.. 
!fore, the Referee's order deferred the 
ation of the employer to make pay-
of the disfigurement benefita to the 
,anl I An appeal wu taken by the 
oyer challenging only the amount of 
,eQUtion awarded. ln that appeal, the 
oyer did not challenge the suspellllion 
1figurement benefits for so long aa the 
iant wu receiving workmen's compen-
n benefits for total diaability, the fact 
the injury had in fact oecurred or that 
figurement had been 1ustained by the 
ianl On July 26, 1979, the Board 
fled the amount of compensation 
h was awarded for the disfigurement 
200 weeks to 180 weeka. The dect-
of the Referee waa aff1m1ed in all 
r reapecta. Neither party appealed the 
,ion of the Boud. 
uninaky died on November 14, 1981 
t.o callll!II unrelated to his work-related 
-y. He had received weekly benefita 
t.otal diaability from the date of his 
-yon June 7, 1972 until the date of his 
h. Becauae he had continued to re-
oncurrenl paymenl of benefi1, for 101&1 dio-
lity and dlofi111remenl benen1s is pn:>IC1"ibed 
Secllon l06(d) o( The Pennsylvania Worli.. 
n't Compenullon Act (Act), Act of June 2, 
15, P.L 736, ,u amaukd. n P.S. I Sil. 
«1ion l06(c) of lhc Acl provides: 
) 
ceive workmen's compenaation benefits for 
total disability until his death, Kaminsky 
never received payment of disfigurement 
benefit.a pursuant to the Referee'• awanl, 
u modified by the Board. 
The instant matter was initiated by the 
filing of a claim petition on or about April 
28, 1982, by Kaminaky'a estate. The e.tate 
aaaerted that it wu entitled to the payment 
of the 180 weeks of compensation awarded 
for Kaminsky'& disfigurement which he did 
not receive during his lifetime. The Ref-
eree'& decision on the matter was circulated 
on December 12, 1982. The Referee 
awarded the estate payment of 180 weeks 
of compensation and denied payment of 
statutory funeral expenaes. On appeal, the 
Board afflfflled the decision of the Referee, 
dilmissed the appeal and ordered payment 
to the estate. The Order of the Board is 
now before this Court for our review. 
Our scope of review is limited to a deter-
mination of whether constitutional right.a 
were violated, an error of law wu oommit,. 
led, or whether neceasary· fmdinge of fact 
are supported by 1ubatantial evidence. 
Section 704 of the Administrative Agency 
Law, 2 Pa.C.S. I 704. 
(I) The employer raises two issues on 
appeal. We shall address them aeriatim. 
First, the employer avera that the Boan! 
erred III a matter of law in awanling pay-
ment of compensation benefita in excess of 
reasonable funeral ei:penaes to the estate 
of Kaminsky, where Kaminsky was not 
survived by a dependent spouse or child at 
the time of death. We agree. 
Before this Court is a question of law, 
namely, whether Section 306(g) of the Act, 
77 P.S. § 541, precludes an award of bene-
fit.a to Kaminsky'a estate in exceae of rea-
eonable funeral e1tpenses. During his life-
time, Kaminsky was awarded benefit.a pur-
auant to Section 806(c), 77 P.S. § 618(22).1 
For •II dioabili1y rcsulling from pcnnancnl 
injuries of the following classes. the compen· 
oation shall be exclmively as follow,,: 
. . . . . 
(22) For acrious and permanent diofigure-
menl of the head. neck or face, of such • 
characler as 10 produce an urw11h1ly appear· 
ance, and such as Is nOI usually Incident 10 
U.S. STEEL CORP. v, W.C.A.B. 
a, ... ~ A.U ,u ,,.,.emwlth. "'" Pa. 517 
Section 306(g) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 541(7), 
provides that payment of such benefit.a, 
after the death of the claimant shall be 
made u follows: 
Should the employe die from some other 
cause than the injury, payment of com-
penaation to which the deceased would 
have been entiUed to under section 
306(c)(l) to (26) shall be paid to the fol-
lowing peraona who at the time of the 
death of the deceased were dependents 
within the definition of claUBe (71 of sec-
tion 307 and in the following order and 
amounta: (footnote• omitted) 
(7) If there be no dependenbl eligible 
to receive payments under thia section 
then the paymenta shall be made to the 
estate of the deceased but ·in amount not 
exceeding reasonable funeral expelllles 
aa provided in this act or if there be no 
estate, to the person or persons paying 
the funeral expenses of such deceased in 
an amount not exceeding reasonable fu-
neral expenaes as provided in this act. 
At the time of his death, Kaminsky waa a 
widower and had no 1urviving dependenta. 
Therefore, subsection (7) of Section 306(g) 
of the Act applies in this case. That sub-
section limit.a any amount payable to an 
estate, of previously awarded disfigure-
ment benefits, to reasonable funeral eJ:· 
penaea. As indicated in Section 307(9) of 
the Act, 77 P.S. I 561(7), reaaonable fu-
neral expenses are limited to One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollen ($1,600.00). The 
clear language of the statute dicbltes that 
the estate of Kaminsky should receive an 
amount not in eJ:~es of reasonable funeral 
upenaes in an amount of One Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). We are 
guided in our decision by our rules of statu-
tory construction which dictate that when 
the language of a statute is clear and un-
ambiguous we may not disregard the letter 
of the law in pursuance of its epiriL See 
Section 192l(b) of the Statutory C,onatruc· 
lion Act of 1972, l Pa.C.S. § 192l(b). The 
ll1t employmen1. 1ix1y-Lir. and 1W<>lhirds per 
cennun of wa,es nol 10 cxaed two hundrrd 
, 
language of the Act is clear and we mUBt 
follow it.a mandate. 
We further note that this Cou.-t in the 
case of Black y. Bill11 Penn Cot-poration. 
72 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 628, 467 A.2d 192 
(1983), discUS8ed Section 806(g) of the Act 
and the amendmenta thereto, with particu-
larity. The Court noted: 
Prior to the 1972 Amendment.a to this 
1tatute, the death of the claimant from a 
cause unrelated to the compensable inju-
ry, terminated all reaponaibility for the 
continuation of payment. . • . nie 
amendment.a here cited gave certain stat-
utorily-defined dependenta the right to 
receive the payment.a, and, if none of 
these dependenta 1urvive, then the estate 
may make a claim. The legislature, how-
. ever, has clearly and unambiguously cht>-
sen to limit the amount of the estate's 
claim. 
Id. at 632, 467 A.2d at 198--94 (citations 
omitted). 
The Court in Blade, went on to cite the 
language of the Act whlch limited the es-
tate's awanl to reasonable funeral ex-
penses. We adopt the reaaoning set forth 
in Black and reverae and remand this mat, 
ter for the computation of reasonable fu-
neral expenses. 
(2) The second i.saue addreued by the 
employer involves the applicability of the 
doctrine of re1 judicata to the instant prc>-
ceeding. The estate claims that the em-
ployer is barred by res judicalA from eh.al· 
lenging the right of the estate to receive 
Kaminaky'11 disfigurement beoefita. The 
estate, in it.a brief to this Court, aaserts 
that the Decision and Order of the Referee 
cireulated on February 21, 1979, awarded 
compensation benefit.a to Kaminaky's rep-
resenlAtives in the event that he did not 
survive. Therefore, the estate concludes 
that the employer, by its failure to appeal 
that Decision and Order, despite the fact 
that the award may have been contrary to 
the Act, results in the employer being 
bound by that awanl. We disagree. 
.evenly.five wttks. 
) 
000289
JN TIIE SUPREME COURT 01• TIIE STATE OF IDAIIO 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
Supreme Comt No. 23928 
) 
Deceased. ) 
________
_______ ) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF I-IEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE. ) 
) 
Petitioner/ Appel lanl, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENT A Tl VE for the Estate of ) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
--------
--------
) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Comt of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, Dish·ict Judge, Presiding. 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
j 
EXHIBIT 
D 
REPLY BRIEF 
000290
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
In the Matter of the Estate of ) 
) Supreme Court No. 23928 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Deceased. ) 
________________ ) 
) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner/Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, PERSONAL ) 
REPRESENTATIVE for the Estate of ) 
LIONEL MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
________________ ) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Latah. 
Honorable JOHN R. STEGNER, District Judge, Presiding. 
W. Corey Cartwright 
Deputy Attorney General 
Division of Human Services 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0036 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 
William C. Kirsch 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9384 
Moscow, ID 83843-9384 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
000291
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .......................... iii 
IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO GRANT PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN 
ORDER TO GIVE A WINDFALL TO A RECIPIENT'S HEIRS ......... I 
JACKMAN'S ERRONEOUS AND DISTORTED REFERENCES AND 
ARGUMENTS DO NOT SUPPORT HER STRAINED INTERPRETATION 
OF THE STATUTE. . ................................... . 
A. No One "Required" Hildor Knudson to Convey Her Property to Lionel 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
B. Jackman's Partial Payment, Which Came after Lionel's Death, Was Not 
Accepted as Full Payment by the Department ................. 3 
C. The Department Agrees That the Legislature Intended to Protect the 
Surviving Spouse, but this Doesn't Extend to Heirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
D. The Assets from Which the Department Seeks to Recover Were 
Community Property ........... .- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
E. Jackman's Incorrectly Argues That Federal Law Does Not Permit Spousal 
Recovery When in Reality, the Law Merely Does Not Require Spousal 
Recovery ........................................ 5 
F. Jackman's Argument That Congress Rejected Language That Would Have 
"Allowed" Spousal Recovery Is a Clear Distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
G. Spousal Estate Recovery Does Not Encourage Divorces . . . . . . . . . . 8 
JACKMAN'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 56-218 IS ONLY POSSIBLE 
BECAUSE SHE IMPROPERLY MANIPULATED KNUDSON'S ESTATES. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I I f I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 9 
A. The Present: Circumstance Could Not Have Arisen Without Ignoring 
Established Procedures and Priorities in the Idaho Code . . . . . . . . . . 9 
B. . It's Not Okay to Manipulate the System in an Attempt to Reap a Windfall 
at Taxpayer Expense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - ji C:IWCC\TEMP\ltHPL YB WPD 
000292
·------
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
STATUTES 
42 U.S.C. § l382b(a)(I) ....................................... 2 
Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(46) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J J 
Idaho Code § 15-2-40 l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Idaho Code § 15-2-402 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Idaho Code § 15-2-801 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-l20l(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IO 
Idaho Code § 15-3-703(a) ................................... I 0, 11 
Idaho Code § l5-5-425(e) ................................... 10, l I 
Idaho Code § 31-3501 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Idaho Code§ 56-218 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l, 4, 9 
Idaho Code § 56-218( I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
139 Cong. Rec. H2997-0J . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04 ........................................ 5 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 8 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § 1, p. 74 .................................... 3 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - iii C:IWCCIT£MPIR.EPL YB. WPD 
000293
I. 
IT IS NOT THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO GRANT 
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO GIVE A 
WINDFALL TO A RECIPIENT'S HEIRS. 
It is basic to the policies underlying Idaho's public assistance laws that each 
person is, to the extent possible, responsible for his or her own needs, including 
medical care: 
Declaration of policy. - It is the policy of this state that each 
person, to the maximum extent possible, is responsible for his or her own 
medical care .... 
Idaho Code§ 31-3501. Therefore, iL must be presumed that, absent a clear intent to 
the contrary, the legislature does not intend to provide taxpayer funded medical care to 
a person, while that person preserves his or her assets for the benefit of relatives or 
heirs. 
II. 
JACKMAN'S ERRONEOUS AND DISTORTED 
REFERENCES AND ARGUMENTS DO NOT 
SUPPORT HER STRAINED INTERPRETATION OF 
THE STATUTE. 
Jackman has raised many minor arguments without support, or with strained 
interpretations of statute and rule. Even if these arguments had merit, which they do 
not, they entirely miss the central issue which is whether the spousal recovery 
provisions of Idaho Code§ 56-218 are to be given effect. Jackman's arguments are 
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briefly discussed in the order presented: 
A. No One "Required" Hildor Knudson to Convey Her Property to Lionel. 
Jackman repeatedly states that the Department "required" Hildor Knudson to 
convey her assets to her Lionel. Respondent's Brief, pp. 7, 24, 25, 27 etc. Jackman 
then asserts that since the Department forced Hildor to convey her property to Lionel, 
it cannot now complain that she had no property at her death. This characterization, 
however, is a distortion. Idaho's Medicaid program is entirely voluntary. No one may 
force another to apply for or receive Medicaid. Indeed, some families choose to fund 
nursing care for their loved ones on their own rather than incur the estate 
reimbursement obligations that accompany Medicaid benefits. 
No one "required" the Knudson's to obtain Medicaid benefits. Rather, the law 
permits couples to obtain Medicaid benefits for the spouse needing nursing care while 
the at-home spouse keeps the couple's assets for his or her own support. 
Furthermore, real property is an excluded resource for a Medicaid applicant who 
states an intention to return home. 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l). Even for those choosing 
to make a spouse eligible for Medicaid benefits, there is no requirement that the 
applicant convey away the family home, which is normally the couple's primary asset. 
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,....., B Jackman's Partial Payment, Which Came after Lionel's Death, Was Not 
Accepted as Full Payment by the Department. 
Jackman contends the Department received and accepted the balance of Hildor's 
estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This is incorrect: 
Hildor Knudson died October 27, l 994. R. p. 67. Lionel died just two weeks 
later on November 11, 1994. AboulJune 30, 1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's 
death, Jackman offered lo disburse $1,861.30 upon affidavit from the Department. See 
Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. p. 146. This offer was rejected by the 
Department, although by return mail on July 7, 1995, the Department did say it would 
accept the sum as partial payment. R. pp. 143-147. About August 22, 1995, the 
Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum of $1,638.03. 
R. p. 70. At no time has the Department accepted payment from Jackman in 
satisfaction of its claim against Lionel's estate. 
C. The Department A&cees That the l&gislature Intended to Protect the Surviving 
Spouse, but this Doesn't Extend to Heirs. 
Jackman contends that the legislature intended lo protect the estates of the 
spouses of Medicaid recipients and cites the following: 
It is further the intent of this legislation to protect the community and 
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse applies for 
medical assistance regardless of whether they are living together. 
Respondent's brief, p. 14 (quoting S.L. 1988, ch. 50, § I, p. 74). The Department is 
in complete agreement that this statute was intended to protect the assets of the spouse 
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remaining at home. Nothing in this statutory language, however, manifests any intent 
to protect a deceased spouse's e.s.tate, so that it can be gifted to relatives, after the 
taxpayers have shouldered the cost of the other's nursing care. The statute protects the 
healthy spouse - it doesn't grant a windfall to the heirs. 
D, The Assets from Which the Department Seeks to Recover Were Community 
Property. 
Jackman quotes the language of IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 contending that 1.he 
Department's rules prohibit recovery from the spouse's estate (Respondent's Brief, p. 
15): 
20. Limitations on ~tate Claims. Limits on the Department's claim 
against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and 
56-21 SA, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse of a 
predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the estate that were 
community property, or the deceased recipient's share of the separate property, 
and jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be made until the deceased 
recipient no longer is survived by a spouse .... 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). Jackman contends that since the marriage 
settlement agreement made all of the couple's property Lionel's separate property, the 
Department has no claim to his estate. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. This argument, 
however, is disingenuous and carefully ignores the context of this section and another 
section of the same rule that follows by only a few paragraphs. 
All of the assets in Lionel Knudson's estate .were the community property of the 
couple - until they were transferred through the marriage settlement agreement to 
facilitate Medicaid eligibility. Section 24 of the same rule states: 
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24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt aeainst the estate of the 
deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement 
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate 
consideration. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24 (underline added); see also IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04 (Rules 
governing countable property for eligibility for aid to the aged, blind and disabled [which is 
the basis for Medicaid eligibility in cases such as this] pennit a marriage settlement agreement, 
but the Department's rights to the transferred property are retained). 
Subsection 20, quoted by Jackman, is merely intended to protect a spouse who marries 
later in Hf e bringing substantial separate property into the marriage. The Department only 
pursues its spousal estate claim against property that had been the couple's community 
property or separate property in which the nursing home spouse had an interest. 
E. Jackman's Incorrectly Argues That Federal Law Does Not Permit Spousal 
Recovery When io Reality, the Law Merely Does Not Require Spousal Recovery. 
AJthough Jackman spends considerable effort claiming that Idaho's spousa.l 
recovery law is pre-empted by federal law, pre-emption should not be an issue here. 
Respondent's Brief, section IV (beginning on page 16). Initially, this was Jackman's 
sole claim. R. p. 49. This argument was rejected by the magistrate (R. pp. 150-151) 
and was not appealed to the District Court. Contrary to Jackman's arguments that pre-· 
emption is merely an alternative basis for decision and they are not seeking affirmative 
relief, a decision based on this claim changes the entire nature of this dispute. The 
magistrate held that Idaho law is not pre-empted, but under these particular 
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.,_,. circumstances, does not apply. Jackman is asking the court to nullify an act of the 
legislature on the basis of federal pre-emption. Such remedy is far greater in scope 
than that afforded by the 1ower courts. It should not be in issue here. 
To the extent that federal pre-emption is in issue in this matter, the Department 
incorporates by reference and adopts its briefing and argument on this issue presented 
to the magistrate division and found in the record at pages 72-89. To summarize that 
argument, while federal law does not clearly require spousal estate recovery, nothing in 
the law forbids it. 
F. Jackman's Argument That Congress Rejected Language That Would Have 
''Allowed" Spousal Recovery Is a Clear Distortion. 
As part of her pre-emption argument, Jackman contends that Congress 
specifica11y rejected language that would have "allowed" spousal estate recovery. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. This same argument was made to the magistrate and was 
shown to be a distortion of language taken out of context. R. pp. 85-86. Despite clear 
knowledge of her error, Jackman repeats the same argument here. again without 
including language plainly needed to give meaning to the quoted language. The full 
Congressiona1 language rejected, is quoted below. Those few portions quoted by 
Jackman are in bold italics. The essential contextual language has been underlined for 
emphasis: 
(2) REQUIREMENTS FOR ESTATE RECOVERY 
PROGRAMS.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)) is amended-
(A) in paragraph (})-
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(i) by striking "(b)(l)" and inserting "(2)", and 
(ii) by striking "(a)(l)(B)" and inserting "(a)(l)(B)(i)"; 
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking "(2) Any adjustment or recovery under" 
and inserting "(3) Any adjustment or recovery under an estate recovery program 
under"; and 
(C) by inserting before paragraph (2), as designated by subparagraph 
(A), the following: 
"(b)(l) For purposes of section 1902(a)(51)03), the requirements for an 
estate recovery program of a State are as fol lows: 
"(A) The program provides ror identirying and tracking (and, at the 
option of the State, preserving) resources (whether excluded or not) of 
individuals who are furnished any of the following long-tem1 care services for 
which medical assistance is provided under this title: 
"(i) Nursing facility services. 
"(ii) Home and community-based services (as defined in section 
1915(d)(5)(C)(i)). 
"(iii) Services described in section 1905(a)(l4) (relating to services in an 
institution for mental diseases). 
"(iv) Home and community care provided under section 1929. 
"(v) Community supported living arrangements services provided under 
section 1930. 
"(B) The program provides for promptly ascertaining-
"(i) when such an individual dies; 
"(ii);,, tl,e case of such a11 i11divid11al who was married aJ the time of 
deaJ/1, wl1e11 the s11rvivi11g spouse dies; and 
"(iii) at the option of the State, cases in which adjustment or recovery 
may not be made at the time of death because of the application of paragraph 
(3)(A) or paragraph (3)(B). 
"(C)(i) 11,e progl"Dtn provides/or tlze collectio11 co1isiste11t wit/, 
paragraph (3) of a,, a1110111it (11ot to exceed tl,e amo1111t described ill clause 
(ii))Jro,n-
"(I) the estaJe of tlie i11divid11al,· 
"(JI) in tire case of a11 i11divid11al described i11 s11bparagrapl, (B)(ii), 
from 1/,e estate oftl,e s11rvivi11g spouse; or 
"(Ill) at the option of the State, in a case described in subparagraph 
(B)(ili), from the appropriate person. 
"(ii) The amount described in this clause is the amount of medical 
assistance correctly paid under this title for long-tenn care services described in 
subparagraph (A) f umished on behalf of the individual.". 
139 Cong. Rec. H2997-0l. 
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When read in the proper context, it is obvious that the rejected language would 
have required all states to perform spousal recovery. Nothing in the language suggests 
that states are not already permitted to engage in spousal estate recovery. 
G. Spousal Estate Recovery Does Not Encourage Divorces. 
Jackman contends that spousal estate recovery encourages divorces to protect 
separate estate assets. She, however, offers absolutely no support for her argument. 
Idaho has been doing spousal estate recovery since 1988 and there is no evidence to 
support a claim that it has encouraged divorces. 
As noted above, IDAPA 16.03.09.025.020 protects the separate property a 
spouse marrying late in life brings into the marriage. Therefore, no divorce is 
required. Only those assets which~ the community property of the couple are 
subject to the spousal estate claim. Since the at-home spouse retains the couple's 
property for his own support, there is no motive to divorce to protect that property. 
Should a couple divorce and split their property unevenly, for the sole purpose of 
avoiding the Department's claim, the Department would view the transfer as voidable 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 56-2 I 8( I). 1 
Just as in this case~ it is after the death of both spouses that the dispute arises, 
1 Undersigned counsel is aware of one case in which this did happen. In a First District case, the 
spouse in the nursing home, apparently upon advice of counsel, stipulated to a decree of divorce vesting all 
the couple's property in the at-home spouse, approximately six weeks before his demise. The Department 
contended the transfer was not for adequate consideration ond imposed liens on lhe renl property in question. 
Because a disabled (adult) child survives (delaying recovery under Idaho Code § 56-218( l )), no recovery has 
yet been made. 
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and the dispute is between the Department and the heirs, not between the Department 
and the benefitted couple. 
III. 
JACKMAN'S INTERPRETATION OF IDAHO CODE§ 
56-218 IS ONLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE SHE 
IMPROPERLY MANIPULATED KNUDSON'S 
ESTATES. 
A. The Present Circumstance Could Not Have Arisen Without Ignoring Established 
Procedures and Priorities in the Idaho Code. 
In her brief, Jackman states that she collected Hildor's personal property by 
affidavit, paid expenses and forwarded the remainder to the Department. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 4. The facts in the record show that this is possible only if she acted outside 
the authority granted her, and in violation of her fiduciary duty to Lionel's estate. 
While often repeated, the sequence of events is important: Jackman signed a 
marriage settlement agreement for both Hildor and Lionel Knudson on March 8, l993. 
Hildor died October 27, 1994. R. p. 67. Lionel died two weeks later on November 
11, 1994. About two weeks after Lionel's death, on November 28, 1994, Jackman 
obtained appointment as personal representative of Lionel's estate. About June 30, 
1995, nearly eight months after Lionel's death, Jackman offered to disburse $1,861.30 
upon affidavit from the Department. See Exhibit A to Affidavit of Willard Abbot. R. 
p. 146. This offer was rejected by the Department. R. pp. 143-147. About August 
22, 1995, the Department issued a receipt to Jackman's attorney for receipt of the sum 
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of $1,638.03. R. p. 70. On August 29, 1995, Jackman filed an inventory with the 
court showing $1,861.30 in the conservator estate. R. p. 58. Jackman's signature on 
the document is dated two months prior to the date of filing. R. p. 58. 
The rights and powers of a conservator, after the death of the protected person, 
are very limited. Idaho Code § I 5-5-425(e) provides as foJJows: 
(e) If a protected person dies, the conservator shall deJiver to the 
court for safekeeping any will of the deceased protected person which 
may have come into his possession, inform the executor or beneficiary 
named therein that. he has done so, and retain the estate for delivery to a 
duly appointed personal representative of the decedent or other persons 
entitled thereto. If after forty (40) days from the death of the protected 
person no other person has been appointed personal representative and no 
application or petition for appointment is before the court, the conservator 
may apply to e".{ercise the powers and duties of a personal representative 
so that be may proceed to administer and distribute the decedent's estate 
without additional or further appointment. 
Idaho Code § 15-5-425(e) (underline added). Therefore, once Hildor had passed away, 
Jackman had no power to deal with her property, other than to retain it for delivery to a 
duly appointment personal representative. After forty days, she could petition to 
become the personal representative, which was never done. 
Jackman did, however, obtain appointment as· personal representative of Lionel's 
estate. Thereafter, she had a fiduciary obligation toward Lionel's estate. Idaho Code § 
15-3-703(a). When Jackman, in August, 1995, obtained Hildor's bank account by 
affidavit, she could do so onJy as a "successor11 to the estate. Idaho Code § 15-3-
120 I (a). A successor is a person, other than a creditor, entitled to possession of estate 
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property by will or pursuant to the probate code. Idaho Code§ 15-1-201(46). 
Therefore, Jackman could obtain the money as heir under a will or through intestate 
succession, or she could obtain the money as the personal representative of Lionel's 
estate. As conservator for Hildor, she had no rights other than to retain the money for 
the personal representative. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 15-2-401 and 402, Lionel had the right to at least the 
first $7,500 from Hildor's estate. Since Jackman had a fiduciary obligation toward 
Jackman's estate, she had a duty to apply any sums she obtained from Hildor's estate to 
Lionel's estate. Un]ess she violated this fiduciary duty, she had no right to deliver 
Hildor's money to the Department.2 In fact, by operation of Jaw, the money Jackman's 
attorney sent the Department in August, 1995, was Lionel's money, not Hi]dor's .. 3 
In order to put this malter in the present posture, then, Jackman had to ignore or 
violate Idaho Code§§ ]5-5-425(e), 15-3-703(a), 15-2-401, 15-2-402, and 15-2-801. 
Had Jackman abided by these laws, this case would never have come before the court. 
In point of fact, Hildor had no estate from which any recovery could have been made 
2As personal representative of Lionel's estate, Jackman had the obligation lo maximize the value of 
the estate - whether the estate would later be paid lo creditors or heirs. Her personal stake as nn heir could 
not play into this obligation. 
3Whilc the probate code permits renunciation and the homestead and exempt property allowances 
may be subject lo renunciation, such renunciation must be in \\Tiling and must be done \\ilhin nine months of 
the death of the decedent. Idah<> Code § 15-2-80 I. There was never any renunciation here. Even had Lionel 
renounced. at least the $3,500 exempt property allowance would have gone to one of Lionel and Hildor's 
children before being subject lo the Department's claim. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 11 C:\WCC\Tl!ll,IP\REPL YB. WPD 
000304
by the Department. 
B. It's Not Okay to Manipulate the System in an Attempt to Reap a Windfall at 
Taxpayer Expense. 
Jackman contends that the fact that she "manipulated" the system is "irrelevant" 
because there is nothing wrong with shrewd estate planning. Respondent's brief, p. 26. 
This case, however, is not a case of shrewd estate planning. This is a case where the 
personal representative manipulated the estate to make it appear that money was being 
paid from Hildor's estate, when in fact, it was not. This was done for the soJe purpose 
of taking assets that had belonged to Hildor and Lionel Knudson and passing them to 
others, while leaving the public holding the bag for Hildor's nursing care. Nothing in 
the law makes such an action morally or legally proper. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
Under Idaho's probate code and Idaho Code § 56-218(1), all estate and property 
of a deceased Medicaid recipient passes lo the surviving spouse. Those funds are 
intended for that spouse's support and use. After both spouses have passed away, the 
law anticipates the public. will be repaid, to the extent possible, from the remaining 
estate. Jackman's manipulation should not be rewarded. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The issue presented by this case is whether there is any 
limit on the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's recovery of 
Medicaid payments. Hildor Knudson was institutionalized on June 
28, 1992. She received $41,600.55 in Medicaid between January 1, 
1993 and her death on October 27, 1994. The value of Hildor's 
estate, minus funeral expenses and her legal fees (a net 
$1,683.03), was paid to the Department. Lionel Knudson, Hildor's 
spouse, died in November 1994 without having received any 
Medicaid. His estate was valued at $40,798.35. 
In January 1995, the Department filed a claim against 
Lionel's estate for the unrecovered balance of the Medicaid 
payments to Hildor. Barbara Jackman, the personal representative 
of Lionel's estate, objected that the Department's claim exceeded 
its authority under state and federal law. The Department's 
claim against Lionel's estate was denied by the magistrate· judge 
as contrary to state law. The Department appealed to the 
district judge, who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. 
The Department appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the 
order denying the Department's claim. 
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.'~ 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
I. The Court' !I holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the 
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and 
absurd results. 
II. The court erred in holding that federal law does not prohib-
it the Department from recovering Medicaid payments :from the 
estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. 
III. The Court erred in holding that state law authorizes the 
Department to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of 
the recipient's surviving spouse. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The Court's holding is based upon a misunderstanding of the 
Medicaid system and will lead to unforseen, inequitable, and 
absurd restL1ts. 
The Court's: decision to allow the Department's claim is 
based on a misunderstanding of the Medicaid system, particularly 
as laid out by federal law. With all due respect, the Court 
misperceived how the system currently works and did not 
adequately consider how the Court's holding will disrupt the 
system in the future. 
It is easy to see how such confusion arose. The Medicaid 
system is extremely complex. The United States Supreme Court 
described the Medicaid statutes as "among the most intricate ever 
drafted by Congress" and stated that their "Byzantine 
construction ... makes [them] almost unintelligible to the 
uninitiated." Schweiker v. Grey Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1981) 
(citations omitted). Because the magistrate and district court 
decisions focused upon state law, both parties emphasized state 
law in the briefs submitted to the Court and neither party set 
out an overall picture of the Medicaid system at the federal or 
state level. Where the parties referred to the federal system, 
Jackman relied on specific technical arguments and the Department 
made several misrepresentations. Both parties also ignore:d the 
fact that both the federal and state law have independently 
changed in signi:ficant ways over time and that federal 
regulations, state laws, and state regulations have often not 
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.... , kept up with changes in federal law. 
Before interpreting Medicaid statutes and regulations, one 
must understand the Medicaid system as it works for institution-
alized individuals in Idaho. Medicaid payments are not a loan 
and couples do not cheat the system simply because the State may 
not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse. The 
federal law ensures that a married couple will spend most of 
their assets on the needy spouse's medical care before an insti-
tutionalized spouse receives any Medicaid. Further, states may 
later recover Medicaid payments from whatever assets are retained 
by the recipient. Thus, even without a provision for states to 
recover from the limited assets a community spouse is allowed to 
retain, Medicaid statutes already require a couple to expend a 
substantial portion of their assets on an institutionalized 
spouse's medical expenses: 
Middle-class individuals in need of long-term care must 
dispose of their assets exceeding poverty limits either to 
pay for the:ir care or, in the alternative, to qualify for 
public assistance. Thus, unlike the affluent (who can 
provide for their own health-care needs) and low-income 
individuals (who qualify for public assistance), middle-
class indiv:iduals must forfeit any wealth accumulated. 
through a lifetime of hard work and savings to pay for long-
term care. This forfeiture is a harsh result for an indi-
vidual who has saved for a lifetime to provide for the 
future and who has paid taxes to support government programs 
like Medicaid. 
Amber R. Cook, Estate Planning with Medicaid: Qualification and 
Planning for the Elderly, 99 w. VA. L. REV. 155 (1996). 
A. How Medicaid eligibility currently works. 
Federal Med:Lcaid eligibility laws are complex but generally 
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,_,. work in a straight-forward way. In 1998, the institutionalized 
spouse must have a monthly income below $1,502 and non-exempt 
assets below $2,000 to receive Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a{a) 
{10). In determining how much assets an applicant has for 
eligibility, the process ignores actual ownership (as between the 
spouses) of the .assets (though the institutionalized spouse will 
ultimate have to transfer actual ownership of all but $2,000 
worth of the non-exempt assets). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S(c) (1) {A). 
Instead, a "snap-shot" is taken of all assets owned by either 
spouse, jointly c::>r separately, on the date the spouse is admitted 
to an institution (the "snap-shot" date). 42 u.s.c. § 1395r-
5 (c) (1) (B). The question is then how much of the "snap-shot" 
assets are "attributed" to each spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 139Sr-
S(c) (2). The community spouse is attributed a "community spouse 
,_.., 
allowance" which is equal to one-half the total assets or $87,350 
(in 1998), whichi:!ver is lower {but not to be below $16,200 (in 
1998)). 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S{f). "Snap-shot" assets beyond.the 
community spouse allowance are attributed to the institutional-
ized spouse. 42 u.s.c. § 1395r-S(c) (2). 
This complex system is easily illustrated. For example, 
assume one member of a married couple is institutionalized and 
applies for Medicaid. If the couple has non-exempt assets worth 
$20,000, $16,200 will be attributed to the community spouse 
{i.e., the Community Spouse Allowance (CSA)) and the remaining 
$3,800 will be attributed to the institutionalized spouse. S. 
REP. No. 36(I), 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 360-361 (1997). Thus, the 
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institutionalized spouse "has" assets exceeding the eligibility 
limit by $1,800. Id. If the couple has non-exempt assets worth 
$100,000, $50,000 will be attributed to each the community spouse 
and the institutionalized spouse (because the CSA will be one-
half of the total and the remainder be the other half). Id,. If 
the couple has non-exempt assets worth $200,000, $87,350 will be 
attributed to thi~ ·community spouse (as the maximum CSA) and the 
remaining $112,000 to the institutionalized spouse (as the 
remainder). Id. 
Again, the institutionalized spouse's non-exempt assets must 
be below $2,000 before he or she is eligible for Medicaid. 
Individuals who E:!Xceed the resource limitations on the "snap-
shot" date typically "spend-down" their assets. Applicants 
generally spend-down assets by paying for their own medical care 
until they becomE~ eligible for Medicaid, meeting current ongoing 
expenses of the community spouse, investing in exempt assets 
(i.e., making improvements to the home, buying a car, or purchas-
ing funeral plans), paying of one's mortgage or other debts, and 
making gifts. 
Applicants can, and do, dispose of assets by making gifts, 
but they do so at a price. Disposal of assets (except for 
transfers between spouses) for less than fair market value during 
the look-back period is penalized by a delay in Medicaid eligi-
bility. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (1) (B) (i). The look-back period is 
defined as the 36 months prior to the first day when an individ-
ual is both instj_tutionalized and has applied for benefits. Id. 
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - _ Page 6 
000317
(For certain tntsts, the look-back period is 60 months.) Id. 
The number of months of delay is determined by the value of the 
transferred assE!tS divided by the average state nursing home rate 
determined by the Department, approximating the value of a. 
month's institutionalized care. 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(c) (1) (E). 
Thus, the penalty is a delay which is about equal to the a.mount 
of time the individual could have paid for his own care w:i th the 
transferred assets. There is no penalty, however, for transfers 
to the individual's spouse {or for the transfer of one's home to 
one's child who is under 21, blind or disabled). 42 u.s.c. § 
1396p(c) (2). 
B. How the current eligibility laws, estate recovery, and 
asset transfer penalties evolved. 
Before moving from the current eligibility system to the 
,w current estate recovery system, it is helpful to examine how the 
federal provisions as to eligibility, estate recovery, and asset 
transfer penalti,es were developed in reaction to these provi-
sion's interaction over time. 
From Medica.id' s creation in 1965 until changes were made in 
1988, the attribution of income and resources for Medicaid 
eligibility purposes was simpler than the current system. When 
one spouse enter1:id a nursing home, each spouse was treated (for 
eligibility purposes) as a separate household. H.R. REP. No. 
lOS(II), 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 66 (1988) reprinted in 1988 
u.s.c.c.A.N. 889. Income was considered to belong to the spouse 
whose name was on the instrument conveying the funds. Id. 
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,,_, Similarly, resources held solely by the institutionalized spouse 
were attributed to him/her. Id. Resources that were jointly 
held were also considered to belong entirely to the institution-
alized spouse, cm the theory that he or she had an unrestricted 
right to use them. Id. If assets were held solely by th,e 
community spousei, however, they were considered to belong solely 
to him/her and there was no obligation on the part of the 
community spouse! to contribute any amount toward the cost13 of the 
care of institutionalized spouse. Id. at 889-890. 
When Congre,ss created the Medicaid program in 1965, :Lt 
included a strict restriction on the ability of states to pursue 
recovery of Medicaid payments: 
A State plan for medical assistance must -
(18) provide that ... there shall be no adjustment or recov-
ery (except, in the case of an individual who was 65 years of 
age or older, from his estate, and then only after the death 
of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when he 
has no surviving child who is under age 21 or is blind or 
permanently and totally disabled) of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of such individual under the plan. 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, §: 1902, 
79 Stat. 347 (1965). 
Originally, Congress allowed states to deny Medicaid eligi-
bility to applic,:l.nts who, within the previous 24 months, grive 
away non-exempt assets, but did not allow states to penalize the 
transfer of exempt assets.· S. REP. No. 494 (I), 97th Cong .. , 2nd. 
Sess., 38 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814. Thus, 
an elderly individual who needed nursing home care could give 
his/her home away (whether to a family member, friend, or 
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.,~_.,., complete strangeir) and "assure that the home will not be part of 
his/her estate, and therefore will not be subject to any recovery 
action initiated by the State after the individual's death." Id. 
at 815. Also, the penalty for transfer of non-exempt assi:!ts was 
a 24 month delay in Medicaid payments, regardless of the value of 
the assets. Id. 
. ., 
In 1982, Congress changed the law to penalize the transfers of 
any assets (whether exempt or not for eligibility purposeB) 
except where an individual transfers title to his/her home to a 
spouse or a minor or handicapped child. Tax Equity & Financial 
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, § 132, 96 Stat. 324 {1982). 
Congress also replaced the old estate recovery provision with the 
following language codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (19~12): 
{b) ADJUSTMENT OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN . 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State 
plan may be made, except -
(A) in the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a) (1) (B), from his estate or upon sale of the property 
subject to a lien imposed on account of medical as:,ds-
tance pai.d on behalf of the individual, and 
(B) In th.e case of an individual who was 65 years c,f age 
or older when the individual received such medical assis-
tance, f:rom his estate. 
Id. The House Committee that wrote these provisions made it 
clear they were intended to ensure that all resources of "an 
individual will be used to defray the public costs of supporting 
that individual in a long-term medical institution" while 
protecting "the legitimate rights of the recipient, the reci-
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pient's spouse and his/her dependent children." S. REP. No. 
4 94 (I) . 
The normal effect of these provisions was that an individual 
would have to spend-down all of his non-exempt assets and any 
gift of his assets would be penalized by a delay in Medicaid 
benefits (which would mean the individual would have to spend on 
nursing home care during the delay an amount equal to the value 
of the gifts). H.R. REP. No. lOS(II). The individual could retain 
exempt assets and the state could recover their value from the 
individual's estate - except for the family home which the 
individual was free to transfer to his/her spouse or minor or 
disabled child. Id. Because the home is the primary exempt 
asset and married individuals could be expected to use the 
opportunity to preserve the home for their family, the Health 
Care Financing Administration assumed its regulations implement-
ing the 1982 statutes would only result in estate recovery from 
unmarried recipients. See 47 Fed. Reg. 43644, 43646 (1982). 
In 1988, Congress recognized that 11 the leading cause of 
financial catastrophe among the elderly is the need for long-term 
care" because "the expense of nursing home care [$2,000 - $3,000 
per month in 1988] has the potential for rapidly depleting the 
lifetime savings of all but wealthiest." H.R. REP. No. lOS(II), 
100th Cong., 2nd Sess., 65 (1988) reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
888. Because Medicare does not cover the costs of long-term 
insti'tutionalizat:ion and "private insurance for nursing home 
costs is not genE!rally available," Congress concluded that the 
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Medicaid program is the only viable source of payment for nursing 
home care for most of the elderly. Id. 
Congress further recognized that the old resource and income 
attribution rule:s were leading to unintended and unwanted 
results. For example, it was quite common for the bulk o:E the 
couple's income and resources to be jointly-owned or owned by the 
institutionalized spouse so that they were attributed to 1:.he 
institutionalized spouse and had to be spent-down before he/she 
received any Medicaid. See H.R. REP. l0S(II). Under such. circum-
stances, the community spouse (usually an elderly woman) could 
keep the couple's house but was otherwise "unjustly impovE~rished" 
(i.e., left with little or no income and resources). Id. at 899-
900. On the other hand, if the bulk of a couple's income and 
resources were solely owned by the community spouse, the insti.tu-
tionalized spouse would immediately qualify for Medicaid -· no 
matter how wealthy the couple had been - and the community spouse 
would retain all the couple's income and assets without contrib-
uting anything to the costs of his/her spouse's medical caLre. 
Id. 
congress responded to these problems by passing the J.Vledicare 
Catastrophic Cov1erage Act (MCCA) which (among other things) 
amended the Medicaid statutes to essentially create the current 
eligibility and asset transfer regime described earlier he:rein. 
The primary relevant changes were replacing the original method 
of resource attr:ibution with the current model of piling together 
all the assets and then taking out the Community Spouse Resource 
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Allowance befor,~ requiring a spend-down. Medicare Catastrophic 
Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 303(a), 102 Stat. 
683, 756 (1988) .. MCCA also replaced the 24-month look-back and 
penalty for assE!t transfers with a 30-month look-back and a 
penalty proportionate to the amount transferred with a 30-month 
cap on the penalty. Id. at§ 303(b), 102 Stat. at 761. Finally, 
MCCA expanded the ability of individuals to transfer thei:r home 
to the community spouse without penalty to include the ab.ility to 
transfer all assets without penalty (which made sense because who 
was the actual owner of the assets no longer mattered for 
eligibility attribution purposes). Id. at§ 303(a), 102 Stat. at 
759; H.R. REP. 105(II) at 896. MCCA did not, however, cha.nge the 
estate recovery provisions. 
Congress again dealt with these issues in August 1993. Based 
on concerns that individuals were hiding assets for eligibility 
purposes, Congress passed broader definitions of assets, E!Xtended 
the look-back period to 36 months, and lifted the 30-month cap on 
transfer penalties. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, 
Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13661-13612, 107 Stat. 312, 622-6251 • To 
the estate recov1ary provisions, Congress added a mandatory and an 
optional definition of "estate 11 and changed the language to read: 
(b) ADJUSTMEN'I' OR RECOVERY OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE CORRECTLY 
PAID UNDER A STATE PLAN. 
(1) No adjui;;tment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly pilid on behalf of an individual under the State 
plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjust-
ment or recc>very of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of 
the following individuals: 
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(A) In the case of an individual described in subsec-
tion (a) (1) (B), the State shall seek adjustment or recov-
ery from the individual's estate. 
Id. at §13612(a & c), 107 Stat. at 627-628 (1993) (emphasis 
added) . 
As Congressman Henry Waxman has noted, "once you wade 
through the maze of Medicaid eligibility rules and trust and 
estate law, the issue goes to some very fundamental questions" 
about who should pay for the long-term health care costs of the 
elderly. Medicaid and Medicaid Budget Reconciliation: Hearings 
before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House 
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 334 {1993)-
[hereinafter Hearings]. The answers to these questions must come 
first from Congress and second from the legislature. 
The preceding history of the Medicaid statute reveals some! of 
•II' these answers . 
First, Congress knows and accepts that Medicaid is the 
primary payer for the long-term care costs of the elderly. H. R. 
REP. 105 (II) . The vast majority of the institutionalized ,elderly 
- no matter how publicly responsible - have no choice but to rely 
on Medicaid unle:3s they simply forgo medical care. Id. Congress 
has thus provided Medicaid for such individuals while consistent-
ly seeking to ensure "that individuals with substantial personal 
assets pay a fair share for nursing home care and certain other 
medical services before they qualify for Medicaid." Hearings at 
19 (statement of William Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, Health 
Care Financing Administration) (emphasis in original). This is 
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,1,.__... achieved through the asset attribution process, the spend-down 
provisions, and asset transfer restrictions. Id. 
On the othE~r hand, Congress has decided it is unfair to 
require a spouse to contribute all of his or her assets to pay 
for the medical care of an institutionalized individual. It is 
fair for them to contribute some assets (unless the couple is too 
poor to do so). Thus, Congress enacted the MCCA allowing un-
penalized spousal transfers, attributing assets without regard to 
ownership for eligibility purposes, and requiring a spend-down 
while protectinsr the community spouse resource allowance. 
Further, Congress has never passed any provision allowing states 
to recover payments from the estate of a recipient's spouse ("nor 
made any exception to the general prohibition against state 
Medicaid recovery except from recipient's estates). 
C. The un.forseen, inequitable and absurd results of the 
Court's holding. 
The above-mentioned goals of the federal Medicaid system are 
generally realized in the system's day-to-day application (though 
there are always anomalies). The system anticipates (even 
expects) that many elderly individuals will engage in estate 
planning to maximize the extent they benefit from the system 
while minimizing their costs. Further, the system pursues: 
fairness by maximizing the amount an individual must pay for 
his/her own care, but limiting the extent others (spouses and the 
public) must pay. The Court's decision upsets this balance and 
creates unfair, even absurd, results without adding to the 
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~1-~ furtherance of the system's goals. Consider the followin9 
hypotheticals: 
Example 1: Spouse receives Medicaid. 
Kelvin farms :Eor a living. He inherited the family farm from 
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, wife, and 
daughter workc:d the farm until Kelvin retired. At that point 
he leased the land to his daughter to farm. Wife is diag-
nosed with Al:2:heimer' s disease and is required to enter a care 
center. Kel v:ln and wife private pay for care at roughly 
$4,000 per month. A year later wife applies for Medicaid and 
is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an 
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a 
month). At wife's death her estate is valued at less than 
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin 
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate 
consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has 
continued to lease the farm. The Department seeks recovery 
of the $300,000 for wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the 
farm) . 
Result: Under the Court's decision, the Department will be 
allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate under state 
Example 2: Gift of farm to daughter, spouse receives Medicaid. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, wife, 
and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At that 
point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. Wifi3 is 
diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease and is required to enter a 
care center. At that point Kelvin gifts the farm to h:Ls 
daughter. This gift of Kelvin's separate property carries 
with it a period of Medicaid ineligibility from 36 months to 
88 months depending on when Kelvin and his wife apply for 
Medicaid. Kelvin and wife pay for 36 months of long term 
care (roughly $144,000) depleting their cash resources. 
Thirty-seven months post-gift Kelvin's wife applies for Medic-
aid and is found eligible. Wife lives in the care center for 
an additional eight years (at a Medicaid cost of $240,000 
($2,500 a month). At wife's death her estate is valued at 
less than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his 
estate consists of his personal effects. 
Result: The Department is unable to obtain recovery of the 
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$240,000 for wife's care from the farm but can recoup min:Lmally 
from Kelvin's estate. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c). See also Peter 
J. Strauss, Medi.caid Revisions in 1993 Budget Act, N. Y. L. ~r. , Sept. 
30, 1993, at 3, 7. The very wealthy can afford to get around the 
asset transfer and estate recovery provisions, but poor and 
middle-class individuals cannot. 
Example 4: Formal post-nuptial agreement. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm from 
his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, first 
wife, and dau9hter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. At 
that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. First 
wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and second wife· 
enter into a j:ormal post nuptial agreement preserving the 
separate nature of each spouse's estate. Within a few years 
of marriage se~cond wife is diagnosed with Alzheimer's disease 
and is require~d to enter a care center. Kelvin and second wife 
private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A year 
later second wife applies for Medicaid for second wife .and is 
found eligiblei. Second wife lives in the care center for an 
additional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a 
month). At second wife's death her estate is valued at less 
than $2,000 ae1 required by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Kelvin lives an additional ten years and at his death his 
estate consists of his farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter 
who has continued to lease the farm. The Department s•:eks 
recovery of the $300,000 for second wife's care from Kelvin's 
estate (the farm). 
Result: Under the Court's decision, the Department will be 
allowed to recover the $300,000 from Kelvin's estate. The 
Court's decision ignores treasured principles of community 
property law by making Kelvin's separate property liable for his 
second wife's Medicaid payments. 
Example 5: Kelvin divorces second wife. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family farm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, 
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. 
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. 
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First wife dies. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and 
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre-
serving the separate nature of each spouse's estate. Within 
a few years of marriage second wife is diagnosed with 1Uz-
heimer' s disease and is required to enter a care center. 
Kelvin and second wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 
per month. A year later Kelvin divorces second wife a.nd their 
property is divided according to the post nuptial agree:ment. 
second wife, now ex-wife, applies for Medicaid and is found 
eligible. Second wife lives in the care center for an addi-
tional ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 {$2,500 a 
month) . At :second wife's death her estate is valued a.t less 
than $2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin 
lives an additional ten years and at his death his estate 
consists of h:is farm. Kelvin's heir is his daughter who has 
continued to lease the farm. Medicaid seeks recovery of the 
$300,000 for ex-second wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the 
farm). 
Result: Unde:r this Court's decision, state law would preclude 
recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Med.icaid 
costs. Hasn't the Court created a powerful incentive for di-
vorce? 
Example 6: Kelvin predeceases second wife. 
Kelvin farms for a living. He inherited the family f:arm 
from his parents. The farm is valued at $300,000. He, 
first wife, and daughter worked the farm until Kelvin retired. 
At that point he leased the land to his daughter to farm. 
First wife die~s. A year later Kelvin remarries. He and 
second wife enter into a formal post nuptial agreement pre-
serving the se!parate nature of each spouse's estate. Within 
a few years of: marriage second wife is diagnosed with Alz-
heimer's diseaLse and is required to enter a care center. 
Kelvin and sec:ond wife private pay for care at roughly :$4, 000 
per month. A year later Kelvin dies. His estate is probated 
according to his Will {reflecting separate nature of each 
spouse's property) with the farm passing to Kelvin's daughter 
and second wif:e, now widow, receiving her statutory spousal 
share. Second wife applies for Medicaid and is found eligi-
ble. Second wife lives in the care center for an additional 
ten years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month). 
At second wife's death her estate is valued at less than 
$2,000 as required by Medicaid eligibility rules. 
Result: Under this Court's decision, state law would preclude 
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recovery other than from second wife's estate for her Medicaid 
costs. Why should whether Kelvin's daughter inherits the farm 
depend upon who - Kelvin or his wife - dies first? 
Example 9: The second wife's inheritance 
Kelvin farms for a living. He and his wife lease a farm 
from Kelvin's parents. Wife is diagnosed with early Alzheime-
r's disease a:nd is required to enter a care center. Kelvin 
and wife private pay for care at roughly $4,000 per month. A 
year later wife applies for Medicaid for wife and is found 
eligible. Wife lives in the care center for an additional ten 
years at a Medicaid cost of $300,000 ($2,500 a month). At 
wife's death her estate is valued at less than $2,000 as 
required by M•:!dicaid eligibility rules. Kelvin remarries and 
he and his second wife live together for twenty-five years. 
The second wi:Ee and Kelvin accumulate an estate valued at 
$500,000 due to second wife's inheritance of a family farm 
from her parents a year before she dies. Second wife has a 
son who leased the inherited farm from second wife and second 
wife's parenti;. At Kelvin's death his estate consists of this 
farm. The Department seeks recovery of the $300,000 for first 
wife's care from Kelvin's estate (the farm). 
Result: Under the Court's decision, the family farm of the 
second wife is liable for Kelvin's first wife's care costs. 
Again, how can this be reconciled with Idaho's community property 
laws? 
In conclusion, the issues raised in these hypotheticals do 
not make the Court's decision erroneous by themselves. They do, 
however, counter any notion that spousal estate recovery i.s a 
moral imperative or follows logically from Idaho's probate: law or 
the Medicaid sch1:!me. There are just as many, if not more, good 
policy reasons to prohibit spousal estate recovery as there are 
reasons to allow it. If Congress and the state legislature has 
made a clear policy choice in favor of spousal estate recovery it 
would not be for the Court to deny it. If, however, federal or 
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state law is contrary to, or ambiguous in regard to, spou,sal 
estate recovery, the Court should have no qualms about prohibit-
ing it. At the very least, it should be clear that Medicaid is 
not a loan and couples do not cheat the system simply because the 
state may not fully recover Medicaid payments made to one spouse. 
II. The Court E1rred in holding that federal law does not prohib-
it the Department from recovering Medicaid payments from the 
estate of t:he recipient's surviving spouse. 
Federal law provides the parameters for state recovery of 
Medicaid payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) (state Medicaid 
programs must comply with the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
with respect to liens, adjustments, and recoveries of Medicaid 
correctly paid). This Court held in McCoy v. State of Idaho, 
Department of Health and Welfare, 907 P.2d 110, 112 (1995): 
Each state's participation in Medicaid is optional, but once 
a state voluntarily elects to participate in the pro9ram, it 
must comply with the requirements imposed by the Act and 
applicable regulations. 
Hildor Knudson received Medicaid payments from Janua1y 1, 
1993 until her d,eath on October 27, 1994. The payments for 
medical services Hildor received prior to October 1, 1993 are 
covered by 42 U.:S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) which prohibits 
states from recmrery Medicaid payments made to a recipient who is 
institutionalized except "from his estate." The payments for 
medical services Hildor received after October 1, 1993 are 
covered by 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998) which also 
prohibits states from recovery of payments made to an individual 
who is institutionalized except from "the individual's estate." 
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Thus, the Department is prohibited by federal law from recovering 
any of the paymEmts made to Hildor except from her estate. The 
Department cannot recover from Lionel's estate. 
The Court finds two reasons why 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) 
does not limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the 
estate of the reicipient. First, the Court concludes that the 
statute is only a limitation on the types of medical assi:stance 
which can be recovered and does not limit from whom these pay-
ments may be recovered. Second, the Court concludes that the 
definition of an individual's estate includes the income and 
resources of the individual's spouse - thus recovery from an 
individual's estate includes recovery from the spouse's estate. 
A. Federal law does limit from whom Medicaid payments may 
be recovered - a state may only recover from the reci-
pient's estate. 
1. The language and history of the federal statute 
demonstrate the illegality of spousal estat:e re-
covery. 
Since the Medicaid program was created in 1965, federal law 
has consistently prohibited recovery of properly paid Medicaid 
payments except from the estate of the recipient individua.1. The 
original 1965 statute specified that "a State plan for medical 
assistance must ... provide that . there shall be no 
adjustment or recovery (except, in the case of an individual who 
was 65 years of age or older, from his estate .. " Pub. L. 89-
97 at§ 1902, 79 Stat at 347 (1965). In 1982, Congress summa-
rized the state of the law as follows: 
Under current law, States are barred from imposing any lien 
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against any recipient's property prior to his death because 
of Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless 
placed as a result of a court judgment. In the case of 
individuals under age 65, no adjustments or recoveri,es can 
be made for Medicaid claims correctly paid. In the case of 
individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for correct-
ly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after 
the individual's death and only (1) after the death of his 
surviving spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving 
children who are under 21, blind, or disabled. 
s. REP. No. 494 (I), 97th Cong., 2nd. Sess., 38 (1982) re_printed 
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 814. Remember that Congress also 
summarized the law as allowing an elderly individual to give 
his/her house to his/her spouse and "by doing so, the individual 
assures that the: home will not be part of his/her estate ,md 
therefore will not be subject to any recovery action init:Lated by 
the State after the individual's death." Id. at 815. It could 
not be clearer, that at least as of 1982, states could not 
.., recover Medicaid payments from the estate of a recipient' f3 
spouse. 
When did CongJ:ess change this language to allow recovery from 
the estate of the recipient's spouse? Never. In 1982, Congress 
changed the relevant provision to read: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical. assistance c:orrect-
ly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be 
made, except -· 
(A) in tl:Le case of an individual [who is an inpati,ent in 
a nursing facility, intermediate care facility for the 
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such 
individual is required, as a condition of receiving s:ervices 
in such institution under the State plan, to spend for costs 
of medical care all but a minimal amount·of his income 
required for personal needs], from his estate or upon sale 
of the property subject to a lien imposed on account of 
medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual, and 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 65 years of age 
or older when the individual received such medical a:ssis-
tance, from his estate. 
Tax Equity & Financial Responsibility Act, Pub. L. 97-248, § 132, 
96 Stat. 324 (1982) (bracketed portion reflects incorporation of 
referenced language from§ 132(a) (1)). Congress also reworded, 
but retained the limitations on when recovery could be made -
only after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse and only 
when there was no surviving child under 21, blind, or disabled. 
As codified. in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (1992), the above 
language was the law of the land until October 1st, 1993. Note 
that Hildor received Medicaid payments from January 1993 through 
October 1994, so about half of her payments are covered by this 
language. R. pp. 25-40. After October 1, 1993, the applicable 
language as codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1) (Supp. 1998) reads: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correct-
ly paid on bellalf of an individual under the State plan may be 
made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or re,covery 
of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of a:n 
individual under the State plan in the case of the folL::>wing 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual [who is an inpa.tient 
in a nursing facility, intermediate care facility :for the 
mentally retarded or other medical institution, if such 
.individual is required, as a condition of receivin9 
services in such institution under the State plan, to 
spend for costs of medical care all but a minimal amount 
of his income required for personal needs], the State 
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate or upon sale of the property subject to a l:len 
imposed on account of medical assistance paid on behalf 
of the individual. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of 
age or older when the individual received such medical 
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assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery 
from the individual's estate, but only for medical assis-
tance consisting of -
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based 
services, and related hospital and prescription drug 
services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services 
under the State plan. 
(C) (i)In the case of an individual who has received (or 
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-tertr1 care 
insuranc,a policy in connection with which assets or 
resources are disregarded in the manner described in 
clause (:ii), except as provided in such clause, the State 
shall se«ak adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of 
the individual for nursing facility and other long-term 
care services. 
(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an 
individual who received medical assistance under a State 
plan of a State which had a State plan amendment approved 
as of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of 
any assets or resources -
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a 
long-term care insurance policy; or 
(II) because an individual has received (or is enti-
tled to receive) benefits under a long term care! insur-
ance policy." 
Omnibus Budget R1econciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-66, 
§1361.2{a), 1.07 Stat. 627-628 (1993). The 1993 amendments did not 
change the limit on when recovery could be made (only where there 
is no surviving spouse or dependent) and added a requirement for 
states to waive :recovery where it would "work an undue hardship." 
42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) (1-3} (Supp. 1998). As will be discussed 
later, a definit:Lon of the term "estate" was also added. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (4) (Supp. 1998}. 
Again, as oJ: September 30, 1982, federal law unequivocally 
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prohibited spouHal estate recovery. S. REP. No. 494(1) a.t 814. 
Where in the legislation since then is there any change allowing 
states to recover Medicaid payments from the recipient's :spouse? 
Nowhere. The change on October 1, 1982 did nothing more than 
amend the generall prohibition against any recovery of Medicaid 
payments to add an exception to allow recovery from the estate of 
individuals who receive benefits prior to age 65 if they received 
such benefits because they were institutionalized. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p (b) (1) (A) (1992). 
The effect of the 1993 amendments is bit more complex, but 
similar. The law still retains the general prohibition against 
any recovery of properly-made Medicaid payments. 42 u.s.c. § 
1396p(b} (l} (Supp. 1998). As to individuals who received Medicaid 
prior to age 55 because they were institutionalized, the permis-
sive exception is changed to a mandatory requirement (i.e., 
states are required to recover the payments from the individual's 
estate or through use of a lien). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) (A) 
(Supp. 1998). A:s to individuals who received Medicaid after they 
were 55, states may recover all payments from the individual's 
estate and are n~quired to recover some types of payments (those 
for long-term care) from the individual's estate. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p (b) (1) (B) (i--ii) (Supp. 1998). As to individuals who receive 
Medicaid under special state provisions that coordinate eligibil-
ity with long-term care insurance policies, states must recover 
payments for long-term care services (except where the state plan 
was approved before May 14, 1993) from the estate of the i:ndivid-
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ual. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (C) (i-ii) (Supp. 1998). 
Thus, States are prohibited - with no qualifiers - from 
recovery of Medj_caid payments except from certain recipients' 
estates in every version of the Medicaid statute that has ever 
existed. It is difficult to conceive how the statute's language 
could more explicitly limit from whom (and by what means) a state 
may recover Medicaid payments. 
2. 'l'he federal statute's I.imitation upon from whom 
(and how) states may recover Medicaid payments is 
:c·eflected in the case I.aw. 
Case law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit and other courts is premised upon the conclusion 
that the federal statutory language limits from where a state may 
recover Medicaid payments. In Bucholtz v. Belshe, 114 F.3d 923 
(9th Cir. 1997), and Citizens Action League v. Kizer, 887 F.2d 
1003 (9th Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit held that, prior t:o being 
amended in 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) limited recovery to the 
recipient's estate. The issue in each case was what assets are 
included in the :recipient's estate. In Kizer, the court held 
that a recipient's estate did not include property the recipient 
owned in joint b,mancy and that a state could not seek to recover 
Medicaid benefits from any person who succeeded by survivorship 
to such property. 887 F.2d at 1006-1008. In Bucholtz, the court 
held that a recipient's estate did include an ownership interest 
at the time of dE~ath in community property or property held as a 
tenant in common,. but did not include property in an inter vivos 
trust. 114 F.3d at 925-927. To the extent a state statute 
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,__,. "seeks to reach further than § 1396p (b) (1), it cannot stand." 
Id. at 925. 
One might, of course, distinguish these cases on the ground 
that the statute was amended in 1993, but such a distinction is 
without merit. First, a large portion of Hildor's Medicaid 
payments were made prior to the effective date of the 1993 
amendments. Second, the key language ("No recovery ... except 
. . . in the casie of an individual . . . from his estate") relied 
upon by the Ninth Circuit in Bucholtz remained essentially 
unchanged ( "No r,ecovery . . . except . . . in the case of an 
individual . . from the individual's estate) by the 1993 
amendments. Compare 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (1992) with 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) (A) (Supp. 1998). 
Cases after the 1993 amendments also hold that the language 
of 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) (1) prohibits states from collecting 
Medicaid paymenti; except from the estate of the recipient. In 
Demille v. Belshe, 1994 WL 519457 (N.D. Cal. Sept.16, 1994), the 
United States District Court for the North District of California 
noted that the general rule created by the statute was no recov-
ery except from individual's estates and held: 
The federal statute allows the state to recoup its e~penses 
only from those persons who are holding real or personal 
property in which the deceased recipient held a legal inter-
est at the t:ime of death. See [42 u.s.c. §] 1396p(b) (1)-
(requiring 1:itate to recover from decedent's "estate") and § 
1396p (b) (4) (defining "estate"). The amount of expens,es the 
state may re!cover from such persons is capped by the .amount 
of decedent's interest in the property. § l396p(b) (4). In 
other words, the federal statute only contemplates th,:it the 
deceased recipient's assets will be traced, not that other 
persons can become liable to pay over their own asset:s. 
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - ;?age 26 
000337
1994 WL at *7. similarly, in Matter of Estate of Budney, 541 
N.W.2d 245 (Wis. App. 1995), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held 
that a state statute authorizing recovery of medical assistance 
benefits from the surviving spouse's estate exceeded the authori-
ty provided by the federal Medicaid statutes. 541 N.W. at 246. 
There appears to be only one case even vaguely supportive of 
the Court's conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b} (1) does not 
limit a state's recovery of Medicaid payments to the estate of 
the recipient. Ironically, Matter of Estate of Imburgia, 130 
A.D.2d 658 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987}, was decided prior to both the 
1988 and the 1993 amendments to the statute and considers mainly 
the deeming of assets between spouses. Further, the Imburgia 
analysis was explicitly rejected by a higher court, the Neiw York 
Court of Appeals, in Matter of Estate of Craig, 624 N.E.2d 1003 
(N.Y. 1993). In Craig, the court held that federal law generally 
prohibited recovery of Medicaid, made a narrow exception f'or the 
recovery from the estate of the recipient, but did not "provide 
for recovery of Medicaid payments on behalf of a predeceased 
spouse from the ;secondarily dying spouse's estate." 624 N. E. at 
1006. The court also noted that the 1993 amendments to the 
statute "gives the States, at their option, the power to recover 
against a spouse"s estate, but only against the recipient's 
assets that were conveyed through joint tenancy and other speci-
fied forms of survivorship." Id. 
B. The court erred by combining 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(e) (l)'s 
definit~ion with 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b) (4)'s definition of 
estate .. 
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The Court's second basis for holding that the Department's 
claim against Lionel's estate does not violate 42 u.s.c. § 
1396p(b) (1) is the Court's conclusion that an individual's estate 
(as defined by the statute) includes all income and resources 
owned by the individual and his/her spouse, including any income 
or resources that the individual and spouse were entitled to but 
did not receive because of action by them on their behalf. By 
plugging the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (1) definition of assets into 
the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) definition of estate, the Court 
reasons that recovery from Hildor's estate includes all of 
Lionel's estate, particularly resources he acquired from the 
marriage settlement agreement. This analysis is faulty in 
several respects. 
1. T:b.e Court's analysis of the definitions ignores 
the effective dates of the statute. 
The 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (1) definition of assets does not 
apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the: date 
of the enactment of this Act" (August 10, 1993). P.L. 103-66, § 
13612(e) (2) (B). Hildor transferred all of her interest in the 
Knudson's assets to Lionel on March a, 1993. R. pp. 63-66. 
Thus, the (e) (1) definition of assets explicitly does not include 
any of Lionel's estate. Additionally, both the 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(e) (1) definition of assets and the 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4) 
definition of estate only apply to Medicaid payments "for calen-
dar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993." P.L. 103-
66, § 13612(e) (2:i (A). Thus, even if the Court's analysis of the 
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definitions of E!State and assets is correct, it cannot be applied 
to Lionel's estate and, even if it could, it would only apply to 
those payments made on Hildor's behalf after October 1, 1993. 
2. 'l~he Court's analysis defies the structure c:>f 42 
U.S. C. § 13 9 6p. 
Subsection (b) (4) 's definition of "estate" is specif:ic to 
"this subsection" (i.e., subsection 42 u.s.c. § 1396p(b)) ,, 
whereas subsection (e) (l)'s definition applies generally to "this 
section" (i.e., all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p). When interpreting 
statutory definitions, as with statutory provisions in general, 
general definitions are superseded by specific definitions. 
State v. Jones, 34 Idaho 83, 199 P. 645 (1921); Herrick v. 
Gallet, 35 Idaho 13, 204 P. 477 (1922); In re Drainage Dist. No. 
1, 40 Idaho 549, 235 P. 895 (1925). Subsection (e) (4) 's defini-
'•1""' tion of "assets" applies to that word's use in section 1396p as a 
whole. This broad definition is displaced, for purposes of 
subsection (b), by subsection (b) (4) 's very specific definition. 
3. The Court's analysis ignores the legislativ-e his-
tiory of the definitions. 
The structu:ral wall between the (b) (4) definition of "es-
tate" and the (e) (1) definition of assets is not a mere techni-
cality. The two provisions were distinguished throughout their 
legislative history. Subsection (b) (4) was enacted as part of 
section 13612 "M«~dical Estate Recoveries" of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation A<::t of 1993. P. L. No. 103-66; 107 Stat. at 627-
628. subsection (e) (1) was enacted as section 13611 "Transfers 
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of Assets; Treatments of Certain Trusts" of the Act. Id. 
Congress intended subsection (b) (4) (B) to allow states the option 
of recovering assets in which the recipient had a legal title or 
interest at the time of death, including assets held through 
joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. H. R. CoN. REP. No. 213, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess. 835 (1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N .. 1524. 
This was an explicit response to Kizer and other cases denying 
state recovery of such assets. Patricia Nemore et al, OBRA-93 
Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of Assets, Treatment of 
Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1206 
(Feb. 1994). Congress had an altogether different intent in 
enacting subsection (e} (1). H.R. CoN. REP. No. 213 at 1523. Subsec-
tion {e) (1) was intended to effect how assets of an individual 
and his/her spouse are treated for the purpose of Medicaid 
eligibility. Id. Nowhere in the legislative history of these 
subsections is a:n expressed intent that the asset definition 
would expand the range of estate recovery. 
4. T:b.e Court's combination of the two definiti,ons 
1eads to absurd resu1ts. 
The cooperation, without the combination, of the two defini-
tions results in a logical scheme. As Congress intended, the 
broad definition of assets in {e) (1) works to prevent the hiding 
of income and re:~ources for the eligibility purposes - applicable 
at the time of the "snap-shot" - and ensures that individuals are 
penalized for the improper transfer of such assets. Patricia 
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Nemore et al, 0EIRA-93 Provisions Concerning Medicaid Transfers of 
Assets, Treatme.r:tt of Certain Trusts, and Estate Recoveries, 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1199, 1200 {Feb. 1994) {the definition was also a 
direct response to recent caselaw) .; H.R. REP. No. 111, 103rd 
Cong., 1st Sess., 206-208 {1993) reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
533-535. The expanded definition of estate in {b) (4) was intend-
ed by Congress to prevent an individual from making an otherwise 
prohibited transfer of an exempt asset (upon death of the indi-
vidual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, 
life estate, or other arrangement) without the individual being 
penalized or the state being able to recover the value of the 
asset. Id. 
The Court's combination of the definitions adds little to 
the meaning of the statute and leads to absurd results. "Plug-
ging in" {e) (1) 's definition of "assets" to (b) (4) 's definition 
of "estate" would make 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{b) (4) (A) read as fol-
lows: 
. "estate," with respect to a deceased individual -
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other [income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse] included within the indivi-
dual's estate as defined for purposes of State probate 
law. 
(Emphasis added.Ji What income and resources of an individual's 
spouse are included in the individual's estate as defined for 
purposes of Idaho probate law? At most, the individual's one-
half interest in any community property. Not the spouse's half 
of the community property, and certainly not the surviving 
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spouse's separate property. 
The (e) (1) definition of assets also includes "any income or 
resources which the individual or the individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action" by the 
individual, the individual's spouse, or anyone (including a court 
or administrative body) acting on behalf of, in place of, the 
direction of, or upon the request of the individual or the 
spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1936p(e) {1) {Supp. 1998). Under Idaho 
probate law, what, if any, "income or resources which the indi-
vidual or the individual's spouse is entitled to but does not 
receive . "are included in the individual's estate? Respon-
dent hesitates to suggest an answer because the question itself 
seems absurd; unfortunately, the question will have to be an-
swered in the implementation of the Court's decision. 
Idaho, of course, has adopted the option in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p{b) (4) {B) which would, under the Court's analysis, define 
estate as: 
any other real and personal property and other [income and 
resources o:f the individual and the individual's spouse} in 
which the individual had any 1ega1 tit1e or interest at the 
time of dea't:.h (to the extent of such interest) 
{Emphasis added.) Again, what is the extent of the recipient's 
legal title or interest in the surviving spouse's half of their 
former community property or the spouse's separate property? 
There is no such interest. Again, it seems absurd but becomes 
necessary to ask: what is the extent of an individual's legal 
title or interest at the time of the individual's death in income 
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or resources thE! individual or the individual was entitled to but 
never received? 
The structure of the statute, the legislative history of the 
statute, and the! absurdities that result from combining the 
(b) (4) definition of estate and the (e) (1) definition of assets 
demonstrate that the definitions were intended to be and must be 
kept distinct. Thus, an "individual's estate" cannot include the 
individual's su:rvi ving spouse's estate - even in the confusing 
world of federal Medicaid law. Moreover, because of the date of 
the transfer of assets between Hildor and Lionel and the effec-
tive dates of the 1993 amendments, Hildor's estate cannot in-
clude, for the purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396(b) (1} (A}, Lionel's 
estate. 
In conclusion, the language of the federal law is clear. It 
has been clear for 33 years. States may only recover Medicaid 
payments from the estate of the recipient. States may not 
recover from the estate of the recipient's spouse. With cLll due 
respect, the Court erred in holding otherwise. 
III. The Court e:rred in hol.ding that state l.aw authorizes the 
Department ·to recover Medicaid payments from the esta.te of 
the recipient's surviving spouse. 
A. The Co111rt erred in interpreting Idaho Code§ 56-218. 
Under Idaho law, the Department must seek recovery of 
Medicaid payment:;; from the estate of the recipient "or if there 
be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse. IDAHO CODE§ 218. 
Hildor had an estate (and the Department recovered part of the 
payments to Hildc:,r from it) . Thus, the Department cannot recover 
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Medicaid paid to Hildor from the estate of her surviving spouse, 
Lionel. The Court appears to concede that the plain meaning of 
I.C. § 56-218(1) would prohibit the Department from recovering 
Medicaid payments paid on behalf of Hildor from Lionel's E~state 
because Hildor had an estate. The Court concludes, howevE~r, that 
the plain meaning of the statute is not controlling because it 
would be contrary to clearly expressed legislative intent and 
would lead to absurd results. 
1. The plain meaning of I.e. § 56-218 is not absurd. 
The primary premise of these arguments is that, because 
Medicaid recipients will almost never have "no estate," the 
provision for recovery from the spouse's estate would be rendered 
meaningless by a literal reading of the statute. Although it 
would be highly unusual for an individual to die without an 
estate, it is not theoretically impossible - particularly if the 
individual has institutionalized for a very long time. Further, 
because, until the statute was amended in 1995, an individual's 
estate was not d,efined by the statute, property that transferred 
automatically to another's ownership upon an individual's death 
at least arguably would not be included in the individual's 
estate. It is at least rational, therefore, that the legislature 
could have enacti~d the "if there be no estate, the estate of the 
surviving spouse'" language on the premise that such circumstances 
could, in fact, arise. It should be noted that the Department 
itself argued at various points in this litigation that, for the 
purposes of the statute, Hildor had no estate - so at least the 
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Department did not think such a concept was absurd. App. Br. 15; 
R . pp . 8 7 - 8 8 , . 
Even if the legislature expected that it would be practical-
ly (if not theoretically) impossible for an individual to die 
without an estate, it does not automatically follow that provid-
ing for such circumstances in I.C. § 56-218(1) would be absurd. 
At a' time when the legislature was enacting other new provisions 
regarding the attribution of assets between spouses and n~garding 
transfers between spouses (i.e., spousal impoverishment provi-
sions), the legislature could well have intended the "if there be 
no estate" catch-all to provide a deterrent from artificial 
creation of such circumstances (or even a deterrent from attempts 
to create such circumstances). This may not be the most reason-
able interpretation of the statute, but this does not make it an 
absurd interpretation. 
2. T:he legislative intent of § 56-218 was not to 
allow Medicaid recovery from the estate of the 
recipient's surviving spouse. 
The Court r,efers to the "legislative intent to recover from 
the estate of a surviving spouse" without clarifying where, such 
intent is clearly expressed. In fact, the only clearly e:x:pressed 
legislative intent was that stated in the companion bill to the 
bill that created I.e. § 56-218(1): 
It is the intent of the legislature in enacting this section 
to reduce the number of situations in which medicaid regula-
tions as th•=Y apply to long term care costs, cause either 
the destitution of the entire family, or a dissolution of 
marriage carried out to prevent destitution. It is further 
the intent of this legislation to protect the community and 
separate property rights of a married person whose spouse 
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applies for medical assistance regardless of whether they 
are living together. 
1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. so, § 1, p.74 (creating I.e. § 56-
209e); 1988 Idaho Sess. Laws, ch. 49., p.73. Given this c:xplicit 
language of the legislature, it is at least as, if not more, 
reasonable to conclude that the legislature wished to narrowly 
restrict or prevent, rather than facilitate, recovery from the 
estate of a surviving spouse. The plain language of the statute 
and the expressed concerns of the legislature should not be 
overwhelmed by a merely implied legislative intent. 
If, when I.C. § 56-218 (1) was enacted, the legislature had 
intended that the Department freely recover Medicaid from the 
estate of the recipient and the estate of the surviving spouse, 
the legislature could have easily so stated. (As it did when it 
·lilljjlll, amended I.C. § 56-218 (1) in 1998). During oral argument before 
the Court, the Department expressed a belief that the legislature 
borrowed the language it used from a similar statute in Oregon. 
This only reinforces the point that, if the legislature had 
intended the statute to mean that the Department could first 
collect Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient and 
then recover the balance from the estate of the surviving spouse, 
the legislature could have enacted language clearly expressing 
such an intent. At the time I.e. § 56-218(1) was enacted, 
Oregon's statutes provided for the recovery of general assistance 
from "the estate of the deceased recipient or if there be no 
estate or the estate does not have sufficient assets to satisfy 
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the claim, the estate of the surviving spouse." OR. REV. STAT. § 
411.795 (1987) 1 
It is the Court's construction of I.C. § 56-218(1), rather 
than the plain meaning of the statute, that is contrary to clear 
legislative intent. First, the Court effectively nullifies the 
"or if there be no estate" language. Under the Court's construc-
tion, the only time the Department will not seek recovery of 
Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse is when the Department's claim is fully satisfied 1:rom the 
recipient's estate. When the Department can fully recover from 
the estate of the recipient, the Department would not makei a 
claim against the surviving spouse's estate even without the "if 
there be no estate 11 language. 
Further, thie spousal impoverishment law was intended to 
avoid the necess.ity for couples to divorce in order to protect 
the community and separate property rights of the community 
spouse. By exposing all of the assets of a surviving spouse to 
potential recovery, the Court's interpretation once again encour-
ages divorce to protect such assets. 2 
Although at the time I. C. § 56-218(1} was enacted Oregon law 
provided for recovery of Medicaid payments using the same "from the estate, or 
if there be no estate the estate of the surviving spouse" language, Oregon law 
now allows for recovery of Medicaid "from the estate of the individual or from 
any recipient of property or other assets held by the individual at the time 
of death including t.he estate of the surviving spouse" and limits such 
recovery from persor.ls other than the recipient to the extent and value of the 
Medicaid recipient's: legal title or interest in the property or assets 
transferred. OR REV. STAT. § 414.105 (Supp. 1996). 
a Ironically, the Department has denied that there would be an 
incentive to divorce under the Court's interpretation of I.C. § 56-218(1), but 
concedes that at lea.st one such divorce {although apparently executed clumsily 
and perhaps unsuccessfully) has already occurred. App. Reply Br. , p. 8. 
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'h .... B. The Cc>urt erred in ignoring the Department' s rei;ula tory 
limitcltions upon estate recovery. 
The Court' 1:1 holding does not address the ef feet of the 
Department's regulations upon its ability to recover Medicaid 
payments from tl:Le estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. 
These regulations are relevant both as aids to the interp:retation 
of I.e. § 56-218(1) and as independent barriers to the Depart-
ment's recovery. 
In the Idaho Administrative Code, the Department has adopted 
provisions for recovery of medical assistance "pursuant to 
Sections 56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code" through "the filing of 
liens against property of deceased persons, and the filin9 of 
liens against the property of permanently institutionalize~d 
recipients." IDAPA 16. 03. 09. 025. The regulations providei for 
·•~ recovery of Medicaid payments from the recipient's estate, or 
upon the sale of property subject to a lien, but makes only a 
limited provision for recovery from the estate of a surviving 
spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.09; IDAPA 16.03.09.025.15. IDAPA 
16.03.09.025.15 states: "If the deceased recipient has no estate, 
recovery shall b,e made from the estate of his surviving spouse." 
Under this regulation, because Hildor had an estate from which 
the Department n~covered, it may not recover from Lionel's 
estate. 
The other ri:gulatory reference to recovery from the estate 
of a recipient's surviving spouse further limits, rather than 
expands, the Department's authority to recover from the estate of 
RESPONDENT'S REHEARING BRIEF - Page 38 
000349
.,...., a surviving spouse. IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20 states: 
Limits on the Department's claim against the assets of a 
deceased reicipient shall be subject to Sections 56-218 and 
56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of ;a. sur-
viving spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to the 
value of the assets of the estate that were community prop-
erty, or the deceased recipient's share of the separ,a.te 
property, aLnd jointly owned property. Recovery shall not be 
made until the deceased recipient no longer is survived by a 
spouse . . . 
(Emphasis added). Even if one accepts the Department's argument 
that this regulation still allows recovery of assets in the 
estate of the surviving spouse in which the recipient ever had a 
community property interest, this does not expand the Depart-
ment's recovery from a surviving spouse's estate beyond circum-
stances where the recipient had no estate. 
The Department's regulations explicitly refute any attempt 
to use broad definitions of estate and assets to make resources 
of the surviving spouse part of the estate of the recipient. 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.03(c) defines the recipient's estate to 
include only that property and assets "in which the recipient had 
any legal or beneficial title or interest at the time of death." 
IDAPA 16.03.09.025.18 extensively defines "assets in estate 
subject to claims," but includes only those assets "the deceased 
recipient owned or in which he had an ownership interest. 11 
Thus, although the Court does not address the issue, state 
regulations impose an independent barrier on spousal estate 
recovery in Idaho, even if it is otherwise allowed by fedeiral and 
state law.· Also, it seems highly unusual, if as the Court held 
the state law only creates an order of priority between recipient 
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and spousal estate recovery that the Department's regulations do 
not reflect this meaning. Similarly, it also seems stran,ge that 
the Department would have adopted regulations that not only do 
not incorporate, but also directly contradict, federal law as 
interpreted by t:he Court. Perhaps the Department's regul,ations 
demonstrate that the Court erred. 
C. The Cc1urt' s holding will cause undesirable results. 
1. 'l~he Court's interpretation of federal and state 
law creates unnecessary conflicts between t:he two. 
Read together, as properly constructed, the federal and 
state statutes and regulations would allow the Department to 
recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipient:, which 
would include the tracing of assets in which the recipient had a 
legal title or interest at the time of her death. All thE~ 
,_, applicable law can be consistently and reasonably read to limit 
recovery from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse to 
such tracing. The Medicaid system would continue to work undis-
turbed without spousal estate recovery, though the Department 
would obviously be denied some revenue. 
on the other hand, to allow the Department's claim a9ainst 
Lionel's estate requires defiance of the plain meaning of federal 
and state statutes and regulations. The Court's holding uninten-
tionally disrupts community property and probate principleis. The 
Court's holding leads to absurd and unfair results. Finally, the 
Court's holding creates direct conflicts between state and 
federal law that could have been avoided. 
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For examplei, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) requires the Depart-
ment to recover Medicaid payments from the estate of the recipi-
ent. As the Court interprets 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (4)'s defini-
tion of "estate" and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (l)'s definition of 
"assets", the estate of a recipient includes "all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual' s spousE~" 
including income or resources which the individual or spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of actions by or for 
them. Although Idaho has adopted (as of 1995) the 42 u.s .. c. § 
1396p(b) (4)'s definition of "estate" for estate recovery purpos-
es, neither Idaho's statutes or regulations include within such 
estate the broad definition of assets from 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)-
(1}. To the contrary, the Department's extensive and detailed 
definition of "assets in estate subject to claims" in IDJ~PA 
16.03.09.025.18 does not include all income and resources of a 
recipient's spouse or all income and resources to which the 
individual or spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
of actions by or for them; rather the regulatory definition 
includes only th,:,se assets "the deceased recipient owned or in 
which he had an ownership interest." Thus, if the Court's 
interpretation o:E the relevant federal law is correct, the 
Department is in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (18) and 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (1) by under-seeking estate recovery. 
Similarly, the IDAPA 16.03.09.025.20's limitation of claims 
against the estate of a surviving spouse to "the value of the 
assets of the estate that were community property, or the de-
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~~ ceased recipient's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property" would also conflict with the Court's interpreta-
tion of federal law. As the Court construes 42 U.S.C. § 1396p-
(b) (1), the Department is required by federal law to seek recov-
ery of Medicaid payments from all income and resources of the 
individual and the individual's spouse. 
Of course, Respondent's point is not that the Department 
should be more aggressive in pursuing estate recovery. To the 
extent, however, that the Court's interpretation of federal and 
state statutes allowing recovery from surviving spouse's t~states 
bring the Department into violation of those statutes, those 
interpretations should at least be reconsidered. 
2. The Court's holding upsets traditional precepts of 
community property and probate law. 
It has already been explained how the Court's holdin9 
disregards distinctions between community and separate property 
and creates an incentive for married couples to divorce. It is 
not uncommon for elderly couples to get married late in life and 
it is particularly unfair in those circumstances that the commu-
nity spouse, married only for a short time to the institutional-
ized spouse, should be expected not only to contribute assets for 
the support of the spouse in the nursing home, but also de:prive 
the heirs of any expectation of receiving property from his or 
her will. After all, there is no taxation upon estates unless 
the estate is worth more than $625,000 and other types of public 
assistance an individual may receive, even if recoverable from 
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the recipients eistate, are not recoverable from the estat,e of the 
surviving spouse!. Ken Coughlin & Harry s. Margolis, Cong.ress 
Gags Attorneys, Provides Capital Gains and Estate Tax Rel.ief, and 
Tweaks Medicare, ELDER LAW REP. 3 (Sept. 1997); I.e. § 56-224. To 
require that ther community spouse's estate be subjected to in 
essence 100 percent taxation from the state for the illnei:;s of 
the spouse is cc,ntrary to the cherished role of inheritance 
elsewhere in Idaho's law: 
Older people expect that the money they have saved all their 
lives will have value in funding their retirement and in 
securing the lives of their children and grandchildren. 
People will not save for a lifetime in order to see those 
savings go down the drain in a matter of a few months or a 
few years, just to save the government some Medicaid dol-
lars. It denies the essence of the middle class view of 
American life and the American dream. 
Joel C. Debris, .Medicaid Estate Planning by the Elderly: Jl Policy 
._._, View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP., 
PROB. & TR. J. 19-20 (1989). 
. ., 
3. Implementation of the Court's holding will be di.fficult 
at best. 
Enforcement of the Court's decision will cause chaos. The 
tracking of assets over decades of time will easily consume the 
Department and create it's own inequities with some surviving 
spouse estates e:3caping estate recovery with others not. Track-
ing of surviving spouse situations would be a nightmare. As an 
example assume that the surviving spouse remarries and takes her 
husbands name. Or the surviving spouse moves out of state and 
takes these resources with her. What resources will be used and 
how will the State of Idaho track this individual's life and 
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death? Then there is the problem of enforcing Idaho's surviving 
spouse estate rEicovery rules that most certainly clash with the 
estate recovery and probate rules of every other state in the 
nation. Of course, the Department could simply not follow-up on 
the full range c,f spousal estate recovery authorized by the 
Court, but that would be contrary to the policies that purport to 
justify any spousal estate recovery. 
Conspicuous consumption and an unforeseen increase in 
Medicaid costs could result from the Court's holding. It is not 
too far fetched for the surviving spouse, once realizing that the 
assets of the recipient as well as his separate property assets 
in existence at his death will pass to the state for repa)nnent of 
the recipient's Medicaid costs, to intentionally leave little for 
recovery. There would be little incentive to save or spend these 
funds in a reasonable manner. Realizing that you can spend your 
estate but not pass it to your heirs will result in the dEipletion 
of savings and in many instances result in earlier eligibility to 
Medicaid. Just how will the Department determine, track, and 
recoup the numer,ous gifts and transfers for less than £air market 
value remains to be seen. 
In estates where a recipient's Medicaid debt exists i.n 
conjunction with the surviving spouse's estate and closely 
consumes the suriTiving spouse's estate the Department will 
increasingly be :required to determine whether or not a Will 
exists, file the probate, assume the duties and responsibilities 
of personal representative, collect, manage, and close the estate 
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of the survivin9 spouse. There would be few reasons for a 
relative to assume the responsibilities of a personal representa-
tive and endure the hassles of probating the surviving spouse's 
Will solely for the state's benefit. 
In conclusion, the Court erred in holding that under state 
law the Department may recover Medicaid payments from the estate 
of the recipient's surviving spouse. The·court's holding con-
flicts with the plain meaning of the statute, is contrary to 
legislative intemt, conflicts with the Department's own n~gula-
tions, and will lead to undesirable results. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully requests that the majority opinion 
be withdrawn and a substitute opinion issued that affirms the 
Magistrate's order denying the Department's claim or that a 
rehearing be granted upon the relevant questions. 
DATED this 20th day of July, 1998. 
Wil~r~ 
Attorney for Respondent 
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section are severable. [1941, ch. 181, § 14, p. 379; am. 1943, ch. 119, § 1, p. 
228;am.1951,ch.246,§ 4,p.520;am.1974,ch.233,§ 8,p. 1590;am.1978, 
ch. 74,§ 1, p. 148;am. 1981,ch. 121, § 1,p. 207;am. 1989,ch. 67, § 2,p. 
107; am. 1995, ch. 214, § 4, p. 742; am. 1996, ch. 50, § 8, p. 147.] 
Compiler's notes. Sections 1613(c) and 
1917(c) and (d) of the Social Security Act, 
·referred to in this section, are compiled as 42 
U.S.C., § 1382b and 1396p, respectively. 
Section 3 of S.L. 1995, ch. 214 is compiled 
as § 15-5-409a. 
. Section 7 of S.L. 1996, ch. 50 is compiled as 
§ 56-210. 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective until 
July 1, 1998.J - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with 
federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual ~ho was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
rec.eived such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if-there be no 
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
paid to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the indiv:idual may be established against the 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U .S.C. 1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by reciP,ients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
court. 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child.who is 
under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently an.d totally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c, the amount of any medical assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings an~ 
may be paid from the estate. · 
(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the re<:ipient. · 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent' 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir,. or 
assign_ of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code. 
(6) The department may file a lien against the property of any estate 
subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against real 
property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days after the depart-
ment is notified in writing of the death of the individual for whom medical 
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assistance was paid under this chapter, file the lien in the same general form 
and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3Xa), Idaho Code, in the office of 
the recorder of the county in which the property of the estate is located. The 
lien shall be recorded, indexea, and extended in the manner provided in 
sections 56-218A(3)(a) and 56-218A(5), Idaho Code. In order to perfect a 
security interest in personal property, the department shall, within ninety 
(90) days after the department is notified in writing of the death of the 
individual for whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file the· 
security interest in accordance with chapter 9, title 28, Idaho Code. Failure 
to file a lien or a security interest does not affect the validity of claims made 
pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [LC., § 56-218, as added by 
1988,ch.49,§ l,p.73;am. 1994,ch.329,§ 1,p. 1059;am. 1995,ch. 105, 
§ 1, p. 336.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef. 
fective July 1, 1998, see the following section 
also numbered§ 56-218. 
56-218. Recovery of certain medical assistance. [Effective July 1, 
1998.] - (1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal 
law medical assistance pursuant to. this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate; or if there he no 
estate the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid 
paid. to either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical 
assistance correctly paid to the individual may be established against the 
estate, but there shall be no adjustment or recovery thereof until after the 
death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only at a time when the individual 
has no surviving child who is under twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind 
or permanently and totally disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C. 1382c. Transfers 
of real or personal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district 
oourt. · 
(2) Except where there is a surviving spouse, or a surviving child who is 
under twenty-one (21) y~ars of age or is blind or perman~ntly and to~ally 
disabled as defined in 42 U.S.C-. 1382c, the amount of any medical .assistance 
paid under this chapter on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55f 
years of age or older when the individual received such assistance is a claim 
against the estate in any guardianship or conservatorship proceedings and 
may be paid from the estate. 
000359
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(3) Nothing in this section authorizes the recovery of the amount of any 
aid from the estate or surviving spouse of a recipient to the extent that the 
need for aid resulted from a crime committed against the recipient. 
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
-· individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent 
of such interest), including suc:h assets conveyed to a survivor, hei:r, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
(5) Claims made pursuant to this section shall be classified and paid as a 
debt with'preference as defined in section 15-3-805(5), Idaho Code.· 
(6) The department may file a notice of lien against the property of any 
estate. subject to a claim under this section. In order to perfect a lien against 
real or personal property, the department shall, within ninety (90) days 
after the department is notified in writing of the death of the individual for 
whom medical assistance was paid under this chapter, file a notice of lien in 
the same general form and manner as provided in section 56-218A(3) (a), 
Idaho Code, in the office of the secretary of state, pursuant to section 
45-1904, Idaho Code. Failure to file a notice of lien does not affec;t the 
,..., validity of claims made pursuant to this section. 
(7) The director shall promulgate rules reasonably necessary to imple-
ment this section including, but not limited to, rules establishing undue 
hardship waivers for the following circumstances: 
(a) The only asset of the estate provides the primary source of support for 
other family members; or 
(b) The estate has a value below an amount specified in the rules; or 
(c) Recovery under the lien by the department will entitle the heirs of the 
deceased individual to public assistance. [J.C., § 56-218, as added by. 
1988, ch. 49, § 1, p. 73; am. 1994, ch. 329, § 1, p. 1059; am. 1995, ch. 105," 
§ 1, p. 336; am. 1997, ch. 205, § 2, p. 607.] 
Compiler's notes. For this section as ef-
fective until July 1, 1998, see the preceding 
section also numbered § 56-218. 
Section 10 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 read: •Not-
withstanding the effective dates specified in 
section 1 through 9 of this act, nothing in f;his 
act shall take effect unless the secretary of 
state shall certify to the Idaho Code Comr.rus-
sion that he has received a sufficient appro-
priation to provide for the development of the 
technology required to implement the pr1Jvi-
sions of this act. If the certification is not 
made by the twenty-first day after the ad-
jourrunent sine die of the First Regular Ses-
sion of the Fifty-fourth Idaho Legislature, this 
act shall be null and void." 
The Secretary ·of State has so certified to 
the Idaho Code Commission and thus the 
Chapter 205 became effective as prescribed 
herein. · · 
Section 1 of S.L. 1997, ch. 205 is compiled 
as§§ 45-1901 through 45-1910. 
56-218A. Medical assistanc,e liens during life of recipient. [Effec-
tive until July· 1, 1998.] - (1), The department may recover and may 
impose a lien aga,inst the real property of any individual prior to his death 
for medical assistance· paid or about to be paid under this chapter on behalf 
of an individual: 
'-. 
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03.09022 -- 03.09024 (RESERVED) , 
03.09025. LIE~S AND ESTATE RECOVERY. Pursuartt to Sections 56-218 
and 56-218A1 Idaho Code; this subsecd.on sets forth the 
provisions for recovery of MAt the filing of liens 
against the property of dece<ised persons t and thei filing 
of tiems against the property of permanently 
institutionalized recipients. (7-1-9S)T 
01. MA Incorrectly Paid. The Department may, pursuant 
to a judgment of a court1 file a lien against the 
property of a living or deceased person of any age 
to recover the costs of MA incorrectly paid. 
(7-1-95)T 
02. Administrative Appeals~ Permanent 
institutionalization determination and undue 
hardship waiver hearings shall be ~overned by the 
fair hearing provisioris of IDAPA 16 t Tit:le 05, 
Chapter 03, "Rules Governing Contested Case 
Proceedings and Declaratory Rulings". (7-1-95)T 
' 03. Definitions. The following. terms are .applicable to 
Subsection 025 of these rules: · · (7-1-95)T 
a. Authorized representative. The person 
appointed by · the court as the personal 
representative in a probate proceeding or, if 
none; the person identified by the recipient 
to receive notice and make decisions on estate 
matters. (7-1-95)T 
b. Equity interest in a home. Any equity 
c. 
d. 
interest in real property recognized under 
Idaho law. 
(7-l.-95)T 
Estate. All real and personal property and 
other assets indluding those in which the 
recipient had any legal or beneficial title or 
interest at the time of deatht to the extent 
of such ihterest, including Stich A1SSets 
conveyed to.a survivor; heir, or assi9nee of 
the deceased recipient through joint bmancy, 
tenancy in common 1 survivorship; iife E~state, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
(7··1-95) T 
Home. The dwelling in which the recipi1~nt has 
an ownership interest, and which the recipient 
occupied as his primary dwelling prior to, or 
subsequent to• his admission to a medical 
institution. (7--1-9S)T 
e. Institutionalized recipient. An inpatient in a 
nursing facility (NF). intermediate care 
facility for the mentally retarded (ICF/MR), 
11 
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or other thedical .institution, who is a 
Medicaid :tec:l.pisht sUbject to post-eligibility 
treatment of ittc!oine in IDAPA16. 03. os; Rules 
Governing Eilgib:l.1:1.ty for Aid to the Aged; 
Blind ahd Disabied (AABD) • (~7-i-95) T 
Lawfully residing; . Residing in a manrb-r not 
contrary to or forbidden by iawt and with the 
recipieht;s knowledge and consent. (7-l-95)T 
Permanehtiy :l.rtstitution~lized. An 
institutionaiized recipient of any age who the 
Department has determined cannot reasot1ably be 
expected to be discharged from the institution 
and return home, (7-1-95)T 
Personal property; Any property not real 
propertyt including cash, jewelry, household 
goods, tools; life insurance policies, boats 
and wheeled vehicles. (7-l-95)T 
Real property. Any land, including buildings 
or immovable objects attached permanently to 
the land. (7-l-95)T 
Residing in the home on a continuous basis. 
Occupying the home as the primary dwelling and 
continuing to occupy stich dwelling as the 
primary residence. (7-l-95)T 
Termination of a lien. The rele,ase or 
dissolution of a lien from property. 
t.Jndue hardship. 
waiver of all or a 
claint against art 
subsections 025.25 
rules. 
{7-1-95)T 
Conditions that :justify 
part of the Department's 
estate, described in 
throtigh 025. 29 of these 
(7··1-95)T 
m. Undue hardship waiver. A decision made by the 
Department to relinquish or limit its claim to 
any or all estate assets of a deceased 
recipieht based on good cause. (7-l-95)T 
04. Notification to Department. All notif:i.cation 
reg-arding liens and estate claims shall be directed 
to the Department of Health artd Welfare; Estate 
Recovery Unit, Towers Buildingt Sixth Floor; P.O, 
Box 83720i 450 W, State St. Boise# Idaho, 
83720-0036. (1-J-95)T 
OS. Lien Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient, During 
the lifetime of the permanently institutionalized 
recipient I and subject to the restrictions set 
forth in Subsection 025. 08 of . these rules, the 
Department may impose a lien against the real 
r 
-u 
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06. 
property ol: the rec:l.p:l.eht .for.MA cbrtectly paid on 
his behalf: The lien ~hail be filed Within ninety 
(90) days of the Departinent 1s final determination, 
~ft~t notice artd bppbtttih!ty· !of· i hearing, that 
the recipient is pe:tmanehtly lhstittitionali~:ed. The 
lien shall be effective ftoftt _the.·b~gihning of the 
most recent contintiotis period. oi the recipient's 
institutionalization; but hot:. before July 1. t 1995. 
Any lien imposed ~hail tHssoive Upot! the 
recipientis discharge from the medical institution 
and return home~ (7-1-95)T 
Determination of Permanent Institutionalization. 
The Department must determine that the recipient is 
permanently ihstitutionalized prior to the lien 
being imposed. An expectation or plan that the 
recipient will return home with the suppott of Home 
and Community Based Services .shal~ -not, in and of 
itselft justify a decision that he is reasonably 
expected to be discharged to return horne. The 
following factors shall be cortsidered when making 
the determination of permanent institutional-
ization~ (7-1-95)T 
a. 
b. 
c. 
The recipient must meet the criteria fc,r NF or 
!CF/MR level of care and services as set forth 
in Subsection~ 180,03 and 160i08 of these 
rules; and (7-1-95)T 
The medical records, including information set 
forth in Subsections 180,02 and 180.01 of 
these rules; shall be reviewed to determine if 
the recipient's condition is e~pected to 
improve to the extent that he Will not :require 
NF or ICF/MR level of care: and (7-1-95)T 
Where the prognosis indicated ih the medical 
records is Uncertain or incondltisive, the 
Department may request additional medical 
informatiott, or may delay t:he determ:ination 
until the next titilization control review or 
annual Inspection of care review1 as 
appropriate. (7·-1-95) T 
07. HQJ:ice of Determination of Pe:r·manent 
Im~titutionalization and Hearing Rights. The 
Department must notify the recipient c,r his 
authorized represent~tiv~, in writing1 of its 
intention to make a det~rmination that the 
recipient. :i.s permanently institutionalized, and 
that he has the right to · a fair hear:lng in 
accordance with subsection 025:02 of these rul~s. 
This notice shall include the foJ®.owing 
information! (7··1-95)T 
-u 
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The notice shall ihfo:rmthij recipient that the 
De~atttnentts deci~ioh that he cannot 
reasortab1y be expected td be discharged from 
the medical inst:U:titibrt to return home is 
based upon a review of the medical records.and 
plart of ea.re; but that this does not preclude 
him from returriihg home kith e1ervices 
necessary to support NF or ICF /MR l,evel of 
care; and (7-l-95)T 
b. The notice shall inform the recipient that he 
or his authorized representative may request a 
fair hearing prior to the D~partmentts final 
dete±:m.ination that he · is . permanently 
institutionalized, The hot ice shall include· 
information that a pre-hear!~g conference may 
be scheduled prior to a fair hearing~- The 
notice shall inciude the ti-me limit's and 
instructions for requestihg a fair hearing; 
and (7-1-95)T 
c. The notice shall inform the recipient that if 
he or his authorized tepresehtative does not 
request a fair hearing within the time limits 
specified; his real property I ihcludi.ng his 
home, may be subject to a lien, cont:ingent 
upon the restrictions in Subsection 02S.08 of 
these rules. (7-1-95)T 
08. Restrictions on Imposing Lien During Lifetime of 
ReC!ipient. A lien may be imposed on the 
recipient's real property; however, no liert may be 
imposed on the recipient's home if any of the 
following is lawfully residing in such home! 
a; 
b. 
c. 
(7-l-95)T 
The spouse of the recipient; (7-1-95)T 
The recipient's chi1d who is under age 
twenty-one (21), or who is blind or disabled 
as defined in 42 U,s.c. 1382c as amended; or 
(7-1-95)T 
A sibling of the recipient who has an equity 
interest ih the recipient's home and who was 
residing in such home for a period of at least 
one (l) year immediately before the date of 
the recipient; s admission to the m,edical 
institution, and Who has beeri residing .in the 
home on a ccntihtious basis. (7-:t-95)T 
09. Rest:rictions on Recovery on Lien tmposed puring 
LifE~time of Recipient. Recov-ery shall be made on 
the lien from the recipient's estate, or a:t any 
time~ upon the sale of the property subject t:o the 
lierit but only after the death oft.he recipient's 
-
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surviving spouse, 
whent 
:l.f any; and only at_ a time 
(1-1-95)T 
a~ The recipient has ho · sUr\ti ving dhild who is 
tinder age tWetity~one (21); (1-1-95) T 
b. The :tecip:i.et1c has no Slirvi ving child of any 
age who is blind or disabled as defined in 42 
u.s.c. 1382c as amended: and (7-l-95)T 
c. In the case ot i lien on a re~ipiertt 1s home, 
when norte of the foliowing is lawfully 
residing in such home who has lawfully :resided 
in the home bi:1 a continuous basis sihce the 
date of the recipient's admission to the 
medical institution! · (7-l-95)T 
i, A sibH.ng of the recipient; who was 
residing in the recipient's home for a 
period of at least one (1) year 
immediately before the date of the 
recipient~ e acindssioh to the me.di cal 
inetitutiont or (7-t-9S)T 
i:I.. A son or daughter of the recipient; \tlho 
was residing_ irt the recipient's he>me for 
a period of at least two (2) years 
immediately before the date of . the 
recipientis admission to the medical 
institution; and who establishes: by a 
preponderance of the e-v-idence that he 
provided necessary care . to the recj.piertt, 
and the care he provided allow~:!d the 
recipient to remain at home rather than 
in a medical institution. 
(7-1-95}T 
10. Recovery Upon Sale of Property Subject t() Lien 
Imposed During Lifetime of Recipient, Should the 
property upon which a lien is imposed be sold prior 
to ·t:he ·recipient.' s death1 the Department shall seek 
recovery of all MA paid on behalf of the recipient, 
subject to the restrictions in Subsection 025.09 of 
these rules. Recovery of the MA paid bn behalf of 
the recipient from t&e proceeds from the s,ale of 
the property does not preclude the Department from 
recovering additiortai MA paid from the recipient's 
est~te as described in Subsedtion 025.14 of these 
rul,::is. 
(7-l-95)T 
11. Filing of Lien During Lifetime of Recipient. When 
appropriate; the Department shall file, in the 
off :lee of the Recorder of the county in which the 
real property of the recipient is locat,ed, a 
verified statement, irt ~riting, setting forth the 
following: (7-:L-95)T 
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12~ 
a. 'i'he ·. ham~ and 1ast 
recip.lerttJ etnd 
know11 address of the 
('7-l-95)T 
bi The iiatne atici address of the official or agent 
of the Oepa:ttment fiiirig the lien; and 
' (7-l-95)T 
c. A brief description of the MA received by the 
recipierlt# and (7-1-95)T 
ci. The amount paid by the Department, as of a, 
given _dal::ei abdi if. applicable, a st:atement 
that the atno~nt bf the lien ~ill inc~ease as 
long aEi MA benefits are paid ort behalf of the 
recipient::, (7-1-95) T 
Renewal of Lien !mposed DUrina Lifetime of 
RecipienL The Iieni or any ext¥nsion thereof, 
shall be ren~wed every five (5), years by filing a 
new verified sbil:.emetlt as required in subs.ection 
025 .11 of these rules,· or as required byC. Idaho 
law. (7-1-95)T 
13. Termination of Lien Imposed During Lifetime of 
Recipient. The lien shall be released as provided 
by Idaho Code> Upon eatisfadtion of the 
Departmertt;s ~laim. The lien shall dissolve in the 
event of the recipientis discharge from the medical 
institution a11d return home. Such dissolution of 
the lien does not discharge th~ Underlying debt and 
the estate remains subject to recovery under estate 
recovery provisions in subsections 025 .14 l:hrough 
025.30 of these rulesi A request for release of the 
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health 
and Welfare; ~state Recovery Unit, trowers 9u.:Llding, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. BoJt 83720, 450 Wl State St., 
Boise, Idaho, 83720-0036. (7-,1-95} T 
14. Estate Recovery. Pursuant to Sect!orts 56-218 and 
56-218A; Idaho code, the Department is requ1.red to 
recover the following! (7-1-95)T 
a. 
b. 
c. 
The costs of all MA correctiy paid on or after 
July 1, 1995, on behalf of a recipient who was 
permanentiy instituti~naiized; and (7-1-95)T 
The costs of MA correctiy paid on behalf of a 
recipient who received MA at age fift·y-five 
(55) or older on or after Jtily 1, 1994t and 
(7-l-9S)T 
The costs of MA correctly paid on behaif of a 
recipient \tlho received MA at age. sixty·-five 
(65) or older on or after July 1j 1988. 
(7-:L-95)T 
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15, RE?covery f:totrt !set.ate of Spouse. If the deceased 
rE!Cipient ha~ ho·. e~tate, recovery shall be made 
from the ~state ot hi~ eur~!ving spdUSel (7-l-95)T 
16 .. Liett Imposed Against Estate of beceaEied Recipient. 
The Department .. may impose a lien , agaittst all 
p1:·operty of the estate of ah applicable rt:cipient 
to _secure its ciaim against the estate. To perfect 
a lien the Department shal1 1 within ninety (90) 
days after the Departmertt is notified1 in writing1 
of the death bf the MA recipient~ file a lien in 
the same gene:tai f orril and manrter as prov.ided in 
Subsection 025.11 of these rules, Failure to file a 
liert does not affect the va1id!ty of claims made 
against the estate, A request for reie~se of the 
lien shall be directed to the Department of Health 
and Welfare, Estate Recovery Unit; Towers Building, 
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 83720, 450 W. State St., 
Bo.iee 1 Idaho 1 S3720-0036, (7-l-9S)T 
17.; Nod .. ce of Estate Cla.iirL The bepattment o- shall 
notify the authorized representative of the amount 
of the estate dlaim after th~ death of the 
recipient, or after the death of the surviving 
spm1se. , The notice shall include instructions for 
applying for an undue hardship waiver. 
18. 
(7--1-95)T 
Aseiets in Estate Subject to cla.i.ms. The authorized 
representative shall be hotified of the 
Department;s claim against the assets of a deceased 
:tec.:l..pient. Assets in the estate from which the 
claim can be satisfied sha11 include all real or 
personal property that the deceased recipient:, owned 
or in which he had an ownership interest~ including 
the following: (7-1-95)T 
a. 
b. 
Payments to the recipient under art installment 
conttact ~hall be included amohg the assets of 
the deceased recipient, This includes , an 
installmeht contract on any real or personal 
property to which the deceased recipient had a 
property right~ The value of a promissory 
note; loan or property agreement ts its 
outstanding principai balance at t.he da.te of 
death of the recipient i When a promissory 
note, loan, or property agreement is St!cUred 
by a Deed of Trust, the Department may ri!quest 
evidence of a reasonabie and just Underlying 
debt; (7-l-9S)T 
The deceased recipient> s ownership intert:!!St in 
an estate; . probated Qr not probated, is an 
asset of his estate wheii! (7-t-95)T 
.. 
,.-
-u 
w 
Q 
000368
.. _,.. 
,. ,') 
MEDICAL ASSISTANC:E, !DAL •. i 6 , . o 3 1 O 2 5) i 8 j b , i . 
19. 
l. 1 . · bocumertt:s · show the deceased recipient is 
-rt ~iig!bie devise~ br doriei·dt'ptbperty 
of afiothef deceased person/ br,· (1-1~95) T 
' ' . ,' · .. 
ii~ The · decet:tsed red.pieht: redei -Ved income 
from property of another person; .or 
(7-"l-95)T 
iii. State intestacy laws award the deceased 
recipient a share irl the di~ttibution of 
the property of another estate •. 
(7-1-"95)T 
c. J\hy trtlst iJ.1s.trume~t which is designed to hold 
or td distribute funds or property, real or 
personal1 ih which the deceased recipient has 
a beneficial interest is arl asset of the 
estate. ~ (7-l-9S)T 
d. Life insurance is considered art asset when it 
e. 
has reverted to the estatei {7-l-95)T 
Buriai insurance is considered an asset when a 
furteral home i~ t:.he primary beneficlary or 
when there are tinspent . ftinds in the burial 
contract. The furtds remaining after payment to 
the ftineral home shall be considered assets of 
the estate; provided no contingent bene:Eiciary 
is designated. · (7-4-95) T 
f. Checking and savings accounts which hold and 
accumulate funds designated for the deceased 
recipient; are assets of the estate, including joint accounts whicihacctimulate funds 1:or the 
benefit of the recipient1 (7-i-9S)T 
g. 
h. 
In . a conservatorship s:U:uation, if a court 
brder under state laW specificaily reiqUires 
funds be made av-aiiabie for the ca:re and 
maintenance of a recipient prior to his death; 
absent evidence to the contrary; Stich funds 
are an asset of the deceased recipient's 
estatei even if a court has to approve release 
of the funds. (7-l-95)T 
Shares of stocks• bonds and mtitual funds to 
the benefit of the deceased recipient are 
assets of the estate. The current market. value 
of all stocks; b6rlds and muttial furtds lnust be 
proved as of .the month preceding settlement of 
the estate cl~im1 (1-1-95)T 
Value of Estate Assets1 
fair market value as 
assets. 
The Department shall use 
the value of the estate 
{7-l-9S)T 
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20. LimH:atiorts -on -E!:itate claltns i - '· Limits on the 
2i. 
Department's elaitrl against the ass~ts bf a deceased 
r1:!cipient sha.11 be subje_ct to Sections 56-218 and 
56-218A 1 Idahd Cdd~, A dlaim i1diri~t ~he ~state of 
a surviving spouse of a predeceased recipient is 
limited to the vaiue bf th~ asset§ bf the estate 
that were commuhity property. · or the deceased 
rE!cipient I s share of the separate property, and 
jointly owned property. Recd-V-ery shall not be made 
until the deceased recipient ho longer is survived 
bi a spousei a child who is tinder age twenty-one 
(21)1 or a blind or disabl~d chiidt as defined in 
42 U.S;C, 1382d a~ am~rtded attdj When appiicable; as 
provided in Stibseetion 025. 09 of· these rules. No 
recovery shall be made if the recipi~ttt received MA 
a~1 the result of a crime comtrtitted agaihst the 
redipient, (7-1•9S)T 
"" 
Expenses DedUdted from Estate1 The 
expenses shall be deducted from the 
assets to determine the amount &vaiiable 
the Department's claim: 
following 
available 
to satisfy 
(7.:.l-95)T 
a. Burial expenses; which shall i.nclt.tde only 
those reasonably nece~sary for embalming, 
transportation of the _body, cremation, 
flower~, clothing; and services of the funeral 
director and staff shall be deducted, 
(7-1-95)T 
b. other legally enforceable ahd necessary debts 
with priority shail be __ deducted. The 
Department's claim is classified and paid as a 
debt with preference as defined in Section 
15-03-805i Idaho Code, Oebts of the deceased 
recipient which may be deducted from the 
estate prior to satisfaction of the 
Departmentts claim must be legally enforceable 
debts given preference over the bepartc,lent;s 
dlaim bnder Section 15-03-805 1 Idaho Code. 
(7-1-95)T 
22. Interest bn Claim. Tb$ Departmentts claim does not 
bear interest except as otherwise provided by 
statute or agreement, (7-i-95)T 
23. Excluded Land. Restricted a11otted land; owned by 
a deceased recipient who was an enrolled member of 
a federally recognized American Indian tribei or 
eligible for tribai tnetnbership, which cannot be 
soid or transferred without permission from the 
Indian tribe or an agency of the Federal 
Governmenti will riot be subject to estate 
recovery. (7-1-95)T 
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24; Marriage · .. s~tt:.1emsnt .. Act:teemiertt · · or other such 
Agreement, ;··'·.·A ·trtarriage settlement· ·agreement or 
ot:he:t such agreement: Which eeparattH:I assets for a 
lnctrried cotitslE! does not elimirtat:e the debt against 
the estat:~ bf the deceased recip_ieH-1t '·or t.he spouse. 
TrahsferEt UrtdM: a tttar:tiage s~f:tletrleht: • agreen,:ent or 
ot;her sudh t!gr~emEH1t · tnay be · voided if nlSt £ or 
adequate coi-isiderat:iorL · (7-l-95)T 
2s. Re!1ease of Estate Claims. The Oe!partment shall 
reilease a dla.im when the bepartmertt' s claim has 
been fully M~tisfi~d and . may release its ciaim . 
under the following conditions: · (7-1-95)T 
a; When an undue hardship waivet as defined in 
Subsection 025. 26 of these ±'tiles has been 
granted; or (7-1-95)T 
b. When a written agreement with the authorized 
representative to pay the Department t ;B claim 
in thirty-six (36l monthly pctyntents or less 
has been achieved1 . (1-1-95)T 
26. Purpose of the Undue Hardship Exception. The undue 
ha:rdship . exception is intended to avo:i.ci the 
impoverishment of the deceased recipient•s family 
due to the Department exercisihg its estate 
recovery right. The faet that family lnembers 
ant::icipate or expect art inheritance, or will be 
inc:ionvenienced. ecortomicaily by the · lack of an 
inheritancef is rtot cause for the Department to 
dec,la.te an Undue hardship. (7··1-95)T 
27, 
2iL 
A.Qplication for Undue Hardship Waiver. An 
applicar1t for art Undue hardship waiver must have a 
beneficial. interest irt the estate and muat apply 
fo:t the waiver Withih hlhety (90) days bf thE:! death 
of the recipient or Withit1 thirty (30) days of 
receivihg rtotice of th~ Dep4rt~~rtt•~ claim, 
whichever is later. The filihg of a elaim by the 
Dep~rtment itt a probate proceeding shall constitute 
notice to all heir~. (7-1-95)T 
Basis for Undue Hardship Waiver. 
waivers shall be cortsidered in 
circumstances! 
. tJndue ha.rdship 
the following 
(7-l-95)T 
a. The estate subject to recovery :i.s th«~ sole 
b. 
income-prodticihg asset of the survivors where 
such income is limited/ or (7-J~9S)T 
Payment of the Depar~mertt•s clai~ would· cause 
heirs of the deceased recipient to be eligible 
for public assist-ticeJ or (7~1-95)T 
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c:. The. bepart:ment. 1 s diaitif ls ie~s . than five 
hundred doilar~ ($500} or·the total assets of 
the entire estate are less thah five hundred 
dollars {$~00); exo1tidirtg·ttust. accounts or 
·other bartk accouhts1 · (7-1-9S}T 
d; The recipient received MA as the reslilt of a 
crime committed against the ±"ecipient. 
. . (7~,::J.-95)T 
29, Litn:U:ations orl bnciue Hardsh:tp . Waiver. Any 
beheficiaty of the estate of a·deceased recipient 
may appiy for waiver of the estat~·recoite±y claim 
based on tindue hardship,. Arty claiin t11ay be waived by 
the Department i partially or . fUlly, because of 
undue hardship. An undue hardshiti does hot 1exist if 
actiort taken by the recipient prior to his "death, 
or by his legal representativer. divested or 
diverted assets from the esb:ttE!, The Department 
shall graht undue hardship waivers on a case by 
case bai::lis tipon review of all facts and 
circumstances, includihg any action ta.ken to 
dim.inish assets ava.ilable for estate recovery or to 
circumvent estate recovery. (7-1--'95)T 
30. Set Aside of Transfers. Transfers of real or 
personal property of the recipient without a.dequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set a.side by 
the district court. (7-l-95)T 
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;JC'BEALTH:AND WELFARE '-~ 42.'. § 1396p 
!,,roup&--pregJWli WCIIIIIJI, reaJdnt.s Ul,•! ·z.·. CopayamOllllt ··~,:,; , , ·!· / ·, .• I 
liOIJIIIIDDl'1 residence& of Office at Mental Retar-,-, .,,. Meclic:ald JegulatiOD eatablisbing ~um -
, . . .. · ~ Office_ of Mental Health, and those, ., paymenUir in-patient hospital aenices at 55 
; ,, iziiab1e to pay; note from pregnant woman's of pa)'Dlem stat.e Dlllkea for !Ira day of in-
'il'<i5W:- was lllflelent for pluinnaelat and oth- patiellt hcleplta1 care, did not v1o1ata Medleafd 
:/·.Ii- are providers, residents were Identified by · statute requirinr c:opaymenta to be ."nomi....l In 
{ '. · · ,of eommuntiy resid~ and st.ldelnellt of . · IIIIIOIIDt"; -Congress ~ by leglalat!ve ~ 
::·~ to pay W11S IIUffil?ient. Sweeney v. · . actment 811d ratlfieation, regulatory definittcm 
if;_ .. C.A.2 (N.YJ 199ll, 996 F .2d 1384. . .. . . promulgated by ~ _of Health and Human 
' . ,. ·. ·• · · · · · · · · · ·· · ' "· Senices. Kansai Heap. Asa'n v. Whiteman, 
ebrallka'a uulatlon of flat.rate copayment · D.Kan.191N, 861 F.Supp. 401·. " ·:.· -
·· _, for. Medicaid reelpients' preaeription. . . • · 
· · .... ,_ '-'·h _...,_ ..:.. .. ,...,, · ...... _ _, ded .. Hospltsla eBtablisbed that they would be II'-
,·· . , w "'"" a.,.._,IS ....,....,.. """".....,.u · reparably harmed it proposed incnlle In Medlc-
··/~rtom'r ealeulatton, Medicaid rveiplent.1 DOt ~ . · aid copay imount of IDpatlent hoepital HrYieea 
.\'i!Scjand to make ~ent,-eoutltuted. vlolatlon · · were allowed to taJca effect, aa required for 
:':J(_n,gulation requiring stat.a to det.ermfne aver~ . tA!mJlOl'V'Y ft8tnin!ng Older; hospitals C!OU!d not c~-or typical payment for .. ~ee; . ~on deny senfeeB w eligible bene&iarfes due to 
f.:i/iii\{~ ~ of pmons melving Medieaid pre- their inab11tJ to pay raqulred copay 1111ount, but 
;;,~ icriptlo11 aaalstanee was required In detenninlnr .. would. be barred from 8Ufng at.ate from damaglB 
:!t'l;•mrap. ·Nebnaka Pharmaclatl Asa'n, Inc. v. ·· lfit-turned·oat that proposed eopayrequlrement 
· braaka •Dept. of Soda! Serrieea, D.Neb.1994,· was exceaalve. Xallau Hoep. .A.tin v. White-
;Supp, 103'1. •,, · ' .. _,, _ man, D.Kan.1993, 836 F.SUpp. 1548._ .- .: 
· ·,,*.," ··'/ i • { :· ' .. ~ ~.~R:. : .. ::~i\'.:' :-1: ,,' "\ .;:•r~ ~ .. ; 1 •• • ,·, ·: ~:1·. , . " 
i . .,. ··139&p, Liens, acijustnaenta and reeaveries, and tnnsfen ofaueta ···, · · -, '· ' 
:i~.:::ril::· ·:· .. -·::-.~ ... --;: ·: /: / ·.,·. ,.: ··. ,. .:· :. ·. ==:···:'--·-:,. _.,, · 
:it<~pnpo!ltion of lien against property of an individual on· ~~unt _of medical 
tfli.;.,.-~ .. , &11111tanee rend~ to him under a State p~, _1 • • : , 
.~•r.:t ' • •• • ' •' • ' ••• I • " ,I·!..;,~, n,.,, $E:ft!9',!)&.1 I (' 
'
14!: (1) No lien may be imposed against the property·ohny Individual prior to his death 
~pn ,account of medical assistance paid. or to be paid ~n,_¥,!_ behal[ µnder the State plan, 
'-, excei>t- . : - ·: . ' '· .. ' ... '. . : :.~;;.:.,;('. ·'.[ ::··, ,: .. .. : .. ' 
. l'fr~ ... (': (A) pUl'BWIDt ~ the j~dgm!91~ ,or a court .o~. '~'- ¥..~eJita ln~y paid 
~; •• ·-on behalf of such mdividual, or· .• '. ... :, :- '. . ' w• " ..... ·- . . . . -
·;J;~:;;:·CB) in the case.of.the real~~'~{~ ~diyl~~~~;_:::;,;:.. . __ ·:,\ : . · _ 
·~·!P.1..l.:-, · (1) who is an inpatient-in a nursinglacility,-iatermediat.e care fadlicy for the 
::;i;,~!l~. mentally retarded, or other medical institution, if-such Individual la nquired, u 
;~\'lo";, a condition or receiving services in slJCb inatitutio~. under the State plan, to 
···< · ,, spend for costs of medical !!are all but a ininimal ·amOUDt'9i'_hls income _required 
· 'r::· ., ~or.~n~ ne.~ and. , .,., ... , . . .... ,... . .. · ., .. ·:" .i, ·.:: ..• , , .. 
;..,\ .. Cd). with respect to whom the State .dt!terminea, after notice and opportunity 
,;-- · for a hearing (in accordance with procedures esta)>liahed by ~e State), that he 
· _,_ cannot reasonably be expected_ to be discharged from the medical institution 
..... andt.oreturnhome, --·--:":"'·.·,,, ,,. ':· .-:···--· .. ,··1' ·,,,.:,.,. ;.- ,.,) 
-. ~~pt aspnwided inp~pb cij; ·"~·-· t·,: '·' h-·.1wi1,·i/ .. tl -, :·:. ·w.,,, 
. . ,,. ~ .• ··~! ., .. :.-~·,;.: ~ ....... ., ..... ,;~:-:cc.t.:i,:.,;t··--~r,.:_~it'~',,-':'" 
2) No lien may be imposed under paragraph U)(B) .on such individual's .home if- . 
r::c. CA) th1i'spouse of such individualt· ·' · · · · i;,;•·· ·.i:;.':i .. .,_.,,, ,· :s"·: ~:··:,.~ 
-''· CB) such ·Individual's child \,Vho ia under age 21,-or (wfth·reapeet to States eligible 
s,; to participate bi the State· program established under subchapter XVI of thia 
chapt.er) is blind or permanently and totally disabled, or (with respect-to Stat.es 
2 which are not eligible to participate in such program) fs blln~ or disabled as defined 
): ,in section 1382c oft!»,i title, or .:. :~,i:,: ,::;• · :· ,,.1 ,; _;f;'.;;:; :<:;;;·,,·::.;; · ., .,~ ·' .. : . : 
y .. · ( C) a sibling of such individual (who has an equity interest in such home and who 
X/ was residing in such individual's. home for a period of at least one year immedia~y JiJ,, .. before. theda.te or ~e in~'1~ual's ~sion;~ ,~,~~~,ins,ti.~~~~~· .,-' . i ., , . )J~ lawfully residing fn such home. · · ::.. .. , , . . , .. : 
~ (3) Any lien imposed .with respect to an individual pursuant to paragraph (l)(B) shall 
,ldissolve upon that individual's dlscharge from the medical ins1itution and return home. i.,.., '. ,.: .... ,,.,, .. , .. <-_; .. ;.:,. ,·J "'I·~·:··.~,,~:·:·, ./.' . ,. 
k.,{b) AdjU&tinent or recovery of medical assistance· correctly paid under a State plan 
• ., .. ~· • ,.. • • • • • , . • J •• : . -. :\ •••• :.-..:., L,., ; : 'l'I 
~-J (1) No adjuatment or recovery or any medlt:.a.l assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
~an- individual ·under the State plan may be rnade,· except·tbat. the State shall seek 
fac!justment· or recovery of any medical. assistance eo?Ted;]y. paid on behalf' of an 
~'.; individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
R :'.:257 
, ...... 
) 
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?42'.,.§ 1396p 
(A) In the ease of an individnardescribed in aubsel!tfon (a)(l)(B) of this section,/ 
•. ,,.the State shall seek adjustment or reroveryfrom the individual's estate orupon sale . 
. , :_::: c,f the property subject t.o a ·uen imposed on account 1>f medical assistance paid.Con} 
· ::,::;.icbe~,ofthe indivi~~; -:, · · :·· .•·; ) < -.--;· ,i;:.i:'. ::,.·:\\,;:\\,:,·:'.:,'.a~-,'. :·:::;f 
• • :, . ..-:, ,1. (B) In the case .of an individual who was 65 years oC.._age_ -0r !)lder. when ~e : 
,:·,:-:.•individual received such medical assistance, the State-shall seek adjustment;;,.or:;; 
· ': '· --~:recovefy from the individual's estat.e, but Ollly for medical ·aseistance consisting',qf-:\ 
''. : ·, .· '(I) -n~g facility ~cea. home and co~unity-b~ servi~;and rela'iea''' 
hospital and prescription drug services or :.. · ": · ·. -:o· .. ::. ,. :' " , .• ,. • .• ··., a ? ;' 
., ... _,,,_ · . (ii) ~-t ~e '>ption of'the State, ariy ~ or_s~~under)Jte·~-~te !>1§~~< 
, ( C)(i) In the case of an Individual who has :received (or la entitledc to receive) , 
. benefits under a long-tenn care insurance policy in connection with which aaset.s· or 
-resources are disregarded in the manner described in dause (il),·except as provided · 
in such clause, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the indivi~~ .. 
. . estate on account of medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual for D1J!'31:11g 
• facility and other Jong-term care services. ·.: . ., , .; ... : .. ,:: . "" !'. ,; ·':?,:.~.:".' . 
· · (ii) Clause (i) ahaJl not apply in the case of an individual who received medical :. 
assistance Ullder a State plan of a State which had a State plan amendment . 
approved WI of May 14, 1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or_ 
reeouree.s-,.; I~ • ,.,. ~ - ···:: ·:::-,:. -. ~ "': :·.:''':: ~ "-~ .:; •. :rr:::-,ii:~ .. ,t ·,..i. ·.~ •• .- .;:·-'~ :~..:_ } _/·::,1 
(I) to the extent that payments are made under a long-term care insurance 
·policy;or , .. ·:~,,,-,, ·· ..• ,, .. <·-;,>:::~i,,: .,,-~_,··;·h.;,;;J,;.( 
(II) because an indiridual ~ received· (or is ,mtitled !il' receive) benefits 
under a long-term care insurance policy.. ..:. · .. ; : -~· , :-: . • . : : if-/ 
'(2)-Any' adj~tcie~t'or reco\i~r:/und~ paragraph (1) may be'made only ~_-f.be."' 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, iC any, and only at a time- ' · s.X!:t • .;, 
· ·· ,·''<A> ·when he~, n~,:~viiig cliild who is\mder. :ige 2i.'};r _(wit!i'respect ~: 
St.ates eligible to participate in the. State program · established under subchapte(. 
XVI of this chapt.er) is blind cir permanently and t:Dtally disabled, or (with respect to} 
States which are not eligible ·to partfcipat.e in euch program) is blind or disabled as 
_ . detinedin-sectfon1382cofthistitle; and·_,,£,t ··,-:- .. ,~:, > .. ::.·;-xi ,l,,r.,;r;·, ,;,)lf 
--~- '..'.\·1 (B) in the case of'a lien on an individual's honie imde:rsubsectiori (a)(l)(B) of this' 
· .~i~--seetion,when- ,.-.1,•·H:.:.. d·.;:~u1;.;~ ·~ _.,;.i •. ;(··-,-.:.:~·~ .• , :~:·~~:rl ~ _:·:·:._<: -~~~~r!:-~,~-~ --·+~i~ 
, .. , . . . " (i) no sibling of the ~dividual (who was residing in the individual's home foi: .. 
· · ·." a period of at least one year immediately bef'ore the date- of ·the individual's 
· · admission t.o the medical institution), and · , ... - · " ,.:. :. --- ,._ ~,, .• : , '!\ 
, • '• :!1- "' ·:- , ~ . ·: · ..... • ~ ; l -~·· \1••••'1 · .•. : .,, ·······: ...... '· ·:-~~" ~J 
(ii) no son or daught.er of the individual (who ·waa residing in the individual's i 
home for a period of at least two years)nµnedi,at.ely before ~~·da~, of'.th.f 
individual's admission. t.o the medical institution,· and who establishes to the, 
-- ;. ·.· satisfact:ion ·of the State that he or she provided care to such individual ;yhich/· 
permitted such individual to reside at. homEI rather than ,_in:,.~ instituti~} '-
. ,,,;· .is lawfully residing in such _home .w:ho has lawfully r,isiged in ,such: ~ome on,) 
-.,:~ : . ~ontinu?us·, basis since: the .:da~ ;,C!,f .~~~.inc;im.dµal's ~~, ¥> .. the :!Dedi~t 
.:.,, ·mstitu.tiOn. · ... ,•;., ·:.:. .;L, :: .. ~:L ·-f~;::;.:,q ~)~w.-;r-:=l . ."':-:·.1ur~.-, ... ·: ··:1 !:;rt!~t! ;.;_,_:_.,.__ .. ,,,.:-.;:..:---:...: .. : ... :f~1i 
.. , '·'ca) The State ~cy sh~ establish· proceduriis {in accordance with standard.a s~': 
fted by the Secretary) wider which the agency shall-waive the applieation~of.~. 
·aubsection (other than paragraph (l)(C)),ff such application would work.ali .. ~~118..--
;, hardship as determined on the basis of eriteria established by the Secretaey. ·, :,., :,, " itt~ 
(4) For purpooe1;-'i thls:·;~1,s~on','·ij;~- t.erm· 11~te", -~th: respect tci··fdec~: 
.. indfv:iduaJ-- . _ . . . ,.,~-re,.; i:.~.:-' 1 r.•.! :J:;.,:l!!:,i'l ,:iC.,THilJ_ ~\:f._ 
.: ';'.:·'.!·,(A) shilllinclude all rea1·anc:t ·pei-sona1 property and other-assets included:witJiitl. 
·.,:~·,r: the Individual's estat.e, as defined for-purposes of State probate law; and· ~--:')l!.ru~Jtk 
. , . (B) may in"'ude, at. ~ (?p1;i~~ of ~ St.ate (and &ti~- jnclude, in ~e ~ ~Ill:'!•'. 
' lndMdual · to whom · paragraph '(1XCXO' ·applie.s), iIJ.y other· real' ·lind perao11111 ·, 
· ; property and other assets in which the individual had-any legal .title- or interest .lit.;, 
, ''the time of death (to.the extent of sueh.,intaest), including·such-aasets,conv~,,. 
: , a survivor, heir, or assign or the deceased indMdual through joint t.eDaney. ,· 
In common, survivorship, life est.ate,' living trust. or otller: arrangement.::!.!l:;;i:·.-,i ·. 
;7258 
000375
! PUBLIC. HEALTH AND WELFARE 42 § 1396p 
' · (e) Taking.Into account certain trans.fen.of asseta.,~i!,,.::j ,rr,., .;.,,::- ;ir<; ·,., ;', .. 
' '<IXAnn''ordei to l?Jeet the requlrementa of t.bis"Biibilecl!on;toi"pu:rposes' of section 
1396a(a)(18J of this titJe, the State plan must provide that lf an inatitutionaliud 
/•individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, _at ~e .option of a State, a noniruldtu-t!onalized individual or the spouse of such an indMdual) disposes of asset.a for leM than 
fair market value on or after the look-back date specified in aubparagraph (13)(i), the 
, individual :Is ineligible for medical 8!18iatance for services deac:r:ibed in subparagraph 
( C)(i) (or, in the caae of a noninstitutionalized individaal. for the services desaibed in 
subparagraph {C}(ii)) during the period beginning on the date specified in subparagraph 
(D) and equal to the number of months specified in subparagraph (E). , . · . 
\ (B}(f) The look-back date specifled in ;this '.subparagraph fa a <hlte that ls" 86 months 
. (or, In the case of payment.s from a trust or portions of a trust tliat are b'eated as assets 
'disposed of by the individual pursuant to paragraph (3)(A)(ili)'or (8)(B)(fi) ofsubsection 
(d) of this section, 60 months) before the date speclaed In 'clause (li). ;.. ;,. :. : . :,, 
'cu)._Th_ edatespeclfi,.edlnthlacla~ ~th·..::.s·····.;.·;:ft·~:,:i_\•'\'_';,:_· .. ~, ,;:._,, . 
, . · ...• ,, "&•. ,, .,..,_,pe~l,i, ~ ·:~ .'i°,.,,,;1•;<.~ .. ·I• - :1_-sr 
:· (I) an institutionalized Individual isJbe i5rst date as of which-the individual both 
Is an institutionalized individual and has applied far medical assietance under the 
.State plan, or .. .. . .. _ .". ,,·r:""'··,. -: ·;, ; . ., .... , .. ; .,.. .,, ,.. ,, ., , .... · 
.. (II) a noninstitutionallzed individual is the date on:_which the individual applies 
for medical sssistance IDlder the State . plan· or, · if later, the date on which the 
individual dlspol!l!ll of assets for lesa thatif*.market !al_uei,;; _ 1,, •• . ", 
( C)(l) The semcea described ln thfs !lllbparagraph with respect to an insdtutionaliz.ed r W &re the foJlowfng: :, •.'. •;.•; . ; .. ";;;;:;;c",I:.! <, ,. '" 
i '1 -'tD Nursing f'ac:illty services. --·-· :.: !i ; , .. 
-; (11) A level of care In any" Institution eqwvalen.t t.o that of ll11l'Sing facility 
services. :r.:..r.,~,:.:. ; ..•. ,:·~·-,:~:·,l:. --~·; ~:\ .,;;;<:J-:' 
"-·: (Ill) Home or commmiity-based &el"lices i'unmhed 1111dera waiver granted under 
subsection (c) or (d) ofsection 1396n of this title • . _;:.,,,; A:,i ,.:, •j .• ; .·c 
(U) The services descnl>ed in this subparagraph-with respect to·a noninstitutionall?.ed 
individual are services (not including any services described in clause (i)) that are 
'eaaibed ln paragraph (7), (22), or (Z4) of section 1396d(a) of this title, and, at the option 
~ & St.ate, other long-term care services for which medical- assistance is otherwise 
.. 11ailable UJ1der the State plan to individuals requiring long~lar!Jl-care. \,., . : ,, ; 
. <D> The 'date speclfled ln tbla eubparagrapn ls the' fim day of.the f1rst month during 
'aft.er which assets have been transferred for less,than fair market value and which 
1ea not occur In any other periods of ineligibiµty under- tbill subsection. H::ii .. 1; :-·:i 
(E)(I) Wlth•·respect to 'an institutionalized ind!vidual/thet·:numl:ier·:of rno11ths of 
neligibillty under this subparagraph ror an Individual shall be:.equal ~ '· :. · ·. ·· · 
' (J) the to~,' cumulative uncompensated valde o't all ll!lsets tranaferred by the 
. individual (or individual's spoUlle) on <1r after the· look-back·. dat.e specified In 
'·_'aubparagraph@({j)• divided by·: . ·. ·_· ... '.3.:._ ';' ·1?":··:"'.,.-:, .:·_"'•-:,: ;,··.·· •: . ·, · 
,. ''(llFthe iverage monthly'eoaflio a private patient of mirsfngfacJllty senlces in 
1
, • ·the State (or, at the option of the State, in the community in which t!ie indivi~ual Is 
institutionalized) at the tbne of application. · ·"'": ·· · 
1- ., '" ' • • -(11) With respect to a iloninstltutionalf fildhifdual,· the number of months of 
iellglbllity under' this subparagrapb_t'or. a1i' indMdual aball not be grster than':a 
1~-~1~~ ~;~:~1~~~~~~--;~~-:-~·lii ~'.~~1~;~c/~·:~. 
' individual (or Individual's 'spouse) on· or after the _lciok-baek date·~~peeified In 
. l!'Jbparagraph (B)(l), divlded by . ' ' . ! •• •• •• :--·:: • 
, L/:CB) tbe'avet'liie morithly:coit to a private patient of liuiiring facility'aemees in 
: the St:at.e (or, at the option olthe· St.at.e. In the community in'vmfch the indlvidual fa 
1inst:ltutionalh:ed)attbetfmeofapplieatlon; · - t·•' ... ,. · , .. ,;,,::,•,\ ·,· · · ·:·.···:. ··· 
": . , . • .• , .. : • . •• ;# ' ,; ' ·: . . '. ·~ ": ' •. •. i "I •• : ~·L 'l-·: ',i i. I .,', • ~ • I 
UH) """e number of months of Ineligibility otherwise determm~ under _cla1a. (1"') .or 
r~to::,::!s:r:::::ti;~~::~:fi:·~~;-~e 
• 1number· of months of ineligibility applleable to the. :individual. oder elaue,('li) aa a 
· result of such disposal, and . " . · 
,:259 
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["(5);-:fu this imbeecition.:tlie:.term:"resources". has the meaning .given such ,t.erm in 
~=£ 1382b _o~~ ~-tJe,.'.witJioat ~: w,the excl~~· d-:S~ in sub~on (a)(l} 
! iiO·:'rteabneii;~;~~::~:;;,t;::!\:'.:~:}c-'.,;,-'.'\J .. : i: .. ,\'.~t::;} .·:1'.·;:· J:,i''~- . 
j _(1! For purpoae8:~f' d~~1aii'.'in~~uiil's eligiliility'f'cir;'6r'.iii:iiowit of, benefita 
under. a Stat.a plaiiwider this-~pterrsubjeet to'paragraph (4), the rules specified in 
: pa1'3graph·cs> shall app1y·w·a_trust established by such Individual. - ,., . · · ·. . . · ... 
1 ;•,•ti'i..')•.\,JC.~··J(.I•'': .. __.l'Ar.•7'f'•1-:r;,4 ':_;,",''-' '-•".•! •',,.,.,.,:,.,,.;..,,!•"• ·, •·•:, 
I (~)(A) Fo. r purposes"of .this. siiliaectiori;. an Individual shall be' corisidered to have 
,stablished a triist·if'aiiiet.a 'oftlie Individual were used t.o' form ·an or part of the COrpu8 
. of the trust and ifanyof the following· individuals establlslied such trust-i1ther than by 
will:-<. · ·: :··_1. ,,'!.::·~·,"'.~~;-_ ·.-~::•::,: · ::,·:·,·~~" ····, ·.,;.'.'.:;·ri,::: .,: ·-'·:· .. ,, . 
. (i):The'l.DclividU:a:L··;'. . ,';:j•:··-~,,(f! \·,. ,--~11_;·:r--:··,.-··: ,·;.<"'" 
:_,:~ (ii) Th~-bi'diridwil's spo··· wie; >/'~n·. ;;;; . ' ---~- :,.·_.: .. : - . :.:: ;. ,' ..... : ·. . . 
. . (iii) .A peri6~::%cl'liding'a;~urt:or ~e ~y, d iepl authority to 
I • act in place of or 011 behalf of the· individual or tb.e individual's spouse, ' 
I··' · :(Jv)·.-A person; mcluding any court or administrative body,.acting at the direction 
i '· '-'or upon the request. of. the individual or the individnal'e,spowie •. _,.:, ; , ·. 
(B) In the· _case cir_ a 1riiiit the . corpus of which includes assets of mi individual (as 
-l
1
et.ermiried under subpangraph (A))"iuid assets of any other pe1'!IOJl or persons, the 
~onil of,this'_liubseetion ~ ·apply,to the portion of the trust attributable to the 
IIIM!til ofthemdividuaL ·t·• .,:1.i,:,,_,·.·::,:::t ::·.::·, , · ... /· , .. ; :.,;.,- '._'·: :::.- '."'.· .. :::--~ ·. 
(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply without regard 00.:..: 
· \d> iii~'.~'r~r~~ at~(~ 8-stal?~ed; ; . :·~~:=;;,,/: t· : :-- , · 
,,i-,. Jil) w~ether __ t:fl~  ~ve o~ ~~ ~ ~ti-~n im,der the trust, 
' - ; ·-(ili}-any ~ctions on :when. or whether_ distribJ?,t;ions may !>e __ ~e from the 
. trust, or ,. :_,.•.~- ·.. .:~,·~.--•~i:";..•-.. ~~- .. ~-.···:~·i~· -~JbrYU ,~;;:.iti_ 
I ;(~;(~~?'~~~~~~~~:;;;~'.~::~~~;:.~,;~·~;:-:,:r:·:· __ :·_:· ,:, . 
.. . '.t (1)1 the ·corpus of t.h""ii tmat'ehall' be considered resources available t.o the individu-
:". '··i ~· ·il;., :~:.,: ~-;,1._,~)_:,;{~' ;!c;·.· 1)-(.!.:lic:::1!·.\~:!tt .;a· :...:i.1),---,~~=-~.i ·; :1 :!:..; -~i-~.~;~~i\rl -~,. ;ri..:.: , . '.·:.. '. ·.~ 
I . (ii) payments from the trust t.o· or for the benefit' of' the individual shall be 
[;· 'COosid~ income.~t.he~dual,. ~~: '.~1e: ·'.. _; l,,i;:;;i :,· ·,;,..;-C:' ii,. ·,:.: :~ 
• ·'···~··: (Ui)"··aey ·otber payments from-the trust shall be considered·88Sets disposed of by 
, · th~ mdividual for purposeii_of subsection (c) of this section. · .. -, .. r::,:', ,. 
I (B) In.the Clise ofiul irrevocable t:nist-
1_ • • . . ,; ' • • ', • . • • • - . : • • . . • ' • • • • • : ,.,. '.f . ,' '•-.~~ . ' 
1 : • (1) if there are any circumstances under which payment from the trust could be 
· made t.o or fm: the benefit of' the fndividaali the portiQn of' the corpus from which, or 
'··' the inco,m,e_p~ ~~ ~~.from whicll, pa~';D~ to ~e indfy.!dual co,uld. be made s~all 
I .,be conB1d~ ,,.esourcea available to the mdiVJdual, and paymenta from ,that portion 
! ;.,ofthe,~_qrJ.~c9rn~i; -~·: ;,/:hi;/;.:; ,:,;!;-~. ,~i;;r_::.~·i::1:·l,-;i~' ;;:::i:,;; ::'.:.,::;:.·.:, 
. (~>. to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be _consi~ income. of the 
1 mdividual,and · · .:~~:t':-'."-o:.!r. t!::.ii_;~f-·_.-t\.:.:·, ~:.£,: ~--- ~.-:>-~·ifi-./j}(r• -,.<: . .,,_.·· ( ·. 
I . , : , ,, , • (II) for any other _purpose, shall be considered a transfer: of asset.a by the 
l .. ': ; ·.: individual iiiibject:tii stlbsection (c) of this section;' arid \ . ~ ·J." ' .· . 
,·,,1,;,'4 ~.·. , •• :~'.!l.~ .. ·.,.•·,.:,,,:_-,,J\·•(,;1;, '·,~Ai," ,:,;_.;<•,:. ', .... , !',)·oJ:~,.i . .,'""'1 ·\~"•;t7t'1!\:,,!_. ·: , 
. . (u) any portion of the trust from which,. or any fricome on tiie ~orpus from which, 
,nt1_ payment ,could under any circumstances be made to the individual shall be i . considered,;'as: of the dai2 of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the date on 
:· whicli payment 'to~ the individual was foreclosed) ti, be. ·asset.a· disposed by the 
'· ':individuaUor purposes of'~on.(c) ot: this section,,and the ~ue. of_the trust 
shall be determined f'or purposes of such subsection by including the amount ~f any 
1 ,· payment.a made.from Sllch portio11 of the trust afte1: such date. . .·· ,. 1"" · - "··. ,,·•!'' .... ,.~~--~·.· -· ..... _ ..... ,~. · .• ,:,..,..·J·ad., •.• , ,,~·.•,,.J_.Lu;,.., ..•.• .'.-::o., tn.·.r.:.! 1-:;· . :.,a; 
!c4j: -This su~oi:J.,shaU not apply t;o;any otthe following trusts:,r,;.i: ~i -,f ;, : · .. . 
'·;:.,.;(A); A tfu.st'con~ the assets ·ot an individuahmder· age 66 who- is disabled 
1
'1& defined iri 'section' l382c(a)(3): of this title} and 'which, is E!i!tablished · for the 
Jiefit of such-indmdaal by a·parent;,grandparent., legalguardian_ of the individual, 
iWa court if the Stat.a will receive all amounts remaming ~#)e trust.upon the_,death 
. .'..261 
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. ' . '. of such individual up to an' amount eqaal to the total medical assisbmce. paid on'} 
. · '· ; behalf af the:individualunder a State plan under this s11bchapter.'.1-:>·, -,,,,: ·- ,;_:.,:·.-1,iiii>. 
(B) A t.nlBt established in a State for the benefit ofan Individual if- : ., . ., ' r:it/ 
(0 the trust is composed only of pension. Social l¾eurity, ··and. other mco~{ 
.. ,,.. to the individual (and accumulated income in the trust), . . . · . .. , .. ·;:.':'. 
-, , ··· · · . ,· ·--··· · •. ·-·.'·:·: .· .. :. "i.:'.· :~.'·.,'-.. '..:~~,.· -:~,; -;,,-:.;;r: "".'•' '\ .. )", ,·:, ,,}~--
. - ;;,::.o '_'. (ii) the State will receive .all amounts l'\!mainlng iii the trust upon the death:. 
· of such individW!1 up to an amount ~. t.o the _total zriedf~ ~tan~-~~ .on 
, behalf of the Individual under a State plan under this subchapter, and · : _. "::_\. 
• • . . ': ': .,_ • ', .. , · '. '. ·• '.; ., :-:; . · ,., , '--,,f,~' ." ;: " : • I~ ,, : "· · ·: "( ', '. .j' ~ • "._ 1 • _' 
. , (iii) the State makes medical assistance· available to Individuals described iii 
section.1396a(a)(l0)(A)(ll)(V) of this _title;· but does·not"niake such assistance· 
available to individuals for ·nursing· facility · services under sectlon 
· 1396a{a)(l0)(C) of this title. · · . · .. · · :::; 
: - , 1 .,~. '. ; , 1 ~ I ,., f\ ' ~ ' ,. 
(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who is disabled (as defined in 
section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) that meets the following ~om: . · . . •-· . 
' ' . (i) . The ti-ust is established and managed by a nonp,,fit'~tio;;:_' . ' .. , -, .., 
(il) A separate account Is maintained for each beneficiary of the trust, but, 
for purpose& of investment and management ol'. funds, the trust pools these 
accounts. .... .;-_., _ " _ , . _ _ , ,·. ·, ,.,_,,-.,:·,·: 
(HI) Accounts.In the trust are established solely for the benefit of individuals 
who are disabled {as defined in section 1382c(a)(3) of this title) by the parent, 
grandparent, or legal guardiBn of such lndlviduals, by such individuals, or by_ii 
. ·court.-=,,_ . . . . . .. : '. ' - .. 'c,:,· .. 
(iv) Tei the extent that amounts remaining in the beneficiary's account upon 
the death.of the beneficiary are not retained by the trust, the trust paya t.o the 
Stat,e from such remaining amounts in the account an amount equal to the total 
·~ amount of medical assistance paid on behalf of the beneficiary under the State 
plan under this subchapter. , · · · -- · 
-(5) The State ~~ idlal1 ~b&h p~edures (hi· llCC<irdan~e ·with staridlU"ds ~~ 
fled by the Secretary) under which the agency W&Nes the application of thls .subsection 
with respect t,o, an· Individual if the individual est.ablishes. that such, application would 
_ work an undue hardship on the Individual as determined on the basis of criterla 
estsblished_bytheSec:retary.,_-,,;-." ,-:; ·;tJ>··i·)..·_ .. ,,._·;- ,.;,;; , :,-.·-;-,:.-;i;:i-. ,:: 
(6) The term "trust" includes any legal instrument cir· device that ls ~·to a trust 
but !Deludes an· annuity only, to such extent .and-, in such manner aa. the Secretary 
Specifies. ;:·):S:'.:7T. · ; \, ... , :i ':~--~c~(~ it, ·)~ -;,••/ · ', n .. ,;,:~ . 
:(e) ~IU~,; '"!'.t'-' ··:"/::. .,;~ ,:·, , , .,;, ,-;~;~;::z~~'.~;~~:'./?:,;:? ,, ,,, , ,. "· _ 
: In this section,.thetollowlngdeflnitiona·shall apply: ,,: 11,;.·-. ·, · ... -: ,,_ ., •. ,; ,,,~.-, 
· ': ·':(Ij The·---.. 11&~11rtii", with respect to :an iric&7idual, includea·illl income and 
resources of the individual and:oft-.he Individual's spouse; includlng-llllY income or 
resources which the individual or auch individual's apouae is entitled to but ·does no; 
receive.because of action-·- ::,/: ·,:t1:-'.\ "d:_ ,c :,i: , -, : ·,:,, -~ ·. ·.·, ·- •. , , J 
. · . (A) by the individual or such individual's apowie. . ,:.::; · i,c,::,:·;•'.,ir: . 
"·.' :_::,,~:--:,~ ,· ···.s 1 :.::, ,. .. , ~ ••• ,, , , .,.. ·.,:< "-q~:;,· ,• .· •-· .. l •• ; .,,;.. ~- ·• 
·, · · ·cB) by a peraon, inchidlng.· a court or administrative body, _with lega 
... : ;' ~.,authorjty ~.act iii place of or o,n,~ehalfof th~_individ~ or a~ individual', 
; :: : !P0~.-~r:~·:··;.,.·-:;::; .. :;. ~~:t·.;:, .. ··. '' ' .. : ':_; ';',, .. : '. .. ' .· , . 
. , ,,> ,.,!.:(C) by·any person, including any court or administrative body, aeting at th 
,,-: · : '1dlirectlon. or,.:.upon the ,request .. of the individual or such. individual's spouat 
. ''(2fThe t:.erm'"income" has the meaning given 8!llch term.in secti~~-188ia of th; 
::"(~ ~title:,·-.T~(• .. ·.;_i-. ·>~J.~,i:/_-:~F: ·•,.: '.°!,}r,!':°'"~·,.:· :. • .. :.:~.": ..... r'(."•.~: :-.""'.;jq_ 'f,~·• ;;.!;,r1-:r:-:J::.:; .. ~·/ ;::l~.:i;~ • 
. (3). The term "imititutiona&ed 0indlvidual" mew an !Ddividual 'who js':'an inp 
tient in a nursing facility; who is an inpatient · in a medical institution and wj, 
.. respect- to :whoDl payment is ,made pased . on a level of care provided in a nursil 
_.,,. facility, or.wh.o is described in,section 1396a(a)(l0)(A)(ii)(VI) of this title • . : ·. - . 
' ,:; ; ; :m The 'term -~oruniltitutio~alized individual":~~eans an individual ~~ 3J 
L. • '·of the servfces'speeified ID subsection (c)(l)(C)(ii) of'this section.;,: .. 0!i :1°;,;1,i .; :--, 
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i ! ·,,,r>_(o) 'The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in section 1382b of 
· :. '1 this 'tjtle;i without- .regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to the' 
.'~ exclusioii-deairibed in subsection (a)(l) of such section. ' .. ,. . ,. '. _':: 
I (Ang. 14, t~'.~58i:'n&~'·§ 1917,~'.;.id~ SepL 3,'i91iz Pu·bt 97~, '.fitle I,,§ l~(b), 96 
1 Stat. :no, and amended·Jan.12, 1983, Pub.L. &7~ Title III. §'309(b)(21), (22), 96 Stat. 2410; Dft. 
1 22, 1987, Pab.L. -1~. ·Tltle IV, § 42ll(h)C12)(A), 101 Stat. 1330-20'1; Dec. 22;'1981, Pub.L. 
, loo--203, Title JV;.§ 4211(h)(12)(B), as amended July 1, 1988, Pub.L. lro-360, TitlelV, § 411(0(3)(1), 
'.. 102 Stat. 803; July 1, 1988, Pub.L. 100-360, Title III, § 30S(b), lO'Z Stat. 7.60 •. Oct. 13, 1988, Pub.L. I 100-,486, Title Yk § 608(dl(l6)(B), 102 Stat. 2417; Dec. J9, 1989, PubJ.; 101--239, Title VI, I § 64ll(e)(l), 103 Stat. 2271; Aug. 10, 1998, Pub.L. 103--66, Title XIII, §§ 13611(•) to (c), 136l2(a) to 
·, Cc('.}rt~;:r ~ ;:~~;:·i~~ICAL1ii STA~:~:':~~'.:i :::'.· :::t{;~;ii:;:::Y·:~t:.~ 
I Remlon Notes and LegfalaUve Reports · · · ,; .. "(B) the·resourees were \ralUiferred (I) to or 
I 1993 Ac1a; Hu'. 'Reriort No. 103-111 and from (or f.o another for the sole benefit of) tbe 
House Conference Report No. 103--213, see 1998 individual's spouse, or (II)· to the individual's 
' . U.S. C-ode Cong. and Adm. News, p. m ehild desm'lled in subparagraph (AXii)(II);", 
I I Amendments:···.;'. · · ,_'· ;'~'.-/ : . · -;'·f:ii'ff~df!'!~~~ted P.!'!;ts" .;~~ 1993 Amendme_nt&· ~ "(b)(l). Pub.L. . sou~" and addi!d'cl. (iii). ,. ... ,.. . - . . 
· 1~,§ 13612(a),lowereathrellholdageto56 ·· . . .. · -, ....... -, .. ;,-. -,1:: ... ,, .. ·-
1 from 66 for individuals from whom the State will · Subsec. ·· (c)C2)(D) •... ·. ·.Pub.L, • .103-66. 
lseek.medicaid est.ate ~CJ!Sies, and expanded § 1.S6ll(a)(2)(D), generally amended~.1111bpar. l::i: °!::!,caii!iusez~~~ wh!~r:;~: ~t:?~,.~ -~e~~~\~~:/~~-~ r I benefidarlea of long-term care Insurance. · · · "CD) the State determines that denial of eligi-
1 Subsec. (b)(3)"·. Pub.L .. 103-66, § 13612(b), bilit:y would work an undue hardship," · · 
ladded par. (S). '; , · • , · .. · · · · · · S11bsec. (i:)(3), Pub.L. 103-66. 
,' Su~ (b)(4). Pub.I.. 103-66,. § ·j3612(ci § Vl611(a)(2)(E), generally amended pal'.(3). 
'added par. (4) •. · - .,. , , . , ... . . · Prior to amendment par. (3) read ~ follOWB: 
Subsec._ (c)(l).:· Puii.i: IN, ·s 136ll(a)(l), "(3) ID this. subsection, the term '!nstitution-
'lletely revtaed par. (1). Prior to the amend- alir.l!d indMdllal' means 811 individual wbo ia an 
par. (1) read as follon: Inpatient in a nUJ'5ing facility, who ia an lllpa-
·,...r1) In order to meet the requirements of tient in a medical institution and with respeeuo 
this subsection. (for purposes of lll!cilon · -whom payment is made based on a level of eare 
l396a{a)(61)(1l) otthis titJe), tbe State plan must p,ovided ID:&- nurslllg.facility, or who la de-
provide for a period of Ineligibility for nUJ'Sing scribed in section 1396a(a)(lO)(A)(il)(VD of this 
=~ ==oi:~~!f8;el~ ~; · ~t;:;ii-";,: icx~j_;; 1, ·. _._.· ~b.i •. >i~. 
facility serrieee and for services under section 
I396n(c) of this title in the ·case of an institu1ion- § -186ll(a)(2XFl,: added provisions- relating t:o · ~ . individual (es defined ID ·paragraph (3)) apportionment of period of lnellgibility amongst 
rho. or whose _spowie, at any time during· or spoWles..:,· .-!TT~.. • . . ,,:, _ .. a::: · .. ,:--,,.", ···'-'· 
lifter the SO-month period immedlat.ely before .. Sub~ (d); ; _l'ub.L. lM. §' 136ll(b}; added 
the date the lndmdual beeomea an illlmtutionaJ. aub~:<~b·~~--· ;._:.: . · ., .,. ~,. ;--.·::;,: ·_ .-. 
ized fnd!vidual"(lf the · indfridual is entitled to Sllhaec. (e). ;· Pnb,L. 103-,M, §, 13611(,:), added 
;nedical ass!stanee under the State plan on such BUbsec. (e~ .,._,:: '. · · 
fate) or, if tha individual la not ao entitled, the . . ..•. _ ..
late the indlvidual applies for such· aasilltance E-ectiY.e ~ .~1"·;; 
ilrhile an institutfonalle.ed lndmdwil. disposed of ""' · ,.,._, ' · 
resources !'or leaa·t1wa· ralr market value. The ···:'.;1993 Act.:' Sectuin 186ll(e) .. of Pub.L.· 10&-68 
'leriod of ineligibility shall begin with the month prov:ided that: v,'. ; "; .- ·. _ ·· · · . 
" whlch such. resources were trall.Bferred and ~ . "Cl) The. amendments made. by this section 
,he'number of'months in such period shall be [amending subsec. (c)and enacting eubsecs.. (d) 
,!qua} to the lesser of- · : . , · ,; ) and (e) of this section and amending seet:iOlltl 
'"<Afsomonths/or " ... ,,·' 1396a and-.l396r-5 of this title] sba1I apply, 
"(B) (i) tJie total WICOJnpelll!at.ed value. of except ,as ~vided in this . subsedion, t.o pay· 
the resources. so transferred, divided by (ii) men ts under title XIX of the Social Security Act 
the average cost. to a private patient :at the... Jt.hia.c aubchapt.er] ror· calendar quarten begin-
time of the application, of nursing facility~ ning on·or after Oct.ober 1, 1993, without regard 
vice& _in the State_ or, at_ State option, in the to whether or not final regulatiom to cany out 
i community in whlch ~e individual is institu- · such amendments have been ·proimilgat.ed by 
i ~~.'~ : :,~:~r.-~·::•i.:~ ·.:-::·:.:.-. ;. 1 _,":; ... 1 ~: :.. such date. ·· · ·• · I Subsec. ··, _. (c)(2)(A). ,·. ,Pnb,L. . 1~, "(2) The amendment.a· made bJ tbll section 
§ J.a6ll(a)(2)(A), . substituted ~assets". for "re- [ameJ1ding subsec. (c) and enacting subeecs. (d) 
so~"·< ; .•, , ,, , ... ·, _, ... _ .. ,'·. .. and (e) of this section and amending sections 
I Sub&ee .. ·,_; (tX2)(B) •. ,:, Pub.L. . 103-$, · 1396und 13961'-5 oftlp title} shall not apply-
. 136ll(a)(2)(B); generally amended par. (2)(B). , ._' :'(Ai t:o medical assistance provided-for aer-
. -. Mor t.o amendment par. (2)(B) read as follows: .. vices fllrnished.bef!)re Qctoi?er l, 1993,.._., • 
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;0 :f :Revision Notes and Legislative Reports community spouse, as defined in section J·, ~: 1!182 Act. Senate Report No. ·n-494 1396r-S(h)(2) of this title.,". 
J/t, '.and House Conference Report No. Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub.L. 101-239, 
'.;'1t 97-760, see 1982 U.S.Code Co111;. and § 6411(e)(l)(B)(ii), struck out cl. (iii) 
tl;: Adm.News, P· 781. which contained material relating to i~N/ :··· 1')83 Act. Senate Report No. 97-592 transfer of resources to person other 
.:{r aod House Conference Report No. than a spouse for less than fair market 
.il).0(97-986, see 1982 U.S.Code Cong. and value. 
1:ffl'Jtdm.News, P· 4149. 1988 Ameudmenta. Suhsec. (c)(l). 
}~: ';': 1987 A.ct. House Report No. lC0-391 Pub.L. 100-485, § 608(d)(l6)(B)(i), sub-
·ti\R{ (Parts I and II) and House Conference stituted "period of ineligibility for nurs-
f~l{ ,Report No. 100-495, see 1987 U.S.Code ing facility services and for a level of 
{if, Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2313-1. care in a medical institution equivalent tf,J\r 1988 Acts. House Report No. to that of nursing facility services and 
ff(/ 100-105(1), (II) and House Conference for services under section 1396n(c) of 
- 988 Us c d ~ this title in the case of an institutional-J,;:. Report 100-(;61, see 1 . . o e ,;.;ong. 
:1~?:. 'iind Adm.News, p. 803. ize)d inhdividual (as defined in paragraph 
"':;i/t.'X' (3 ) w o, at any time during or after the }t(f. Senate Report No. 100-377, House 30-month period immediately before the 
'\}J Conference Report No. 100-998, see date the individual becomes an institu-
,d:Y 1988 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, P· tionalized individual (if the individual is 
/{ffe( f.]7 6. entitled to medical assistance under the 
i~'\<;'.' 1989 Act. House Report No. 101-247, State plan on such date) or, if the indi· Jl\: House Conference Repon .No. 101--386, vidual is not so entitled, the date the 
c~i%· and Statement by President, see 1989 individual applies for such assistance j:.;'i. U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 1906. while an institutionalized individual" for }ii i:odlficatlons . "period of ineligibility in the case of an 
· ·. institutionalized individual (as defined [~J ;; Pub.I.. 100-203, Title · IV, in paragraph (3)) who, at any time dur-
.li;';, § 4211(h)(12)(A), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. ing the J~rnonth period immediately 
':1~i' 133~207, provided that subsec. before the individual's application for 
;~l {c)(2){B)(i) is amended by striking out medical assistance under the State plan". 
:c~'( "skilled nursing facility, intermediate j!!(;fcare facility" and inserting "nursing fa. Pub.I.. 100-360, § 303(b), substituted 
.J(~ cility, intermediate care facility for the provisions establishing a period of ineli-
. ~("' 11 d d" · r th f d gibility for institutionalized individuals )1fmenta Y retar e m ieu . ereo ' an . who, at any time during the 30-month 
.. ,;,;;, Pub.L. 100-203, Title IV, od d b f 
~1lf§ 4211(h)(I2)(B), Dec. 22, 1987, 101 Stat. peri irnme iately e ore the individu· 
·;}Jr; 133~207, as amended Pub.L. 100-360, al's application for medical assistance 
;tiTitle IV,§ 411(/)(3?(1), July 1, 1988, 102 :!:esu;~r ~~\C!~raf:s::rk~t°!a1i:; 
cfii(.St.at. 803, provided that subsec. 
i:l:·(c)(2)(B)(ii), is amended l,y striking out for provisions for denial of medical as-
"skilled" each place it appears, which sistance for any individual who would 
amendments could not be executed in not be eligible for such assistance except 
.view of complete amendment of subsec. for such disposition. (~l._?Y Pub.L. 100-360, § 303(b). Subsec. (c)(2). Pub.L. . 100-360, 
i:.., · § 303(b), substituted provisions that an 
~endments individual shall not be ineligible for 
~i.1989 Amendment. Subsec. (c)(l). medical assistance by reason of pill', (1) 
.Pub.L. 101-239, § 641 l(e)(l)(A), inserted to the extent that the resources transfer• 
:·whose spouse," followinf "an institu· red were a home and title to the home 
llzed individual (as defined in para• · was transferred to certain individuals, 
h C3H who,". the resources were transferred to (or to 
sht:isec. (c)(2)(B)(i). Pub.L. 101-239, another for the sole benefit of) the com-
. ll(e)(l)(B)(i), substituted "(i) to or munity spouse, or the individual's child 
'in (or to another for the sc,le benefit who is blind or permanently and totally 
.the individual's spouse, or'' for "(f) ·to disabled, a satisfactory showing was 
: to another for the sole benefit of) the made to the State that the individual 
. 7~ 
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intended to dispose of the resources ei-
ther at fair market value or for other 
valuable consideration, or the resources 
were transferred exclusively for a pur-
pose other than to qualify for medical 
assistance, or the State determines that 
denial of eligibility would work an un-
due hardship for provisions which em-
powered States to establish periods of 
ineligibility in excess of 24 months in 
any case in which the uncompensated 
value of disposed of resources exceeded 
$12,000 or the property was disposed of 
for less than fair market value. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(ii). Pub.L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(ii), designated existing 
provisions in part as subcls. (I) and (II), 
respectively. 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iii). Pub.L 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(iii), substituted "the in-
dividual becomes an institutionalized in-
dividual" for "of the individual's admis-
sion to the medical institution or nurs-
ing facility". 
Subsec. (c)(2)(A)(iv). Pub.L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(iv), substituted "the in-
dividual becomes an institutionalized in-
dividual" for "of such individual's admis-
sion to the medical institution or nurs-
ing facility". 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B). Pub.L. 100-485, 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(v). designated existing 
provisions in part as cl. (i), added cl. (ii), 
and struck out "or the individual's child 
who is blind or permanently and totally 
disabled" following Nsection 
1396r-S(h)(2) of this title,". 
Subsec. (c)(3). Pub.I.. 100-485, 
SOCIAL SECURITY Ch. 7 ·. ·. 
been so eligible if the State plan require-
ments with respect to disposal of re- · 
sources applicable under paragraphs '(l) 
and (2) of this subse<:tion had been ap-
plied in lieu of the provisions of section ' 
1382b(c) of this title. 
Subsec. (c)(4). Pub.L. 100-360,. 
§ 303(b), added par. (4). 
Subsec. (c)(S). Pub.L. 100-485, ,. 
§ 608(d)(l6)(B)(vii), a1Jded par. (5) .. , .. ,.. 
1987 Amendment. Subsec: ' 
(a)(l)(B)(i). Pub.L. 100-203,. 
§ 4211 (h)(l2)(A), substituted ·nursing 
facility, intermediate care facility for the. 
mentally retarded" for "skilled nursing ' 
facility, intermediate care facility". : ·., 
1983 Amendment. Subsec. (b)(2)(B). 
Pub.L. 97-448, § 309(b)(21), substituted 
"who" for "and" preceding "has lawfully· ·· · 
resided". · · y: 
Subsec. (c)(2)(B)(iii). Pub-L. 97-44"8; ;' 
§ 309(b)(22), substituted in subcL (I) .. 
"can" for "cannot" and deleted from ' 
subcl. (IV) the introclu:::tory word "if~ · 
,•-; 
Effective Dates 
1989 Act. Amendment by Pub.L 
101-239 amending subsec. (c)(I) and 
(2)(B)(i), (ii) and striking subseci 
(c)(2)(B)(iii), applicable to transfers oc- . 
curring after Dec. 19. 1989, see section 
64l l(e)(4) of Pub.L. 101-239, set out as a· 
note under section 139<ia of this title:; 
1988 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. . 
100--485 effective as if included in the~ 
enactment of Pub.L 1~360, see section ... 
608(g)(1) of Pub,L 100-485. set out as' a 
note undei- section 704 of this title. · : ~ 
§ 608(d)(16)(B)(vi), qualified definition Amendment by secti,,n 303(b) -of· 
of "institutionalized individual" to pro- Pub.L. 100-360 applicable to resources · 
vide that inpatients in medical institu- disposed of on or after July 1, 1988, 
tions must be those with respect to except that such subsection, as · so 
whom payment is made based on a level amended, shall not apply with respect to 
of care provided in a nursing facility, inter-spousal transfers occurring befor~ 
and included within the definition per- October l, 1989, and to p.1yments under: 
sons described in section this subchapter for calendnr quarters be- . 
1396a(a)(l0)(A)(il)(Vl) of this title. ginning on or after July 1, 1988 (except 
Pub.I.. 1~360, § 303(b), substituted in certain situations requi.ring State leg-
definition of the term "institutionalized islative action), without regard to wheth-
individual'' for provision that in any case er or not final regulatiom; to carry out · 
where an individual was ineligible for such amendment have been promul-
medical assistance undei- the State plan gated by such date (with an exception 
solely because of the applicability to for resources disposed of before July l, 
such individual of the provisions of sec- 1988), see section 303(g)(2), (5) of Pub.L. 
tion 1382b(c) of this title, the State plan 100-360, set out as a note undei- section 
could provide for the eligibility of such 1396r-S of this title. 
individual for medical assistance under 1987 Act. Amendment by Pub.L.: 
the plan if such individual would have 100--203 applicable to nw·sing facility 
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encompass a range of issues with respect to access, quality, financ-
ing, and other aspects of long-term care. 
Protection of income and resources of couple for maintenance of 
community spouse (section 214) 
The leading cause of financial catastrophe among the elderly is 
the need for long-term care, especially the need for nursing home 
placement. The expense of nursing home care-which can range-
from $2,000 to $3,000 per month or more-has the potential for 
rapidly depleting the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest. 
Even under the Committee's bill, Medicare's expanded skilled nurs-
ing facility benefits will not protect the elderly against the costs of 
long-term institutionalization. Private insurance coverage for nurs-
ing home costs is not ienerally available. For most of the elderly, 
the Medicaid program 1S the only third party source of payment for 
nursinJ home care. . 
Medicaid, a means-tested entitlement program, requires that the 
elderly or disabled nurs~·ng oine resident be poor in order to qual-
ify for coverage. It also li its the income that an institutionalized 
spouse may make avail e for the spouse remaining in the com· 
munity. If' the institu · nalized spouse receives the pension and 
other income in his name, this limit may have the effect of impov-
erishing the spouse in the community. The purpose of the Commit-
tee bill is to end this pauperization by as.,uring that the communi-
ty spouse has a sufficient-but not excessive-amount of income 
and resources available to her while her spouse is in a nursing 
home at Medicaid expense. This will be of particular benefit to 
older women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing 
home care, have often worked at home all their lives raising fami-
lies and have limited income other than their husbands' pension 
checks. · 
Current law.-To determine how much is available for the com~ 
munity spouse to live on when her elderly spouse in the nursing 
home applies for Medicaid, it is necessary first to determine wheth-
er the institutionalized s1>ouse is eligible for Medicaid based on 
income and resources. If eligibility is established, it is then neces-
sary to determine how much of the institutionalized spouse's 
monthly income is to be applied to the cost of nursing home care, 
and how much is to be available to the community spouse. · 
Eligibility standards.-In general, in order to qualify for Medic-
aid, an individual must be categorically related-that is, be aged, 
blind, disabled, or a member of a family with dependent children-
and must meet certain income and resources standards. 
In most States, elderly or disabled people receiving cash assist-
ance under the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program are 
automatically eligible for Medicaid. Aged or disabled individuals 
may receive SSI benefits if their countable income and countable 
resources do not exceed specified standards. The basic SSI income 
standard for an individual in 1987 is $340 per month, but many 
States have elected to supplement this benefit with their own 
funds. Thei basic SSI resource standard for an individual in 1987 is 
$1,800. In determining countable resources, a number of items are 
excluded, including the individual's home (of any value), household 
goods and personal effects worth less than $2,000, an automobile 
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with a market value of $4,500 or less, and up to $1,500 in life insur-
ance or burial funds. 
Not all States automatically extend Medicaid coverage to SSI 
beneficiaries. In about 14 States, known as "209(b)" Stat.es, eligibil-
ity standards, farticularly resource rules, more restrictive than 
those under SS are applied to the elderly or disabled. In about 35 
States, elderly individuals who are not poor enough to qualify for 
SSI, but who have large, recurring medical expenses, such as nurs-
ing home bills, qualify for Medicaid as "medically needy." Finally, 
aboµt 30 States offer coverage, on · an "optional categorically 
needy" basis, to nursing home residents whose incomes fall below a 
State-establi:3hed special income level no higher than 300 percent 
of the basic SSI benefit level ($1,020 per month in 1987). 
There are roughly 1.5 million Medicaid beneficiaries in nursing 
homes, whether skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) or intermediate 
care facilities (ICFs). Less than one--fourth of those are poor enough 
to qualify for SSI cash assistance. The remaining three-fourths are 
eligible either as "medically needy" or "optional categorically 
needy." Individuals who qualify for Medicaid in nursing homes on 
either of these bases must apply a certain portion of their income 
toward the cost of their nursing home care. It is these post-eligibil-
ity rules, in combination with the rules for attributing income and 
resources, that give rise to the problem of "spousal impoverish-
ment." · 
Attribution of income.-When one spouse enters a nursing home 
(or other institution) and applies for Medicaid, the following rule 
determines the amount of that spouse's income for eligibility pur-
poses. Shortly after institutionalization, each spouse is treated as a 
separate household. Income-generally Social Security checks, pen-
sions, and interest or dividends from investments-is considered to 
belong to the spouse whose name is on the instrument conveying 
the funds (in the case of Social Security checks, the amount attrib-
uted to each spouse is the individual's share of the couple's bene-
fit). Thus, in a case where a couple's pension check is made out to 
the husband, if the husband enters a nursing home, all of the 
income is considered his for purposes of determining eligibility. If 
the wife in this case enters the nursing home, however, none of the 
income is considered hers, and the husband is under no obligation 
under Federal law t-0 contribute any of his income toward the cost 
of her care. (However, some States do impose spousal contribution 
requirements in these circumstances). 
Attribution of resources._:The rule for attributing resources is 
basically the same as that for attributing income. Of course, the 
only resources that are~ttributed are countable resources, com-
monly liquid assets like\savings accounts, mutual fund invest-
ments, certificates of depos~t, etc. Generally, in the month follow-
ing institutionalization, resources to which a spouse has unrestrict-
ed access, including joint savings accounts, are considered available 
to that spouse for eligibility purposes. Thus, if resources are held 
solely by the institu.tionalized spouse, they are attributed to him 
for eligibility purposes. If the resources are jointly held, they are 
also consid,ered to belong entirely to the institutionalized spouse, on 
the theory that he or she has an unrestricted right to use them. If 
the assets :are held solely by the community spouse, however, they 
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are considnred, after the first month, to belong to her. There is no 
obligatir • under Federal law on the part of the community spouse 
to cont".-ibute any amounts of resources toward the costs of care of 
the a1stitutionalized spouse. In the view of the Department, these 
attribution rules apply in all States, including those with communi-
ty property laws: this Departmental interpretation ·is currently the 
subject of liti~ation. 
Transfer o( resources. -States have the option of denying Medic-
aid eligibility to individuals who have transferred countable re-
sources for less than fair market value within two years of apply-
ing for Medicaid. In the SSI program, the uncompensated value of 
the resource is counted for 24 months from the month the resource 
was disposed of, regardless of the amount at issue. States can be 
less restrictive than SSI, but they can also be more restrictive as 
well. \Vhere the value of the resorces for which no compensation 
was received exceeds $12,000, the State may deny eligibility for 
more than 24 months, beginning with the date of the transfer. 
States may waive this penalty in cases where undue hardship 
would result. In the case of transfers of an individual's home to 
someone other than a spouse or minor or disabled child, the period 
for which eligibility is denied, if any, must be based on the rela-
tionship between the value of the home for which no compensation 
was received and the average Medicaid expenditure for · nursing 
home care. States cannot deny eligibility if the individual intended 
to dispose of the home at fair market value or if denial would 
cause undue hardship. 
Post-eligibility application of income.-Once an institutionalized 
spouse has established eligibility for Medicaid by meeting the appli-
cable income and resource standards, some of his monthly income 
is reserved for his use and that of his spouse, and the rest is ap-
plied to the cost of nursing home care. These post-eligibility income 
rules apply whether the spouse qualifies for Medicaid as a "medi-
cally needy" or "optional categorically needy" individual. From the 
gross monthly income of the institutionalized spouse are deducted 
the following amounts, in the following order. First, there is re-
served for the institutionalized spouse a personal needs allowance 
for clothing and other expenses of at least $25. Second, there is set 
aside an allowance for the maintenance needs of the communit,Y 
spouse. This amount, combined with the community spouse s 
income, if any, allows the community spouse a certain amount of 
income, or maintenance needs level. Third, if the institutionalized 
spouse has a family' at home, an amount is set aside for the mainte-
nance of the family. Finally, an amount is allowed for expenses in-
curred for medical care that is not covered by the State's Medicaid 
plan or by Medicare or other third party. Any income remaining 
after these deductions is used to reduce the imount that the Medic-
aid program pays to the nursing home for~fthe care of the institu-
tionalized spouse. 
Under current regulations, the mainten ce needs level for the 
community spouse, may not exceed the hig . est of the SSI, State 
supplemEmtation, or "medically needy" income standard in the 
State. As the folla,wing table, based on a March 1987, survey con-
ducted by the American Association of Retired Persons, indicates, 
these· community spouse maintenance needs levels vary greatly 
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from S~te to State. The maintenance needs level is the total of the 
amount of the community spouse's income and the amount set 
aside from the income of the institutionalized spouse. Thus, in a 
State with a maintenance needs level of $340, if the community 
spouse receives a monthly Social Security check of $150, the contri-
bution from the institutionalized spouse is $190, not $340. 
Community spouse maintenance needs leuels 
State: 
Alabama ........................................................................................................... . 
Alaska ............................................................................................................... . 
Ari.iona ............................................................................................................. . 
Arkansas ........................................................................................................... . 
California ...................................................... · .................................................. .. 
Colorado ............................................................................................................ . 
Connecticut ...................................................................................................... . 
Dela·ware .......................................................................................................... .. 
District of Columbia .................... - ................................................................. . 
Florida .............................................................................................................. . 
Georgia ............................................................................................................. .. 
Hawaii. .......................................................................................................... - .. . 
Idaho ................................................................................................................. . 
Illinois .............................................................................................................. .. 
Indiana .............................................................................................................. . 
Iowa ................................................................................................................... . 
Kansas .......................................................................... ,. ........ ~ ....................... . 
~~::!::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Maine ................................................................................................................ . 
Maryland .......................................................................................................... . 
Ma.ssachu.setui ............................................................................................. -.. .. 
Mi<'higan .......................................................................................................... .. 
Minnesota ......................................................................................................... . 
~:o~~pi:::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::=:::::::::::::::::::::::~::::: 
Montana ........................................................................................................... . 
Nebraska ......................................................................................................... .. 
Nevada .............................................................................................................. . 
New Hampshire .............................................................................................. . 
New Jersey .................... '" ............................................................................... .. 
New Mexico .................................................................................................... .. 
New York ........................................................................................................ .. 
North Carolina ............................................................................................... .. 
North Dakota .................................................................................................. . 
Ohio .................................................................................................................. .. 
Oklahoma ......................................................................................................... . 
~~~~lvania ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Hh•:>de Island .................................................................................................... . 
South Carolina ............................................................................................... .. 
South Dakota ........................ , ......................................................................... .. 
Tennessee ........................................................................................................ .. 
Texas ................................................................................................................. . 
Utah ................................................................................................................. .. 
~r::iiat ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::.::::::::::::::::::: 
W11shington ..................................................................................................... .. 
;:o~ftnia ·:·:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::~:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Wyoming .................................. : ....................................................................... . 
Maintenan.ct! 
M«U.kvei 
$34.0 
682 
(1) 
188 
534 
229 
375-450 
164 
362 
840 
340 
300 
Up to 393 
267 
340 
340 
341 
192 
187 
350 
325 
354 
358-370 
397 
340 
340 
340 
375 
173 
354 
872 
340 
417 
233 
345 
258 
0 
342 
373 
475 
340 
257 
150 
340 
289 
398 
217-325 
368 
200 
442 
196 
1 Amoaa operatea, under demDlllltrat.ion authority, a Medicaid program that d1111 not cover 
nursing home or other long-term care benefit.. 
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Court-ordered support. -In some cases, courts have issued orders 
against institutionalized spouses requiring them to make monthly 
support payments in certain amounts to their spouses in the com· 
munity. The policy of the Health Care Financing Administration 
(HCFA) is that, notwithstanding such an order, the income of the 
institutionalized spouse is to be considered available to him for pur-
poses of determining the amount of his contribution toward the 
cost of nursing home care. The only part of his income which 
HCFA policy acknowledges as available to the community spouse is 
the specified maintenance needs allowance. This interpretation is 
the subject of litigation. 
Committee bill. -The improvement of individuals whose spouses 
reside in nursing homes and receive Medicaid benefits is not justifi-
able. The current maintenance needs levels for community spouses, 
which are limited by current Federal regulation, are inadequate. In 
some cases, they have forced community spouses, in desperation, to 
sue their husbands for support. The financial duress that these low 
maintenance needs levels impose on the community spouse may, in 
certain cases, even force the premature institutionalization of that 
spouse. 
The C.Ommittee bill would end spousal impoverishment. It revises 
the current Federal requirements relating to attribution of income, 
attribution of resources, transfer of resources, and post-eligibility 
application of income. These revisions are limited to the context of 
a couple with one spouse in an institution who applies for or re-
ceives Medicaid. The purpose of these revisions is to assure that 
the community spouse in these circumstances has income and re-
sources sufficient .to live with independence and dignity. 
This bill establishes a uniform national spousal protection ~olicy 
that applies in all States, whether they are "SSI," "209(b)," ' medi-
cally needy," or "special income level" States, and whether or not 
they are community property jurisdictions. Should Arizona at some 
point offer nursing home coverage through its Medicaid demonstra-
tion, these rules would apply to it as well. 
The bill allows an institutionalized spouse to elect to be governed 
by the rules that were in effect in his State as of March 1, 1987, 
regarding the treatment of income, the protection of income for the 
community spouse, the transfer of resources to the community 
spouse. The purpose of this election is to assure that the bill does 
not inadvertently make a community spouse worse off than under 
current law with respect to protected income of with respect to the 
minimum protected resource level of $12,000. This election could be 
used by the institutionalized spouse either to increase the amount 
of income or resources available to the community spouse or to 
reduce it, thereby allowing the community spouse to qualify for 
Medicaid or other public assistance benefits herself. However, the 
bill does not permit either the institutionalized spouse or the com-
munity spouse to opt out of the rules regarding the treatment of 
countable resources at the time of initial eligibility determination, 
which impose, in effect, a maximum protected countable resource 
limit of $48,000 on the 'community spouse. 
Eligibility standards,-The bill does not alter income or resource 
standards for Medicaid eligibility of the institutionalized spouse. 
Thus, if the current resource standard is $1,800, it would remain 
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$1,800 under this bill. Similarly, the bill generally does not alter 
current law as to what income or resources are countable, and 
which are not, or how income or resources are valued. The princi-
pal exception to this relates to the exemption for household goods 
and personal effects for the limited purpose of attributing resources 
at the time of institutionalization. The spousal protection rules in 
this bill apply regardless of whether the institutionalized spouse 
has qualified for Medicaid by meeting the eligibility standards as a 
categorically needy, optional categorically needy, or medically 
needy individual. 
Attribution of income.-During any month that a spouse enters a 
nursing home, hospital, or other institution, the following attribu-
tion rules apply for purposes of determining eligibility. Income paid 
solely in the name of one spouse or the other is considered to 
belong to that respective spouse. Thus, no income paid solely to the 
community spouse is considered available to the institutionalized 
spouse for eligibility purposes. If the income is paid in the names of 
both spouses, half is considered available to the community spouse, 
and half to the institutionalized spouse. If income is paid in the 
name of either spouse and another person or persons, the income is 
considered available to each individual names in equal proportion-
al shares, unless the instrument controlling the income specifically 
otherwise provides. The same principles apply in the case of 
income from trust property. In the case of income from a trust 
where there is no instrument establishing ownership, half of the 
income is attributed to the institutionalized spouse and half to the 
community spouse. These attribution rules are subject to rebuttal 
by the institutionalized spouse upon a showing, by preponderance 
of the evidence, that ownership interests are otherwise. 
Attribution of resources.-The following rules would apply in de-
termining the amount of countable resources at the time of appli-
cation for Medicaid benefits by the institutionalized spouse. First, a 
determination would be made of the total value of all the countable 
resources held by either the institutionalized spouse, the communi-
ty spouse, or both, on the day the institutionalized spouse began 
the continuous period of institutionalization during which he ap-
plies for Medicaid benefits. Any countable resources belonging to 
either or both spouses would be included in this determination, in-
cluding resources from inheritance or previous marriages. For this 
purpose only, the current limit of $2,000 on the equity value of the 
exemption for household goods and personal effect.s would be inap-
plicable. Thus, all household goods and personal effects, regardless 
of value, would not be counted among the resources attributed to 
the couple or either spouse at the time of institutionalization for 
purposes of determining eligibility. 
One half of the value of all these resources, known as the spousal 
sharE!, would be attributed to each spouse. If the spousal share of 
the community spouse were less than $12,000, the institutionalized 
spouse would be allowed to transfer a sufficient amount to the com-
munity spouse to enable her to hold countable resources in her 
own name of a' total of $12,000. The institutionalized spouse would 
not be required to make this transfer; however, any resources not 
solely in the ownership of the community spouse would be attrib-
uted to the institutionalized spouse and, to the extent they exceed-
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ed the applicable resource standard (generally $1,800), would 
render the institutionalized spouse ineligible for Medicaid. 
If the spousal share of the community spouse were greater than 
$48,000, the institutionalized spouse would have attributed to him, 
for purposes of determining eligibility, both his own spousal share 
and the resources attributed to the community spouse in excess of 
$48,000. This $48,000 limit represents four times the $12,000 pro-
tected resource level. In 1989 and each year thereafter, these dollar 
amounts would be increased by the percentage increase in the con-
sumer price index for all urban consumers for each year since Sep-
tember 1987. 
The attribution of resources into spousal shares, and the subse-
quent imposition of limits on the community spouse's shares, would 
occur only once, at the time of initiaJ application. Afrer the month 
in which an institutionalized spouse has met the resource eligibil-
ity standard and is determined to he eligible for benefits, no re-
sources of the community spouse, regardless of value, would be con-
sidered available to the institutionalized spouse Thus, if while the 
care of the institutionalized spouse is being paid for by Medicaid, 
the community spouse's countable resources grow to exceed the 
$48,000 initial limit, the State would not be authorized to require 
the community spouse to apply any excess toward the cost of care 
of the institutionalized spouse. 
c The Committee observes that, in many cases, the institutional-
? ized spouse may not apply for Medicaid benefits until months after l his admission to a nursing home. Often these individuals and their spouses have "spent down" a significant amount of their life sav-
ings to pay the nursing home charges. Repeated division of the cou-
ple's total resources into equal spousal shares at each application 
or reapplication for benefits would result in the pauperization of 
the community spouse, as the couple's total resources would effec-
tively be reduced to twice the resource eligibility standard, general-
ly $3600, before the institutionalized spouse qualified for Medicaid. 
Precisely the opposite result is intended b,;y the Committee. For this 
reason, the bill requires, .,n effect, that a 'snapshot" of the couple's 
total resources be taken at the time of initial institutionalization, 
and that attribution of resources into spousal shares proceed on the 
basis of that "snapshot," regardless of the point at which the insti-
tutionalized spouse actually files application for benefits. The Com-
mittee expects that the States, in reconstructing the couple's re-
sources at the time of institutionalization, will not apply unreason-
able documentation requirement.s. 
Post-eligibility application of i~ome.-After an institutionalized 
spouse has met the resource and income criteria for eligibility, the 
income attributed to that spouse would be applied as follows each 
month. (The rules relating to attribution of income for purposes of 
determination of eligibility, described above, would also apply for 
purposes of post-eligibility treatment of income). From the institu-
tionalized spouse's income, the following amounts would be deduct-
ed, in the following order. First, at least $25 would be reserved for 
that spouse's personal needs. Second, a community spouse monthly 
income allowance ·would be set aside. Third, a family allowance 
would be deducted for each minor or dependent child, dependent 
parent, or dependent sibling of either spouse living with the com-
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munity spouse. Finally, there would be deducted amounts for in-
curred expenses for medical care for the institutionalized spouse 
not paid for by Medicaid, Medicare, or another liable third party. 
The community spouse monthly income allowance is the amount 
needed to bring the community spouse's monthly income, including 
any income otherwise available to her, up to a minimum level. 
This minimum level is defined as the sum of (1) an amount equal 
to 150 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines for a family of two, 
or $925 per month in 1987; (2) an excess shelter allowance (the 
amount by which mortgage expenses or rent, plus utility costs, 
exceed 30 percent of the amount in (1); and (3) one-half of the 
amount by which the income of the institutionalized spouse ex-
ceeds the sum of amounts (1) and (2). The community spouse's min-
imum monthly maintenance needs allowance may not exceed $1500 
per month. In 1989 and each year thereafter, this amount would be 
increased by the percentage increase in the consumer price index 
for all urban consumers for each year since September 1987. This 
$1500 limit applies only to the amount that may be deducted from 
the institutionalized spouse's income for the maintenance of the 
community spouse; it does not in any way constrain the amount of 
income that the community spouse may receive in her own name 
from sources other than the institutionalized spouse. 
The $1500 limit on the minimum monthly maintenance needs al-
lowance is not absolute. Under the bill, the institutionalized spouse 
is entitled to an opportunity to demonstrate, at- a fair hearing, that 
the minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance is inadequate 
to support the community spouse without financial duress. If the 
spouse makes this showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
the State would be required to establish an adequate monthly 
maintenance needs allowance in that case. 
Under the bill, States would be required, upon request by either 
spouse or upon a determination of eligibility, to notify the institu-
tionalized spouse of the amount of the community spouse monthly 
income allowance, the family allowance, the way in which the com-
munity spouse resource allowance was computed, and the spouse's 
right to a fair hearing. The bill makes clear that an institutional-
ized spouse who believes that the minimum monthly maintenance 
needs allowance for the community spouse is inadequate, or who 
believes that the State has not accurately determined the amount 
of monthly income actually available to the community spouse 
from other sources, is entitled to a fair hearing on either of these 
issues, as well as any other State determinations that adversely 
affect the incc,me or resources available to the community spouse. 
Court ordered support.-The Committee recognizes that there 
will be some instances in which the rules set forth in the bill do 
not take adequate account of the special circumstances affecting a 
particular community spouse. The bill therefore provides that; if a 
. court has entered an order against an institutionalized spouse for 
monthly income for the support of the community spouse, the com-
munity spouse monthly income allowance must be at least as great 
as the amount of the !ncome ordered to be paid. Similarly, if a 
court has en1;ered a l?Upport order against an institutionalized 
spouse requiring that spouse to transfer countable resources to the 
community spouse, the spouse ntay comply with the court's order 
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without running afoul of the transfer of assets prohibitions, even 
where the effect is to leave the community spouse with countable 
resources in excess of $48,000. 
Tran.-;fer of resources.-The Committee is informed that a 
number of States have not made effective use of the authorities 
under current law to prevent affluent individuals from disposing of 
resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home coverage. f In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program for the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated 
wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent chil-
dren. The Committee is also concerned by the arbitrary nature of 
current SSI policy relating to disposal of assets, under which the 2-
year penalty for transfers is unrelated to the amount of the assets 
disposed of. Accordingly, the Committee bill replaces the current 
law option with a uniform national policy, mandatory on all the 
States, that is specific to Medicaid eligibility and that reasonably 
relates the value of the resources improperly transferred to the 
period of denial of eligibility. 
Under the bill, States must determine whether each nursing 
home or hospital patient who applies for Medicaid has, within 2 
years of application, disposed of any countable resources for less 
than fair market value. If such a transfer has occurred, the State 
must determine the value (as of the time of transfer) of the count-
able resources transferred for which the applicant received less 
than fair market value. The total uncompensated value of these 
countable resources must then be divided by the average cost, to a 
private patient at the time of application, of nursing home care in 
the State. This yields the number of months for which the individ-
ual is ineligible for Medicaid, beginning with the month in which 
the transfer took place. The Committee expects that, where practi-
cable, the State should use the cost of nursing home care to private 
patients in the community in which the applicant is institutional-
ized. 
To avoid inequitable results, the bill provides for a number of ex-
ceptions from the denial of eligibility for transfers of countable re-
sources for less than fair market value. 
First, the prohibition on transfer does not apply at all in the case 
of the transfer of an applicant's home to his or her spouse, child 
under 21, or blind or disabled adult child. The Committee recog-
nizes that, so long as an individual lives in a home or intends to 
return to it, the home is not a countable resource. The purpose of 
thi,s exception is to underscore that the transfer of an applicant's 
or bem~ficiary's home to the community spouse or to any minor or 
disabled children would be protected. 
Second, the prohibition on transfers does not apply at all in the 
case of a transfer of countable resources to the community spouse 
of an institutionalu.ed individual, or to another for the sole benefit 
of the community spouse. Since the Committee bill establishes 
rules for the attribution of resources of married couples at the time 
of institutionalization which reach both spouses, no purpose would 
be served by pr9.hibiting transfers of countable resources from the 
institutionalized SJX?US8 to the community spouse. 
Third, if an individual can demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the 
State, that he or she intended to dispose of the resources at fair 
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market value, or for other valuable consideration, denial of eligibil-
ity for Medicaid should not occur. The purpose of the Committee 
bill is to deter those who, through "gifting" or other disposal, 
knowingly seek to shelter assets from dissipation due to nursing 
home costs. The bill is not intended to penalize those who inadvert-
ently, or through lack of sophistication, did not receive adequate 
compensation. Nor is the bill intended to deny eligibility to those 
who transfer resources to relatives or others by way of compensa-
tion for the informal care which these individuals have given to 
the applicant or beneficiary; the imposition of a penalty in such 
circumstances would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging 
family members and friends from caring for the frail elderly or dis-
abled and helping them remain independent for as long as possible. 
Finally, the Committee recognizes that there will be circum-
stances where, although an individual may have transferred assets 
in order to qualify for Medicaid benefits, the effect of denying Med-
icaid coverage for the specified period of time would be to seriously 
threaten the continuing care or well-being of the applicant or oth-
erwise work an undue hardship. The Committee also recognizes 
that there will be circumstances where, with no expectation of 
needing nursing home care and no intent of qualifying for Medic-
aid, an individual may give away money or property, perhaps for a 
grandchild's education, and then later learn that, as a result of a 
rapid change in medical condition, such as a stroke, nursing home 
placement is suddenl_y required. The bill provides that where the 
State determines such circumstances exist, eligibility for Medicaid 
benefits must not be denied. 
These prohibitions on transferring countable resources, and the 
exceptions to them, are mandatory on all the States. The Commit-
tee bill expressly provides that States are not authorized to impose 
more-or less-restrictive eligibility delays than those specified in 
the Committee bill. Thus, the States could not impose any penalties 
for transfers of resources on applicants or beneficiaries other than 
those in nursing homes or hospitals. Similarly, the current SSI 
policies relating to transfer of assets would no longer apply for pur-
poses of determining Medicaid eligibility of applicants or benefici-
aries in institutions or those outside. 
Conforming changes.-Currently, a number of States that offer 
Medicaid coverage to the aged and disabled under the "medically 
needy" option use less restrictive income or resource methodologies 
in determining eligibility than apply to the aged and disabled 
under the SSI program. HCF A interprets current law to require 
that States use SSI income and resource methodologies under their 
medically needy programs for the elderly and disabled. 
The current treatment of income and resources of institutional-
ized spouses-substantially revised by the Committee bill-is essen-
tially the result c,f applying SSI principles in a Medicaid context. 
This is only one of many examples where principles that may be 
valid in the context of a cash assistance program are not appropri-
ate in the context of a medical assistance program. The State Med-
icaid Directors A..<1SOCiation has submitted a report to the Congress 
concluding that directly linking Medicaid and SSI income and re-
source methodolo1pes results in impoverishment of the elderly and 
disabled, increased State and Federal costs, and burdensome ad-
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ministrative practices. The Medicaid Directo1'3 offer a number of 
examples of SSI policies which are inappropriate when applied to 
Medic.aid, such as the rule that resource eligibility is determined 
on the first day of the month. Following this SSI rule, if a nursing 
home patient has resources in excess of the allowable. threshold 
($1,800) on that day, he or she is ineligible for Medicaid throughout 
the rest of the month, even if the amount of excess resources is too 
small to enable the individual to pay for the entire month's nurs-
ing home costs. 
In the view of the Committee, there is no justification for the 
rigid application of SSI eligibility rules to Medicaid medically 
needy programs. Prior to this HCFA interpretation, States had 
flexibility to establish income or resource methodologies less r~ 
strictive-i.e., more generoUB from the applicant's standpoint-
than those under SSI. States should continue to have this flexibil-
ity. On the other hand, the Committee does not believe that the 
States should have . the discretion to apply methodologies under 
their medically needy programs that are more restrictive-i.e., less 
generous from the applicant's standpoint-than those under SSI. 
The bill therefore provides that the State's methodology for deter-
minir1g eligibility for the medically needy aged and disabled shall 
be no more restrictive than that under the SSI program (or, in the 
case of families with children, under the corresponding Aid to Fam-
ilies with Dependent Children cash ruisistance program). To avoid 
any possible ambiguity, the bill provides that a methodology is con-
sider,~ to be "no more restrictive" if, using the methodology, indi-
viduals qualify for Medicaid even though they would not be eligible 
were the SSI methodology used, and individuals who would be eligi-
ble for Medicaid under the SSI methodology would not be ineligible 
under the State's medically needy methodology. 
Effective dates.-The provisions relating to the treatment of 
income and resources for institutionalized spouses are effective for 
individuals residing in institutions on or after January 1, 1988. 
This includes spouses who were residing in nursing homes before 
that date, as well as spouses who are admitted on or after that 
date. The provisions relating to transfers of resources apply to all 
institutionalized individuals first applying for Medicaid on or after 
January 1, 1988, with respect to any transfers for less than fair 
market value occurring up to two years prior to the date of applica-
tion. Both provisions are effective whether or not the Secretary of 
HHS has promulgated final implementing regulations. If the Secre-
tary determines that a State requires State legislation. other than 
an appropriations bill, to implement these requirements, the provi-
sions do not take effect until the first day of· the first calendar 
quarter beginning after the close of the first regular State legisla-
tive session beginning after enactment. Finally, the provision al-
lowing States to use less restrictive income and resource method-
ologies in their medically needy programs is October 1, 1982, the 
effective date of the current statutory language on which HCF A er-
roneously bases its current interpretation. No disallowances or 
other adverse .. actions may be taken against States based on the 
currimt statufury language relating to "same" methodologies. 
Examples.-The following examples illustrate the operation of 
the Committee bill. Assume an elderly couple who together own a 
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home assessed at $110,000 and have a joint savings account, to 
which either spouse has unrestricted access, with a balance of 
$20,000. The husband's monthly income, from his Social Security 
benefit and his private pension, is $750. The wife, who worked at 
home all her life raising a family, has income of $150 from Social 
Security. The husband develops Alzheimer's disease and his wife, 
no longer able to care for him at home, must place him in a nurs-
ing home. The husband a~plies for Medicaid. The State covers "op-
tional categorically needy' nursing home residents under a special 
income standard of $875 per month and a resource standard of 
$1,800. The State's maintenance needs allowance for community 
spouses is $340 per month. 
Under current law, the husband is categorically related due to 
his age, and, as of the beginning of the first full calendar month 
after institutionalization, is eligible under the special income stand-
ard of $875. (Until the beginning of the first full calendar month, 
the wife's income is attributed to him, and he does not meet the 
special income standard). However, he must still meet the $1,800 
resource standard. The entire amount in the couple's joint savings 
account is attributed to the husband, since he has unrestricted 
access to it, giving him excess resources of $18,200. Until he spends 
these excess resources, he will remain ineligible for Medicaid. If he 
gives the $18,200 to his wife, the State has the option of denying 
him Medicaid eligibility for more than 2 yea,rs from the date of 
transfer. 
Assuming all the excess resources in the couple's joint account 
are applied to the cost of nursing home care, and assuming a pri-
vate patient rate of $2,000 per month, it will take about 9 months 
for the husband to become resource-eligible for Medicaid. After eli-
gibility has been established, the husband's income is applied as 
f :,llows. First, an allowance of $25 is reserved for his personal 
needs. Then an allowance of $190 for the maintenance needs of his 
wife (the State standard of $340 minus the wife's own income of 
$150) is set aside. If the husband had no uncovered medical costs in 
the previous month, the remaining $535 of his income is applied to 
the cost of nursing home care. The remainder is paid by the State 
and Federal governments through Medicaid. 
The wife in the community is left with the house, a monthly 
income of $340, and access to the $1,800 remaining in the couple's joint savings account. Before her husband entered the nursing 
home, the couple's total income ($900 per month) was about 146 
percent of the Federal poverty level for a couple; after her hus--
band's institutionalization, she has only $1,800 in liquid assets and 
her income places her at 75 percent of the Federal poverty level for 
a single individual. 
In sharp contrast to current law, the Committee bill would not 
impoverish the wife in this case. At the time the husband enters 
the nursing home, only $750 in income would be attributed to him, 
and he would immediately be eligible under the State's special 
income standard. With respect ,to resources, half of the couple's 
total assets would be attributed to the wife and half to the hus-
band. However, the bill allows-- the husband to transfer without 
peni;tlty $12,000-the minimum community spouse resource allow-
ance-to an account in his wife's name at any time. When the hus-
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band has spent all but $1,800 of the remaining $8,000, he becomes 
resource-eligible for Medicaid. Assuming he applies all of these 
excess resources to the cost of his nursing home care at $2,000 per 
month, this will take about 4 months. 
Once eligibility for Medicaid has been established, the husband's 
monthly income is applied as follows. First, $25 is set aside each 
month for a personal needs allowance. Second, $725 is reserved for 
the maintenance needs of the community spouse. The community 
spouse is allowed a minimum of $925, including her income; since 
the wife's income is only $150, she can receive at least $775 from 
the husband. However, since the husband's total income is less 
than $775, she receives only the total income less the $25 personal 
needs allowance, or $725. Nothing remains to reduce the cost of the 
husband's nursing home care to the Medicaid program. 
Under the Committee bill, the wife is left with a monthly income 
of $875 (her Social Security check of $150 plus the maintenance 
needs allowance of $725), or about 190 percent of the Federal pover-
ty level for a single individual. She also has $12,000 in savings in 
her name. The husband would qualify for Medicaid about 5 months 
earlier than under current law. The total Federal and State Medic-
aid payment to the nursing home would go up by $535 per month 
(the difference between the husband's $190 community spouse 
monthly income allowance under current law and the $725 allow-
ance under the bill). 
Another example will illustrate the effect of the bill's provision 
for an equal division of the couple's resources. Assume that the 
couple's joint savings account at the time of institutionalization 
contains not $20,000, but $50,000. Under the bill, the husband 
would be . allowed, without penalty, to transfer $25,000 of this 
amount to an account in the wife's name. Of the remaining half, 
$23,000 would have to be spent before the husband would become· 
resourc~ligible for Medicaid. Under current law, all but $48,200 
in the joint account has to be spent before the husband becomes 
eligible for Medicaid. (Although a couple with $50,000 in savings is 
likely to have household goods and personal effects valued at more 
than $2,000, the bill provides that all these items are not to be con-
sidered resources for purposes of determining the community 
spouse resource allowance). 
The effect of the bill's ceiling of $48,000 on the community 
spouse resource allowance may be demonstrated by assuming that 
the couple has not $20,000, but $100,000 in joint savings accounts 
and jointly held stocks and mutual funds at the time of the hus-
band's institutionalization. The bill allows the husband to transfer 
half of the jointly held resources, or $50,000, to the wife in her own 
name, subject to the limit of $48,000. Thus, the couple would have 
to spend $50,200 (the husband's $50,000 share, plus $2,000 excess 
resources from the wife's share, less the resource eligibility stand-
ard of $1,800) before the husband could qualify for Medicaid. Again, 
any household goods or personal effects would not be taken into ac-
count in determining 'the amount of the community spouse's re-
source allowance. 
The effect of the bill on financial planning {or the lack thereof) 
can be illustrated with the following example. Assume that this 
couple has a total of $50,000 in savings, and because it has done no 
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financial planning, all of these resources are held by the husband 
in his own name when he is admitted to the nursing home. Under 
current law, the husband cannot qualify for Medicaid until all but 
$1,800 of this amount is spent. Under the bill, however, the hus-
band may transfer $25,000 to the wife in her own name without 
penalty. 
If one assumes that this couple, learning of the husband's dis-
ease, anticipated the need for institutionalization and transferred 
all of the $50,000 joint savings to the wife more than two years 
prior to application for Medicaid, the result under the bill is the 
same as in the previous example. Regardless of ownership, the re-
sources are attributed in equal shares to each spouse. Until the 
wife's resources are reduced to $25,000, the husband is not re-
source-eligible for Medicaid. Under current law, the husband, with 
no resources attributable to him, would immediately qualify for 
Medicaid, and the wife would be under no Federal law obligation to 
contribute toward the cost of his care. 
Finally, the concept of the resource "snapshot" at institutional-
ization is illustrated by the following example. Assume, as above, 
that couple has countable resources of $50,000, jointly held, at the 
time of the husband's admission to the nursing home. The husband 
does not apply for Medicaid upon admission; instead, the couple 
begins to spend it resources to pay for the cost of his care. After a 
year, the couple has spent $24,000 from its joint resources, and the 
husband applies for Medicaid. The State would then look back to 
the date of the husband's institutionalization for purposes of attrib-
uting resources. Since the wife's spousal share was $25,000 then, if 
the husband transfers his interet in $25,000 of the remaining re-
sources to his wife, he will immediately be resource-eligible for 
Medicaid, since the remaining $1,000 would meet the $1,800 re-
source standard. 
Study of adult day care services (section 215) 
The Committee bill would require the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to conduct a survey and report to the Congress on 
adult day care services that are currently being provided through-
out the United States. Such a report is to include information on 
(1) the scope of adult day care services and the extent of their 
availability around the country; (2) the characteristics of the vari-
ous entities (such as community-based programs, hospitals, and 
nursing facilities) that provide these services; (3) licensure, certifi-
cation, and other quality standards that are applicable to those en-
tities providing such services; (4) the cost and financing of adult 
day care services; and (5) the characteristics of individuals who use 
the services (including on the individuals' level of disability and on 
the availability of similar in-home care services). 
The purpose of this review is to evaluate programs and projects 
that have already been established, so that Congress can properly 
consider the advisability of Medicare coverage for adult day care 
services. Thus, it is not the intention of the Committee that the 
Secretary undertake a demonstration project or in any other 
matter initiate or fund new adult day care programs. The Secre-
tary is to report only on the current availability of services and on 
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Further, the committee expects that the Secretary, in reviewing a 
State's P.roposed cost-sharing charges to determine if they are nom-
inal, will consider the monthly amounts paid by the 8tate as cash 
assistants under the State's AFDC program. and the income stand-
ards use.d to determine eligibility for the medically needy, as well as 
the costs of the specific medical services. Finally the amendment as-
sures that recipients are not denied emergency care or other needed 
services because they are not able to pay required copayment amounts 
as a precondition to securing such services. 
Ejfect,~ve date.-Enactment. 
Eatima.tea aavinga.-
Fiscal years: Mlltlons 
1983 ....... ·--·························-·····-·-·-···-················-···················-··········--····--······· $42 
1984.......................................................................................................................... 47 
l 985.......................................................................................................................... 53 
ELIMINATE MATCHING RATE FOR MEDICINE PART B "BuY·IN" 
( Section 132 of the Bill) 
Present law.-Most State Medicaid plans pay the monthly Medi-
care Part B premium payment for their dual eligible beneficiaries 
under a "buy-m" agreement. While States may buy-in to Medicare for 
both their cash assistance and medically needy populations who are 
eligible for Medicare federal matching for premium payments is 
r, ,·oilab]e only for the cash assistance group. If a State does not buy 
in for Part B coverage, it cannot receive Federal matching payments 
for services that would have been covered under Medicare if there had 
been a buy-in arrangement. Four Statrs and two jurisdiction~ do not 
currently have a buY-in arrangement. These are: Alaska, Louisiana, 
Oregon, ·wyoming, tl:e Northern Mariana Islands, and Puerto Rico. 
A}i,,c;ki,'s buv-in agreement becomes effectfre 0ctober 1. 1982. 
Committee a.mendment.-The amendment eliminates Federal 
matching for all Medicare Part B premium payments, effective with 
respect to pN?miums due for months after September 1982. The com· 
mittee notes that the current comhination of the 75 pere€nt FC'dernl 
general revenue subsidy for part B (for all Medicare part B eligi-
bles) coupled with the Federal match for Medicaid eligibles results 
in a Federal subsidy of close to 90 percent for part B services for this 
popnlation group. 
Eftccti·re date .. -Premiums due -for months after September 1982. 
Eatlmated savings.- · 
Fiscal years: MIiiions 
1983 ..... ·-···················· .. ··-································· ........... _ ...................... - .. ·······-······· $203 
1934.................................................................................................................................. 216 
1985 ................................................................ -··--····--.. ·······-·· .. ·····-·················-··· 230 
MODIFY LIEN PROVISIONS 
(Section 133 of the Bill) 
Present law.-Under current law, States ore barred from imposing / 
any lien against a~y recipient's property prior to his death because of > 
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Medicaid claims paid or to be paid on his behalf unless placed as a 
result of a court judgment. In the case of individuals under age 65, no 
n.djustments or recoveries can be made for Medicaid claims correctly 
paid. In the case of individuals over 65, adjustments and recoveries for") 
correctly paid claims can only be made from his/her estate after the 
individ•iaPs death and only (1) after the death of his surviving) 
spouse; and (2) where there are no surviving children who are under> 
21, blind, or disabled. '-
Further, under current law, States may deny medicaid eligibility to 
applicants who, within the previous 24 months, transferred for less 
than fair market value resources which, if retained, would ha,·e made 
them ineligible for the program. However, in most instances the 
applicant's ownership of a home would not make him or her ineligible 
for medicaid. 
It is therefore possible, under current law, for an elderly individual 
who anticipates needing nursing home care to give his/her home to a 
famil1 member or friend without fear of losing or being denied medic-
aid eligibility. By so doing, the individual assures that the home will 
not be part of his/her estate and therefore will not be subject to any 
recovery action initiated by the State after the individual's death. 
O(}7Tlt'lnittee amendment.-The amendment intends to assure that all 
of the resources available to an institutionalized individual, including 
equity in a home, which are not needed for the support of a spouse or 
dependent children will be used to defray the costs of supporting the 
mdividual in the institution. In doing so) it seeks to balance govern-
ment's legitimate desire to recover its medicaid costs against the indi-
vidual's need to have the home available in the event rlisclrn,rge from 
the institution becomes feasible. 
The amendment has two parts. First, it allows States to deny :Medic-
aid eligibility temporarily to patients in medical institutionc; who 
dispose of a home for Jess than £air market value, even though such 
disposal would not make them ineligible for supplemental seeuritJ 
income (SSI). States could either deny eligibility to all such in<l1yid-
uals for periods reasonably related to the uncompensated value, or 
they could deny eligibility in all cases for a minimum of 24 months, 
with the option to provide for longer periods of ineligibility in the 
case of individuals who disposed of homes worth substantial amounts. 
The provision would not apply in the case of individuals who reason-
ably expected to be discharged from the medical institution and re-
turn home; indivi<luals who demonstrated that they had intended to 
obtain fair market value or other valuable consideration in exchange 
£or their homes; or individuals who transferred title to their homes 
to a spouse or a minor or handicapped child. The State coulrl also 
make an exception in other cases where undue hardship would other-
wise result. , 
Second, the amendment would allow States to attach the real prop-
erty, including the home, of medicaid recipients who are permanently 
institutionalized, in nursing homes or other long term care medical 
institutions. The lien could not be foreclosed upon, and States could 
recover the cost- of medical assistance provided to the recipient only 
when the recipient volunt!J,rily chose to sell the property or, after the 
recipfont's death, from his estate. As under current law, no recovery 
would be permitted while the recipient's spouse was still living or 
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while his/her children were still dependent (under 21, or blind, or 
disabled). Further, if the recipient is discharged from the institution 
and returns home, the lien would dissolve, and the property wou:d be 
available for the recipient's use until his/her death. 
The commjttee notes that, under current law, States are often un-
able to recover resources which recipients hold as homes or as inoJme-
producing real property. The amendment would facilitate States' 
efforts to recover medical assistance costs from these types of resources 
and to assure that all resources available to an indivi<luaJ,will be used 
to defray the public costs of supporting that individual in a long-term 
medical institution. 
At the same time, the committee notes that the legitimate rights of 
the recipient, the recipient's spouse and his/her dependent children are 
protected under the amendment. 
Effective date.-Enactment. 
Eatimated savings.-
Fiscal years: Millions 
1983 ........ ·-···························································-·················································· $183 1984.......................................................................................................................... 200 
1985 ............. -........................................................................................................... 221 
REDUCTION IN :ERROR RATE TOLERANCE 
( Section 134 of the Bill) 
Present Zaw.-Under an amendment to the 1980 Appropriations Act, 
States were reguired to reduce their payment error rMes for eligi.bil-
ity determinat1ons to 4 percent by September 30, 1982.. States whose 
error rates exc-eed the target figure are subject to a penalty reductio~. 
The nationwide Medicaid payment error rate for the October 1980-
l\farch 1981 period was estimated at 4.1 percent. 
Oommittee amendment.-The amendment deletes the error rate pro· 
visions and penalties incorporated in the 1980 Appropriations A~t. It 
substitutes language establishing a 3 percent target error rat,~ fqr 
quarters beginning after March 30, Hl82. Prospective fiscal sanction~ 
are to be applied beginning in the second half of fiscal year 1983 for 
States which have error rates exceeding the 3-percent figure. The an-
nual penalty, applied on a prospective basis, will be equal to th¢ 
product of (a) the portion of the projected error rate which eX·~eeds 
;1 percent for the year in question and ( b) the total amount of Federal 
financial participation expected to be claimed :for the year for services 
provided to recipients for whom the State determined eligibility. If thf 
estimated prospective penalty proves to be inaccurate when actual data 
from the period become available, appropriate adjustments wm be 
made in subsequent grants. The Secretary is prov1ded discretion in 
applying the fiscnl penalties, in whole or part, for a State which has 
made a good faith effort to meet the 3-percent target. 
The committee is a.ware that many questions remain to be res,)lved 
relative to the matter of sanctions for e:s:cessive rates of error. For 
example~.· under the existing provision no sanctions have in fact been 
imposed. H°'ve\'er, the Administration's projections of program cost$ 
under present law appear to he based on an assumption that no waiv-. 
ers would be grante<l. The committee believes that the question can-
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PART fi...,.ELJGIBILITY 
SEC. 13611. TRANSFERS OF ASSETS; TREATMENT OF CERTAIN TRUSTS. 
(a) PERIODS OF INELIGIBILITY FOR TRANSFERS OF AssETS.-
. (1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1917(c)(l) (42 u.s.c. 1396p(cX1)) 
is amended to read as follows: 
"(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection 
for purposes of section 1902(aX18), the State plan must provide 
that if an institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an 
individual (or, at the option of a State, a noninstitutionalized 
individual or the spouse of such an individqa}) disposes of assets 
for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date 
specified in subparagraph (BXi), the individual is ineligible for 
medical assistance for services described in subparagraph (CXi) 
(or, in the case of a noninstitutionalized individual, for the services 
described in subparagraph (C)(ii)) during the period beginning on 
the date specified in subparagraph (D) and equal to the number 
of months specified in subparagraph (E). 
"(B)(i) The look-back date specified in this subparagraph is 
a date that is 36 months (or, in the case of payments from a 
trust or portions of a trust that are treated as assets dis~sed 
of by. the individual pursuant t.o paragraph (3XA)(iii) or (3XB)(ii) 
of subsection (d), 60 months) before the date specified in clause 
(ii). . 
"(ii) The date specified in this clause, with respect to- . 
"(I) an institutionalized individual is the first date as of 
which the individual both is an institutionalized individual 
and has applied for medical assistance under the State plan, 
or 
"(II) a noninstitutionalized individual is the date on which 
the individual applies for medical assistance under the State 
plan or, if later, the date on which the individual disposes 
of assets for less than fair market value. 
"(C)(i) The services described in this subparagraph with respect 
to an institutionalized individual are the following: 
"(I) Nursing facility services. . 
"(II) A level of care in any institution equivalent to that 
of nursing facility services. 
"(Ill) Home or community-based services furnished under 
a waiver granted under subsection (c) or (d) of section 1915. 
"(ii) The services described in this subparagraph with respect 
to a noninstitutionalized individual are services (not including any 
services described in clause (i)) that are described in paragraph 
(7), (22), or (24) of section 1905(a), and, at the option of a State, 
other long-term care services for which medical assistance is other-
wise available under the State plan to individuals requiring long-
term care. · 
"(D) The date specified in this subparagraph is the first day 
of the first month during or after which assets have been transferred 
for less than fair market value and which does not occur in any 
other periods of ineligibility under this subsection. 
"(E)(i) With respect to an institutionalized individual, the num-
ber of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ-
ual shall be equal to--
"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets 
transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or 
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after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided 
by 
"(Il) the average monthly cost t.o a private patient of nurs-
ing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State, 
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized) 
at the time of application. 
"(ii) With respect to a noninstitutionalized individual, the mun-
her of months of ineligibility under this subparagraph for an individ-
ual shall not be greater than a number equal to-
"(I) the total, cumulative uncompensated value of all assets 
transferred by the individual (or individual's spouse) on or 
after the look-back date specified in subparagraph (BXi), divided 
by 
"(II) the average monthly cost to a private patient of nurs-
ing facility services in the State (or, at the option of the State, 
in the community in which the individual is institutionalized) 
at the time of application. 
"(iii) The number of months of ineligibility otherwise deter-
mined under clause (i) or (ii) with respect to the disposal of an 
asset shall be reduced-
"(I) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under 
clause (i), b,: the number of months of ineligibility applicable 
to the individual under clause (ii) as a result of such disposal, 
and 
"(II) in the case of periods of ineligibility determined under 
clause (ii), by the number of months of ineligibility applicable 
to the individual under claUBe (i) as a result of such disposal. 
(2) EXCEPTIONS.-Section 1917(c) is amended- 42 USC 1396p. 
(A) in parar.-aph (2XA), by striking "resources" and 
inserting "assets ; 
(B) by amending paragraph (2XB) to read as follows: 
"(B) the assets-
"(i) were transferred to the individual's spouse or to 
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
"(ii) were transferred from the individual's spoUBe to 
another for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse, 
"(ill) were transferred to, or to a trust (including a 
trust described in subsection (dX4)) established solely for 
the benefit of, the individual's child described in subpara-
graph (AXii)(II), or 
"(iv) were transferred to a trust (including a trust 
described in subsection (d)(4)) established solely for the 
benefit of an individual under 65 years of age who is 
disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3));"; 
(C) in paragraph (2)(C)-
(i) by striking "resources" each place it appears 
and inserting "assets", 
(ii) by striking "any", 
(ill) by striking "or (ii)" and inserting "(ii)", and 
(iv) by striking "; or" and inserting ", or (iii) all 
assets transferred for less than fair market value have 
been returned to the individual; or"; 
(D) by amending paragraph (2XD) to read as follows: 
"(D) the State determines, under procedures established 
by the State (in accordance with standards specified by the 
Secretary), that the denial of eligibility would work an widue 
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hardshiJ!c: determined on the basis of criteria established 
by the tary;"; 
(E) by striking paragraph (3) and inserting the 
following: 
"(3) For p~ of this subsection, in the case of an asset 
held by an individual in common with another eerson or persons 
in a joint tenancy.I.. tenancy in common, or similar arrangementJ 
the asset (or the anected portion of such asset) shall be conaiderea 
1;o be transferred !>Y such individual when any action .is taken, 
either by such individual or by any other person. that reduces 
or eliminates such individual's ownerBhip or control of such asaet.n; 
and 
(F) by adding at the end of paragraph (4) the following: 
"In the case of a transfer !7 the ~use of an individual 
which results in a period of ineligibility for medical assist .. 
ance under a State plan for such individual, a State shall,, 
using a reasonable methodology (aa specified by the Sec·· 
retary), apportion such period of inellinf>ility (or any J)(!rtiori: 
of such. period) among the individual and the individual's 
spouse if the spouse otherwise becomes eligible for medical 
assistance under the State plan.". 
(b) TREATMENT OF TRUST AMOUNTS.-Section 1917 (42 U.S.C,. 
l396p) is amended by adding at the end the following: 
"(dXl) For purposes of determining an individual's eligibility 
for, or amount of, benefits under a State plan under this title., 
subject to paragraph (4), the rules specified m paragraph (3) shalll 
appll. to a trust established by such individual. 
(2XA) For purposes of this subsection, an individual shall 
be considered to have established a trust if assets of the individua:l 
were used to form all or part of the corpus of the trust and 
if any of the following individuals established such trust other 
than by will: · 
"(i) The individual. 
"(ii) The individual's use. · 
"(iii) A person, inclu'!lrng a court or administrative body, 
with le~ authority to act in place of or on behalf of thE: 
individual or the individual's spoUBe. 
"(iv) A person. including any court or administrative body, 
acting at tlie · direction or upon the request of the individual 
or the individual's spouse. 
"(B) In the case of a trust the corpus of which includes assets 
of an individual (as determined under subparagraph (A)) and assets 
of any other perBon or persons, the provisions of this subsection 
shall apply to the portion of the trust attributable to the aasets 
of the individual. 
"(C) Subject to paragraph (4), this subsection shall apply with· 
out regard to-
"(i) the purposes for which a trust is established. 
"(ii) whether the trustees have or exercise any discretion 
under the trust, 
"(iii) any restrictions on when or whether distributions 
may be made from the trust, or 
"(iv) any restrictions on the use of distributions from the 
trust. 
"(3)(A) In the case of a revocable trust-
"(i) the co~ of the trust shall be considered resourcea 
available to the individual, 
· ! 
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"(ii) payments from the .trust to or for the benefit of the 
individual shall be considered income of the individual, and 
"(iii) any other payments from the trust shall be considered 
assets disposed of by the individual for purposes of sub-
section (c). 
"(B) In the case of an irrevocable trust-
"(i) if there are any circumstances under which payment 
from the trust could be made to or for the benefit of the 
individual, the portion of the corpus from which, or the income 
on the corpus from which, payment to the individual could 
be made shall be considered resources available to the individ-
ual, and g.ayments from that portion of the corpus or income-
(!) to or for the benefit of the individual, shall be 
considered income of the individual, and 
"(ID for any other purpose, shall be considered a trans-
fer of assets by the individual subject to subsection (c); 
and 
"(ii) any portion of the trust from which, or any income 
on the corpus from which, no payment could under any cir-
cumstances be made to the individual shall be considered, 
as of the date of establishment of the trust (or, if later, the 
date on which payment to the individual was foreclosed) to 
be assets disposed by the individual for purposes of subsection 
(c), and the value of the trust shall be determined for purposes 
of such subsection by including the amount of any payments 
made from such portion of the trust after such date. 
"(4) This subsection shall not apply to any of the following 
trusts: 
"(A) A trust containing the assets of an individual under 
age 65 who is disabled (as defined in section 1614(a)(3)) and 
which is established for the benefit of such individual by a 
parent, grandparent, legal· guardian of the individual, or a 
court if the State will receive all amounts remaining in the 
trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount equal 
to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of the individual 
under a State plan under this title. . 
"(B) A trust established in a State for the benefit of an 
individual if-
"(i) the trust is composed onlr of pension, Social Secu-
rity, and other income to the individual (and accumulated 
income in the trust), 
"(ii} the State will receive all amounts remaining in 
the trust upon the death of such individual up to an amount 
equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf of 
the individual under a State plan under this title, and 
"(iii) the State makes medical assistance available to 
individuals described in section 1902(aXl0XA)(iiXV), but 
does not niake such assistance available to individuals 
for nursing facility services under section 1902(aX10XC). 
"(C) A trust containing the assets of an individual who 
is disabled (as defined in section 1614(aX3)) that meets the 
following conditions: . 
"(i) The trust is established and managed by a non-
profit association. 
"(ii) A separate account is maintained for each bene-
ficiary of the trust, but, for purposes of investment and 
management of funds, the trust pools these accounts. 
000406
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"(iii) Accounts in the trust are established solely for 
the benefit of individuals who are disabled (as defined 
in section 1614(aX3)) by the parent, grandparent, or legal 
guardian of such individuals, by such individuals, or by 
a <".ourt. 
"(iv) To the extent that amounts remaining in the 
beneficiary's account upon the death of the beneficiary 
are not retained by the trust, the tl'Ust pays to the State 
from such remaining amounts in the account an amount 
equal to the total amount of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the beneficiary under the State plan under this 
title. · 
"(5) The State a~ncy shall establish procedures (in accordance 
with standards specified by the· Secretary) under which the agency 
waives the application of this subsection with respect to an individ-
ual if the individual establishes that such application would work 
an undue hardship on the individual as determined on the basis 
of criteria established by the Secretary.". 
"(6) The term 'trust' includes any legal instrument or device 
that is similar to a trust but includes an annui~ only to such 
extent and in such manner as the Secretary specifies .. 
(c) DEFINITIONS.--Section 1917 (42 U.S.C. 1396p), as amended 
by subsection (b), is further amended by adding at the end the 
following new subsection: 
"(e) In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
"(1) The term 'assets', with respect to an individual, 
includes all income and resources of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse, including any income or resources 
which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled 
to but does not receive because of action- · 
"(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
"(B) by a person, including a court or administrative 
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf 
oft;he individual or such individual's spouse, or 
"(C) by any person, including any court or administra-
tive body, acting at the direction or upon the request of 
the individual or such individual's spouse. 
"(2) The term 'income' has the meaning given such term 
in section 1612. 
"(3) The term 'institutionalized individual' means an 
individual who is an in_patient in a nursing facility, who is 
an inpatient in a medical institution and with res_pect to whom 
payment is made based on a level of care provided in a nursing 
facility, or who is described in section 1902(aXl0)(A)(ii)(VI). 
"(4) The term 'noninstitutionalized individual' means an 
individual receiving any of the services specified in subsection 
(cXlXCXii). . 
"(5) The term 'resources' has the meaning given such term 
in ~tion 1613, without regard (in the case of an institutional-
ized individual) to the exclusion described in subsection (aXl) 
of such section.". 
(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.-
(1) Section 1902 (42 U.S.C. 1396a) is amended-
(A) in subsection (a)(18), by striking "and transfers 
of assets" and inserting ". transfers of assets, and treatment 
of certain trusts"; (B) in subsection (a)(51)-
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(i) by st~ •(A)"; and 
(ii) by striking •, and (B)" and all that follows 
and inserting a semicolon; and 
(C) by striking subsection (k). 
(2) Section 1924(b)(2)(B)(i) (42 U.S.C. 1896r-5(b)(2)(B)(i)) 
is amended by striking "1902(k)" and inserting "1917(d)". 
(e) EFFECTIVE DATES.-{!) The amendments made b;yJhie_sec-
ti~n shap apply, exceJ>.~ as __ l>~~-d:~ ~ __ tjjj_-~]luh•tt&n;].i) __ p'!1-.Plenta 
qnde1" ·t1tJe·--xix-ofthe 13oclfil. __ Secimty .. AcLfor .. -.calendar--quar,t.ers 
;!!;~~!l~~J~~~-lJt!~~~~~:ta ~a;:e: 
promulgated by such date. 
(2) The amendments made by this section shaJ.J.__n_Qt-.Jlppl_y-(N to medical assistance provided for servi~~-furnisped before Octooer-1;rg9a;--·------------·· ········-···---------- - -
~~ ··-c:1~;:!~=oo/Uiis'tt-:,sp_o~d _ of on_ or .. before . the 
~-- . -------- ···-···-- ----------- ·--·-·, . (C) with respect to irusts established on or before the 
date of the enactment of this Act. 
(3) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under 
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other 
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet 
the additional re<{uirements imposed by the amendment made by 
subsection (b), the State plan shall not be regarded as failing 
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendment solely 
on the basis of its failure to meet these additional requirements 
before the first day of the first calendar quarter beginning after 
the close of the first regular session of the State legislature that 
begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2-
year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed 
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature. 
SEC. 13612. MEDICAID ESTATE RECOVERIES. 
(a) MANDATE To SEEK REcOVERY.-Section 1917(b)(l) (42 
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)) is amended by striking "except-" and all that 
follows and inserting the following: "except that the _State shall 
seek a<\justment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case 
of the following individuals: 
"(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a)(l)(B), the State shall seek a(ijustment or recovery from 
the individual's estate or upon sale of the property subject 
to a lien imposed on account of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the mdividual. . 
"(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of 
age or older when the individual received auch medical assist-
ance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the 
indiviclual's estate, but only for medical assistance consisting 
of-. 
"(i) nursing facility services, home and community-
based services, and related hospital and prescription drug 
services, or 
"(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services 
under the S!:8te plan. 
42 USC 1396p 
note. 
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"(CXi) In the case of an individual who has received (or 
is entitled to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance 
policy in connection. with which assets or resources are dis-
regarded in the manner described in clause (ii), except as 
provided in such clause, the Stat.e shall seek acljustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate on account of medical 
assistance paid on behalf of the individual for nursing facility 
and other long-term care services. 
"(ii) Clause (i) shall not apply in the case of an individual 
who received medical assistance wider a State plan of a State 
which had a State plan amendment approved as of May 14, 
1993, which provided for the disregard of any assets or 
resources-
"(D to the extent that payments are made under a 
long-term care insurance policy; or 
"(II) because an individual has received (or is entitled 
to receive) benefits under a long-term care insurance 
~licy.". 
(b) HARDSHIP WAIVER.-Section 1917(b) (42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)) 
is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph: 
"(3) The State agency shall establish procedures (in accordance 
with standards s~ed by the Secretary) under which the agency 
shall waive the application of this subsection (other than paragraph . 
(lXC)) if such ap_plication would work an undue hardship as deter-
mined on the bains of criteria established by the Secretary.". (c) DEFINITION OF ESTATE.-Section 1917(b) (42 u.s.c. 
1396p(b))l as amended by subsection (b), is amended by adding 
· · at the ena the following new paragraph: 
"(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'estate', with 
respect to a deceased individual-
"(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for 
purposes of State probate law; and 
"(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall 
incl~de, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (lXCXi) 
applies), any other real and personal pro~rty and other assets 
in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the 
time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such 
assets conveyed to a ,urvivor, heir, or assign of the deceased 
individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivor-
ship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement.". 
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-(lXA) Except as provided in subpara-
graph (B), the ~endments m. ade bY. .. this se~tion. s_ha!L_apJ>JY. .to 
~~~ under title XIX..of..the .. Socu~Lf½l;Jll'lty:_J\cLfQ.cciilendar 
<@.~.ti-oo~r after October 1, 1993, without regard 
t<f whether or not ffiiiuffigu1affonrtocany-out such amendments 
have been promulgated by such date. 
(B) In the case of a State plan for medical assistance under 
title XIX of the Social Security Act which the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services determines requires State legislation (other 
than legislation appropriating funds) in order for the plan to meet 
the additional requirements imposed by the amendments made 
by this section, the St.ate plan shall not be regarded as failing 
to comply with the requirements imposed by such amendments 
solely on the basis of its failure to meet these additional require-
ments before the first day of the first calendar quarter be~ng 
after the close of ,the first regular session of the State legislature 
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that begins after the date of the enactment of this Act. For purposes 
of the preceding sentence, in the case of a State that has a 2-
year legislative session, each year of such session shall be deemed 
to be a separate regular session of the State legislature. 
(2) The amendments made by this section shall not apply 
to individuals who died before October 1, 1993. 
PART ID-PAYMENTS 
SEC. 13821. ASSURING PROPER PAYMENTS TO DISPROPORTIONATE 
SHARE HOSPrrALS. 
(a) DISPROPORTIONATE SHARE HOSPITALS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE 
MINIMUM LEvEL OF SERVICES TO MEDICAID PATIENTS.-
(!) IN GENERAL.-Section 1923 (42 U.S.C. 1396r-4) is 
amended-
(A) in subsection (aXl)(A), by striking "requirement" 
and inserting "requirements"; 
(B) in subsection (b)(l), by striking "requirement" and 
inserting "requirements"; 
(C) in the heading to subsection (d), by striking 
"REQUIREMENT" and inserting "REQUIREMENTS"; 
(D) by adding at the end of subsection (d) the following 
new paragraph: 
"(3) No hospital may be defined or deemed as a dispropor-
tionate share hospital under a State plan under this title or 
under subsection (b) or (e) of this section unless the hospital 
has a medicaid inpatient utilization rate (as defined in sub-
section (b)(2)) of not less than 1 percent."; 
(E) in subsection (e)(l)-
(i) by striking "and" before "(B)", and 
(ii) by inserting before the period at the end the 
following: ", ai;id--{C) the plan meets the requirement 
of subsectiol)-{d)(3) and such payment adjustments are 
made consf'stent with the last sentence of subsection 
(c)"; and/ 
(F) in s~bsection (e)(2)-
(i) :'in subparagraph (A), by inserting "(other than 
the last sentence of subsection (c))" after "(c)", 
(ii) by striking "and" at -. the end of subparagraph 
(A), 
(iii) by striking the period at the end of subpara-
graph (B) and inserting", and", and 
(iv) by adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
"(C) subsection (dX3) shall apply.". 
(2) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this sub-
section shall apply to payments to States under section 1903(a) 
of the Social Security Act for payments ·to hospitals made 
under State plans after-
(A) the end of the State fiscal year that ends dwing 
1994, or 
(B) in the case of a State with a State legislature 
which is not scheduled to have a regular legislative session 
in 1994, the end of the State fiscal year that ends during 
1995; 
42 USC 1396r-4 
note. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
By Order dated August 26, 1998, the Court has requested that the Appellant, the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "Department") file a limited 
responsive brief addressing only the issue of "whether the definition of 'assets' contained 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(I)(B) as enacted in 1993 is applicable to the Marriage Settlement 
Agreement between Lionel and Hildor dated March 8, 1993." 
This brief concludes that: 
( 1) Whether the definition is "applicable" depends on whether the issue 
examined is Medicaid eligibility or estate recovery; 
(2) The definition of "assets" is not applicable for the purpose of determining 
Hildor Knudson's Medicaid eligibility; 
(3) The definition of "assets" is applicable and significant in understanding 
Congressional intent for estate recovery purposes; but 
( 4) The definition of assets is only persuasive authority and does not control the 
outcome of this case. 
While the Department profoundly disagrees with many other aspects of Jackman's 
Rehearing Brief, in accordance with the Court's order, only the issue presented by the 
Court has been briefed herein. 
LINIITED RESPONSE TO 
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........ 
A. 
II . 
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" lVIA Y BE 
APPLICABLE FOR ESTATE RECOVERY PlJRPOSES 
EVEN THOUGH IT IS INAPPLICABLE IN 
DETERlVIINING MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY. 
The Distinction Between Eligibility and Estate Recoverv. 
When scrutinizing asset transfers, including transfers between spouses through a 
marriage settlement agreement, there is a significant distinction between questions of 
eligibility and questions of estate recovery. Transfers which may be appropriate for 
eligibility purposes, may be voidable in other contexts. See IDAP A citations, infra. This 
unusual circumstance arises because, at least in part, federal Medicaid law ignores state 
marital property laws. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p deals with both eligibility and estate recovery in different 
sections. For example, subsection ( c) imposes a period of ineligibility for prohibited 
transfers, while specifically permitting transfers between spouses. Seemingly in conflict 
with state community property principles, transfers to third parties by either spouse are 
punished, without regard to which spouse is the legal owner of the property. At the same 
time, what property is available for estate recovery is enlarged in subsection (b) by an 
expansive definition of "estate." 
The eligibility provision, punishing transfers to third parties, ignores the effect of 
state community property laws. When estate recovery law is applied to the same 
circumstance to recover property which has been transferred between the spouses, it 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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appears that the laws conflict. This perceived conflict arises, however, only because of 
the interplay between state community property laws and federal Medicaid law. There is 
actually no conflict, and in Idaho, community property principles are preserved and are 
modified only to the extent necessary to effectuate the federal scheme. 
As an example, IDAPA_ 16.03.09.025.20 permits recovery only of estate property 
which had previously been the couple's community property: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. Limits on the Department's 
claim against the assets of a deceased recipient shall be subject to Sections 
56-218 and 56-218A, Idaho Code. A claim against the estate of a surviving 
spouse of a predeceased recipient is limited to the value of the assets of the 
estate that were community property1 or the deceased recipient's share of 
the separate property, and jointly owned property. 
IDAP A 16.03.09.025.20 (underline added). 1 Similarly, transfers between spouses 
•
11, • .r through a marriage settlement agreement, valid under state law, which have no effect on 
eligibility. are, because of community property law, restricted for purposes of estate 
recove:r:y: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. A 
marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates 
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of 
the deceased recipient or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement 
agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate 
consideration. 
1It is because of this section that most of the "examples" posed by Jackman at pages 15 through 18 of 
the Rehearing Brief are wrong. The Department does not seek recovery of property that has been received and 
maintained as separate property. Only property that was, prior to establishing Medicaid eligibility, community 
property, is subject to the Department's reimbursement claim. The Court's decision, contrary to Jackman's 
claim at page 16 of her Rehearing Brief, does not ignore "treasured principles of community property law", it 
protects them. 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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IDAPA 16.03.09.025.24. This provision is found within the Medicaid estate recoverv 
provisions, but a similar provision is found within the eligibility rules: 
A marriage settlement agreement may be valid for Medicaid eligibility and 
still be voidable for estate recovery purposes if value is transferred between 
spouses without adequate consideration. 
IDAPA 16.03.05.620.04. 
These provisions of State and federal law merely show that a different ar;,alysis is 
required when considering questions of eligibility and questions of estate recovery. The 
reason this dichotomy arises is, at least in part, because federal law ignores community 
property principles and State law preserves them. 
B. Hildor Knudson's Medicaid Eligibility Is Not in Issue and the Eligibilitv 
Provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Are Not in Issue. 
Had the marriage settlement agreement improperly conveyed assets between 
Hildor and Lionel Knudson, Hildor's Medicaid eligibility could have been affected. No 
one, however, has contended that Hildor was not eligible for Medicaid. No one has 
claimed the marriage settlement agreement improperly transferred assets from one spouse 
to the other. Therefore, whether the definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p applies to 
the marriage settlement agreement, for eligibility purposes, is completely irrelevant to the 
outcome of this case. 
At page 28 (under subheading 1) of her brief, Jackman argues that the definition in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p does not apply because the marriage settlement agreement was entered 
into before the effective date of the act. In support of this argument, Jack.man cites P .L. 
,..., LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
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103-66, § 13612(e)(2)(B). Section 13612 contains the effective dates for those provisions 
dealing with estate recovery. However, the cited provision does not exist in section 
13612. Instead, the correct citation is§ 1361 l(e)(2)(B). Section 13611 is the section 
dealing with eligibility not estate recovery. Therefore, it is true that Hildor Knudson's 
eligibility was unaffected by transfers made prior to the effective date of the act. But 
that was never the issue. 
The effective date for the estate recovery changes is found in § 13612( d)(l )(A) 
which states: 
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the amendments made by this 
section shall apply to payments under title XIX of the Social Security Act 
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, without regard 
to whether or not final regulations to carry out such amendments have been 
promulgated by such date. 
P.L. 103-66, § 13612(d)(l)(A). In other words, the estate recovery amendments are 
effective based on payments made, not on the date of a transfer which could have affected 
eligibility. There is no question that the definition of "assets" is applicable to estate 
recovery issues in this case. 
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III. 
THE DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IS IMPORTANT 
AND APPLICABLE IN DEMONSTRATING 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT TO RECOVER ASSETS 
TR.\NSF'ERRED BETWEEN SPOUSES. 
A. The Definition of "Assets" Is Significant and Important to Proving Jackman's 
Preemption Claim Is Incorrect. 
The fact that Hildor Knudson's eligibility is not in issue does not mean the 
definition of "assets" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p is unimportant. It is important, but mostly to 
show congressional intent. Jackman's argument has been that federal law somehow 
preempts Idaho's estate recovery law and prohibits recovery from the estate of a 
surviving spouse. Since there is no specific federal prohibition to spousal estate recovery, 
Jackman has been forced to argue that the structure and purpose of the federal law 
somehow implies preemption. However, this is simply not so. The definition of "assets" 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, by including a broad range of property of both spouses merely 
shows that Congress did not view State marital property laws as having an effect on the 
overall scheme to permit one spouse to become eligible without impoverishing the other, 
while at the same time preserving the State's ability to recover the couple's property after 
both of them are deceased. 
LIMITED RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR REHEARING - 6 
000420
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p Supports Idaho Code§ 56-218 Spousal Estate Recovery. 
The Court correctly held that Idaho Code§ 56-218 permits estate recovery from 
the estate of Hildor Knudson's spouse in this case. This section, alone, is sufficient to 
reach all of the property in this case. The court also correctly perceived the federal 
support for spousal estate recovery found in the definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b )( 4): 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with 
respect to a deceased individual -
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for 
purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall 
include, in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) 
applies), any other real and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of 
death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). This section refers to "assets" and 
therefore incorporates the definition of "assets" found in subsection ( e). 2 Unlike the 
eligibility amendments made in§ 13611 of P.L. 103-66, this provision was adde:d by§ 
13612. As stated above, this section became effective based on payments made and is 
clearly applicable in this case. There is no question but that the definition of "estate," as 
2 Jackman argues that the definition of "assets" in subsection ( e) cannot be applied to the word "assets" 
found in subsection (b). Rehearing Brief, p. 27. There is no support for this contention, however, which 
contradicts the plain language of the definition which begins "( e) Definitions - In this section, the following 
definitions shall apply:". 
"'•·
1
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broadened by reference to the definition for "assets" includes property transfen-ed by 
Hildor in the marriage settlement agreement. \Vhile these provisions of federal law are, 
by no means, essential to the court's holding in this case, they clearly defeat Jackman's 
argument that federal law somehow prohibits spousal estate recovery. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order requesting this brief asked whether the definition of "assets" frmnd in 
42 U.S.C. § l 396p( e) is "applicable" to the marriage settlement agreement. If the 
question were whether the definition was applicable with regard to Hildor's elig;ibilitv, 
the answer would have to be "no." However, the definition is clearly applicable to show 
that Congress intended estate recovery to reach assets conveyed between spouses, 
including assets conveyed through a marriage settlement agreement. While not essential 
for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel through the 
marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject 
to recovery in this case. 
DATED this 9 day of September, 1998, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 23928 
. IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE-OF · · .. ) 
, LIONEL:MALCOLM· KNUDSON,.-·.· ,···) ·, .. 
J 
Deceased. ) 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ) 
WELFARE, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
BARBARA JACKMAN, Personal ) 
Representative for the Estate of LIONEL ) 
MALCOLM KNUDSON, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) · 
,.,\-. 
Lewiston, April 1998 Term 
1998 Opinion No. 60. 
Filed:June16,1998 
Frederick C. Lyon, Clerk 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the 
State of Idaho, Latah County. Hon. John R. Stegner, District 
Judge; Hon. W.C. Hamlett, Magistrate Judge. 
Appeal from order denying claim against estate. Vacated and 
remanded. 
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. W. 
Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, argued, 
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for respondent. 
JOHNSON, Justice 
P. 17 
Thls is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that p!lrsuant to section 56-218(1) of the 
Idaho Code (I.C.), the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the.Department) may recover 
from the available estate of a surviving spouse the balance ·of Medicaid payments received by an 
1 EXHIBIT 
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individual who was fifty-five years old or older when receiving the payments- if the individual's 
estate is inadequate to repay the entire amount. 
I. 
THE BACKGllOUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS , .. 
' • ' • ~ ' I • , 
. . 
Barbara Jack.man (Jackman) \_Vas the niece of IUl elderly couple, Hildor_an~ Lionel Knudson 
(the Knudsons). - Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and held a durable power of attorney for 
Lionel. On behalf of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a ''Marriage Settlement Agreement" (the 
_ agreement) on March 8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the Knudsons' community 
_ property into Lionel's separate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as her separ~te property 
. her personal property and household effects in her possession, her irrevocable burial trust, arid 
$1,900 in cash. The purpose of the agreement was to makeHildor eligible for Medic:aid assistance. 
Hild.or received $41,600.55 in Medicaid payments (the Medicaid°payments) prior to her death on 
October 27, 1994. 
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's estate-pursuant to the procedures for smaU 
estates contained in LC. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's funeral expenses _fmd legal fees, 
Jaclan~ delivered the balance ofHildor's _estate, $1,638.03, to the :Oepartment ~n August 10, 1995. 
. . -.. -
_The Department .accepted this as a partial settlement of.its claim fo,r.recoveiy of the_ ·Medicaid 
. . . ' 
payments, 
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman 
initiated probate proceedings (or his estate and became Lionel's personal representa.tive. Lionel's 
estate was vatu·ed at $40.,798.35. The Department sought allowance of a claim against Lionel's 
estate to recover the remaining balance of !ho Medicaid payments (the balance of the Medicaid 
, payments). Jackman objected to the Department's claim. 
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim against Lionel'~ estate because Hildor 
had an estate, and the Department received the remainder of the estate after expenses. The 
Department appealed to the district judge, ·who affirmed the magistrate judge's decision. The 
Department appealed. 
II . 
. I.C. § 56-218 PERMITS RECOVERY OF THE BALANCE 
2 
000425
Jan. 7. 2010 2:06PM No. ·.324 P. 19 
OF THE MEDICAID PAYMENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE. 
The Department asserts that LC. § 56-218 pennits recovery of the balance c.f the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree. 
I. C. § 56-218 prbvides that rrtedic~f assistan~e "paid on behalf of an ~dividual who was fifty-
i, ·fiv-e'.(55}'yeats 'of age or'oldhr wheri th~'.iridi~idual reteived such ~~istance may be reco~ered from 
the estate, or if there be rio estate the estate of the surviving sp~use, if any, shall be charged for'such 
aid paid to either or both .... " I.C. § 56-218(1) . 
. In George W. Watkins Family v, Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990), the Court 
- pointed out: 'The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent 
is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." Id. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388. 
If we were to read I.C. § 56-218(1) not to allow recovery from LionePs estate of the balance 
of the M~dic.aid payments because there was $1,638.03 in Hildor's estate, our reading would be 
contrary to expressed legislative intent and would lead to absurd results. This reading would mean 
that if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid assistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, 
the Department could collect nothing from the estate of the surviving spouse. As acknowledged by 
, . J ack:man; s attorney ~t the oral ~~erit of this c~e. this readirig ~f the stafut~ ·would ~ean that there 
... ii h<>1 ;circum'sta.nte' iii which ·tiii iegislativgiritent t~ rebo;et" fro~ "t&e: 6state rif is~r~ivi~g spo~se 
would be fulfilled. 1bis result flies in the face of the expressed legislative intent that the Department 
recover from the estate of the surviving spouse under some circumstances. It is absurd to read the 
statute as preventing recovery from the surviving-spo\lse's estate even if the recipi.ent's estate is 
inadequate for the full recovery of Medicaid payments. 
From this analysis we conclude that the correct reading ofI.C. § 56-218(1) is that if the 
estate of the individual who received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay the full amount of 
the assistance received, the Department can recover the balance from tho estate of the surviving 
spouse. Stated in terms of the circumstances of this case, when the Department receiv1:d the balance 
of Hildor' s estate, there was "no estate,, of Hildor remaining from which tho Department could 
recover the balance of the medicaid payments. Therefore, the Department is entitled to recover the 
balance from Lionel's estate. 
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Jaclonan contends that the Idaho statutes allowjng for estate recovery exceed the authority 
granted by federal law. We disagree. 
Jaclanan relies on a portion of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) for the proposition that re~overy 
may only be had from the recipient's estate, Reading the entir~ _section, however, it :is clear that the 
statute is only a limitation on the types ofI1_1eclical assistance which can bo recovered. lbis includes 
payments for nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and related Jiospital and 
prescription drug services, or, at the State's option, any items or services under the State plan. The 
statute defines the types of payments· tp.at are recoverable and does not purpprt to def111e from whom 
. ,. ,· 
_these payments may be recoyered. 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as well as from the 
estate of the surviving spouse, The federal definition of asset is significant. Federal law includes 
within the recipient's estate "all real and personal property and <?ther assets included within the 
.individual's estate ... " and "any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or_interest at the time of death . .- .. ''. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)( 4); I.C. § 
, 
56-2,8(4). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and resources as well as 
Lionel's income and resources, The agreement does not affect the status of the assets that federal 
law considers to be part of the recipient's estate because the definition of assets includes "income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive 
because of action by a person . . . with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual 
or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jacbnan's signing of the agreement 
constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor and Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the 
Department from recovering the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the Department's claim against Lionel• s estate 
and remand the c~e to the ~agistrate judge for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursuant to J.C.§ 15-3-720 she is entitled to 
receive from Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disbursements includmg reasonable attorney 
fees. 1his is a question the m~~gistr~te judge· must consider on remand. 
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,1.: 
/ 
We award the Department costs, but not attorney fees, on appeal. 
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER, and WALTERS, CONCUR. 
·.•'.'.. 
r 
5 
I, Fr(lclsl'ick C. Lyon, Clerk of the Suprnms Co11n 
of the State of Idaho, do hereby certify tliAt th{l 
ebQ\IG 11 a true· and correct copy of th~ ~~ 
~nt11rEIC1 tn the above entitled ceu~o .cJn now on 
rooord in my office. . . 
vl,TNEGS mv hand nnd tho Seel of this Courr ~~ --9 I 
FREDERICK C, LYON 
Clork 
t1'f. ~ -.~u,c 
000428
221. 1 Sec. 26. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B. l 5, subdivision la, is amended to read: 
221. s Subd. la. Estates subject to claims. (£!)_If a person receives any medical assistance 
221. 9hereunder, on the person's death, if single, or on the death of the survivor of a married 
221. 1ocouple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, or as otherwise provided 
221. 11for in this section, the total amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person 
221.12and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the person or the estate of the 
221.13surviving spouse in the court having jurisdiction to probate the estate or to issue a decree 
221. Hof descent according to sections 525.31 to 525.313. 
221.1s(b) For the purposes of this section, the person's estate must consist of: 
221.16(1) the person's probate estate; 
221.11(2) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in real property the 
221.1sperson owned as a life tenant or as a joint tenant with a right of survivorship at the time of 
221. 19the person's death: 
221. 20(3) all of the person's interests or proceeds of those interests in securities the person 
221.21owned in beneficiary form as provided under sections 524.6-301 to 524.6-311 at the time 
221. 22of the person's death, to the extent the interests or proceeds of those interests become part 
221. 23of the probate estate under section 524.6-307: 
221.24(4) all of the person's interests in joint accounts, multiple-party accounts, and 
221.2spay-on-death accounts, brokerage accounts, investment accounts, or the proceeds of 
221.26those accounts, as provided under sections 524.6-201 to 524.6-214 at the time of the 
221.2merson's death to the extent the interests become part of the probate estate under section 
221. 2s524.6-207; and 
221.29(5) assets conveyed to a survivor. heir, or assign of the person through survivorship, 
221.Joliving trust, or other arrangements. 
221.n(c) For the purpose of this section and recovery in a surviving spouse's estate for 
221. J2medical assistance paid for a predeceased spouse, the estate must consist of all of the legal 
221.JJtitle and interests the deceased individual's predeceased spouse had in jointly owned or 
221.Jfmarital property at the time of the spouse's death. as defined in subdivision 2b. and the 
221. Jsproceeds of those interests. that passed to the deceased individual or another individual, a 
222.1survivor, an heir. or an assign of the predeceased spouse through a joint tenancy, tenanfY_ 
222.2in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. A deceased 
222.Jrecipient who, at death, owned the property jointly with the surviving spouse shall hav,~ 
222.•an interest in the entire property. 
222. s( d) For the purpose of recovery in a single person's estate or the estate of a survivor 
222. 60f a married couple, "other arrangement" includes any other means by which title to all or 
222. 1any part of the jointly owned or marital property or interest passed from the predeceased 
222. sspouse to another including, but not limited to, transfers between spouses which are 
222. 9permitted, prohibited, or penalized for purposes of medical assistance. 
222.10.(tl_A claim shall be filed if medical assistance was rendered for either or both 
222.11persons under one of the following circumstances: 
222 .1~ill the person was over 55 years of age, and received services under this chapter; 
222.1Jte,...a.l the person resided in a medical institution for six months or longer, received 
222 .14services under this chapter, and, at the time of institutionalization or application for 
222.1srnedical assistance, whichever is later, the person could not have reasonably been expected 
222. 16to be discharged and returned home, as certified in writing by the person's treating 
222.17Physician. For purposes of this section only, a "medical institution" means a skilled 
222.1snursing facility, intermediate care facility, intermediate care facility for persons with 
222. l9developmental disabilities, nursing facility, or inpatient hospital; or 
222. 2~11} the person received general assistance medical care services under chapter 
222. 21256D. 
222.22.(fi_The claim shall be considered an expense of the last illness of the decedent for the 
EXHIBIT 
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222. 2Jpurpose of section 524.3-805. Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, a state or 
222.24county agency with a claim under this section must be a creditor under section 524.6--307. 
222. 25Any statute of limitations that purports to limit any county agency or the state agency, 
222.26or both, to recover for medical assistance granted hereunder shall not apply to any claim 
222. 27ffiade hereunder for reimbursement for any medical assistance granted hereunder. Notice 
222.2softbe claim shall be given to all heirs and devisees of the decedent whose identity carr be 
222.29ascertained with reasonable diligence. The notice must include procedures and instrui;tions 
222.Jofor making an application for a hardship waiver under subdivision 5; time frames for 
222.J1submitting an application and determination; and information regarding appeal rights and 
222. J2procedures. Counties are entitled to one-half of the non federal share of medical assistance 
222. JJcollections from estates that are directly attributable to county effort. Counties are entitled 
222. 34to ten percent of the collections for alternative care directly attributable to county effort. 
222.35 Sec. 27. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision lb, is amended to read: 
22J.1 Subd. lh. Estates ofspecific persons receiving medical assistance. (a) For 
22J.2Purposes of this section, paragraphs (b) to Wiil apply if a person received medical 
223. Jassistance for which a claim may be filed under this section and died single, or the 
22J.4surviving spouse of the couple and was not survived by any of the persons described 
22J. 5in subdivisions 3 and 4. 
223. 6 (l:i) For p1:tFposes of this seotiot1, the persoa's estate ooasists of: (l) the f')ersoa's 
22J. 7flFObme estme; (2) all of01e f')ersoR's iRterests or proeeeds of those iaterests ia real property 
223. sthe persoR ov1Recl as a life teaaRt or as a joiRt teRant with a right of SllfYiYorship m the 
22 J. gtime of the persoa's death; (3) all of the persoR's iaterests or proeeeds of those iaterests itl 
22J.10see1:trities the persoa ov,rRed ia beRefieiary form as proYided 1:tHder seetioRs 524.6 301-to 
22J. 11524.6 311 m the time of the persoa's death, to the eKteRt they beeome f')art of the proba-te 
223 .12estate eader seetioa 524 .6 307; (4) all of the persoR's iRterests iR joiRt aeeol:Hlts, meltiple 
22J.13f'larty aooo1:tRts, and pay OR demh aooo1:tRts, or the prooeecls of those aeom.lftts, as provided 
22J .141:tRder seotioas 524 .6 2Q 1 to 524 .6 214 at the time of the persoa's death to the eKteat 
22J.1sthey beeome pat1 of the probate estate uader seetioa 524.6 207; ilild (5) the f')ersoR's 
223. 16legal title or iRterest at the time of the persoR's death iR real f'lFOperty traRsferrecl uRder 
22J.11a traRsfer oR death deed Hnder seotion 507.071, or iR the proeeeds from the soosequeRt 
223. 19sale of the persoa's interest in the real f')Foperty. NotwithstaRding l¼RY law or rule to thti 
22 J. Hoontrary, a state or 001:tRty agene~' with a el aim. HRder this seetion shall ee a ereditor 1:HM:ier 
22J.20seetion 524.6 307. 
22J.21 W..Du Notwithstanding any law or rule to the contrary, the person's life estate or joint 
223. 22tenancy interest in real property not subject to a medical assistance lien under sections 
223.235)4.980 to 514.985 on the date of the person's death shall not end upon the person's death 
22J.24and shall continue as provided in this subdivision. The life estate in the person's estate 
22J.25shall be that portion of the interest in the real property subject to the life estate that is equal 
223. 26to the life estate percentage factor for the life estate as listed in the Life Estate Mortality 
22J.21Table of the health care program's manual for a person who was the age of the medical 
223. 2sassistance recipient on the date of the person's death. The joint tenancy interest in real 
22J.29property in the estate shall be equal to the fractional interest the person would have owned 
223. Join the jointly held interest in the property had they and the other owners held title to the 
223. 31property as tenants in common on the date the person died. 
223. J2 Will The court upon its own motion, or upon motion by the personal representative 
223. JJor any interested party, may enter an order directing the remaindermen or surviving joint 
22J. J4tenants and their spouses, if any, to sign all documents, take all actions, and otherwise 
22J.J5fully cooperate with the personal representative and the court to liquidate the decedent's 
223. J6life estate or joint tenancy interests in the estate and deliver the cash or the proceeds of 
224. 1those interests to the personal representative and provide for any legal and equitable 
000430
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224.2sanctions as the court deems appropriate to enforce and carry out the order, including an 
224. 3award of reasonable attorney fees. 
224. 4 Wifil The personal representative may make, execute, and deliver any conveyances 
224. 50r other documents necessary to convey the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest 
224. 6in the estate that are necessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest or 
224. 1for any other purposes. 
224. s fff M Subject to administration, all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, 
224. 9directly and immediately related to liquidating the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy 
224. 1ointerest in the decedent's estate, shall be paid from the gross proceeds of the liquidation 
224. 11allocable to the decedent's interest and the net proceeds shall be turned over to the personal 
224 .12representative and applied to payment of the claim presented under this section. 
224.13 Will The personal representative shall bring a motion in the district court in which 
224. Hthe estate is being probated to compel the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants to 
224. 15account for and deliver to the personal representative all or any part of the proceeds of any 
224 .16sale, mortgage, transfer, conveyance, or any disposition of real property allocable to the 
224 .11decedent's life estate or joint tenancy interest in the decedent's estate, and do everything 
224.1snecessary to liquidate and reduce to cash the decedent's interest and turn the proceeds of 
224. Hthe sale or other disposition over to the personal representative. The court may grant any 
224. 2olegal or equitable relief including, but not limited to, ordering a partition of real estate, 
224.21under chapter 558 necessary to make the value of the decedent's life estate or joint tenancy 
224. 22interest available to the estate for payment of a claim under this section. 
224.23 fhj_(g} Subject to administration, the personal representative shall use all of the cash 
224.24or proceeds of interests to pay an allowable claim under this section. The remaindermen 
224. 25or surviving joint tenants and their spouses, if any, may enter into a written agreemenit 
224. 26With the personal representative or the claimant to settle and satisfy obligations imposed at 
224.21any time before or after a claim is filed. 
224.2s fi:)Jhl. The personal representative may, at their discretion, provide any or all of the 
224.29other owners, remaindermen, or surviving joint tenants with an affidavit terminating the 
224. 3 odecedent's estate's interest in real property the decedent owned as a life tenant or as a joint 
224. 31tenant with others, if the personal representative determines in good faith that neither the 
224.J2decedent nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance 
224. 33for which a claim could be filed under this section, or if the personal representative has 
224. 34filed an affidavit with the court that the estate has other assets sufficient to pay a claim, as 
224.3spresented, or if there is a written agreement under paragraph fhj__(g), or if the claim, as 
224. 36allowed, has been paid in full or to the full extent of the assets the estate has available 
225.1to pay it. The affidavit may be recorded in the office of the county recorder or filed in 
225.2the Office of the Registrar of Titles for the county in which the real property is located. 
225.3Except as provided in section 514.981, subdivision 6, when recorded or filed, the affidavit 
225. 4Shall terminate the decedent's interest in real estate the decedent owned as a life tenant or a 
22s. ajoint tenant with others. The affidavit shall: 
225. 6(1) be signed by the personal representative; 
225. 1(2) identify the decedent and the interest being terminated; 
225. s(3) give recording information sufficient to identify the instrument that created the 
225.9interest in real property being terminated; 
225. 10( 4) legally describe the affected real property; 
225. 11(5) state that the personal representative has determined that neither the decedent 
225.12nor any of the decedent's predeceased spouses received any medical assistance for which 
22 s .13a claim could be filed under this section; 
225 .14( 6) state that the decedent's estate has other assets sufficient to pay the claim, as 
225. 1spresented, or that there is a written agreement between the personal representative and 
225. 16the claimant and the other owners or remaindermen or other joint tenants to satisfy the 
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225.11obligations imposed under this subdivision; and 
225 .1s(7) state that the affidavit is being given to terminate the estate's interest under this 
225.19subdivision, and any other contents as may be appropriate. 
225. 20The recorder or registrar of titles shall accept the affidavit for recording or filing. The 
225. 21affidavit shall be effective as provided in this section and shall constitute notice even if it 
22s.22does not include recording information sufficient to identify the instrument creating the 
225. 23interest it terminates. The affidavit shall be conclusive evidence of the stated facts. 
22s.24 f:BJU The holder of a lien arising under subdivision le shall release the lien at 
225.25the holder's expense against an interest terminated under paragraph fhj_(g} to the extent 
22 s. 26of the termination. 
22s. 21 Wii.l If a lien arising under subdivision 1 c is not released under paragraph f:BJU, 
22s.2sprior to closing the estate, the personal representative shall deed the interest subject to the 
22s.29lien to the remaindermen or surviving joint tenants as their interests may appear. Upon 
225.3orecording or filing, the deed shall work a merger of the recipient's life estate or joint 
225.Jltenancy interest, subject to the lien, into the remainder interest or interest the decedent and 
225.32others owned jointly. The lien shall attach to and run with the property to the extent of 
22s. 33the decedent's interest at the time of the decedent's death. 
225.34 Sec. 28. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, subdivision 2, is amended to read: 
226 .1 Subd. 2. Limitations on claims. The claim shall include only the total amount 
226. 20f medical assistance rendered after age 55 or during a period of institutionalization 
226.3described in subdivision la, elat1se (b) paragraph (e). and the total amount of general 
226.4assistance medical care rendered, and shall not include interest. Claims that have been 
226. sallowed but not paid shall bear interest according to section 524.3-806, paragraph ( d). A 
226. 6claim against the estate of a surviving spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for 
226. 7ffiedical assistance rendered for the predeceased spouse, shall be payable from the full 
226.svalue of all of the predeceased spouse's assets and interests which are part of the surviving 
226. 9Spouse's estate under subdivisions 1 a and 2b. Recovery of medical assistance expenses in 
226. 1othe nonrecipient surviving spouse's estate is limited to the value of the assets of the estate 
226. 11that were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage._Jhe 
226. 12claim is not payable from the value of assets or proceeds of assets in the estate attributable 
226 .13to a predeceased spouse whom the individual married after the death of the predeceased 
226. Hrecipient spouse for whom the claim is filed or from assets and the proceeds of assets Jin the 
226. 1sestate which the nonrecipient decedent spouse acquired with assets which were not marital 
226. 16property or jointly owned property after the death of the predeceased recipient spouse. 
226.11Claims for alternative care shall be net of all premiums paid under section 256B.0913, 
226. 1ssubdivision 12 , on or after July 1, 2003, and shall be limited to services provided on or 
226. 19after July I, 2003. Claims against marital property shall be limited to claims against 
226.2orecipients who died on or after July 1, 2009. 
226.21 Sec. 29. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B.15, is amended by adding a 
226.22subdivision to read: 
226.23 Subd. 2b. Controlling provisions. (a) For purposes of this subdivision and 
226.24Subdivisions la and 2, paragraphs (b) to (d) apply. 
226.2s(b) At the time of death of a recipient spouse and solely for purpose of recovery of 
226.26medical assistance benefits received, a predeceased recipient spouse shall have a legal. 
226.27title or interest in the undivided whole ofall of the property which the recipient and the 
226.2srecipient's surviving spouse owned jointly or which was marital property at any time 
226.29during their marriage regardless of the form of ownership and regardless of whether 
226. 3oit was owned or titled in the names of one or both the recipient and the recipient's 
226. 31spouse. Title and interest in the property of a predeceased recipient spouse shall not end 
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226. 32or extinguish upon the person's death and shall continue for the purpose of allowing 
226.JJrecovery of medical assistance in the estate of the surviving spouse. Upon the death of 
226.J4the predeceased recipient spouse, title and interest in the predeceased spouse's property 
226.Jsshall vest in the surviving spouse by operation oflaw and without the necessity for any 
221. 1probate or decree of descent proceedings and shall continue to exist after the death of i:he 
221.2Dredeceased spouse and the surviving spouse to permit recovery of medical assistance.'" 
221. JThe recipient spouse and the surviving spouse of a deceased recipient spouse shall not_ 
221. 4encumber, disclaim, transfer, alienate, hypothecate, or otherwise divest themselves of 
221. sthese interests before or upon death. 
221. 6(c) For put:poses of this section, "marital property" includes any and all real or 
221. 10ersonal property of any kind or interests in such property the predeceased recipient 
221. sspouse and their spouse, or either of them, owned at the time of their marriage to each 
221. gother or acquired during their marriage regardless of whether it was owned or titled in 
221. 1othe names of one or both of them. If either or both spouses of a married couple received 
221. 11medical assistance, all property owned during the marriage or which either or both spouses 
221. 12acquired during their marriage shall be presumed to be marital property for purposes of 
221. 1Jrecovering medical assistance unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 
221.14(d) The agency responsible for the claim for medical assistance for a recipient spouse 
221. ismay, at its discretion, release specific real and personal property from the provisions of 
221. l6this section. The release shall extinguish the interest created under paragraph (b) in the 
221 .11land it describes upon filing or recording. The release need not be attested, certified, or 
221. 1Backnowledged as a condition of filing or recording and shall be filed or recorded in the 
221. aoffice of the county recorder or registrar of titles, as appropriate, in the county where 1:he 
221. 20real property is located. The party to whom the release is given shall be responsible for 
221. 21paying all fees and costs necessary to record and file the release. If the property described 
221. 22in the release is registered property, the registrar of titles shall accept it for recording and 
221. 2Jshall record it on the certificate of title for each parcel of property described in the release. 
221. 24If the property described in the release is abstract property, the recorder shall accept it_ 
221.2sfor filing and file it in the county's grantor-grantee indexes and any tract index the county 
221. 2rmaintains for each parcel of property described in the release. 
221. 21 Sec. 30. Minnesota Statutes 2008, section 256B. l 5, is amended by adding a 
221.2ssubdivision to read: 
221.29 Subd. 9. Commissioner's intervention. The commissioner shall be permitted to 
221.3ointervene as a party in any proceeding involving recovery of medical assistance upon 
221. 31filing a notice of intervention and serving such notice on the other parties. 
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IDAHO GENERAL DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY 
THE POWERS YOU GRANT BELOW ARE EFFECTIVE 
EVEN JF YOU BECOME DISABLED OR INCOMPETENT 
NOTICE: THE POWERS GRANTED BY THIS DOCUMENT ARE BROAD AND 
SWEEPING. THEY ARE EXPLAINED IN THE UNIFORM STATUTORY FORM POWER 
OF ATTORNEY ACT. IF YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT "rHESE POWERS, 
OBTAIN COMPETENT LEGAL ADVICE. THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT AUTHORIZE 
ANYONE TO MAKE MEDICAi. AND OTHER HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS FOR YOU. 
YOU MAY REVOKE THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IF YOU LATER WISH TO DO SO. 
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AND.WILL CONTINUE 
TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF YOU BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR 
INCOMPETENT. 
I, Martha Jean Perry 2401 Tendoy Boise, Idaho 83705 
Appoint 
George D. Perry 2401 Tendoy, Boise, Idaho 83705 or 
Lrcu 
t\":JV 2 B WU! 
RECEIVED 
as my Agent (attorney-In-fact) to aot for me In any lawful way with respect to the 
followlng initialed subjects: 
TO GRANT ALL OF THE FOLLOWING POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONr OF 
(N) AND IGNORE THE LINES IN FRONT OF THE OTHER POWERS. 
TO GRANT ONE OR MORE, BUT FEWER THAN ALL, OF THE FOLLOWING 
POWERS, INITIAL THE LINE IN FRONT OF EACH POWER YOU ARE GRANTING. 
TO WITHHOLD A POWER, DO NOT INITIAL THEUNE IN FRONT OF IT. YOU MAY, 
BUT NEED NOT. CROSS OUT EACH POWER WITHHELD. 
Note: If you initial Item A or Item B, which follow, a notarized signature will be 
required on behalf of the Prlnclpal. 
INITIAL 
h1 d I (A} Real property transactions. To lease, sell, mortgage, purchase, 
,~e. and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contract for the lease, sale, · 
purchase,.exchange, and acquisition of, and to accept, take, receive, and possess any 
lntereat in real property whatsoever, on such terms and conditions, and under suoh 
~venants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and to maintain, repair, tear down, 1after,. 
. rebuild, improve manage, insure, move, rent, lease, sell, convey, subject to liens, 
mortgage$, and security deeds, and In any way or manner deaf with all or any part of 
any Interest in real property whatsoever, Including specifically, but without llmltatfon, real 
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property lying and being situated in the State of 1daho, under such tenns and conditions, 
and under such covenants, as my Agent shaU deem proper an'd may for all deferred 
payments accept purchase money notes payable to me and secured by mortgages or 
deeds to secure debt, and may from time to time collect and cancel any of said notes, 
mortgages, security Interests, or deeds to secure debt. . -1 l-rclJ 
-.f//J f \e) Tangfble personal property transactions. To lease, se~1/ko~g,e, 
purchase, exchange, and acquire, and to agree, bargain, and contr~~.c.J~e )ei'Gel 
sale, purchase, exchange, and acqulslti?n of, and to ~ccept,_ta,ke, re~ro,~ssess 
any personal property whatsoever, tangible or intangible, or mterest thereto, oinuth 
terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem proper; and . 
to maintain, repair, improve, manage, insure, rent. lease, sell, convey, subject to llens or 
mortgages, or to take any other security interests in said property which are recognized 
under the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted at that time under the laws of the State 
of Idaho or any applicable state, or otherwise hypothecate (pledge), and in any way or 
manner deal with all or any part of any real or personal property whatsoever, tangible or 
intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter 
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such cov~nants, as my Agent 
shall deem proper. 
lll.Jt.(C) Stock and bond transaction&._To purchase, sell,exohange, surrender, 
assign, redeem, vote at any meeting, or otherwise transfer any and arr shares ,of stock, 
bonds, or other securities In any business, association, corporation, partnership, or 
other legal entity, whether private or public, now or hereafter belonging to me. 
· '111 /J )(D) Commodity and option transaction•. To organ!~ or continue and ~~ny business which term includes, without limitation, any farming, 
manufacturing, service, mining, retailing or other type of business operation In any form, 
whether as a proprietorship, joint venture, partnership, corporation, trust-or other legal 
entity; operate, buy, sell, expand, contract, terminate or liquidate any buslness: direct, 
control, supervise, manage or participate In the operation of any' business and engage, 
compensate and discharge business managers, employees, agents, attorneys, 
accountants and consultants; and, In general, exercise all power.& with respect to 
business fntere$ts and operations which ·the principal could If present and unde'~ no 
disability. 
Md / (E) Banking and other flnanoial institution tranaacaona. To m~ke, recetve, 
, ~orse, execute, acknowledge, deriver and possess chects, drafts, bills of 
exchang$, letters of.credit, notes, stock certificates. wlthdrawal receipts_ and deposit 
instruments. relating to accounts or deposits in, or certfflcates of 4eposit of banks, 
saving$ and· loans, credit unions, or other Institutions or assoclatlbns. To pay all sums of 
mon~y, at any time or times, that may ~ereaft&r be owing by me µpon any account, bfll 
of exchange, check; draft, purchase, contract, note, or trade acce;ptance made, 
executed, endorsed, eccepted, and delivered by ma or for me In my name, by m,y 
Agent. To borrow from time to time such sums of money as my Agent may deem proper 
and execute promissory notes, security deeds or agreements, financing statements, or 
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other security instruments in such form as the lender may request and renew said notes 
and security Instruments from time to time In whole or in part. To have free access at 
any time or times to any safe deposit box or vault to which I might have access. 
ht /J ~F) Buainess operating transactions. To conduct, engage in, and[dJf)e,wise 
~the affairs of any and all lawful business ventures of whatever nature ··or'K~ 
that I may now or hereafter be Involved in. Nl)1/ '> u 
· ~o 280? 
ltl 1f'e / (G) Insurance and annuity tranaactfons. To exercise or pe~~. 
po r, duty, right, or obligation, in regard to any contract of life, accide-~t,h~. t:::.D 
disability, liability, or other type of Insurance or any combination of insurance; and to 
procure new or ·additional contracts of insurance for me snd to ·designate the beneficla·ry 
of same; provided, however, tllat my Agent cannot designate himself or herself as 
beneficiary of any such Insurance contracts . 
)/J d / (H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt for, 
·~ release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand. sue for, claim and 
. recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment due or 
payable to or for the principal; assert any Interest in and exercfse any power over any 
trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable trust solely for 
the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death of the principal and is then 
distributable to the legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general, 
exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts whict, the principal could exercise 
If present and under no disability; provided, however, that the Agent may not make or 
change a wiU and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by tl'1e 
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the prfnclpel to pay income 
or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given. 
Mf J ;J (l)Clalms and litigation. To commence, prosecute, discontinue, or defend all 
'~r other legal proceedings touching my property, real or personal, or any part 
thereof, or touching any matter in which I or my property, real or personal, may be in 
any way concerned. To defend, settle, adjust, make allows.nces, compound, submit to 
arbttration, and compromise all accounts, reckonings, claims, and demands whatsoever 
that now are, or hereafter shall be, pending between me and any person, flnn, 
corporation, or other legal entity, in such manner and in all respects as my Agent shall 
deem proper. 
'lJltt._ (J) Pentonal and family maintenance. To hire accountants, attorneys at law, 
consultants, clerics, physicians, nurses, agents, servants, workmen, and others and to 
remove them, and to appoint others In their·place, and to pay and allow the persons so 
employed such salartes, wages, or other remunerations, as my Agent shall deem 
proper. 
. 0 . 
'JJ/ 11. /' (IC) Benefits from Soclaf Security, •dtcare, Medicaid. or other 
-~ental programs, or military service. To prepare, sign and file any cla'lm or · 
·.application for Soclal Security, unemployment or mlfitary servfce benefits; sue for, settle · 
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or abandon any claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local or 
foreign statute or regulation; control, deposit to any account, collect, receipt for, and 
take title to and hold all benefits under any Social Security, unemployment, military 
service or other statej federal, local or foreign statute or regulation; and, in general, 
exercise all powers with respect to Social Security, unemployment, military service, and 
governmental benefits, Including but not lfmited to Medioare and Medicaid, which the 
principal could exercise if present and under no disability. l!l.t ~ (L) Rellrem•nt plan transactions. to contribute to, withdraw from and 
de osit funds in any type of retirement plan (which term includes, without limrtation, any 
tax Qualified or nonquallffed pension, profit sharing, stock bonus, employee savings and 
other retirement plan, indlvldual retirement account, deferred compensation plan and 
any other type of employee benefit plan); select and change payment options for the 
principal under any retirement plan; make rollover contributions from any retirement 
plan to other retirement plans or lndMdual retirement accounts; exercise all investment 
powers available under any type of self-directed retirement plan; and, in general, 
exercise all powers with respect to retirement plans and retirement plan account 
balances which the principal could If' present and under no disability. 
}/ .d / (M) Tax matters. To prepare, to make elections, to execute and to file all tax, 
~urity, unemployment insurance, and informational returns required by the laws 
of the United States, or of any state or subdivision thereof, or of sny foreign 
government; to prepare, to execute, and to file all other papers and instruments wtilch 
the Agent shall think to be desirable or necessary for safeguarding of me against 
excess or illegal taxation or against penalties imposed for claimed violation of any law or 
other governmental regulation; and to pay, to compromise, or to contest or to apply for 
refunds in connection wrth any taxes or assessments for which I am or may be liable. 
)n/) / (N) ALL OF THE POWERS LISTED ABOVE. YOU NEED NOT LttP(JL ANY 
~LINES IF YOU rNITIAL LINE (N). · . L'if . 
. ~v 
SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: . . . A, u, ;_ 8 2001 
ON THE FOLLOWING LINES YOU MAY GIVE SPECIAL INSTRUCT~~§:£-G 
OR EXTENDING THE POWERS GRANTED TO YOUR AGENT. . . 
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THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY IS EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY AN ~AWNIINUE 
UNTIL IT IS REVOKED. • vi::u 
THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY SHALL BE CONSTRUED AS A GENERAL DURABLE 
POWER OF ATTORNEY AND SHALL CONTINUE TO BE EFFECTIVE EVEN IF I 
BECOME DISABLED, INCAPACITATED, OR INCOMPETENT. 
(YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE AUTHORITY TO EMPLOY OTHER PERSONS AS 
NECESSARY TO ENABLE ·THE AGENT TO PROPERLY EXERCISE THE POWERS 
GRANTED IN THIS FORM, BUT YOUR AGENT WILL HAVE TO MAKE ALL 
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS. IF YOU. WANT TO GIVE YOUR AGENT THE RIGHT 
TO DELEGATE DISCRETIONARY DECISION-MAKING POWERS TO OTHERS, YOU 
SHOULD KEEP THE NEXT SENTENCE, OTHERWISE IT SHOULD BE STRICKEN.) 
Authority to Deh~gate. My Agent shall have the right by written Instrument to delegate 
any or all of the foregoing powers involving discretionary decision-making to any person 
or persons whom my Ag~nt may select, but such delegation may be amended or 
revoked by any agent 0ncludlng any successor) named by me who is acting under this 
power of attorney at the time of reference. 
(YOUR AGENT WILL BE ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR ALL REASONABLE 
EXPENSES INCURRED IN ACTING UNDER THIS POWEROF ATTORNEY. STRIKE 
OUT THE NEXT SENTENCE IF YOU 00 NOT WANT YOUR AGENT TO ALSO BE 
ENTITLED TO REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES AS AGENT.} 
Right to Compensation. My Agent shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for 
services renderec:I as a.gent under this power of attorney. 
{If YOU WISH TO NAME SUCCESSOR AGENTS, INSERT THE NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) OF SUCH SUCCESSOR(S) IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH.) 
Successor Agent. If any Agent named by me shall die, become incompetent, resign or 
refuse to accept the office of Agent, I name the following (each to act alone and 
successively, In the order named) as successor(s) to such Agent: 
Steven A. Perry 3215 Targee, Boise, Idaho 83705 
Barbara McCormick 2525 Joretta Drive, Boise, Idaho 83704 
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BE VALID IN ALL JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND ALL 
FOREIGN NATIONS. 
I am fully informed as to at! the contents of this form and understand the 
full import of this grant of powers to my Agent. 
I agree that any third party who receives a copy of this document may act 
under it. Revocation of the power of attorney is not effective as to a third 
party unt\l the third party leams of "the revocation. I agree to Indemnify the 
third party for any claims that arise against the third party because of 
reliance on thts power of -attorney. 
Signed this _j.___ day of '7l? g~ ,20 a5 
L,cu 
fVDv' 2 8 ?n'!J. , A-' C, l 
r::: c2 rv1:::LJ 
CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDA~ . 
COUNTY OF 1 
'. . 
efore me on .3 / .3 / oS [Date] by 
. 4'mlh • • [name of prtncipa!]. 
'-n'l~~lf..~ fi ~a- ' . 
. . A.\!&4-:&1 m#. ~ 
(Signature of' Notartal Officer) 
· Notary Publle for the State of Idaho 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
The East 70 feet of Lot 11 In WINES SUBDIVISION, according to the offictal plat thereof, filed in Book 10 of 
Plats at Page(s) 489, official records of Ada County, Idaho. 
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I> 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Lewiston, April 1998 Term. 
In the Matter of the Estate of Lionel Malcolm 
Knudson, Deceased. 
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
WELFARE, Petitioner-Appellant, 
V. 
Barbara JACKMAN, Personal Representative for 
the Estate of Lionel Malcolm Knudson, Respond-
ent. 
No. 23928. 
Nov.2, 1998. 
Following death of Medicaid recipient and sub-
sequent death of her husband, Department of Health 
and Welfare sought allowance of a claim against 
husband's estate to recover the remaining balance 
of the Medicaid payments. W.C. Hamlett, Magis-
trate Judge, denied claim, and the District Court, 
Latah County, John R. Stegner, J., affirmed. De-
partment appealed. The Supreme Court, Johnson, 
J., held that: (I) if the estate of the individual who 
received Medicaid assistance is inadequate to repay 
the full amount of the assistance received, the De-
partment can recover the balance from the estate of 
the surviving spouse, but (2) federal law, as in ef-
fect when recipient and her husband entered into 
marital settlement agreement transmuting most of 
recipient's and husband's community property into 
separate property of husband, limited the Depart-
ment to recovering any community property recipi-
ent and husband may have accumulated after the 
agreement. 
Vacated and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
Ill Health 198H ~494 
198H Health 
I 98HIII Government Assistance 
Page I 
I 98Hlfl(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
l 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 l. 70) 
Health 198H €=::>495 
198H Health 
l 98HIII Government Assistance 
I 98HIIl(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 l .70) 
If the estate of the individual who received Medi-
caid assistance is inadequate to repay the full 
amount of the assistance received, the Department 
of Health and Welfare can recover the balance from 
the estate of the surviving spouse. I.C. § 56-2 l 8. 
(21 Statutes 361 ~188 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 Vl(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k 187 Meaning of Language 
361 kl 88 k. In General. \1ost Cited 
Cases 
Plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless 
clearly expressed legislative intent is contrary or 
unless plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
131 Health 198H €=;:,494 
198H Health 
l 98HIIT Government Assistance 
I 98HIII(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
! 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Rt:coupment 
of Payments 
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l 98Hk494 k. Estate of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
Health 198H €=495 
198H Health 
198HIII Government Assistance 
1981-IlH(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
l 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
Federal statute regarding recovery of Medicaid as-
sistance, as in effect when husband's guardian 
signed marriage settlement agreement on March 8, 
1993, transmuting most of husband's and wife's 
community property and the income from that 
property into separate property of husband, pre-
cluded Department of Health and Welfare from re-
covering from husband's estate the Medicaid assist-
ance that wife had received and that Department 
had not recovered from wife's estate, except De-
partment could recover any community property 
husband and wife may have accumulated after the 
agreement. Social Security Act, § l 9 l 7(b )(l )(B), 
(b)(4), (e)(l)(B), as amended, 42 U.S.C.(1994 Ed.) 
§ 1396p(b)(l)(B), (b)(4), (e)(l)(B); I.C. §§ 
15-1-201(15), 32-906(1), 56-218(4). 
**7 *214 Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; 
W. Corey Cartwright, Deputy Attorney General, 
Boise, for Appellant. W. Corey Cartwright argued. 
William C. Kirsch, Moscow, for Respondent. 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION THE COURT'S PRI-
OR OPINION DATED JUNE, 16, 1998, IS 
HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
JOHNSON, Justice. 
This is a Medicaid recovery case. We conclude that 
section 56-218(1) of the Idaho Code (LC.), as it ex-
Page 2 
isted at times applicable to this case, authorized the 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (the De-
partment) to recover from the available estate of a 
surviving spouse the balance of Medicaid payments 
received by an individual who was fifty-five years 
old or older when receiving the payments if the in-
dividual's estate is inadequate to repay the entire 
amount. We conclude, however, that federal law 
applicable to this case prohibited this recovery, ex-
cept from any community property the spouses may 
have accumulated after a marriage settlement 
agreement transmuting their community property 
into separate property of each. We remand for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. 
THE BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEED-
INGS 
Barbara Jackman ( Jackman) was the niece of an 
elderly couple, Hildor and Lionel Knudson (the 
Knudsons). Jackman was also Hildor's guardian and 
held a durable power of attorney for Lionel. On be-
half of the Knudsons, Jackman signed a "Marriage 
Settlement Agreement" (the agreement) on March 
8, 1993. The agreement transmuted most of the 
Knudsons' community property into Lionel's separ-
ate property. By the agreement, Hildor received as 
her separate property her personal property and 
household effects in her possession, her irrevocable 
burial trust, and $1,900 in cash. The purpose of the 
agreement was to make Hildor eligible for Medi-
caid assistance. Hildor received $41,600.55 in 
Medicaid payments (the Medicaid payments) prior 
to her death on October 27, 1994. 
After Hildor's death, Jackman collected Hildor's es-
tate pursuant to the procedures for small estates 
contained in I.C. § 15-3-1201. After paying Hildor's 
funeral expenses and legal fees, Jackman delivered 
the balance of Hildor's estate, $1,638.03, to the De-
partment on August I 0, 1995. The Department ac-
cepted this as a partial settlement of its claim for re-
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covery of the Medicaid payments. 
Lionel died two weeks after Hildor on November 
11, 1994. After Lionel's death, Jackman initiated 
probate proceedings for his estate and became Li-
onel's personal representative. Lionel's estate was 
valued at $40,798.35. The Department sought al-
lowance of a claim against Lionel's estate to recov-
er the remaining balance of the Medicaid payments 
(the balance of the Medicaid **8 *215 payments). 
Jackman objected to the Department's claim. 
The magistrate judge denied the Department's claim 
against Lionel's estate because Hildor had an estate, 
and the Department received the remainder of the 
estate after expenses. The Department appealed to 
the district judge, who affirmed the magistrate 
judge's decision. The Department appealed. 
II. 
l.C. § 56-218 AUTHORIZED RECOVERY OF 
THE BALANCE OF THE MEDICAID PAY-
MENTS FROM LIONEL'S ESTATE. 
[I] The Department asserts that I.C. § 56-218, as it 
existed at times applicable to this case, authorized 
recovery of the balance of the Medicaid payments 
from Lionel's estate. We agree. 
l.C. § 56-218 provides that medical assistance "paid 
on behalf of an individual who was fiftyfive (55) 
years of age or older when the individual received 
such assistance may be recovered from the estate, 
or if there be no estate the estate of the surviving 
spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to 
eitherorboth .... "I.C. § 56-218(1). 
[2] In George W Watkins Family v. Messenger, 
118 Idaho 537. 797 P.2d 1385 (1990), the Court 
pointed out: "The plain meaning of a statute will 
prevail unless clearly expressed legislative intent is 
contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd 
results." Id. at 540, 797 P.2d at 1388. 
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If we were to read I.C. § 56-218( I) not to allow re-
covery from Lionel's estate of the balance of the 
Medicaid payments because there was $1,638.03 in 
Hildor's estate, our reading would be contrary to 
expressed legislative intent and would lead to 
"absurd results." Id. This reading would mean that 
if the estate of a spouse who received Medicaid as-
sistance had even one cent, or a toothbrush, the De-
partment could collect nothing from the estate of 
the surviving spouse. As acknowledged by Jack-
man's attorney at the oral argument of this case, this 
reading of the statute would mean that there is no 
circumstance in which the legislative intent to re-
cover from the estate of a surviving spouse would 
be fulfilled. This result is contrary to the expressed 
legislative intent that the Department recover from 
the estate of the surviving spouse under some cir-
cumstances. The statute should not be read as pre-
venting recovery from the surviving spouse's estate 
even if the recipient's estate is inadequate for the 
full recovery of Medicaid payments. 
From this analysis we conclude that the correct 
reading of I.C. § 56-218( l) is that if the estate of 
the individual who received Medicaid assistance is 
inadequate to repay the full amount of the assist-
ance received, the Department can recover the bal-
ance from the estate of the surviving spouse. Stated 
in terms of the circumstances of this cas~:, when the 
Department received the balance of Hildor's estate, 
there was "no estate" of Hildor remaining from 
which the Department could recover the balance of 
the Medicaid payments. 
III. 
FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTS THE AUTHOR-
ITY GRANTED TO THE DEPARTMENT BY 
I.C. § 56-218 TO RECOVER FROM LIONEL'S 
EST ATE, EXCEPT FROM ANY COMMUNITY 
PROPERTY OF LIONEL AND HILDOR. 
[3] Jackman asserts that federal law applicable to 
this case does not permit recovery from Lionel's es-
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tate. We agree, except to the extent of any com-
munity property Lionel and Hildor accumulated 
after the agreement. 
The pertinent portions of 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4), as enacted in 1993, 
provide, as follows: 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as-
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual 
under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any med-
ical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an indi-
vidual**9 *216 under the State plan in the case of 
the following individuals: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years 
of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment 
or recovery from the individual's estate, but only 
for medical assistance consisting of-
(1) nursing facility services, .... 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 
"estate", with respect to a deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other assets included within the individual's estate, 
as defined for purposes of State probate law; .... 
This amended statute applied to Medicaid payments 
for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 
I, 1993. Pub.L. 103-66, § 13612(d). 
J.C. § 15- I -20 I (I 5) defines "estate," as follows: " 
'Estate' means all property of the decedent, includ-
ing community property of the surviving spouse 
subject to administration, property of trusts, and 
property of any other person whose affairs are sub-
ject to this code as it exists from time to time dur-
ing administration." The agreement, in addition to 
Page4 
transmuting the community property Lionel re-
ceived into his separate property, contained the fol-
lowing provision: 
3. We further specifically agree that the income, 
rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and other earn-
ings or increases on our separate property as de-
scribed above and the proceeds from any disposi-
tion thereof constitute the separate property of the 
person owning such property and are: not com-
munity property. The forgoing [sic] also shall apply 
to all property that may be separately acquired 
hereafter by either ofus in any manner whatsoever. 
As authorized by LC. § 32-906(1 ), this provision 
maintained the separate character of the assets 
transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the 
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, 
profits, capital gains, and other earnings or in-
crease" on this separate property. The agreement 
did not prevent the accumulation of other com-
munity property by Lionel and Hildor after the date 
of the agreement and before Hildor's death. The re-
cord before us does not disclose whether Lionel and 
Hildor had any community property at lthe time of 
Hildor's death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that 
community property may be part of Lionel's estate, 
and may therefore be part of Hildor's "estate" that 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the 
Department to recover and apply against the bal-
ance of the Medicaid payments. 
The Department contends that 42 U.S.C. ~ 
l 396p( e )(1 )(B), enacted in 1993, broadens the 
"assets" from which it may recover the balance of 
the Medicaid payments. This portion of the federal 
law provides, as follows: 
( e) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall ap-
ply: 
(I) The term "assets", with respect to an individual 
includes all income and resources of the individual 
and of the individual's spouse, including any in-
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come or resources which the individual or such in-
dividual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive 
because of action-
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative 
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on 
behalf of the individual or such individual's spouse, 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not 
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed 
on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 1993. 
The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 
amendments to the federal statute does not apply 
"with respect to assets disposed of on or before the 
date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, I 993]." 
Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, it does not 
apply to the agreement and does not allow the De-
partment to recover the balance of the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's separate property. This is 
true even though 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(4), which 
applies to Medicaid payments for calendar quarters 
beginning on or after October I, 1993, authorizes 
the Department to recover the Medicaid payments 
from "other assets." Without the definition of 
"assets" contained **10 *217 in 42 lJ.S.C. § 
l 396p( e )(I), "other assets" are only those included 
within Hildor's estate, as defined by J.C. § 
15-1-20 I (15). Lionel's separate property, including 
the community property transmuted by the agree-
ment, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
We vacate the magistrate judge's denial of the De-
partment's claim against Lionel's estate and remand 
the case to the magistrate judge for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
We do not address Jackman's contention that pursu-
Page 5 
ant to I.C. § 15-3-720 she is entitled to receive from 
Lionel's estate her necessary expenses and disburse-
ments including reasonable attorney fee:s. This is a 
question the magistrate judge must consider on re-
mand. 
We award no costs or attorney fees on appeal. 
TROUT, C.J., and SILAK, SCHROEDER and 
WALTERS, JJ., concur. 
Idaho, 1998. 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 
132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of North Dakota. 
In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Verna M. 
WIRTZ, Deceased. 
North Dakota Department of Human Services, 
Claimant and Appellant, 
V. 
Vernon Caroline, as Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Verna Wirtz, deceased, Respondent and 
Appellee. 
No. 990275. 
March 21, 2000. 
Department of Human Services petitioned for al-
lowance of claim against widow's estate for Medi-
caid benefits paid for benefit of husband prior to his 
death. The District Court, Mountrail County, North-
west Judicial District, Robert W. Holte, J., denied 
department's claim, and department appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Neumann, J., held that any assets 
conveyed by husband to his widow before his death 
and traceable to widow's estate were subject to de-
partment's recovery claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
[I] Appeal and Error 30 €=-842(1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVl(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k838 Questions Considered 
30k842 Review Dependent on Whether 
Questions Are of Law or of Fact 
30k842(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
which is fully reviewable by the Supreme Court. 
[2] Statutes 361 €:=181(1) 
Page 1 
361 Statutes 
361 VJ Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 I k 180 Intention of Legislature 
36 lk 18 l In General 
36lkl8l(l) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
The primary objective of statutory construction is 
to ascertain the legislature's intent. 
[3] Statutes 361 €:=188 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k 187 Meaning of Language 
36 lkl88 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
In ascertaining legislative intent, thf: Supreme 
Court looks first at the words used in ithe statute, 
giving them their ordinary, plain-language mean-
ing. 
[4) Statutes 361 €=>205 
361 Statutes 
361 VJ Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
36lk205 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Statutes 361 €:=206 
361 Statutes 
361 VJ Construction and Operation 
361 VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k204 Statute as a Whole, and Intrinsic 
Aids to Construction 
361 k206 k. Giving Effect to Entire 
Statute. Most Cited Cases 
The Supreme Court construes statutes as a whole to 
give effect to each of their provisions, whenever 
fairly possible. 
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[51 Statutes 361 €:=212.7 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction 
361 k212 Presumptions to Aid Construc-
tion 
361k212.i' k. Other Matters. Most 
Cited Cases 
If the language of a statute is clear and unambigu-
ous, the legislative intent is presumed clear from 
the face of the statute. 
[61 Statutes 361 €=>214 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 VT(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 t k213 Extrinsic Aids to Construction 
361k2!4 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
If statutory language is ambiguous, the Supreme 
Court may resort to extrinsic aids to construe the 
statute. 
171 Health 198H €=>495 
198H Health 
l 98HI II Government Assistance 
198HITI(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
198Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.70) 
Any assets conveyed by husband to his widow be-
fore his death and traceable to widow's estate were 
subject to recovery claim by state Department of 
Human Services for Medicaid benefits paid for be-
nefit of husband prior to his death; however, separ-
ately-owned assets in widow's estate, or assets in 
which husband never held interest, were not subject 
to department's claim for recovery. Social Security 
Act,§ 1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b) 
; NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
[81 Health 198H €;=495 
198H Health 
I 98HIII Government Assistance 
Page 2 
I 98HIIl(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk490 Recovery Back or Recoupment 
of Payments 
I 98Hk495 k. Spouse of Aid Recipient, 
Recovery From. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak24 I. 70) 
Recovery from a surviving spouse's separately-
owned assets because of a past obligation to pay a 
now-deceased Medicaid recipient's medical ex-
penses as necessaries, or recovery from the surviv-
ing spouse's entire estate, including asse1s not trace-
able from the recipient, is not allowed. Social Se-
curity Act, §1917(b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
[91 Health 198H €;=503(2) 
198H Health 
I 98Hlll Government Assistance 
I 98Hlll(B) Medical Assistance in General; 
Medicaid 
I 98Hk499 Administrative Proc,~edings 
198Hk503 Evidence 
I 98Hk503(2) k. Presumptions and 
Burden of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 356Ak241.l 15) 
As the claimant seeking recovery from widow's es-
tate for Medicaid benefits paid for bene:fit of hus-
band prior to his death, the Department of Human 
Services bore the initial burden of showing traceab-
ility of those assets it sought recovery against. So-
cial Security Act, § I 9 I 7(b ), as amended, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1396p(b); NDCC 50-24.1-07. 
*883 Blaine L. Nordwall, Special Assistant Attor-
ney General, Bismarck, for claimant and appellant. 
Shane C. Goettle of McGee, Hankla, Backes & 
Dobrovolny, Minot, for respondent and appellee. 
NEUMANN, Justice. 
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['II I] The North Dakota Department of Human Ser-
vices appeals from the trial court's order denying 
the department's claim against Verna M. Wirtz's es-
tate for Medicaid benefits paid by the department 
for the benefit of Clarence Wirtz. We reverse and 
remand. 
['II 2] Clarence Wirtz and Verna Wirtz married in 
1943. In July 1996, Clarence Wirtz began receiving 
Medicaid benefits to pay for nursing home care. 
Clarence Wirtz continued to receive benefits until 
his death on August 24, 1997. Clarence Wirtz was 
over age fifty-five and married to Verna Wirtz at all 
times he received benefits. The parties stipulated 
Clarence Wirtz received $53,635.83 in benefits. 
Clarence Wirtz's estate was not probated at his 
death. 
['II 3] Verna Wirtz died on September 21, 1998. 
Vernon Caroline was appointed Personal Repres-
entative of the estate. On November 18, 1998, the 
department filed a claim against Verna Wirtz's es-
tate for $55,977.93, seeking reimbursement for be-
nefits paid to Clarence Wirtz, plus interest. On 
January 11, 1999, Caroline denied the claim. On 
January 22, 1999, the department petitioned the tri-
al court for allowance of the claim. A hearing was 
held on April 12, 1999. The department argued 
Verna Wirtz's entire estate was subject to recovery 
because Clarence Wirtz had a marital or equitable 
interest in all of her property at his time of death. 
Caroline moved to dismiss. The trial court denied 
the department's claim, rendering the motion for 
dismissal moot. The trial court determined "[n]one 
of the property in the Verna Wirtz Estate is prop-
erty Clarence had any legal title or interest in at the 
time of his death." The department appeals. 
['II 4] The department argues the trial court erred, as 
a matter of law, by interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b) and N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 as not allow-
ing recovery for past Medicaid benefits paid to 
Clarence Wirtz from Verna Wirtz's entire estate. 
The department contends 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) al-
lows recovery of equitable interests, a marital estate 
interest in the surviving spouse's entire estate, a 
Page 3 
homestead interest, and a legal interest in the sur-
viving spouse's obligation to pay for the Medicaid 
recipient's medical care as a necessary. Caroline ar-
gues the trial court did not err because any asset not 
transferred by the Medicaid recipient at death to the 
surviving spouse through joint tenancy, tenancy-
in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living trust 
is not subject to recovery, even if the asset was 
transferred only hours before the recipient's death. 
We disagree with both parties' arguments. 
['II 5] 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) limits a stat~:'s power to 
recover Medicaid benefits, providing: 
*884 (b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assist-
ance correctly paid under a State plan 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical as-
sistance correctly paid on behalf of an indi-
vidual under the State plan may be made, ex-
cept that the State shall seek adjustment or re-
covery of any medical assistance correctly paid 
on behalf of an individual under the State plan 
in the case of the following individuals: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years 
of age or older when the individual received 
such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's 
estate, ... 
(2) Any adjustment or recovery under parngraph ( 1) 
may be made only after the death of the indi-
vidual's surviving spouse, if any, ... 
( 4) For purposes of this subsection, the term 'estate 
', with respect to a deceased individual -
(A) shall include all real and personal property and 
other assets included within the individual's 
estate, as defined for purposes of State pro-
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bate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any 
other real and personal property and other as-
sets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets 
conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
Id. ( emphasis added); see Estate o/Thompson, 1998 
ND 226, 586 N.W.2d 847. 
[1 6] Section 50-24.1-07, N.D.C.C., using broader 
language, fully implements 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 
and provides: 
1. On the death of any recipient of medical assist-
ance who was fifty-five years of age or older 
when the recipient received the assistance, and on 
the death of the spouse of the deceased recipient, 
the total amount of medical assistance paid on 
behalf of the recipient following the recipient's 
fifty-fifth birthday must be allowed as a preferred 
claim against the decedent's estate .... 
2. No claim must be paid during the lifetime of the 
decedent's surviving spouse, if any, nor while 
there is a surviving child who is under the age of 
twenty-one years or is blind or permanently and 
totally disabled, but no timely filed claim may be 
disallowed because of the provisions of this sec-
tion. 
[1 7] We rely on 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) to provide 
the meaning of N.D.C.C. § 50-24.1-07 because the 
federal statute limits the situations in which the 
states can recover Medicaid benefits from the sur-
viving spouse's estate. Estate of Thompson, at 11 
8-11; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396p(b)(I) and 1396a(a)(18). 
We must, therefore, interpret 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) 
to determine which assets in Verna Wirtz's estate 
are subject to recovery. 
[1](2][3][4][5][6] [18] Jn Estate of Thompson, we 
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explained our statutory analysis process. 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, 
which is fully reviewable by the Court. Jensen v. 
North Dakota Workers Comp. Bureau. 1997 ND 
107,' 9, 563 N.W.2d 112. 
The primary objective of statutory construction is 
to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Eff'ertz v. 
North Dakota Workers' Comp. Biweau, 481 
N.W.2d 218, 220 (N.D.1992). Jn ascertaining le-
gislative intent, we look first at the words used in 
the statute, giving them their ordinary, plain-
language meaning. Shiek v. North Dakota Work-
ers Comp. Bureau, 1998 ND 139, 1 16, 582 
N.W.2d 639. We construe statutes as a whole to 
give effect to each of its provisions, whenever 
fairly possible. *885County of Stutsman v. State 
Historical Society, 371 N.W.2d 321, 325 
(N.D.1985). "Jf the language of a statute is clear 
and unambiguous, the legislative int,~nt is pre-
sumed clear from the face of the statute." 1Wed-
center One, Inc. v. North Dakota S1ate Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 1997 ND 54, ii 13, 561 N.W.2d 634. 
Jf statutory language is ambiguous, we may resort 
to extrinsic aids to construe the statute .. Hassan v. 
Brooks. 1997 ND 150, 15,566 N.W.2d 822. 
Estate of Thompson, at 116-7. 
[19] Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B), the operat-
ive language provides Medicaid benefits can be re-
covered from: 
[R]eal and personal property and other assets in 
which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such in-
terest), including such assets conveyed to a sur-
vivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, sur-
vivorship, life estate, living trust, or other ar-
rangement. 
[110] The parties stipulated Verna Wirtz is a sur-
vivor, heir, or assign of Clarence Wirtz, and Clar-
ence Wirtz had not transferred or conveyed any 
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property or other assets he had any legal title or in-
terest in at the time of his death to Verna Wirtz 
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, surviv-
orship, life estate, or living trust. Our inquiry, 
therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz 
had "real and personal property and other assets in 
which [he] had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna 
Wirtz through "other arrangement." 
[i! 11] Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), asset 1s 
defined as: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, 
includes all income and resources of the individu-
al and of the individual's spouse, including any 
income or resources which the individual or such 
individual's spouse is entitled to but does not re-
ceive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative 
body, with legal authority to act in place of or on 
behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or adminis-
trative body, acting at the direction or upon the 
request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
See Idaho Department of Health and Weljare v. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6, 9 (Jd.1998) 
(concluding the definition does not apply to assets 
disposed of on or before August 10, 1993). 
[i! 12] Thus, the department can assert a claim 
against real or personal property, and other assets in 
which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other 
interest at his death, including income and assets 
conveyed through "other arrangement." This has 
been interpreted to include community property 
FN 1 and homestead interests. Bucholt: v. Be/she, 
114 F.3d 923, 927-28 (9th Cir. I 997) (including 
community property interests because they are in-
cluded in the state's definition of "estate" and re-
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mained liable for the decedent's debts); Estarl:' of 
Rhodes, 148 Misc.2d 744, 561 N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 
(N.Y.1990) (including homestead interests). Recov-
ery under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{b) is not limited to as-
sets in the surviving spouse's estate that the Medi-
caid recipient had legal title to and conveyed 
through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, surviv-
orship, life estate, or living trust. Such an interpret-
ation would ignore the words "interest" and "other 
arrangement." However, on this point, the statute's 
language and meaning are not clear. See Estate of 
Thompson, at ,r,r 11-14. The words "interest" and 
"other arrangement" are ambiguous. We, therefore, 
resort to extrinsic aids to ascertain the legislative 
intent. Id. at ,r 7. 
FNI. North Dakota is not a community 
property state. American Standard Life and 
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Speros, 494 N .W.2d 599, 
606 (N.D.1993). 
[,r 13] In Estate of Thompson, we determined the 
Congressional committee reports*886 on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p(b) revealed an intent to allow states a wide 
latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries. Id. 
at ,r 14. 
"Allowing states to recover from the estates of per-
sons who previously received assistance furthers 
the broad purpose of providing for the medical 
care of the needy; the greater amount recovered 
by the state allows the state to have more funds to 
provide future services." Belshe v. Hope, 33 
Cal.App.4th 161, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917, 925 
(Cal.Ct.App.1995). That broad purpose is 
furthered more fully by allowing states to trace a 
recipient's assets and recover them from the es-
tate of a recipient's surviving spouse . ... 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant 
statutory provisions, in light of the Congressional 
purpose to provide medical care for the needy, re-
veals a legislative intention to allow states to 
trace the assets of recipients of medical assist-
ance and recover the benefits paid when the re-
cipient's surviving spouse dies. 
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[7][8] [,r 14) We hold any assets conveyed by Clar-
ence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's 
death and traceable to her estate are subject to the 
department's recovery claim. However, the recover-
able assets do not include all property ever held by 
either party during the marriage. Cf Estate ,~f Johe, 
S90 N.W.2d 162, 166 (Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in 
which the deceased recipient once held an interest 
will be traced. It does not provide that separately-
owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in 
which the deceased recipient never held an interest, 
are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Thus, recovery from a surviving spouse's separ-
ately-owned assets because of a past obligation to 
pay a now deceased Medicaid recipient's medical 
expenses as necessaries, or recovery from the sur-
viving spouse's entire estate, including assets not 
traceable from the recipient, is not allowed. 
[9] [11 1S] On the limited record before us, traceable 
assets could minimally include Clarence Wirtz's 
transferred interest in the Granada House and his 
interest in a land contract for deed dated March 22, 
1977. However, unless the department can show 
traceability, assets subject to recovery would not in-
clude Verna Wirtz's solely-owned home interior 
business, automobile, bank account, and miscel-
laneous personal property. As the claimant, the de-
partment bears the initial burden of showing trace-
ability. See Sorum v. Schwartz. 411 N.W.2d 6S2, 
6S4 (N.D.1987) (providing "one who asserts the ex-
istence of a fact material to an issue in a case as-
sumes the burden of proof'). We remand to allow 
the department the opportunity to present evidence 
concerning asset traceability. 
[,r 16] We reverse the trial court's order and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
[11 17] GERALD W. VANDE WALLE, C.J., 
MARY MUEHLEN MARING, DALE V. SAND-
STROM, CAROL RONNING KAPSNER, JJ., con-
cur. 
N.D.,2000. 
In re Estate of Wirtz 
607 N.W.2d 882, 2000 ND S9 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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In suit challenging conveyances of virtually all 
principal's property by agent to himself under 
power of attorney, the First Circuit Court ruled that 
agent exceeded authority, imposed constructive 
trust on conveyed assets, and awarded punitive 
damages. Agent appealed. The Intermediate Court 
of Appeals, Watanabe, J., held that: (I) general 
power of attorney did not authorize agent to make 
gifts to himself; (2) plaintiffs attorney fees could 
be considered when computing amount of punitive 
damages; but (3) admitting evidence of agent's re-
fusal to comply with court order for return of prop-
erty was error. 
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
11 I Appeal and Error 30 ~863 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(A) Scope, Standards, and Extent, in 
General 
30k862 Extent of Review Dependent on 
Nature of Decision Appealed from 
30k863 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Order granting summary judgment is reviewed on 
appeal under same standard applied by trial court. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 56(c). 
121 Judgment 228 €==181(8) 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
Page I 
228k 18 I Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228k 181(5) Matters Affecting Right to 
Judgment 
228kl81(8) k. Ambiguity in Written 
Instrument. Most Cited Cases 
Where construction of written instrument is at issue 
in lawsuit, preliminary question of whether instru-
ment is ambiguous is question of law tlhat may be 
resolved on summary judgment. 
[31 Judgment 228 €;=181(18) 
228 Judgment 
228V On Motion or Summary Proceeding 
228k 18 I Grounds for Summary Judgment 
228kl81(15) Particular Cases 
228k 181 (18) k. Brokers or Agents, 
Cases Involving. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 228k181(15.l)) 
If language of power of attorney is clear and mean-
ing of instrument can be readily ascertained from 
words used, legal effect and construction of instru-
ment are questions of law properly resolved on 
summary judgment disposition. 
141 Principal and Agent 308 C:=97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
Fundamental rule in construing power of attorney 
document is that intent of parties governs, as 
gleaned from entire context of instrument. 
151 Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000452
924 P.2d 559 
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559 
(Cite as: 83 Hawai'i 65,924 P.2d 559) 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I OJ Purchases, Sales, and Con-
veyances 
308k I 03( I 0) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Agent lacks authority to make gift of principal's 
property, unless authority is expressly given in 
power of attorney. 
[61 Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
3081I(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €==103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308ITl(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k103 Purchases, Sales, and Con-
veyances 
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Agent may not gratuitously convey principal's 
property to himself absent express written authoriz-
ation in power of attorney. 
f71 Evidence 157 €==385 
157 Evidence 
I 57XI Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting 
Writings 
157XI(A) Contradicting, Varying, or Adding 
to Terms of Written Instrument 
157k385 k. Writings Excluding Extrinsic 
Evidence in General. Most Cited Cases 
Extrinsic evidence of principal's intent to allow 
agent to make gifts to himself or herself is not ad-
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missib\e when power of attorney does not expressly 
authorize gift to agent. 
[8] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69( I) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €;=103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I 03 Purchases, Sales, and Con-
veyances 
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
Cited Cases 
Oral authorization from principal is insufficient to 
prevent agent to make gift to himself or herself; 
written documentation of principal's clear intent in 
power of attorney is required. 
[9] Principal and Agent 308 €==69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Principal and Agent 308 €;;;;>103(10) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308TII Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k I 03 Purchases, Sales., and Con-
veyances 
308k I 03(10) k. Purpose and Terms 
of and Consideration for Sale or Conveyance. Most 
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Cited Cases 
General grant of authority in power of attorney, to 
perform every act that principal could, did not au-
thorize agent to make gift of principal's property to 
himself, to exclusion ofprincipal's other children. 
110) Principal and Agent 3081£;:::>79(9) 
308 Principal and Agent 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrong-
ful Acts of Agent 
308k79(9) k. Judgment and Measure of 
Damages. Most Cited Cases 
Attorney fees incurred by plaintiff could be con-
sidered when determining amount of punitive dam-
ages to award against agent who used power of at-
torney to make unauthorized gifts to himself of vir-
tually all of principal's property to exclusion of 
principal's other children; attorney fees provide 
meaningful standard for guiding jury when award-
ing punitive damages. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 908 comment. 
[11) Damages 115 ~87(1) 
I I 5 Damages 
I I 5V Exemplary Damages 
115k87 Nature and Theory of Damages Ad-
ditional to Compensation 
115k87( !) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Purpose of punitive damages award is to punish de-
fendant for aggravated or outrageous misconduct 
and to deter defendant and others from similar con-
duct in future, rather than to compensate plaintiff. 
f 12) Principal and Agent 3081£;:::>79(5) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308II Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308Il(A) Execution of Agency 
308k79 Actions for Negligence or Wrong-
ful Acts of Agent 
308k79(5) k. Evidence. Most Cited 
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Cases 
Agent's refusal to comply with order directing re-
turn of principal's assets which agent conveyed to 
himself, in excess of authority granted under power 
of attorney, was irrelevant to agent's state of mind 
when conveyances were made and, thus, admitting 
evidence on issue of punitive damages was error. 
**560 *66 Syllabus by the Court 
The circuit court correctly ruled that a defendant 
exceeded his authority when the defendant used a 
general power of attorney from his moither to gift 
substantially all of her property to himself, to the 
exclusion of his four sisters. The clear and unam-
biguous language of the power of attorney did not 
expressly authorize the defendant to make a gift to 
himself, and we will not construe any broad, all-
encompassing grants of power to the defendant un-
der the power of attorney to confer the power to 
make a gift. 
The circuit court properly instructed the jury that it 
could consider the plaintiffs reasonable attorney 
fees in computing the amount of punitive damages. 
The instruction provided objective guidance to the 
jury in calculating the amount of punitive damages, 
thus allowing punitive damages to be more accur-
ately measured and decreasing the potential for an 
arbitrary and abusive punitive damages award. Ad-
ditionally, the instruction helped to enmre that a 
plaintiff entitled to punitive damages can be made 
truly whole as a result of a defendant's wrongful 
and malicious act. 
The circuit court erred, however, in admitting evid-
ence at trial of the defendant's refusal to comply 
with a partial summary judgment order directing 
the defendant to return to the administrator of his 
mother's estate the assets he had wrongfully con-
veyed to himself. Such evidence was inelevant to 
the defendant's state of mind at the time he al-
legedly committed fraud in conveying his mother's 
property to himself. Since the jury's award of punit-
ive damages may have been based on the foregoing 
evidence, we remand this case for a new trial on 
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punitive damages. 
Edward Y. N. Kim, Kim & Kim, on the briefs, 
Honolulu, for defendant-appellant. 
Carroll S. Taylor (Taylor, Leong & Chee, of coun-
sel), on the brief, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee. 
Before BURNS* C.J., WATANABE and REEN, JJ., 
RECUSED.FN 
FN"' On October 6, 1993, Circuit Judge 
Marie N. Milks was assigned to sit with 
the judges of the Hawai'i Intermediate 
Court of Appeals, temporarily, in place of 
then Associate Judge Walter M. Reen, who 
was recused from this case. Judge Hccn 
subsequently retired on October 30, 1994. 
WAT ANA BE, Judge. 
This lawsuit arises out of a dispute over whether 
Defendant-Appellant Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also 
known as Isaac Kahele Joshua, Jr. (Defendant), ex-
ceeded his authority when he used a general power 
of attorney from his mother, Rose K. Joshua 
(Mother), to gift substantially all of Mother's prop-
erty to himself, to the exclusion of his four sisters, 
Gladys K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel 
(Lorraine), Doris K. Farm (Doris), and Plaintiff-
Appellee Blossom Joshua Kunewa (Plaintiff) FNI 
(collectively, Sisters). 
FNI. This 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff) 
lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff-
Blossom Joshua Kunewa 
against Defendant-Appellant 
Isaac K. Joshua, Jr., also known as Isaac 
Kahele Joshua, Jr., (Defendant) on March 
16, I 988. On December 20, 1988, Gladys 
K. Brash (Gladys), Lorraine K. Daniel 
(Lorraine), and Doris K. Farm (Doris) 
moved to intervene in the lawsuit as 
plaintiffs, and their motion was granted on 
April 17, 1989. In the meantime, however, 
on December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a 
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motion for partial summary judgment 
which was granted on July 14, 1989. Be-
cause the intervention was granted after 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment had been filed, a question arose 
as to whether the partial summary judg-
ment could be entered in favor of Gladys, 
Lorraine, and Doris, in addition to 
Plaintiff. To obviate this question, Gladys, 
Lorraine, and Doris stipulated with De-
fendant that they would dismiss with preju-
dice the prosecution of their cla:ims against 
Defendant, but that Plaintiffs claims for 
"payment of rents and proceeds.," "fraud," 
and "willful, wanton and callous disregard 
of ... trust" would be tried. Gladys, Lor-
raine, and Doris also agreed to be bound 
by the judgment entered by the circuit 
court on the issues that were tried. 
**561 *67 Defendant appeals from the First Circuit 
Court's: {I) July 14, I 989 order granting partial 
summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor, which con-
cluded that Mother's power of attorney did not au-
thorize Defendant to convey Mother's property to 
himself without consideration and which directed 
Defendant to hold all property so transferred as 
constructive trustee for the beneficiaries of Moth-
er's estate (Partial Summary Judgment Order); (2) 
June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment based upon a spe-
cial jury verdict, awarding Plaintiff $34,670.10 in 
special damages and $95,000 in punitive damages 
(Amended Judgment); and (3) April 26, 1991 Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
[the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's 
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, (8) Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial 
(April 26, 1991 Order). 
We (I) affirm the Partial Summary Judgment Or-
der, (2) affirm that part of the Amended Judgment 
which awarded Plaintiff special damages, vacate 
that part of the Amended Judgment which awarded 
Plaintiff punitive damages, and remand for a new 
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trial on the punitive damages issue, and (3) vacate 
the April 26, 1991 Order. 
BACKGROUND 
Mother was the widow of Isaac Joshua, Sr. 
(Father), who died on January 9, 1963. On Septem-
ber 15, 194 7, both Mother and Father executed 
wills, bequeathing their individual estates to the 
other, and in the event of the death of the survivor, 
then in equal shares to their five children-Plaintiff, 
Defendant, Gladys, Lorraine, and Doris. 
In 1980, Mother was hospitalized for medical prob-
lems. After she was released from the hospital, 
Mother asked Defendant to take her to an attorney 
so that she could settle her property and business 
affairs. On June 26, 1980, Defendant took Mother 
to see attorney Matthew Pyun (Pyun), a friend of 
Defendant. At Mother's request, Pyun prepared a 
document, which Mother subsequently signed, giv-
ing Defendant a general power of attorney to man-
age Mother's affairs (June 26, 1980 power of attor-
ney). 
The June 26, 1980 power of attorney, which was re-
corded at the Hawai'i Bureau of Conveyances on 
June 27, 1980, read in relevant part, as follows: 
ROSE KAPU JO SHU A of 2105 St. Louis Drive, 
City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii 
[Hawai'i), 
have made, constituted and appointed and by these 
presents do make, constitute and appoint ISAAC 
KAHELE JOSHUA, JR., of86-124 Hoaha Street, 
Waianae [Wai'anae], City and County of Hon-
olulu, State of Hawaii [Hawai'i), 
my true and lawful attorney, for me in my name, 
place and stead, and for my use and benefit with 
full power and authority to do and perform every 
act, deed or thing that I might or could do if per-
sonally present, including without limitation, the 
following: 
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* * * * * * 
2. To bargain, contract, purchase, receive and 
take real property and/or any interests therein and 
to accept the seizin and possession thereof and 
the delivery of all deeds, leases, assignments, 
agreements, options and other conveyance docu-
ments thereto, and to rent, lease, sublease, bar-
gain, sell, release, convey, mortgage, hypothec-
ate, and in every manner deal with the real prop-
erty I now own, and any real property I may here-
after acquire, upon such terms and conditions, 
and under such covenants as he shall think fit; 
3. To bargain and agree for, buy, sell, mortgage, 
hypothecate and in any and every way and man-
ner deal in and with goods and m•!rchandise, 
choses in action and other property in possession 
or in action; 
* * * * * * 
6. To sign, seal, execute, acknowledge and deliv-
er for me and in my name, and as my act and 
deed, such deeds, options, grants, leases, assign-
ments, covenants, indentures, agreements, mort-
gages, hypothecations, bills, checks, bonds, 
notes, receipts, evidences of debts, and such other 
**562 *68 instruments in writing of whatever 
kind and nature as may be necessary or proper in 
the premises. 
The foregoing power of attorney did not contain 
any language expressly permitting Defendant to 
make gifts of Mother's property. 
Defendant did not use the June 26, 1980 power of 
attorney to transfer title to any of Mother's property 
until the summer of 1987. On June 20, 1987, Moth-
er suffered a stroke and was hospitalized. Her treat-
ing physician, Dr. Bernard Fong (Dr. Fong), dis-
cussed with Defendant and Sisters the possibility of 
Mother not being able to live beyond the, next four 
days. Dr. Fong also informed Defendant and Sisters 
that Mother, on the other hand, might have a pro-
longed recovery, in which case the cost of her care 
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and treatment could consume all of her assets. 
After the meeting with Dr. Fong, Defendant de-
cided to use the June 26, 1980 power of attorney to 
transfer all of Mother's assets to himself. Because 
Defendant initially could not locate the June 26, 
1980 power of attorney, he requested that attorney 
Blake Okimoto (Okimoto) prepare another power 
of attorney and have Mother execute it at the hos-
pital. 
Upon arrival at Mother's hospital room on June 22, 
1987, Okimoto found that Mother "was bedridden 
and unable to communicate verbally[.]" To determ-
ine whether Mother were mentally competent to ex-
ecute this second power of attorney, Okimoto ex-
plained the contents of the power of attorney docu-
ment to Mother and informed her that if she signed 
the document, she would be giving Defendant the 
ability to act on her behalf as to all property that 
she owned. Okimoto asked Mother to squeeze his 
hand if she understood what he was explaining to 
her, and Mother responded by squeezing his hand. 
Okimoto also asked Mother if it was her desire to 
convey her property to Defendant, and Mother 
again squeezed Okimoto's hand. 
Because of her physical condition, Mother was un-
able on her own to sign her name on the power of 
attorney document. Defendant, therefore, assisted 
Mother by guiding her hand to the signature line of 
the document and holding her hand steady as she 
made an "X" mark. Okimoto, who was also a not-
ary public, then signed and sealed the notarial ac-
knowledgment certificate on the document, thus 
certifying that Mother had appeared before him and 
had signed the document as her free act and deed. 
Okimoto also required Mother to sign her "X" in 
his notarial record book.fN2 which contained doc-
umentation of all notarial acts performed by 
Okimoto. Okimoto then had both Defendant and 
Defendant's wife, Maile Joshua (Maile), sign the 
power of attorney document as witnesses. He also 
required Maile and the following individuals, who 
were present in the hospital room and had wit-
nessed Mother's signing of the power of attorney 
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document, to sign his record book as witnesses to 
the transaction: Doris, who would later be named as 
the personal representative of Mother's estate; Lor-
raine; and Faith Brash, Lorraine's daughter and 
Mother's granddaughter. 
FN2. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 
456-15 (1993) requires, in part, that 
"[e]very notary public shall record at 
length in a book of records all acts, 
protests, depositions, and other things, by 
the notary noted or done in the notary's of-
ficial capacity." 
Following Mother's execution of the second power 
of attorney, Defendant located the original June 26, 
1980 power of attorney at the Bureau of Convey-
ances. Before Mother died on September 9, 1987, 
Defendant used the original power of attorney to 
transfer to himself Mother's interest in a lien-free 
home on St. Louis Drive, some real property on the 
Big Island, and some real property in California. In 
addition, Defendant put his name on the titles to 
Mother's bank accounts and car. Defendant attemp-
ted, but was not allowed, to use the power of attor-
ney to transfer Mother's common stock into his own 
name; however, he continued to use the power of 
attorney after Mother's death to negotia1e Mother's 
stock dividend checks and to deposit the: same into 
his bank account. Defendant never paid Mother for 
any of the property so transferred. 
After Defendant made the foregoing transfers of 
title to Mother's property to himself, he informed 
Sisters of the transfers. He also assured them that 
they should not worry because "[i]t will all be 
equal.... When *69 **563 [M]other gets well, I will 
give everything back to [Mother]." 
After Mother's death, however, Defenda111t changed 
his mind. At a family gathering in October 1987, 
Defendant showed Sisters a copy of Mother's will, 
the original of which was never found, and the ori-
ginal power of attorney which Mother had given 
him. Defendant then informed Sisters that Mother 
had expressed to him many times over the years of 
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her intent to give him all of her property and that 
Mother had given him the power of attorney for 
that purpose. Defendant indicated that, in view of 
Mother's wishes, he considered all of the property 
he had transferred to himself pursuant to the power 
of attorney to be his alone. He also refused to com-
mence a probate of Mother's will or to share Moth-
er's property with Sisters in accordance with Moth-
' ·11 h . FN3 er s w1 or t e statutes on mtestacy. 
FN3. Under the will of Rose K. Joshua 
(Mother), all of Mother's property was to 
be divided equally among her five chil-
dren. The same division of property would 
result if Mother had died intestate. HRS § 
560:2-103( I) (1993). 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On March 16, 1988, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, al-
leging fraud and breach of trust by Defendant and 
seeking to ( 1) impose a constructive trust on the 
property transferred by Defendant to himself, (2) 
return the transferred property to Mother's estate, 
(3) submit Mother's will to probate, ( 4) collect fair 
market rent from Defendant for his occupancy of 
Mother's house after the transfer, and (5) award 
Plaintiff punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs 
for Defendant's conversion of Mother's property. 
On December 29, 1988, Plaintiff filed a motion for 
partial summary judgment on two issues: ( 1) 
whether Mother's will should be submitted to pro-
bate; and (2) whether Defendant should be required 
to "convey to the personal representative of 
[Mother's estate] all property, real and personal, 
formerly owned by [Mother], title to which was 
conveyed into Defendant's name by Defendant act-
ing under a power of attorney given him by 
[Mother], together with any dividends, interest, 
rents, issues and profits received by Defendant 
from or on account of said property." In opposing 
the motion, Defendant provided three affidavits 
FN4 in support of his assertion that Mother had 
made several oral representations that she intended 
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for Defendant to have all of her property. 
FN4. The affiants who signed the affi-
davits were as follows: Defendant; De-
fendant's wife, Maile Joshua; and Rose 
Kajioka Brash, Mother's niece. 
On July 14, 1989, the circuit court enter,ed an order 
granting Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment. In relevant part, the order r,ead as fol-
lows: 
THE COURT HEREBY FINDS: that the power 
of attorney given by [Mother] to Defendant dated 
June 26, 1980 is clear and unambiguous; and that 
said power of attorney does not contain any au-
thority for Defendant to transfer [Mother's] prop-
erty to himself, thereby effecting a gift to himself 
of her assets; 
AND THE COURT THEREFORE CON-
CLUDES: that the June 26, 1980 power of attor-
ney given by [Mother] must be strictly construed; 
that a strict reading of said power of attorney 
shows that Defendant was not empowered to 
deed over [Mother's] property to himself and 
thereby effect a gift to himself of [Mother's] as-
sets; that the affidavits submitted by Defendant 
which tend to show [Mother] wanted Defendant 
to obtain the property through the power of attor-
ney are insignificant in the light of the unambigu-
ous power of attorney strictly construe:d; that the 
affidavits submitted by Defendant are inadmiss-
ible as parol evidence and are deem1!d not ad-
missible for the Court; that Defendant holds all 
property formerly belonging to [Mother] which 
he acquired by the use of the June 26, 1980 
power of attorney and said property shall be held 
as a constructive trust for the benefit of those 
people who will take through the probate of 
[Mother's] estate[.] 
Based on the foregoing findings and conclusions, 
the circuit court ordered Defendant to deliver Moth-
er's will to Plaintiff, to hold all of Mother's property 
in constructive trust, and to not transfer or encum-
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her the real and personal property he had trans-
ferred to himself. 
On December 19, 1990, the case proceeded to trial 
on the issue of damages. On January **564 *70 3, 
1991, the jury returned a special verdict, awarding 
Plaintiff special damages in the amount of 
"$45,671.00 less documented funeral expenses" 
and punitive damages in the amount of $95,000. 
The circuit court entered judgment for the forego-
ing amounts on February 4, 1991, and Defendant 
appealed from this judgment. However, on May 2, 
1991, Defendant's appeal was dismissed by the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court because "the judgment did 
not fully determine the amount of special damages, 
is therefore incomplete and not final, and we do not 
have jurisdiction." Thereafter, on June 9, 1992, the 
circuit court entered an amended judgment which 
determined that the amount of special damages 
awardable to Plaintiff, after deducting documented 
funeral expenses of $11,000.90, was $34,670.10. 
This appeal followed. 
Defendant argues that the circuit court committed 
reversible error in several respects. First, Defendant 
argues that the court was wrong when it granted 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment be-
cause a genuine triable issue of material fact existed 
as to Mother's intent in giving Defendant the power 
of attorney. Second, the court improperly instructed 
the jury that Plaintiffs attorney fees in bringing this 
lawsuit could be considered in computing the 
amount of a punitive damages award. Third, the cir-
cuit court erroneously admitted evidence of De-
fendant's refusal to comply with a prior court order 
to return Mother's assets to the administrator of 
Mother's estate. Fourth, the circuit court improperly 
allowed several of Plaintiffs witnesses to testify, 
since insufficient notice was provided to Defendant 
that the witnesses would be testifying. Finally, De-
fendant argues that the circuit court erred when it 
refused to allow Defendant to read into evidence a 
part of Plaintiffs deposition which was relevant to 
attack Plaintiffs credibility. 
Page 8 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Partial Summary Judgment: Whether De-
fendant Exceeded His Authority Under .rhe Power 
of Attorney 
A. Standard of Review 
[1] On appeal, an order granting summary judgment 
is reviewed under the same standard applied by the 
trial courts. State v. Tradewinds Elec. Serv. & Con-
tracting Inc., 80 Hawai'i 218, 222, 908 P.2d 1204, 
1208 ( 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator-
ies, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law." Hawai'i 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). 
[2][3] Where the construction of a written instru-
ment is at issue in a lawsuit, the preliminary ques-
tion of whether the instrument is ambiguous is a 
question of law that may be resolved on summary 
judgment. Pelosi v. Wai/ea Ranch Estates, 10 
Haw.App. 424, 436, 876 P.2d 1320, 1327, cert. 
denied, 77 Hawai'i 373, 884 P.2d 1149 (1994). 
Moreover, if the language of the instrument is clear 
and the meaning of the instrument can be readily 
ascertained from the words used therein, the legal 
effect and construction of the instrument are ques-
tions of law properly resolved on summary judg-
ment disposition. Id. 
Defendant contends that the circuit court erred in 
concluding, as a matter of law, that the power of at-
torney did not authorize him to convey Mother's 
property to himself without consideration. Defend-
ant claims that because he submitted three affi-
davits which explained that Mother had intended 
that he use the power of attorney to make gifts to 
himself, a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to the scope of his authority under the power of at-
torney, thus precluding summary judgment. We dis-
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agree. 
B. Rules Governing Construction of Powers of At-
torney 
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accord-
ance with the rules for interpretation of written in-
struments generally; in accordance with the prin-
ciples governing the law of agency; and, in the ab-
sence of proof to the contrary, in accordance with 
the prevailing laws relating to the act authorized." 3 
Am.Jur.2d Agency§ 30, at 533-34 ( 1986). 
**565 *71 [ 4] The fundamental rule in construing 
written instruments is that the intent of the parties, 
as gleaned from the entire context of the instru-
ment, governs. Pelosi, IO Haw.App. at 436, 876 
P.2d at 1327. "As long as the terms of [the instru-
ment] are not ambiguous, i.e., not 'capable of being 
reasonably understood in more ways than one,' we 
are required to interpret the terms 'according to 
their plain, ordinary, and accepted sense in common 
speech.' " Id. (quoting Cho Mark Oriental Food, 
Ltd. v. K & K Int'/, 73 Haw. 509, 520, 836 P.2d 
1057, 1064 (1992)). 
It is also well-established that powers of attorney 
"are subjected to a strict construction and are never 
interpreted to authorize acts not obviously within 
the scope of the particular matter to which they 
refer." Lopez v. Soy Young, 9 Haw. 113, 115 (I 892) 
. As explained in F.Af. Stigler, Inc. v. H.N.C. Re-
al~v. 595 S.W.2d 158, 161 (Tex.Civ.App.), rev'd on 
other grounds, 609 S.W.2d 754 (Tex.1980), 
when authority is conferred upon an agent by a 
formal, written instrument, such as a power of at-
torney, the authority given the agent will be 
strictly construed so as to exclude any authority 
not specifically set forth, except authority neces-
sary to effectuate the purpose of the authority 
granted. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[5] Accordingly, it is well-settled that an agent 
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lacks authority to make a gift of the principal's 
property unless that authority is expressly given by 
the language of the power of attorney. Kaname 
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. l, 4 (D.Haw.1947) (to 
authorize gift of asset by agent, the agent must have 
such a power expressly and clearly conforred; even 
if principal intended to make a gift to agent, if 
power of attorney lacked express language author-
izing gift, no gift could be made), affa; 172 F.2d 
384 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 937, 69 S.Ct. 
1512, 93 L.Ed. 1743, reh'g denied, 338 U.S. 839, 
70 S.Ct. 34, 94 L.Ed. 513 ( 1949); Aiello v. Clark, 
680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in absence of 
express authority to make a gift, none may be 
made); Johnson v. Fraccacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 
(Fla.App.1977) (agent has no power to make a gift 
of his principal's property unless that power is ex-
pressly conferred upon the agent by the instrument 
or unless such power arises as a necessary implica-
tion from the powers which are expressly con-
ferred). 
[6] Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the 
absence of express written authorization, an agent 
may not gratuitously convey the principal's prop-
erty to himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 
So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent exceeded author-
ity in appropriating for agent's own use fonds in de-
cedent principal's checking account in the absence 
of clear language to that effect in the power of at-
torney), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re 
Estate of DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of attor-
ney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held 
to encompass an authorization to attorney-in-fact to 
make gift to himself of principal's property; such a 
gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and 
self-dealing, a presumption which can be overcome 
only with the clearest showing of principal's intent 
to make the gift), affd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 
N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
[7][8] Where a power of attorney docs not ex-
pressly authorize the attorney-in-fact to make gifts 
to himself or herself, extrinsic evidence of the prin-
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cipal's intent to allow such gifts is not admissible. 
An attorney-in-fact may not make a gift to himself 
or herself unless there is clear intent in writing from 
the principal allowing the gift. Oral authorization is 
not acceptable. McCarter v. Willis. 299 S.C. 198, 
383 S.E.2d 252, 253 (App.1989). 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained 
the policy reasons underlying the rule prohibiting 
extrinsic evidence as follows: 
When one considers the manifold opportunities 
and temptations for self-dealing that are opened 
up for persons holding general powers of attor-
ney-of which outright transfers for less than value 
to the attorney-in-fact [himself or] herself are the 
most obvious-the justification for such a flat rule 
is apparent. And its justification is made even 
more apparent when one considers the ease with 
which such a rule can be accommodated by prin-
cipals and their draftsmen. 
Estate of Casey v. Comm 'r of Internal Revenue, 948 
F .2d 895, 898 ( 4th Cir. 1991 ). 
**566 *72 We now examine the power of attorney 
at issue in this lawsuit according to the foregoing 
rules. 
C. The Power of Attorney in this Case 
[9] In the instant case, the power of attorney which 
Mother gave to Defendant did not expressly author-
ize Defendant to make gifts of Mother's property. 
However, it did broadly authorize Defendant to 
"perform every act, deed or thing that [Mother] 
might or could do if personally present" and to 
"bargain, contract, purchase, receive and take real 
property and/or any interests therein and to accept 
the seizin and possession thereof and the delivery 
of all deeds, leases, assignments, agreements, op-
tions and other conveyance documents ... and to 
rent, lease, sublease, bargain, sell, release, convey, 
mortgage, hypothecate, and in every manner deal 
with the real property I now own, and any real 
property I may hereafter acquire, upon such terms 
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and conditions ... as he shall think fit." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Defendant contends that since the power of attorney 
which Mother conferred on him was so broad, its 
language is ambiguous as to whether it authorized 
him to make gifts of Mother's property to himself. 
Therefore, the circuit court should have considered 
extrinsic evidence of Mother's intent in giving him 
the power of attorney and denied Plaintiffs motion 
for partial summary judgment. We disagree. 
"Well established rules of interpretation of powers 
of attorney dictate that broad, all-encompassing 
grants of power to the agent must be discounted." 
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Harper, 622 S.W.2d 345, 
349 (Mo.App.1981) ( citing Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 34, comment h (1958)). See al5o Estate of 
Casey v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 948 F.2d at 
900-0 I (where power of attorney expressly author-
ized agent to transfer principal's asse1s by sale, 
lease, or mortgage, but omitted any reference to the 
power of transfer by gift, the expansive language of 
the power of attorney would be interpreted to con-
fer only those incidental, interstitial powers neces-
sary to accomplish objects as to which authority has 
been conferred and not to confer power to make a 
gift). 
Three reasons are mentioned for the application of 
the foregoing doctrine: 
First, the power to make a gift of the principal's 
property is a power that is potentially hazardous 
to the principal's interests. Consequently, this 
power will not be lightly inferred from broad, all-
encompassing grants of power to the agent. Ac-
cordingly, the agent must be circumspe,ct with re-
gard to the powers created-or the lack of them. 
Second, the main duty of an agent is loyalty to 
the interest of his principal.... Thus, in exercising 
granted powers under a power of attorney, the at-
torney in fact is bound to act for the be,11efit of his 
principal and must avoid where possible that 
which is detrimental unless expressly author-
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ized .... 
Third, it would be most unusual for an owner of 
property to grant a power of attorney authorizing 
the attorney in fact to give his property away. If a 
person has decided to make a gift of property, he 
or she usually decides as to who is going to be 
the donee. 
King v. Bankerd, 303 Md. 98, 492 A.2d 608, 613 
( 1985) ( citations, quotation marks, and brackets 
omitted). 
In Kaaukai v. Anahu, 30 Haw. 226 ( 1927), the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court held that a power of attor-
ney broadly authorizing an agent to "grant, bargain 
and sell" on behalf of the principal "any land in the 
Territory of Hawaii [Hawai'i] belonging to [him or] 
her or in which [he or] she might have an interest" 
did not confer authority on the agent to give the 
land away. Id. 
In the present case, we similarly conclude that the 
clear and unambiguous language of the general 
power of attorney given by Mother to Defendant 
did not authorize Defendant to make a gift to him-
self of Mother's property. Therefore, the circuit 
court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Defend-
ant lacked authority to make a gift of Mother's 
property to himself and properly granted Plaintiffs 
motion for partial summary judgment. 
**S67 *73 II. The Punitive Damages Award 
In its charge to the jury, the circuit court gave the 
following instruction regarding how punitive dam-
ages should be calculated: 
If you allow punitive damages in this case then in 
assessing such damage you may take into consid-
eration the following items: (I) such amount as 
will deter defendant from such future conduct; 
(2) an amount as shall be an example to others 
and deter them from such conduct; (3) [t]he 
probable and reasonable expense of the litigation 
including attorney's fees, expert witness fees and 
Page 11 
the inconvenience and time involved in preparing 
for trial [.] The amount should not be so small as 
to be trifling nor so large as to be unjust, but such 
as candid and dispassionate minds can approve as 
a punitive example and as a warning to others 
against a similar lapse of duty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
[ 10] Defendant contends that the circuit court com-
mitted reversible error when it instructed the jury 
that attorney fees are an element of punitive dam-
ages. Defendant points out that the "longstanding 
rule of Hawai'i law" is that "no attorney fees may 
be awarded as damages or costs unless so provided 
by statute, stipulation or agreement" and no statute, 
stipulation, or agreement authorized the imposition 
of attorney fees in this case. Therefore, Defendant 
contends, the court's instruction provided an indir-
ect means for Plaintiff to obtain compensation for 
attorney fees where none was allowed by law. 
We find no error in the circuit court's instruction. 
A. The Law of Punitive Damages in Hawai 'i 
[11] The purpose of a punitive damages award in 
Hawai'i is not to compensate the plaintiff, but 
rather, to punish the defendant "for aggravated or 
outrageous misconduct and to deter the defendant 
and others from similar conduct in the future." Ma-
saki v. General 1\.-fotors Corp., 71 Haw. 1, 6, 780 
P.2d 566, 570, reconsideration denied, 71 Haw. 
664, 833 P.2d 899 (1989). In order to recover punit-
ive damages, the plaintiff "must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the defendant has acted 
wantonly or oppressively or with such malice as 
implies a spirit of mischief or criminal indifference 
to civil obligations, or where there has been some 
wilful misconduct or that entire want of ,;are which 
would raise the presumption of a conscious indif-
ference to consequences." / d. at 16- I 7, 780 P .2d at 
575. 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has instructed that "the 
proper measurement of punitive damages should be 
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'[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or gross negli-
gence which forms the basis for the award and the 
amount of money required to punish the defend-
ant....' " Kang v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 663, 
587 P.2d 285, 291 (1978) (quoting Howell v. Asso-
ciated Hotels, 40 Haw. 492, 501 (1954)). However, 
no Hawai'i case has specifically addressed the 
question of whether a plaintiffs attorney fees may 
be considered (n determining the amount of punit-
. d FN5 1ve amages. 
FN5. In Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 
71 Haw. I, 780 P.2d 566, reconsideration 
denied, 71 Haw. 664, 833 P .2d 899 ( 1989), 
the Hawai'i Supreme Court observed in 
dicta that "[o]ther purposes for imposing 
punitive damages which have been recog-
nized by courts and commentators include 
preserving the peace; inducing private law 
enforcement; compensating victims for 
otherwise uncompensable losses; and pay-
ing the plaintiffs attorneys' fees." 71 Haw. 
at 8 n. 2, 780 P.2d at 571 n. 2 (emphasis 
added; citation omitted). 
B. Attorney Fees as an Element of Punitive Dam-
ages in Other Jurisdictions 
Courts in other jurisdictions disagree on whether a 
jury, or a judge sitting as fact finder, may consider 
a plaintiffs attorney fees or other litigation costs in 
determining an award of punitive damages. See An-
notation, Attorneys' Fees or Other Expenses of Lit-
igation as Element in Measuring Exemplary or 
Punitive Damages, 30 A.L.R.3d 1443 (1970), 
Several jurisdictions refuse to allow a jury to con-
sider reasonable attorney fees in measuring an 
award of punitive damages, reasoning that (I) such 
fees are compensatory in **568 *74 nature and 
therefore not a proper consideration in measuring a 
punitive damages award, or (2) the jury ought to 
have unfettered discretion in deciding the amount 
of punitive damages subject only to a trial court's 
remittitur if it deems the award excessive. See, e.g., 
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Viner v. Untrecht, 26 Cal.2d 261, 158 P.2d 3 (1945) 
; Kinane v. Fay, 111 N.J.L. 553, 168 A. 724 ( 1933); 
international Elecs. Co. v. NS T. Metal Prods. Co., 
370 Pa. 213, 88 A.2d 40 ( 1952); Earl v. Tupper. 45 
Vt. 275 ( 1873); Fairbanks v. Witter, 18 Wis. 287 
(I 864). 
The majority of jurisdictions, however, regularly al-
low a jury to consider attorney fees in computing 
the amount of punitive damages. See e.g., Afro-
American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 
(D.C.Cir.1966); Marshall v. Beh1er, 17 Ala. 832 
(I 850); Markey v. Santangelo. 195 Conn. 76, 485 
A.2d 1305 ( 1985); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 
700, 682 P.2d 1247 (1983); Anvil Inv. Ltd. Partner-
ship v. Thornhill Condominiums, Ltd., 85 
Ill.App.3d 1108, 41 Ill.Dec. 147, 407 N.E.2d 645 
(1980); Dorris v. Miller, 105 Iowa 564, 75 N.W. 
482 ( 1898); Newton v. Hornblower, 224 Kan. 506, 
582 P.2d 1136 (]978); St. Luke Evangelical Luther-
an Church. Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 337,568 A.2d 35 
( 1990); Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 2 Mich.App. 
288, 139 N.W.2d 765 (1966); Central Bank of Mis-
sissippi v. Butler, 517 So.2d 507 (Miss.1987); Senn 
v. Manchester Bank of St. Louis, 583 S.W.2d 119 
(Mo.1979); .Jeffries Av/on, Inc. "· Gallagher. 149 
Misc.2d 552, 567 N.Y.S.2d 339 (N.Y.1991); Fre-
mont Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 26 O.O.2d 109, 
192 N.E.2d 123 (Ohio Com.Pl.1963); Hofer v. Lav-
ender, 679 S.W.2d 470 (Tex.1984); Debry & Hilton 
Travel Servs., Inc. v. Capitol Int'/ Airways. Inc., 
583 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1978); Kemp v. Miller. 166 
Va. 661, 186 S.E. 99 (1936); Olds v. Ho.~ford, 354 
P.2d 947 (Wyo.1960), reh'g denied, 359 P.2d 406 
(Wyo.1961 ). 
Under the majority approach, " 'attorney fees are 
not allowed as compensation [to the plaintiff] but 
rather as punishment for defendant's wrongful and 
malicious act. They are not allowed in addition to 
the sum assessed as [punitive] damages., and their 
recovery is never permitted in a separate action .... ' 
"Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 434 P.2d 
at 830 (quoting 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 50 (1966)). 
Courts that have adopted the majority VIew gener-
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ally reason that allowing a jury to consider the 
amount of a plaintiffs attorney fees in calculating 
punitive damages diminishes the potential for arbit-
rary and abusive punitive damages awards. In St. 
Luke Evangelical Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith. 
568 A.2d 35, for example, the Maryland Court of 
Appeals held that allowing a jury to consider reas-
onable attorney fees in determining punitive dam-
ages satisfies two seemingly disparate goals: 
First, because the jury will be offered objective 
guidance in calculating the amount of its punitive 
award, punitive damages will be more accurately 
measured and the potential for abuse decreased. 
Second, the plaintiff can be made truly whole in 
precisely those kinds of cases in which the de-
fendant's wrongful conduct is found to be at its 
most flagrant, for only in such cases are punitive 
damages warranted. 
568 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted). 
The majority view is consistent with the approach 
advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
(I 958). The Restatement recognizes that "damages 
in a tort action do not ordinarily include compensa-
tion for attorney fees or other expenses of the litiga-
tion." Id. § 914(1), at 492. However, the Restate-
ment also states that "[i]n awarding punitive dam-
ages when they are otherwise allowable, the trier of 
fact may consider the actual or probable expense 
incurred by the plaintiff in bringing the action." Id., 
comment a, at 493. See also Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 908, comment e, at 467 (in determining 
the amount of punitive damages, the trier of fact 
can consider the extent of harm to the injured per-
son, including "the fact that the plaintiff has been 
put to trouble and expense in the protection of his 
interests, as by legal proceedings in this or in other 
suits"). 
C. Attorney Fees as an Element of Punitive Dam-
ages in Hawai 'i 
In Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont. Inc. v. Ke/co 
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Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 278, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 
2922, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court **569 *75 held that "the propriety 
of an award of punitive damages for the conduct in 
question, and the factors the jury may consider in 
determining their amount, are questions of state 
law." (Emphasis added.) The Court thus left the re-
sponsibility for framing guidelines for punitive 
damages awards to the states. In a cogent concur-
ring opinion, however, Justice Brennan lamented 
the general lack of guidance given to juries faced 
with the responsibility of calculating a punitive 
damages award: 
Without statutory (or at least common-law) 
standards for the determination of how large an 
award of punitive damages is appropriate in a 
given case, juries are left largely to themselves in 
making this important, and potentially devastat-
ing, decision. Indeed, the jury [in Browning-Fer-
ris ] was sent to the jury room with nothing more 
than the following terse instruction: 'In determin-
ing the amount of punitive damages, ... you may 
take into account the character of the defendants, 
their financial standing, and the nature of their 
acts.' [Citation omitted.] Guidance like this is 
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not 
suggest that the instruction itself was i111 error; in-
deed, it appears to have been a correct statement 
of [state] law. The point is, rather, that the in-
struction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that pun-
itive damages are imposed by juries guided by 
little more than the admonition to do what they 
think is best. 
492 U.S. at 281, l 09 S.Ct. at 2923 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
Subsequently, in Pacijic Mut. Lije Ins. Co. v. 
Haslip, 499 U.S. I, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d I 
(1991 ), the Court was called upon to determine 
whether a due process violation had occurred when 
an Alabama jury awarded over $800,000 in punitive 
damages against an insurer whose agent had de-
frauded an insured. The award was more than four 
times the amount of the compensatory damages 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000464
•111~ 
924 P.2d 559 
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559 
(Cite as: 83 Hawai'i 65,924 P.2d 559) 
award, more than two hundred times the out-
of-pocket expenses incurred by the insured, and 
greatly in excess of the fine that could be imposed 
for insurance fraud under Alabama law. 
The Court's majority initially conceded "that unlim-
ited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion 
for that matter-in the fixing of punitive damages 
may invite extreme results that jar one's constitu-
tional sensibilities." Id. at 18, 111 S.Ct. at 1043. 
However, the Court ultimately upheld the award, 
concluding that the award had been made pursuant 
to objective criteria and had also been subjected to 
a full panoply of procedural protections. First, the 
trial court's instructions had placed reasonable con-
straints on the exercise of the jury's discretion by 
expressly describing the retribution and deterrence 
purposes of punitive damages, requiring the jury to 
consider the character and degree of the particular 
wrong, and explaining that the imposition of punit-
ive damages was not compulsory. Second, the trial 
court had conducted a post-trial hearing to scrutin-
ize the punitive damages award. Finally, the award 
had been subject to meaningful judicial review be-
cause the Alabama Supreme Court had approved 
the verdict, on appeal, after reviewing the propriety 
of the award according to the following factors: 
(a) whether there is a reasonable relationship 
between the punitive damages award and the 
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct 
as well as the harm that actually has occurred; (b) 
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the defend-
ant's awareness, any concealment, and the exist-
ence and frequency of similar past conduct; (c) 
the profitability to the defendant of the wrongful 
conduct and the desirability of removing that 
profit and of having the defendant also sustain a 
loss; (d) the "financial position" of the defendant; 
( e) all the costs of litigation; (f) the imposition of 
criminal sanctions on the defendant for its con-
duct, these to be taken in mitigation; and (g) the 
existence of other civil awards against the de-
fendant for the same conduct, these also to be 
Page 14 
taken in mitigation. 
Id. at 21-2, 111 S.Ct. at I 045 ( emphasis added). 
The Court held that the application of thf: foregoing 
standards "impose[d] a sufficiently dt:finite and 
meaningful constraint on the **570 *76 discretion 
of Alabama fact finders in awarding punitive dam-
ages [,]" and "ensure[ d] that punitive damages 
awards are not grossly out of proportion to the 
severity of the offense and have some understand-
able relationship to compensatory damages." Id. at 
22, 111 S.Ct. at I 045. The award of punitive dam-
ages, therefore, "did not lack objective criteria" and 
did not "cross the line into the area of constitutional 
impropriety." Id. at 23-4, 111 S.Ct. at 1046. Com-
pare BMW of North America. Inc. v. Gore. 5 l 7U.S. 
559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996), 
where the Court struck down a $2 million punitive 
damages award against BMW of North America, 
Inc. (BMW) for having knowingly failed to tell a 
BMW automobile buyer that, at a cost of $600, it 
had repainted portions of his new $40,000 car, 
thereby lowering its potential resale value by ap-
proximately ten percent. The Court held the award 
grossly excessive in light of the following: (I) the 
low level of BMW's reprehensible conduct, (2) the 
500 to I ratio between the punitive and compensat-
ory damages awards, and (3) the difference between 
the punitive damages award and the civil or crimin-
al sanctions that could be imposed for comparable 
conduct. 
If a reviewing court may consider a plaintiffs litig-
ation expenses in evaluating the propriety of a pun-
itive damages award, we see no reason to preclude 
a jury from considering such expenses in calculat-
ing the award. Indeed, Justice O'Connor suggested 
as much in her dissent in Haslip, in which she 
strongly criticized the vagueness of the i111structions 
concerning punitive damages provided to the jury 
and strongly urged that the same factors which the 
Court held that appellate courts could consider in 
reviewing punitive damages awards "could assist 
juries to make fair, rational decisions." 499 U.S. at 
52, 111 S.Ct. at I 061 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
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(emphasis added). As Justice O'Connor pointed out: 
Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Im-
posed wisely and with restraint, they have the po-
tential to advance legitimate state interests. Im-
posed indiscriminately, however, they have a 
devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, com-
mon-law procedures for awarding punitive dam-
ages fall into the latter category. States routinely 
authorize civil juries to impose punitive damages 
without providing them any meaningful instruc-
tions on how to do so. Rarely is a jury told any-
thing more specific than "do what you think 
best." 
In my view, such instructions are so fraught with 
uncertainty that they defy rational implementa-
tion. Instead, they encourage inconsistent and un-
predictable results by inviting juries to rely on 
private beliefs and personal predelictions. Juries 
are permitted to target unpopular defendants, 
penalize unorthodox or controversial views, and 
redistribute wealth. Multimillion dollar losses are 
inflicted on a whim. While I do not question the 
general legitimacy of punitive damages, I see a 
strong need to provide juries with standards to 
constrain their discretion so that they may exer-
cise their power wisely, not capriciously or mali-
ciously. The Constitution requires as much. 
Id. at 42-3, 111 S.ct. at I 056 (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting). 
More recently, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg. 512 
U.S. 415, 114 S.ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), 
the Court struck down a $5 million punitive dam-
ages award by an Oregon jury which was over five 
times the amount of the plaintiffs compensatory 
damages award. The Court held that because the 
Oregon Constitution prohibited judicial review of 
the amount of punitive damages awarded by a jury, 
"unless the court can affirmatively say there is no 
evidence to support the verdict," the Oregon pro-
cedure for awarding punitive damages violated the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. id. at ---, I 14 
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S.Ct. at 2332. Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg noted 
that although Oregon did not provide for a post-
verdict review and remittitur of the amount of a 
punitive damages award, it provided several pre-
verdict mechanisms which channeled the jury's dis-
cretion more tightly than in Haslip. Significantly, 
the jury was instructed that the defendant could not 
be found liable for punitive damages unless the de-
fendant's liability were established by "clear and 
convincing evidence." FN6 **571 *77 More im-
portantly, jurors were given precise instructions de-
tailing seven substantive criteria which they could 
consider in making their award, far more guidance 
than their counterparts in Haslip received. These 
criteria resembled the seven factors against which 
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the punitive 
damages award in Haslip. Justice Ginsburg argued 
that 
FN6. United States Supreme Court Justice 
Ginsburg noted that in Pac/fie Mut. Life 
fns. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. l, 6 n. I, 111 
S.ct. 1032, 1037 n. I. 113 L.Ed.2d 1 
( 1991 ), the "jury was told it could award 
punitive damages if 'reasonably satisfied 
from the evidence' that the defendant com-
mitted fraud." Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 
512 U.S. 415, ---- n .4, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 
2334 n .4, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994). 
requir[ing] the factfinder to apply ... objective cri-
teria [when calculating punitive damages is] more 
likely to prompt rational and fair punitive damage 
decisions than are the post hoc checks [by appel-
late courts] employed in jurisdictions following 
Alabama's pattern. 
Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2347 (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Ginsburg also remarked that " 
'application of objective criteria ensures that suf-
ficiently definite and meaningful constraints are 
imposed on the finder of fact.' " Id. ( quoting 
Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 316 Or. 263, 283, 
851 P.2d 1084, 1096 (1993)). 
We agree with Justices Brennan, O'Connor, and 
Ginsburg that meaningful standards are needed to 
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guide a jury in its award of punitive damages. Ac-
cordingly, we adopt the majority view that a jury 
should be allowed to consider a plaintiffs attorney 
fees in determining the amount of a punitive dam-
ages award. We also conclude that, in the instant 
case, the circuit court's instruction to the jury to this 
effect was proper. 
III. The Circuit Court's Evidentiary Rulings 
A. Evidence of Defendant's Refusal to Comply with 
Circuit Court's Order 
[ 12] At trial, the jury was repeatedly allowed to 
hear evidence about Defendant's refusal to comply 
with the circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment 
order directing Defendant to return to the adminis-
trator of Mother's estate the assets he had wrong-
fully conveyed to himself. In explaining the relev-
ance of such evidence, Plaintiffs counsel stated it 
was necessary for the jury to understand that its 
task was not to determine whether Defendant 
should return property to Mother's estate, but to as-
sess the damages caused by Defendant's breach of 
duty. Plaintiffs counsel also explained that this 
evidence was relevant to establishing that Defend-
ant's behavior was willful: 
The gist of my question, Your Honor, is the mental 
intent which I have to establish for punitive dam-
ages. My analysis of the case is that the question 
of intent breaks down into two parts post Judge 
Klein's order which is a separate element of pun-
itive damages. This disobedience of the court's 
order and pre Judge Klein's order when he-what 
is his intent in breaching his fiduciary duties as 
an attorney in fact. So what I am getting at right 
now is his disregard, callous, wanton, and wilful 
disregard of Judge Klein's order and it goes into 
the punitive damages on the post Judge Klein is-
sue. 
Defendant contends that evidence of his refusal to 
comply with the Partial Summary Judgment Order 
Page 16 
should have been excluded at trial. Based on Kang 
v. Harrington, 59 Haw. 652, 587 P.2d 285, we 
agree. 
In Kang, supra, the Hawai'i Supreme Court ruled 
that a non-jury award of $20,000 in punitive dam-
ages was excessive because it appeared that the trial 
court, in making its determination, improperly con-
sidered a defendant's subsequent actions in attempt-
ing to perpetrate a fraud on the court, as well as on 
the plaintiff. 59 Haw. at 660,587 P.2d at 291. In re-
ducing the punitive damages award, the supreme 
court held as follows: 
"The proper measurement of punitive damages 
should be '[t]he degree of malice, oppression, or 
gross negligence which forms the basis for the 
award and the amount of the money required to 
punish the defendant.. . .' Howell v. Associated 
Hotels, [ 40 Haw. 492, 50 I (l 954) ]. Further, in 
determining that degree, the analysisH572 *78 is 
limited to an examination of defendant's state of 
mind at the time of the act. O'Harra v. Pundt, 
210 Or. 533, 310 P.2d 1110 (1957). Con-
sequently, defendant's subsequent actions and 
state of mind during trial are irrelevant." 
Id. at 663, 587 P.2d at 293. The suprem1! court also 
explained that 
[t]he distinction between appellant's fraud on the 
court and his fraud on appellee is cm~ial since a 
finding of fraud on the court is unrelated to the 
fraud on appellee and will not provide a basis for 
an award of punitive damages. In assessing punit-
ive damages the trial court should haLVe ignored 
appellant's fraud upon the court and looked only 
to his fraud on appellee. 
Id. at 660, 587 P.2d at 291. 
In this case, Defendant's conduct in violating the 
circuit court's Partial Summary Judgment Order is 
similarly distinguishable from Defendant's fraud 
upon Sisters and cannot form a basis for an award 
of punitive damages. While Defendant's conduct 
may appropriately subject Defendant to contempt of 
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court sanctions, such evidence is irrelevant to De-
fendant's state of mind at the time he allegedly 
committed fraud in conveying Mother's property to 
himself. 
Accordingly, the circuit court erred in allowing 
such evidence to be admitted at trial. Because the 
jury's award of punitive damages may have been 
based on the foregoing evidence, we must remand 
this case for a new trial on the punitive damages is-
sue. 
B. The Circuit Court's Other Evidentiary Rulings 
In view of our remand of this case for a new trial, 
we find it unnecessary to address Defendant's re-
maining arguments on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the 
First Circuit Court's July 14, I 989 order granting 
partial summary judgment in Plaintiffs favor. We 
vacate that part of the June 9, 1992 Amended Judg-
ment which awarded Plaintiff S95,000 in punitive 
damages and remand this case for a new trial on the 
punitive damages issue. In all other respects, we af-
firm the June 9, 1992 Amended Judgment. In view 
of our vacatur of part of the June 9, 1992 Amended 
Judgment, we also vacate the April 26, 1991 Order 
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of 
(the February 4, 1991 Order Denying] Defendant's 
Motions for (A) Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict, (B) Reconsideration of Order Denying 
Motion for Directed Verdict and (C) New Trial. 
Hawai'i App.,1996. 
Kunewa v. Joshua 
83 Hawai'i 65, 924 P.2d 559 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Decedent's child, who was named payee upon death 
of certificate of deposit owned by decedent, 
brought damages suit against attorney-in-fact who 
cashed certificate upon maturity. The District 
Court, Chickasaw County, James L. Beeghly, J., 
dismissed suit and appeal was taken. The Supreme 
Court, Tcrnus, J., held that: (I) attorney-in-fact did 
not engage in self-dealing or make prohibited gift 
by cashing certificate to provide support for prin-
cipal; (2) attorney-in-fact acted in principal's best 
interests by cashing disputed mature certificate, 
rather than using other certificates of deposit which 
were subject to early withdrawal penalty; and (3) 
claim that attorney-in-fact owed fiduciary duty to 
payee as third-party beneficiary was waived. 
Affirmed. 
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TERNUS, Justice. 
Appellant, Mary Ann Crabtree, seeks damages res-
ulting from the cashing of a certificate of deposit in 
the name of her father, Archard A. Crabtree, and 
payable on his death to Mary Ann. This transaction 
was consummated before Crabtree's death by 
Sherry Wurzer, Mary Ann's sister and Crabtree's 
daughter, who was acting under a power of attor-
ney. Because we find no merit in Mary Ann's chal-
lenge to Sherry's action, we affirm the district court 
judgment dismissing Mary Ann's claim. 
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. 
On March 4, 199 I, Crabtree deposited $20,000 in a 
one-year certificate of deposit, payable on his death 
to Mary Ann. In October 199 I, Crabtree had a 
stroke. After his stroke, he had problems with bal-
ance and vision, and moved to a nursing home. 
In November 1991, Crabtree executed a plenary 
power of attorney, appointing Sherry his attorney-
in-fact. Pursuant to the power of attorney, Sherry 
had "full power and authority to manage and con-
duct all of [Crabtree's] affairs, with full power and 
authority to exercise or perform any act, power, 
duty, right or obligation" that Crabtree had the legal 
right, power or capacity to exercise or perform. The 
appointment included the power and authority "[t]o 
open, maintain or close bank accounts, .. . savings 
and checking accounts; to purchase, renew or cash 
certificates of deposit.. .. " 
The cost of Crabtree's care varied depending upon 
his medical condition; expenses ran between $1600 
and $2000 per month. By March 1992, the cash on 
hand was insufficient to continue into the next 
month. At the same time, Crabtree expressed a de-
sire to purchase a $4000 burial contract and a 
$1700 monument. Crabtree's assets then consisted 
of a one-half interest in a 200-acre farm and several 
certificates of deposit. All of the certificates ma-
tured after March 4, 1992, except the one payable at 
death to Mary Ann. 
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The district court found that in consultation with 
Crabtree and with his agreement, Sherry cashed the 
$20,000 certificate dated March 4, 1991, and placed 
the money in Crabtree's checking account. Sherry 
chose this certificate to cash because it was mature 
and the only one that could be cashed without a 
penalty for early withdrawal. She then purchased 
the burial contract and monument Crabtree wanted. 
Crabtree died in December 1992. In his will, ex-
ecuted in 1989, he appointed his daughters, Mary 
Ann and Sherry, as co-executors; any assets re-
maining after the payment of his legal obligations 
were to be distributed equally to Mary Ann and 
Sherry. At the time of his death, Crabtree still 
owned certificates of deposit in excess of $20,000. 
Mary Ann filed a claim in probate seeking $20,000. 
As noted by the district court in its rnling, had 
Sherry liquidated other certificates*l 70 or personal 
property of Crabtree instead of the $20,000 certific-
ate, Mary Ann would have received the $20,000 
certificate when Crabtree died. Thus, the liquida-
tion of the certificate prior to Crabtree's death in-
creased the probate estate by $20,000. As a result, 
Sherry benefits by $10,000 while Mary Ann loses 
the same amount. 
The district court dismissed Ma1y Ann's daim, con-
cluding Sherry did not breach her fiduciary duty to 
Crabtree. On appeal, Mary Ann argues Sherry made 
a gift to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate 
of deposit, a power not granted to Sherry under the 
power of attorney. Alternatively, Mary Ann con-
tends Sherry breached a duty to Mary Ann under 
the power of attorney not to defeat Crabtree's 
"contractual disposition" of his property unless it 
was necessary for his support or maintenance. We 
find no merit in the first argument and conclude the 
second issue was not raised in the district court. 
Therefore, we affirm. 
II. Scope of Review. 
[ l ][2] [3] Claims in probate are triable at law. In re 
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Estate ol Voelker, 252 N.W.2d 400, 402 (Iowa 
l 977). Consequently, we review for correction of 
errors of law. Iowa R.App. P. 4. We are bound by 
the trial court's findings of fact provided they are 
supported by substantial evidence. Voelker, 252 
N.W.2d at 402. 
III. Did Sherry Breach her Duty to Crabtree Under 
the Power of Attorney? 
A. Sherry did not have the power to make a gift. 
Mary Ann first asserts Sherry did not have the right 
to make gifts pursuant to the power of attorney. We 
agree. 
[ 4 ][5] "The established rule is that a power of attor-
ney must be strictly construed and the instrument 
will be held to grant only those powers which are 
specified." Bloom v. Weiser, 348 So.2d 65 I, 653 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977); accord Whitf'ord v. Gaskill, 
119 N.C.App. 790, 460 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1995), 
cert. granted, 342 N.C. 197,463 S.E.2d 250 (1995) 
; see Abodeely v. Cavras, 221 N.W.2d 494, 501-02 
(Iowa 1974) ( construing power of attorney as grant-
ing only powers specified therein). Because the 
power of attorney form used by Crabtree did not 
expressly grant Sherry the power to make a gift, she 
did not have that power. See Aiello v. Clark, 680 
P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska I 984); Johnson v. Frac-
cacreta, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) 
; In re Estate of Rolater, 542 P .2d 219, 223 
(Okla.App.1975). 
B. Sherry did not breach her duty to Crabtree un-
der the power of attorney. Mary Ann argues that by 
cashing the $20,000 certificate and thereby increas-
ing the probate estate, Sherry made a gift to herself. 
We disagree. 
[6][7] We have held in other contexts a gift is made 
when the donor has a present intention to make a 
gift and divests himself "of all control and domin-
ion over the subject of the gift." Taylor v. Grimes, 
223 Iowa 821, 826, 273 N.W. 898, 901 (1937); see 
Kirchner v. Lenz, 114 Iowa 527, 530, 87 N.W. 497, 
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498 (190 I) (a gift is anything "which is voluntarily 
transferred by one person to another without com-
pensation") (emphasis added); Fender v. Fender, 
285 S.C. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430, 431 ( 1985) (attorney 
in fact may not use his position for his "personal 
benefit in a substantially gratuitous transaction"). 
The transfer of dominion and control must be actu-
al-a present, not a future, transfer. Reeves v. Lyon, 
224 Iowa 659, 662, 277 N.W. 749, 751 (1938); 
Jones v. Luing, 152 Iowa 276,277, 132 N.W. 371. 
371 ( 1911 ). Here Crabtree's "dominion and control" 
over these funds was just as great after the transac-
tion as before, and Sherry's ability to use the funds 
for herself personally was just as restricted. Sherry 
benefited in no way from this transaction at the 
time it occurred. 
[8] The trial court found the $20,000 certificate was 
the only mature certificate and it was cashed to 
provide needed support to Crabtree. There is sub-
stantial evidence to support these findings. Thus, 
any benefit to Sherry was unintentional and merely 
fortuitous. There was no reason to believe at the 
time of the transaction that Sherry would profit 
from it in the future. Had Crabtree lived longer, 
eventually all his certificates would have been used 
to pay his expenses. Moreover, Crabtree was com-
petent to make *171 changes to his will, so there 
was no certainty that Sherry would eventually bene-
fit from this transaction as a beneficiary of the es-
tate. Thus, we conclude Sherry did not make a gift 
to herself by cashing the $20,000 certificate of de-
posit. 
[9] Mary Ann's real complaint is that Sherry did not 
cash other certificates of deposit before she cashed 
the one payable on death to Mary Ann. As the trial 
court found, however, cashing other certificates of 
deposit would have reduced the monies available 
for payment of Crabtree's expenses because he 
would have had to pay an early withdrawal penalty. 
Thus, it would not have been in Crabtree's financial 
interest to cash a different ce11ificate. Sherry, as 
Crabtree's fiduciary, was required to act in his best 
interests. See Rolater, 542 P.2d at 223 ("in exer-
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cising granted powers, the attorney is bound to act 
for the benefit of his principal avoiding where pos-
sible that which is detrimental"); Fender, 285 S.C. 
260, 329 S.E.2d at 43 I ("an agent must further the 
principal's interests"). Although not determinative, 
we also note Crabtree approved of Sherry's cashing 
of the certificate. 
In summary, we conclude Sherry's cashing of the 
certificate of deposit did not result in a gift to her. 
Although her interest in the estate was ultimately 
increased, there is no evidence this result was any-
thing other than fortuitous. Additionally, Sherry ac-
ted in Crabtree's best interest, and with his approv-
al, in cashing a mature certificate of deposit rather 
than one which would have required payment of a 
penalty. For these reasons, Sherry did not breach 
her fiduciary duty to Crabtree. 
IV. Did Sherry Violate a Duty to Mary Ann Under 
Crabtree's Power of Attorney? 
[ 1 OJ On appeal Mary Ann argues that Sherry owed 
her a duty under the power of attorney "much like 
the rights of a donee beneficiary under the doctrine 
of third party beneficiaries." This argument was not 
made to the district court. 
Although the district court ruled Sherry's "fiduciary 
duty was to Mr. Crabtree, not Mary Ann Crabtree," 
this statement was made in the context of discuss-
ing whether Sherry breached her fiduciary duty by 
making a gift to herself. There is nothing in the re-
cord to indicate the district court had a third-
party-beneficiary theory in mind when this state-
ment was made. At trial, Mary Ann simply claimed 
Sherry "engaged in self-dealing as [a] fiduciary and 
effectively made a gift to herself." No mention was 
made to the district court of the theory of third 
party beneficiary. 
We conclude the issue of third party beneficiary 
was not raised in the trial court. See Kanzmeier v. 
McCoppin, 398 N.W.2d 826. 829-30 (Iowa 1987) 
("trial court ... did not mention the concept of third 
Page 5 
party beneficiary, nor did either party advance this 
theory in its trial brief'). Because Mary Ann did not 
present this issue at trial, it is waived. See Hagartv 
v. Dysart-Geneseo Community Sch. Dist., 282 
N.W.2d 92, 96 (Iowa 1979) ("we cannot permit her 
claim to be tried here on a theory not urged in the 
trial court"); General Expressways, lr,c. v. Iowa 
Reciprocity Bd., 163 N .W.2d 413, 417 (Iowa 1968) 
(we only consider issues argued to and considered 
by the trial court). 
AFFIRMED. 
Iowa,1996. 
Matter of Estate of Crabtree 
550 N.W.2d I 68 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Daughter, individually and as coconservator of her 
mother's estate and who was also named as cotrust-
ee of her mother's inter vivos trust, sought to set 
aside an assignment to her brother by mother of be-
neficial interest in a note contained in the trust and 
purportedly assigned by mother as attorney in fact 
for daughter or, in the alternative, an award of dam-
ages. The Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, 
Jay Hodges, J., refused to set aside the assignment 
or award damages, and daughter appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Moore, J ., held that: ( 1) power of at-
torney granted by daughter to mother did not in-
clude power to make gifts; (2) son could not claim 
estoppel on part of daughter; (3) note in which 
daughter held a one-half interest was part of trust 
property even though trustor mother retained pos-
session of it; and (4) purported assignment was in 
violation of trust agreement. 
Reversed. 
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Power of attorney, which granted power to lease, 
bargain, and sell land upon such terms as grantee 
saw fit and to bargain, agree for, buy, sell, mort-
gage, hypothecate, and in any and every way and 
manner deal in and with other property and to 
make, do and transact all and every kind of busi-
ness of whatsoever nature and kind, did not include 
power of making gifts of property in which grantor 
had a beneficial interest; therefore, grantor/daughter 
was not bound by grantee/mother's attempted as-
signment of daughter's beneficial interest a promis-
sory note and the assignment was void. 
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tion of the trust document; no endorsement is ne-
cessary where there are no challenges from a holder 
in due course and, if creator of a trust by appropri-
ate words or acts fully and completely constitutes 
himself trustee, no change of possession of the note 
is necessary. 
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(Formerly 390k371/2) 
Trust was validly created and contained trustor/ 
mother's one-half interest in a note, even if mother 
retained possession of the note as trustor, where 
language of the trust showed necessary present in-
tent to create the trust, mother's capacity at that 
time was not contested, and trust agreement 
provided that property set forth in exhibit, which 
listed the note, would constitute the trust estate. 
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390I(A) Express Trusts 
390k58 k. Modification. Most Cited Cases 
Strict compliance with terms of trust providing that 
written notice of revocation be given by trustor/ 
mother to trustee/daughter was mandated in regard 
to mother's attempt to remove certain property from 
the trust, where mother suffered a gradual deterior-
ation of her physical and mental health, was de-
scribed as tired, forgetful, confused, and in need of 
full custodial care, was diagnosed as suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease, and was declared incompetent 
after establishment of the trust and after her attempt 
to remove the property from the trust. 
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390II(B) Estate or Interest of Trustee and of 
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390k 146 Transfer of Estate or Interest of 
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390kl47(1) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
Trustor/mother's attempted assignment of her bene-
ficial interest in a note contained in the trust was in 
violation of the trust, where her right to receive 
payments on the note was a trust asset, trust instru-
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ment provided for her revocation upon written no-
tice to trustee/daughter and prohibited her from dis-
posing of trust property for less than adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth, daughter 
was not notified in writing of the assignment, the 
written assignment was not directed to daughter and 
did not mention the trust, assignee did not pay for 
the assignment, and mother did not replace the note 
with any other property. 
*1164 Andrew J. Kleinfeld, Fairbanks, for appel-
lant. 
Daniel T. Saluri, Fairbanks, for appellees. 
Before BURKE, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, MAT-
THEWS, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ. 
OPINION 
MOORE, Justice. 
Donna Aiello, individually and as co-conservator of 
the estate of Fern Palfy, appeals the judgment of the 
superior court refusing to set aside an Assignment 
of Beneficial Interest or, in the alternative, award 
damages. Palfy purported to act for herself and as 
attorney in fact for Aiello in assigning a note which 
they held as joint tenants. Aiello alleges that the as-
signment was beyond Palfy's general power of at-
torney and in violation of the Palfy Family Trust. 
We agree and reverse the judgment of the superior 
court. 
I. Factual Background 
Raymond Clark and Donna Aiello are the son and 
daughter of Fem Palfy. Donna Aiello (Aiello) 
signed a "General Power of Attorney" on Septem-
ber 9, 1968 and another one on April 16, 1974 mak-
ing Fem Palfy her attorney in fact at all material 
times. During the mid- l 970s Palfy conveyed a great 
deal of property to Aiello; however, through her 
power of attorney, she retained use of the property 
and proceeds from sales of property. On March 24, 
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1976 Palfy sold a piece of real estate known as the 
brewery property to Daniel and Josephine Gaudi-
ane. The subject promissory note (Gaudiane note) 
and deed of trust were executed giving Palfy and 
Aiello undivided half interests with the right of sur-
vivorship in the lien on the brewery property. Ai-
ello had no direct input concerning the terms, con-
ditions or decisions to sell in the property transac-
tions of which she was a beneficiary. However, she 
was one of the payees on the Gaudiane note and a 
named beneficiary under the deed of trust. She was 
also very active in the efforts to collect the out-
standing debt. 
On October 20, 1976 Palfy created a trust to hold 
the Gaudiane note and other property. Palfy was 
Trustor of "The Palfy Family Trust." Palfy and Ai-
ello were named as Co-Trustees. Fern Palfy was to 
be the trust beneficiary during her life. Upon her 
death, Donna Aiello, as trustee, was to distribute 
Palfy's residence to Ray Clark and his daughter 
Joyce and the remainder of the Trust property to 
herself. The property placed in the Trust, to the ex-
tent it still exists, is administered pursuant to the 
Trust Agreement. 
On April 21, 1979, Palfy, purporting to act indi-
vidually and as attorney in fact for Aiello, signed an 
Assignment of Beneficial Interest. The assignment 
attempted to transfer the Gaudiane note from Palfy 
and Aiello to Ray and Joyce Clark. Daniel Gaudi-
ane and Attorney Eugene Belland jointly prepared 
the documents. Palfy signed the instrument in the 
presence of Gaudiane and his notary friend, John 
Rowlett. 
Under the assignment, Palfy retained a life estate 
and the Clarks took the remainder interest. Aiello 
was completely divested of her interest. According 
to the instrument, the assignment was "in consider-
ation of love and affection, and other good and 
valuable considerations, in hand paid ... " 
Clark testified that Palfy told him she was "going to 
do it for what she owed me, *1165 money she 
owed .... " However, Clark regarded the promissory 
Page4 
notes representing the money owed as outstanding, 
and therefore, he did not release Palfy from the ob-
ligations in consideration of the interest in the 
Gaudiane note. Furthermore, Clark testiified he did 
not learn of the assignment until April 30, 1979 and 
testified he did not pay anything for it at that or any 
other time. 
Aiello revoked the powers of attorney in August 
1979 when she learned Palfy had granted Gaudiane 
a two-year extension on t~e note, which was at that 
. $12 000 . FN l time , m arrears. 
FNI. Unaware of the assignment which 
purported to divest her of any interest, Ai-
ello traveled to Fairbanks in the summer of 
1979 to begin foreclosure proceedings 
against the Gaudiane note. She learned at 
this time that in April, Palfy, individually 
and as Aiello's attorney in fa,;t, had ex-
ecuted a modification of Deed of Trust and 
Promissory Note moving the due date for 
the $12,000 installment from March 1978 
( over a year past due) to March 1981 ( two 
years hence). 
Aiello testified she did not learn of the assignment 
to the Clarks until October 1981. On May 8, 1979, 
just a week after he first learned of the assignment, 
Clark testified that he told Aiello about the assign-
ment. She testified that he did not explain the trans-
action to her. Neither Clark nor Palfy (nor anyone 
else) ever sent Aiello a copy of the assignment or 
aw,, written notice of the termination of her interest. 
F - On April 13, 1982, six months after learning 
of the assignment, Aiello filed suit individually and 
as co-conservator of the estate of Fem Palfy 
FN3 ' 
against the Clarks. 
FN2. In fact, Aiello received a document 
prepared by the Clarks' attorney dated July 
16, 198 I titled Declaration of Default 
which she was requested to sign as benefi-
ciary and as co-conservator for Fem Palfy, 
beneficiary under the Gaudiane note. 
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FN3. Mrs. Palfy was declared incompetent 
and Ray Clark and Donna Aiello were 
named as co-conservators based upon a 
hearing and a petition filed with the superi-
or court dated June 24, 1980. According to 
trial testimony, Palfy, age 75, suffered a 
gradual deterioration of her physical and 
mental health between the mid- l 970s and 
1980. She was described as tired, forgetful, 
confused, and in need of full custodial 
care. She was diagnosed as suffering from 
Alzheimer's disease. 
II. Powers of Attorney 
Aiello argues that Palfy, under the provisions of the 
powers of attorney acted outside the scope of her 
authority when she made a gift of Aiello's half in-
terest in the Gaudiane note to the Clarks without 
her knowledge or consent. The Clarks argue that 
the powers of attorney were held by Palfy to protect 
her equitable interest in the property and, as such, a 
gift was authorized. They further argue that Aiello 
had no more than bare legal title, and thus no 
agency relationship was ever created. 
[1][2] The powers of attorney granted by Aiello in 
1968 and 197 4 were general. These were not gran-
ted in consideration of being named as payee on the 
Gaudiane note in 1976. The instruments creating 
the relationship must be taken as prima facie evid-
ence of its nature. "The intention of the donor or 
grantor is to be gathered from the instrument of cre-
ation." Brown v. Laird, 291 P. 352, 353 ( Or.1930) 
citing 49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers 
§ 22 ( 1951 ). Beyond this, the burden is on the con-
testant to show that a different type of association 
or purpose exists. This burden was not met. Thus, 
Aiello's intention must be gleaned from the written 
grant of power as a reasonable person reading the 
instrument would interpret it. In 1968, Aiello gran-
ted Palfy power to: 
lease, ... bargain, sell ... lands ... upon such terms ... 
as she shall think fit. Also to bargain and agree 
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for, buy, sell, mortgage, hypothecate, and in any 
and every way and manner deal in and with ... 
other property ... and to make, do and transact all 
and every kind of business of what nature and 
kind soever. 
[3][4] Expressions such as "and otherwise dispose 
of' are catchall phrases and add nothing for they 
refer "to such undescribed methods of disposition 
as may have been omitted (but were not) and are in 
nature like those specifically enumerated." *1166 
Fujino v. Clark, 71 F.Supp. 1, 4 (D. Hawaii 1947). 
The powers of attorney held by Palfy contained 
phrases of the same nature (see above); however, 
these phrases do not transform the power granted to 
include making gifts. 
The general rule of construction is stated in Brown 
v. Laird, 291 P. at 354 deferring to Gouldy v. Met-
calf: 75 Tex. 455, 12 S.W. 830, 831 ( 1889): 
The language used in the grant of general power is 
certainly very comprehensive, but the established 
rule of construction limits the authority derived 
by the general grant of power to the acts author-
ized by the language employed in granting the 
special powers. 
In Gouldy, the Texas Court further stated that: 
When an authority is conferred upon an agent by a 
formal instrument, as by a power of attorney, 
there are two rules of construction to be carefully 
attended to: ( 1) The meaning of general words in 
the instrument will be restricted by the context, 
and construed accordingly. (2) The authority will 
be construed strictly, so as to exclude the exer-
cise of any power which is not warranted either 
by the actual terms used, or as a necessary means 
of executing the authority with effect. 
12 S.W. at 831 
Thus, the authority to deal "upon such terms as she 
shall think fit" does not alter the type of acts which 
are authorized. 
A general power of attorney authorizing an agent to 
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sell and convey property, even though it author-
izes him to sell for such price and on such terms 
as to him shall seem proper, implies a sale for the 
benefit of the principal, and does not authorize 
the agent to make a gift of the property, or to 
convey or transfer it without a present considera-
tion inuring to the principal. 
Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768, 773-74 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1979) quoting Johnson v. Frac-
cacrera, 348 So.2d 570, 572 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1977) 
The terms of the powers of attorney granted to 
Palfy were general though limited to business trans-
actions. Consistent with that, Palfy had on all prior 
occasions received valuable consideration in Ai-
ello's behalf for transfers she made as Aiello's attor-
ney in fact. As the court said in Fujino, 71 F.Supp. 
at 4, "[a] gift is not a business transaction." Further-
more, 72 C.J.S. Powers § 25 (1951) states: "Gifts. 
Power to sell does not include authority to make a 
gift of the subject matter, or convey it without con-
sideration, and such a transfer is void." See also 
Brown 1•. Laird, 29 I P. 352, 354 (Or.1930). 
[5][6] In the absence of express authority to make a 
gift, none may be made. The agent must avoid act-
ing to the detriment of his principal "in the absence 
of an explicit direction." Estate of Rolater, 542 
P.2d 219. 223 (Okla.App.1975). 
Clark relies upon the case of Clay v. Saute, 295 
P.2d 914 (Cal.App.1956) for the proposition that 
the agent may make a gift where the principal holds 
bare legal title and the agent holds equitable title. 
Clay is distinguishable from this case. In Clay, the 
agent conveyed property to his daughter in order to 
deprive his business associates and creditors of ac-
cess to his assets. His daughter never knew about 
these transfers and there is no evidence that she 
held any beneficial interest. The agent was declared 
incompetent, although he was not, and was later de-
termined to be competent. 
To the contrary, in this case, Aiello was holder of a 
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beneficial interest in the promissory nolte and deed 
of trust and was informed of most of her interests 
although she was not active in the transactions. 
Palfy's apparent purpose in placing title in Aiello's 
name was not to evade creditors but rather to give 
her daughter a beneficial interest in the property 
which would become hers at Palfy's death, or when 
Palfy could no longer exercise the power of attor-
ney. 
The power of attorney granted to Pailfy merely 
made her an agent for Aiello. Palfy acted beyond 
the scope of her authority in making the gratuitous 
assignment to *1167 Clark, and Aiello is not bound 
by Palfy's acts and representations. 
[7] The general rule was stated in State v. Neal & 
Sons. 489 P.2d 1016, 1019 (Alaska 1971): 
[A] person who deals with another, knowing that 
the other is acting as an agent, and who fails to 
inquire into the extent of the delegated authority, 
may be held to deal at his peril. 
Clark knew that his mother held a power of attor-
ney for his sister. He did not inquire into its lim-
its. Clark did not pay for the assignmf:nt, and Ai-
ello did not benefit from it. Clark did not justifi-
ably rely to his detriment upon another's acts, and 
thus, he cannot claim estoppel on the part of Ai-
ello. We hold that Palfy's assignment of Aiello's 
beneficial interest to the Clarks is void. FN4 
FN4. It is also possible that Aiello's own 
interest was transferred to the Palfy Family 
Trust, and that a gift of this interest would 
also be invalid for reasons discussed in 
Section III, infra, of this opinion. Because 
we have already held that the powers of at-
torney did not authorize a gift, we need not 
reach and do not decide this issue. 
III. The Trust 
The Clarks argue that Palfy's own beneficial in-
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000479
680 P.2d 1162 
(Cite as: 680 P.2d 1162) 
terest in the Gaudiane note was validly assigned for 
the reason that no conveyance of the property into 
the Trust was ever made, or in the alternative, that 
the Trust was revocable, and in fact had been re-
voked by Palfy. Aiello argues that the Trust Agree-
ment was valid and enforceable, but that Palfy's gift 
of her own interest was invalid for two reasons: (I) 
that she was mentally disabled and (2) that Gaudi-
ane, and perhaps Clark, exercised undue influence. 
FN:, 
FN5. Palfy's mental disability or the exer-
cise of undue influence over her affairs by 
others need not be addressed. Our decision 
here makes these issues moot. 
The Trust Agreement provided in Article I: 
Trustor has contemporaneously with the execu-
tion of this Agreement, transferred and delivered 
to Trustee, or stated that she would transfer and 
deliver to Trustee, without consideration paid or 
to be paid therefor, the property set forth in Ex-
hibit "A" attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein and made a part hereof. Such 
property, together with any additions of property 
made to this Trust, whether by Trustor or by an 
other person, shall constitute and be known as the 
"Trust Estate" and shall be held, administered, 
and distributed as hereinafter provided. 
Schedule A was attached to the Trust Agreement. It 
listed the Gaudiane $874,000 promissory note. The 
terms of the Trust were not contested. The testi-
mony at trial established that the property listed for 
the Trust was being administered as part of the 
Trust. 
[8) A note may be assigned merely by execution of 
the trust document. No endorsement is necessary 
where there are no challenges from a holder in due 
course. 11 Am.Jur.2d Bills and ~otes § 313 (l 963). 
As to delivery of the note, " ... if the creator of the 
trust by appropriate words or acts fully and com-
pletely constitutes himself trustee, no change of 
possession is necessary .... " 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 64 
Page 7 
( 1955). 
[9] Even if Palfy retained possession as Trustor, a 
trust was completed as to her one-half interest. 
"Where the instrument creating the tru~.t expressly 
provides that it shall be for the benefit of the grant-
or during his life, a retention of possession by him 
is not inconsistent with the trust." 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 
64 (1955). Palfy created a valid trust. The language 
of the trust shows the necessary present intent to 
create a trust. Her capacity at that time is not con-
tested. 
For Palfy to transfer the interest held in trust would 
have required revocation of the Trust. The terms of 
the Trust are unambiguous. The Declaration of the 
Trust provided: 
*1168 This Declaration and Agreement of Trust, 
made and entered into this 21 day of October, 
1976, by and between FERN P ALFY of Fairb-
anks, Alaska, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Trustor") and FERN P ALFY and DONNA 
LOUISE AIELLO of Redwood City, California, 
as Co-Trustees, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Trustee"). 
The Trust was revocable as specified in Article IV: 
During the lifetime of Trustor, this Trnst may be 
revoked in whole or in part by the Trustor. The 
power of revocation shall be exercised by written 
notice delivered to the Trustee. In the event of 
such revocation, the revoked portion thereof shall 
revert to Trustor and shall constitute her separate 
property as if this Trust had not been created. 
The document provides for revocation by the Trus-
tor (Palfy) upon written notice to the Trustee (both 
Palfy and Aiello). (emphasis added) The only writ-
ing prepared by Palfy regarding the Tmst property 
was the Assignment of Beneficial Intf:rest to the 
Clarks. This was never given to Aiello. She dis-
covered it only through the Fairbanks Title Com-
pany while doing a title search. Her investigation 
was triggered by a form she was requested to sign 
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only as Palfy's co-conservator to permit Gaudiane 
to transfer the brewery property. The parties were 
listed as Clark and Aiello as co-conservators for the 
estate of Palfy and the proposed transferee. The 
writing was not directed to the Trustee nor did it 
mention the Trust. 
[ I OJ No other method of revocation is permissible 
under the terms of the Trust.FN6 As stated in Re-
statement 2d Trusts § 330 ( 1959): 
FN6. Under the facts of this case, see fn. 3, 
strict compliance with the terms of the 
Trust is mandated absent any exceptional 
reasons that might justify non-adherence to 
the requirement that written notice of re-
vocation be given the Trustee. 
(I) The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and 
to the extent that by the terms of the trust he re-
served such a power. 
Comment (a) to the same section explains: "The in-
tention of the settlor which determines the terms of 
the trust is his intention at the time of the creation 
of the trust and not his subsequent intention." 
Moreover, Comment j of§ 330 states: 
Where method of revocation specified. If the settlor 
reserves a power to revoke the trust only in a par-
ticular manner ... he can revoke the trust only in 
that manner .... If the settlor reserves power to re-
voke the trust only by a notice in writing de-
livered to the trustee, he can revoke it only by de-
livering such a notice to the trustee. 
[ I I] Palfy could not avoid this provision by assign-
ing her interest in the Trust because her interest was 
only a life estate. The interest which she purported 
to assign to Clark was everything but an estate for 
her life. 
The assignment was in violation of the Trust. 
Palfy's right to receive the payments on the Gaudi-
ane note was a Trust asset. Article VII, M. of the 
Trust instrument provides: 
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"Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the 
contrary, no powers enumerated herein or accor-
ded to the Trustee generally pursuant to law shall 
be construed to enable the Trustor, or any other 
person, to purchase, exchange, or oth,~rwise deal 
with or dispose of all or any part of the corpus or 
income of the Trust for less than adequate con-
sideration in money or money's worth ... " 
Clark did not pay for the assignment and Palfy did 
not replace the Gaudiane note with any other prop-
erty. Therefore, neither Palfy's nor Aiello's interest 
was properly transferred to the Clarks. 
REVERSED. 
Alaska, 1984. 
Aiello v. Clark 
680 P.2d 1162 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court of Nebraska. 
Sophia CHELOHA, Personal Representative of the 
Estate of Alphons Cheloha, deceased, Appellee and 
Cross-Appellant, 
V. 
Robert C. CHELOHA, Appellant and Cross-Ap-
pellee. 
No. S-96-360. 
July 17, 1998. 
Personal representative for uncle's estate sought ac-
counting from nephew regarding transactions he 
entered into on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable 
power of attorney. The District Court, Platte 
County, Robert R. Steinke, J., found that nephew 
had converted money from uncle's certificates of 
deposit to his own use and awarded personal rep-
resentative that amount plus postjudgment interest 
and costs. Nephew appealed and personal repres-
entative cross-appealed. The Supreme Court, Ger-
rard, J., held that: (I) nephew failed to establish ex-
press oral contract for payment of compensation for 
services rendered; (2) nephew converted uncle's 
certificates of deposit; (3) nephew converted money 
from uncle's checking account; and ( 4) personal 
representative was entitled to prejudgment interest 
on amount converted from certificates of deposit, 
but not amount converted from checking account. 
Affirmed, as modified. 
West Headnotes 
11 I Executors and Administrators 162 €=>468 
162 Executors and Administrators 
I 62XI Accounting and Settlement 
! 62Xl(B) Proceedings for Accounting 
!62k468 k. Nature and Form of Remedy. 
Most Cited Cases 
An action for an accounting of estate property is in 
equity. 
12] Appeal and Error 30 €=>893(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVl(F) Trial De Novo 
30k892 Trial De Novo 
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30k893 Cases Triable in Appellate 
Court 
30k893(2) k. Equitable Proceed-
ings. Most Cited Cases 
Appeal and Error 30 €=;>895(2) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(F) Trial De Novo 
30k892 Trial De Novo 
30k895 Scope of Inquiry 
30k895(2) k. Effect ofFindings Be-
low. Most Cited Cases 
In an appeal of an equity action, an appellate court 
tries factual questions de novo on the record and 
reaches a conclusion independent of the findings of 
the trial court, provided, however, that where cred-
ible evidence is in conflict on a material issue of 
fact, the appellate court considers and may give 
weight to the fact that the trial judge heard and ob-
served the witnesses and accepted one version of 
the facts rather than another. 
131 Principal and Agent 308 €=;)10(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081 The Relation 
3081(A) Creation and Existence 
308k7 Appointment of Agent 
308k IO Letters or Powers of Attorney 
Under Seal 
308k 10( I) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
A power of attorney authorizes anoth{:r to act as 
one's agent. 
141 Principal and Agent 308 €=>64(.5)1 
© 2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
000482
582 N.W.2d 291 
255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 
(Cite as: 255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308ll(A) Execution of Agency 
308k64 Collection of Debts Due Principal 
308k64( .5) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
An agent has a duty to account to his principal for 
all property or funds which he has received or paid 
out on behalf of the principal. 
[51 Principal and Agent 308 o:£;=78(4) 
308 Principal and Agent 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
30811(A) Execution of Agency 
308k78 Actions for Accounting 
308k78(4) k. Presumptions and Burden 
of Proof. Most Cited Cases 
The burden is upon the agent to prove a proper dis-
position of all property and funds which have been 
entrusted to him pursuant to a power of attorney, 
since the agent was the one who managed the prop-
erty and funds and had control of the accounts. 
[61 Principal and Agent 308 ~48 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081J Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
30811(A) Execution of Agency 
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation. 
Most Cited Cases 
An agent is generally required 10 act solely for the 
benefit of his principal in all matters connected 
with the agency and adhere faithfully to the instruc-
tions of the principal. 
f 71 Principal and Agent 308 ~1 
308 Principal and Agent 
3081 The Relation 
308l(A) Creation and Existence 
308kl k. Nature of the Relation in Gener-
al. Most Cited Cases 
An agent and principal are in a fiduciary relation-
ship such that the agent has an obligation to refrain 
from doing any harmful act to the principal. 
[81 Principal and Agent 308 €=69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
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30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308JJ(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
An agent is prohibited from profiting from the 
agency relationship to the detriment of the princip-
al. 
[91 Principal and Agent 308 €;=103(.S) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308111 Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308Jil(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308kl 03 Purchases, Sales, and Con-
veyances 
308k 103( .5) k. In General. Most 
Cited Cases 
No gift may be made by an attorney in fact to him-
self unless the power to make such a gift is ex-
pressly granted in the instrument itself and there is 
shown a clear intent on the part of the principal to 
make such a gift. 
[101 Principal and Agent 308 €=>69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308H Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308TI(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Absent express intention, an agent may not utilize 
his position for his or a third party's benefit in a 
substantially gratuitous transfer. 
1111 Contracts 95 €;=9(1) 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
95l(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter 
95k9( l) k. In General. Most Cited 
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Cases 
A court of equity will not enforce a contract unless 
it is complete and certain in all its essential ele-
ments. 
112] Specific Performance 358 €;;;;.>28(1) 
358 Specific Performance 
35811 Contracts Enforceable 
358k27 Certainty 
358k28 In General 
358k28(1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The parties to a contract must agree upon the mater-
ial and necessary details of the bargain, and if any 
of these be omitted or left obscure or indefinite so 
as to leave the intention of the parties uncertain re-
specting the substantial terms, the case is not one 
for specific performance. 
113) Contracts 95 €:=>143(3) 
95 Contracts 
95Jl Construction and Operation 
95JI(A) General Rules of Construction 
95k 143 Application to Contracts in Gen-
eral 
95kl43(3) k. Rewriting, Remaking, or 
Revising Contract. Most Cited Cases 
It is not a function of a court of equity to make a 
contract for the parties or to supply any of the ma-
terial stipulations thereof. 
[141 Contracts 95 €:=>9(2) 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
95I(A) Nature and Essentials in General 
95k9 Certainty as to Subject-Matter 
95k9(2) k. Services and Compensation 
Therefor. Most Cited Cases 
Elderly uncle's statement to nephew, that he would 
pay for nephew's services, was insufficient to create 
express oral contract for payment of compensation 
for services rendered, absent additional evidence as 
to material terms of purported contract. 
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115) Contracts 95 €:=>28(.5) 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
95T(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k28 Evidence of Agreement 
95k28(.5) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Fact that nephew did not report income he received 
from uncle's certificates of deposit on his tax re-
turns supported inference that certificates of deposit 
did not represent compensation for services 
rendered. 
(16) Contracts 95 €:=>14 
95 Contracts 
951 Requisites and Validity 
95l(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95kl4 k. Intent of Parties. Most Cited 
Cases 
Mutual assent to an agreement is determined by the 
objective manifestations of intent by the parties, not 
by their subjective statements of intent. 
117] Trover and Conversion 389 €:=>22 
389 Trover and Conversion 
38911 Actions 
389JI(A) Right of Action and Defonses 
389k2 l Defenses 
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Since uncle and nephew had not enter,~d into ex-
press contract for payment of compensation for ser-
vices rendered, and power of attorney did not ex-
pressly grant nephew the power to mak,~ gifts with 
uncle's property, nephew's use of uncle's certific-
ates of deposit for his own purposes constituted 
conversion. 
I 18] Principal and Agent 308 €;;;;.>62(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308TI Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k62 Custody and Care of Principal's 
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Property 
308k62( l) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Disbursements nephew made from uncle's checking 
account pursuant to power of attorney were proper, 
to the extent they represented expense reimburse-
ments and items that benefited uncle during his life-
time. 
[191 Trover and Conversion 389 ~22 
389 Trover and Conversion 
38911 Actions 
389Il(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
389k2 l Defenses 
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Compensation payments nephew made to himself 
from uncle's checking account while acting as 
uncle's attorney in fact were not proper disburse-
ments, since uncle and nephew had not entered into 
express contract for payment of compensation for 
services rendered, and power of attorney did not au-
thorize nephew to compensate himself from uncle's 
property. 
[20] Trover and Conversion 389 ~22 
389 Trover and Conversion 
3891I Actions 
389II(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
389k2 l Defenses 
389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Since power of attorney did not grant nephew the 
power to make gifts with uncle's property, nephew's 
use of uncle's money to purchase gifts for his wife 
and children was not a proper disposition of uncle's 
property. 
121] Trover and Conversion 389 €'=>22 
389 Trover and Conversion 
38911 Actions 
389TI(A) Right of Action and Defenses 
389k2 l Defenses 
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389k22 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
Nephew's purchase of radar detector with money 
from uncle's checking account while acting as 
uncle's attorney in fact was not proper disposition 
of uncle's property; although nephew testified that 
uncle authorized him to purchase radar detector so 
that he would not get speeding tickets while trans-
porting uncle to doctor's appointments, this testi-
mony was not credible. 
f221 Statutes 361 €'=>278.17 
36 J Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity 
36 lk278. l 7 k. Amendatory Acts. Most 
Cited Cases 
(Formerly 361 k270) 
Where an amendment to a statute makes a proced-
ural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on the ef-
fective date of the amendment and is applicable to 
pending cases that have not been tried. 
f23] Interest 219 €:=29 
219 Interest 
21911 Rate 
2 l 9k29 k. Constitutional and Statutory Provi-
sions. Most Cited Cases 
Amended prejudgment interest statute applied in 
personal representative's action for accounting; 
amendment became effective before action was 
tried, and prejudgment interest statute was proced-
ural in nature. Neb.Rev.St. § 45--103.02 ( 1993). 
[241 Statutes 361 €'=>174 
361 Statutes 
361 VI Construction and Operation 
36 I VI(A) General Rules of Construction 
36 lk 174 k. In General. Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 361 k265) 
Statutes 361 €'=>278.10 
361 Statutes 
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361 VI Construction and Operation 
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity 
36 lk278. IO k. Statutes Imposing Liabilit-
ies, Penalties, Duties, Obligations, or Disabilities. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 361 k266) 
Statutes 361 €=:>278.13 
361 Statutes 
361 VT Construction and Operation 
361 Vl(D) Retroactivity 
361 k278. I 2 Statutes Relating to Remedies 
and Procedures 
36 l k278. l 3 k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
(Formerly 36lk267(1)) 
A substantive law creates duties, rights, and obliga-
tions, whereas a procedural law prescribes the 
means and methods through and by which substant-
ive laws are enforced and applied. 
f251 Interest 219 ~12 
219 Interest 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
2 l 9k8 Compensation for Use of Money 
219kl2 k. Money Wrongfu1ly Obtained, 
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases 
Interest 219 ~31 
219 Interest 
21911 Rate 
2 I 9k3 I k. Computation of Rate in General. 
Most Cited Cases 
An agent is chargeable with interest at the legal rate 
from the time that the money is wrongfully with-
held from the principal. Neb.Rev .St. § 45-104. 
1261 Interest 219 ~12 
2 l 9 Interest 
2191 Rights and Liabilities in General 
219k8 Compensation for Use of Money 
2 I 9k I 2 k. Money Wrongfully Obtained, 
Held, or Used. Most Cited Cases 
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Since nephew, in his capacity as uncle's agent or at-
torney in fact, wrongfully converted to his own use 
and retained money belonging to uncle without 
uncle's consent, interest was allowable pursuant to 
statute authorizing interest on money retained 
without the owner's consent. Neb.Rev.St § 45-104. 
[27] Interest 219 €:=39(2.15) 
219 Interest 
2 l 9ITI Time and Computation 
2 I 9k39 Time from Which Inter,est Runs in 
General 
219k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen-
eral 
2 l 9k39(2. l 5) k. Liquidated or Unli-
quidated Claims in General. Most Cited Cases 
A claim is "liquidated," for purposes of prejudg-
ment interest statute, when there is no reasonable 
controversy either as to the plaintiffs right to re-
cover or as to the amount of such recovery. 
Neb.Rev.St.§ 45-103.02 (1993). 
128] Interest 219 €;;=39(2.20) 
219 Interest 
2 I 91TI Time and Computation 
2 l 9k39 Time from Which Inten!st Runs in 
General 
2 I 9k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen-
eral 
2 l 9k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and 
Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Since damages were liquidated and no reasonable 
controversy existed as to nephew's conversion of 
money from uncle's certificates of deposit to his 
own use, uncle's personal representative was en-
titled to prejudgment interest as a matter of law on 
that amount from the time that nephew received the 
certificates of deposit. Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 
( 1993). 
129] Interest 219 ~39(2.20) 
219 Interest 
2 l 9TIT Time and Computation 
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2 I 9k39 Time from Which Interest Runs in 
General 
2 l 9k39(2.5) Prejudgment Interest in Gen-
eral 
2 I 9k39(2.20) k. Particular Cases and 
Issues. Most Cited Cases 
Since, in personal representative's action for ac-
counting regarding transactions nephew entered in-
to on behalf of uncle by virtue of durable power of 
attorney, reasonable controversy existed regarding 
nephew's disbursements from uncle's checking ac-
count, personal representative's claim against neph-
ew was not liquidated, and personal representative 
was not entitled to prejudgment interest on improp-
er disbursements from the checking account. 
Neb.Rev.St. § 45-103.02 (1993). 
**294 Syllabus by the Court 
*32 1. Equity: Decedents' Estates: Accounting. 
An action for an accounting of estate property is in 
equity. 
2. Equity: Appeal and Error. In an appeal of an 
equity action, an appellate court tries factual ques-
tions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu-
sion independent of the findings of the trial court, 
provided, however, that where credible evidence is 
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate 
court considers and may give weight to the fact that 
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and 
accepted one version of the facts rather than anoth-
er. 
3. Principal and Agent. A power of attorney au-
thorizes another to act as one's agent. 
4. Principal and Agent: Property. An agent has a 
duty to account to his or her principal for all prop-
erty or funds which he or she has received or paid 
out on behalf of the principal. 
5. Principal and Agent: Property: Proof. The 
burden is upon the agent to prove a proper disposi-
tion of all property and funds which have been en-
trusted to him or her pursuant to a power of attar-
Page 6 
ney, since the agent was the one who managed the 
property and funds and had control of the accounts. 
6. Principal and Agent. Generally, an agent is re-
quired to act solely for the benefit of his or her 
principal in all matters connected with the agency 
and adhere faithfully to the instructions of the prin-
cipal. 
7. Principal and Agent. An agent and principal are 
in a fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an 
obligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to 
the principal. 
8. Principal and Agent. An agent is prohibited 
from profiting from the agency relationship to the 
detriment of the principal. 
9. Principal and Agent: Gifts: Intent. No gift may 
be made by an attorney in fact to himself or herself 
unless the power to make such a gift is expressly 
granted in the instrument itself and there is shown a 
clear intent on the part of the principal to make 
such a gift. 
10. Principal and Agent: Intent. Absent express 
intention, an agent may not utilize his or her posi-
tion for his or her or a third party's benefit in a sub-
stantially gratuitous transfer. 
11. Equity: Contracts. A court of equity will not 
enforce a contract unless it is complete and certain 
in all its essential elements. 
12. Contracts: Parties: Intent. The parties them-
selves must agree upon the material and necessary 
details of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted 
or left obscure or indefinite so as to leave the inten-
tion of the parties uncertain respecting the substan-
tial terms, the case is not one for specific perform-
ance. 
13. Equity: Contracts: Parties. It is not a function 
of a court of equity to make a contract for the 
parties or to supply any of the material stipulations 
thereof. 
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**295 *33 14. Statutes: Time. Where an amend-
ment to a statute makes a procedural change, it is 
binding upon a tribunal on the effective date of the 
amendment and is applicable to pending cases that 
have not been tried. 
15. Statutes. A substantive law creates duties, 
rights, and obligations, whereas a procedural law 
prescribes the means and methods through and by 
which substantive laws are enforced and applied. 
16. Principal and Agent: Prejudgment Interest: 
Time. Under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue 
1993), an agent is chargeable with interest at the 
legal rate from the time that money is wrongfully 
withheld from the principal. 
17. Prejudgment Interest: Claims. A claim is li-
quidated when there is no reasonable controversy 
either as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to 
the amount of such recovery. There must be no dis-
pute either as to the amount or as to the plaintiffs 
right to recover. 
Richard K. Watts, of Mills, Watts & Nicolas, 
Osceola, for appellant. 
Clark J. Grant, of Grant, Rogers, Maul & Grant, 
Columbus, for appellee. 
CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD 
, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ. 
GERRARD, Justice. 
In this equity action, Sophia Cheloha, as personal 
representative of the estate of Alphons Cheloha, de-
ceased, filed a third amended petition in the district 
court, seeking an accounting from Alphons' brother, 
Carl C. Cheloha, and Carl's son, Robert C. Cheloha, 
as to all transactions they entered into on behalf of 
Alphons by virtue of a durable power of attorney. 
Sophia alleged that sums of money expended by 
Carl and Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' at-
torneys in fact, were not solely for the benefit of 
Alphons. Following a bench trial, the district court 
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entered judgment, finding that Robert converted 
$33,495.05 in either principal or interest from certi-
ficates of deposit owned by Alphons to his own use 
and awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment 
interest and costs. Robert appeals, and Sophia 
cross-appeals. 
*34 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Alphons was a bachelor and retired farmer who 
lived in rural Platte County, Nebraska. In 1986, Al-
phons was admitted to a nursing home, but some-
time later was able to return to his own home. 
However, in late July or August 1988, Alphons was 
again admitted to a nursing home, where he re-
mained until his death on October I 0, 1993. 
Robert was Alphons' nephew and lived less than a 
mile from Alphons' home. During Alphons' life-
time, few people other than Robert paid any atten-
tion to Alphons or his needs. Robert cleared snow 
from Alphons' roads, trimmed his trees, provided 
transportation for him for doctor's appointments, 
and made arrangements for his medical and nursing 
home care. In addition, Robert paid Alphons' bills, 
managed his finances, and provided transportation 
for him to purchase his groceries. 
Robert testified that in April 1986, he had a discus-
sion with Alphons regarding Robert's desire to be 
compensated for the services that he had been 
providing to Alphons. Robert testified that he had 
this discussion with Alphons at the nursing home in 
the presence of Robert's wife and parents. Accord-
ing to Robert, as corroborated by his mother, 
Robert told Alphons that his care was more re-
sponsibility than Robert could handle, to which Al-
phons allegedly responded, "I am so glad that you 
have been helping me, that you are helping me, and 
I want you to be paid." 
Robert testified that After this conversation, he dis-
cussed the matter with the family attomey, Cleo 
Robak. Robert told Robak what Alphons had said, 
and Robak told Robert that he was entitkd to com-
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pensation. Robak testified by deposition that he was 
never informed or heard of any agreement between 
Alphons and Robert for the payment of compensa-
tion. Robak, however, did testify that sometime 
after problems began to surface with Alphons, 
Robak told Robert that he could charge a reason-
able fee for **296 whatever work he had done for 
Alphons, although no further details were discussed 
and no legal work was embarked upon by Robak to 
specifically deal with this issue. 
On August 11, 1988, Alphons executed a durable 
power of attorney, naming Carl and Robert as his 
attorneys in fact. Robak testified that in preparing 
Alphons' power of attorney, Robak had no know-
ledge of any discussion between Alphons and *35 
Robert regarding an agreement for the payment of 
compensation for services rendered by Robert pur-
suant to the power of attorney. The power of attor-
ney instrument did not contain a provision authoriz-
ing Robert to compensate himself or a provision au-
thorizing Robert to make gifts from Alphons' prop-
erty. 
On September 20, 1995, Sophia, as personal repres-
entative of the estate of Alphons, filed a third 
amended petition in equity in the district court, 
seeking an accounting from Carl and Robert as to 
all transactions they entered into on behalf of Al-
phons by virtue of the power of attorney. Sophia al-
leged that sums of money expended by Carl and 
Robert, in their capacities as Alphons' attorneys in 
fact, were not solely for the benefit of Alphons and 
were, in fact, paid to the detriment of Alphons. At 
the bench trial on the matter, Robert admitted that 
he used the power of attorney in order to convert 
$33,495.05 in certificates of deposit owned by Al-
phons to his own use. Robert, however, testified 
that he received these monies as compensation for 
services rendered by him pursuant to an oral con-
tract with Alphons. Robert also admitted to using 
the power of attorney to make various purchases 
and disbursements with money from Alphons' 
checking account. Robert, however, testified that 
these various purchases or disbursements consti-
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tuted either gifts, reimbursement of expenses, or 
compensation for services rendered. 
Following the bench trial, the district court entered 
judgment, finding that Robert converted $33,495.05 
in either principal or interest from certificates of 
deposit owned by Alphons to his own use and 
awarded Sophia that amount plus postjudgment in-
terest and costs. The district court dismissed the pe-
tition as it related to Carl, since no evidence was 
submitted that he had ever come into possession, 
control, or management of Alphons' property. 
Robert appeals, and Sophia cross-appeals. We re-
moved the case to our docket pursuant to our power 
to regulate the caseloads of the Nebraska Court of 
Appeals and this court. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 
24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995). 
II. SCOPE OF REVIEW 
[1][2] An action for an accounting of estate prop-
erty is in equity. Mischke v. Mischke, 247 Neb. 752, 
530 N.W.2d 235 (1995). In *36 an appeal of an 
equity action, an appellate court tries factual ques-
tions de novo on the record and reaches a conclu-
sion independent of the findings of the trial court, 
provided, however, that where credible evidence is 
in conflict on a material issue of fact, the appellate 
court considers and may give weight to the fact that 
the trial judge heard and observed the witnesses and 
accepted one version of the facts rather than anoth-
er. Schram Enters. v. L & H Properties. 254 Neb. 
717, 578 N.W.2d 865 (1998); Mischke v. Mischke, 
supra. 
III. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
Robert's four assignments of error can be consolid-
ated and restated into the following one: The trial 
court erred in finding that the conversion of Al-
phons' certificates of deposit represented a gift to 
Robert as Alphons' attorney in fact rather than com-
pensation for services rendered pursuan1 to an ex-
press or implied contract. 
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In her cross-appeal, Sophia assigns the following 
two errors: The trial court erred in (1) determining 
that she was not entitled to a money judgment for 
funds wrongfully converted from Alphons' check-
ing account to Robert's personal use pursuant to the 
power of attorney and (2) not awarding prejudg-
ment interest. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
1. POWER OF ATTORNEY 
[3][4][5] A power of attorney authorizes another to 
act as one's agent. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; 
**291Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 
N.W.2d 576 (1989). An agent has a duty to account 
to his or her principal for all property or funds 
which he or she has received or paid out on behalf 
of the principal. Walker land & Cattle Co. v. Daub, 
223 Neb. 343,389 N.W.2d 560 (1986). The burden 
is upon the agent to prove a proper disposition of 
all property and funds which have been entrusted to 
him or her pursuant to a power of attorney, since 
the agent was the one who managed the property 
and funds and had control of the accounts. See id. 
[6][7][8] Generally, an agent is required to act 
solely for the benefit of his or her principal in all 
matters connected with the agency and adhere faith-
fully to the instructions of the principal. Fletcher v. 
Mathew, supra. *37 An agent and principal are in a 
fiduciary relationship such that the agent has an ob-
ligation to refrain from doing any harmful act to the 
principal. Id. An agent is prohibited from profiting 
from the agency relationship to the detriment of the 
principal. Mischke v. Mischke, supra; In re Estate 
cf Lienemann, 222 Neb. 169, 382 N.W.2d 595 
(1986). 
[9][ IO] It is well settled that no gift may be made 
by an attorney in fact to himself or herself unless 
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted 
in the instrument itself and there is shown a clear 
intent on the part of the principal to make such a 
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gift. Mischke v. Mischke, supra. We adopted the 
foregoing rule in Fletcher v. Mathew, supra, in or-
der to discourage fraud and abuse by attorneys in 
fact. Thus, absent express intention, an agent may 
not utilize his or her position for his or her or a 
third party's benefit in a substantially gratuitous 
transfer. Mischke v. Mischke, supra. 
Robert asserts that his conversion of $33,495.05 in 
principal or interest from Alphons' certificates of 
deposit to his own use represented compensation 
for services rendered by him pursuant to an express 
oral contract or an implied contract and that, thus, 
the district court erred in awarding Sophia 
$33,495.05. At trial, however, Robert did not raise 
the theory that he properly converted Alphons' cer-
tificates of deposit pursuant to an implied contract. 
Therefore, on appeal, our sole inquiry is whether an 
express oral contract existed whereby Alphons 
agreed to pay Robert $33,495.05 in certificates of 
deposit as compensation for services rendered. See 
Sunrise Country Manor v. Neb. Dept. of Soc. 
Servs., 246 Neb. 726, 523 K.W.2d 499 (1994) 
( cases are heard in state appellate courts on theory 
upon which they were tried). Robert claims that an 
express oral contract existed because Alphons had 
specifically told Robert in the presence of his im-
mediate family that Alphons wanted Robert to be 
paid for his services. 
[I 1][12][13] A court of equity will not enforce a 
contract unless it is complete and certain in all its 
essential elements. Sayer v. Bowley, 243 Neb. 80 I, 
503 N.W.2d 166 (1993). The parties themselves 
must agree upon the material and necessary details 
of the bargain, and if any of these be omitted or left 
obscure or indefinite so as to leave the intention of 
the parties uncertain respecting *38 the substantial 
terms, the case is not one for specific performance. 
Id. It is not a function of a court of equity to make a 
contract for the parties or to supply any of the ma-
terial stipulations thereof. Id. 
[ 14] In the instant case, the only evidenc,! in the re-
cord that would support a mutual understanding 
between Alphons and Robert that Robert's services 
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were not rendered gratuitously was the self-serving 
testimony of Robert and the testimony of his moth-
er that Alphons told Robert that Alphons would pay 
Robert for his services. Even assuming that this 
conversation did, in fact, take place and that a con-
tract was formed between the parties, the record 
contains no evidence of a mutual understanding as 
to the specific terms of the compensation to be paid 
to Robert. While Robert testified that 4 years after 
the alleged conversation with Alphons, Alphons 
told Robert that he was entitled to a certificate of 
deposit as compensation for services rendered, 
there is no evidence in the record as to which certi-
ficate of deposit or as to the amount of the particu-
lar certificate of deposit to which Robert was en-
titled. In short, the record is devoid of any evidence 
as to the material terms of the purported contract, 
and thus, as an appellate court, it is not our function 
to supply the terms for the parties and enforce 
**298 the parties' alleged contract for the payment 
of compensation for services rendered. 
[ 15] [ 16] Moreover, contrary to Robert's claim of a 
contract for compensation of services, the record 
reveals that Robert never reported the income he re-
ceived from the certificates of deposit on his tax re-
turns, thereby supporting an inference that the certi-
ficates of deposit did not represent compensation 
for services rendered. Mutual assent to an agree-
ment is determined by the objective manifestations 
of intent by the parties, not by their subjective 
statements of intent. See Viking Broadcasting Corp. 
v. Snell Publishing Co .. 243 Neb. 92, 497 N.W.2d 
383 (1993). 
[ I 7] Therefore, we determine from our de novo re-
view of the record that Robert's conversion of Al-
phons' certificates of deposit to Robert's own use 
was not pursuant to any enforceable oral contract, 
but, rather, was a substantially gratuitous transac-
tion. Moreover, since the power of attorney did not 
expressly grant Robert the power to make gifts with 
Alphons' property, Robert has failed to meet his 
burden of proof with respect to the *39 proper dis-
position of Alphons' certificates of deposit and in-
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terest totaling $33,495.05. Accordingly, the district 
court was correct in awarding Sophia the sum of 
$33,495.05 with respect to the certificates of depos-
it. Robert's assignment of error is without merit. 
2. SOPHIA'S CROSS-APPEAL 
(a) Checking Account 
In her cross-appeal, Sophia asserts that the trial 
court erred in not awarding a judgment against 
Robert for money he wrong-fully converted from 
Alphons' checking account to his own use. Robert 
admits to using the power of attorney to make vari-
ous purchases and disbursements with money from 
Alphons' checking account; however, Robert con-
tends that these various purchases or disbursements 
were proper because they represented either reim-
bursement of expenses, compensation for services 
rendered, or gifts. 
[ 1 8] As we address Sophia's claims in our de novo 
review, we recognize that the nature of many of the 
checking account expenditures was in d:ispute, and 
we have considered and given weight to the fact 
that the trial court observed the witnesses and ac-
cepted one version of facts over another with re-
spect to several of the transactions. S,!e Schram 
Enters. v. L & H Properties, 254 Neb. 717, 578 
N.W.2d 865 (1998). In that regard, there were nu-
merous checks that were written by Robert on be-
half of Alphons either for alleged expense reim-
bursements or for items that allegedly benefited Al-
phons during his lifetime. Without detailing each 
and every check, Sophia claims that se:veral pur-
chases were not solely for the benefit of Alphons 
and that certain checks were not reimbursement for 
legitimate expenses. The checks at issue: were for 
the purchase of two filing cabinets to keep track of 
Alphons' business, the payment of real estate taxes 
on Alphons' farmstead and personal property tax on 
Alphons' pickup truck, several checks. to Wal-
green's to purchase personal hygiene items and 
medications for Alphons, the purchase of a televi-
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sion set for Alphons' room in the nursing home, the 
purchase of a vacuum for Alphons' home, the pay-
ment for repairs to Alphons' truck, the purchase of a 
camcorder that was eventually sold to Robert, and 
the payment of utilities *40 and homeowner's insur-
ance on Alphons' farmstead. The evidence was in 
dispute in many of these transactions, and the trial 
court heard several witnesses, including the admin-
istrator of the Genoa Haven Home, testify regard-
ing the issue whether Alphons was benefiting from 
the purchases and disbursements outlined above. 
Based on our de nova review of the record, we de-
termine that the trial court did not err in concluding 
that Sophia was not entitled to judgment regarding 
the aforestated disbursements. 
[ 19] However, based on the principles set forth in 
Fletcher v. A1athew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576 
( 1989), our de nova review of the record leads us to 
a different conclusion regarding Sophia's claims 
with respect to the alleged compensation for ser-
vices and gifts to Robert. With regard to those pur-
chases constituting alleged compensation for ser-
vices rendered, Robert testified that he purchased 
**299 a pair of shoes for himself in the amount of 
$241.50. Robert also testified that he paid himself 
$500 for handling Alphons' funeral arrangements. 
Lastly, Robert testified that he paid himself $80.15 
for moving Alphons' belongings to and from the 
various nursing homes. As previously detennined, 
because the record is devoid of satisfactory proof 
that Alphons entered into a binding contract to 
compensate Robert for services rendered and be-
cause the power of attorney does not contain a pro-
vision authorizing Robert to compensate himself 
from Alphons' property, we determine that Robert 
has failed to meet his burden of proof with regard 
to the proper disposition of Alphons' money in the 
sum of$821.65. 
[20] As to those purchases made with Alphons' 
money allegedly constituting gifts, Robert wrote 
checks to Wal-Mart totaling $7,055.74. While 
Robert testified that these purchases were primarily 
for personal items for Alphons, Robert also testified 
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that a portion of those purchases was for gifts for 
his wife and children pursuant to Alphons' oral au-
thorization. Despite Alphons' alleged oral authoriz-
ation, because the power of attorney did not grant 
Robert the power to make gifts with Alphons' prop-
erty and the purchases were not solely for Alphons' 
benefit, we determine that Robert has failed to meet 
his burden of proof with respect to the disposition 
of Alphons' money in the amount of$7,055.74. 
[21] *41 Robert also purchased a radar detector for 
$240.14. Robert testified that Alphons authorized 
Robert to purchase a radar detector so that he would 
not get speeding tickets while transporting Alphons 
to doctor's appointments. Because we do not find 
Robert's testimony credible in that regard, we de-
termine that Robert has failed to meet his burden of 
proof with respect to the proper disposition of Al-
phons' money in the further sum of$240.14. 
Based on the foregoing, we determine that the trial 
court erred in not awarding Sophia a judgment in 
the amount of $8,117.53 for funds wrongfully con-
verted from Alphons' checking account to the bene-
fit of Robert. 
(b) Prejudgment Interest 
Sophia asserts that the trial court wrongly applied 
an old version of Nebraska's prejudgment interest 
statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993), 
in denying her request for an award of prejudgment 
interest. Sophia claims that under the amended ver-
sion,§ 45-103.02 (Cum.Supp.1996), she is entitled 
to prejudgment interest. 
The version of§ 45-103.02 that the trial court ap-
plied in the instant case provided the following: 
Except as provided in section 45-103.04, judg-
ment interest shall also accrue on decrees and 
judgments for the payment of money from the 
date of the plaintiffs first offer of settlement 
which is exceeded by the judgment until the 
rendition of judgment if all of the following con-
ditions are met: 
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( 1) The offer is made in writing upon the defend-
ant ... ; 
(2) The offer is made not less than ten days prior 
to the commencement of the trial; 
(3) A copy of the offer and proof of delivery to 
the defendant ... is filed with the clerk of the 
court in which the action is pending; and 
(4) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or with-
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever 
occurs first. 
§ 45-103.02 (Reissue 1993 ). Under this version of§ 
45-103.02, in order to receive prejudgment interest 
in a cause of action accruing after January 1, 1987, 
a litigant must comply with the *42 four require-
ments of§ 45-103.02. See, Pantano v. McGowan, 
247 Neb. 894,530 N.W.2d 912 (1995); Label Con-
cepts v. Westendorf Plastics. 247 Neb. 560, 528 
N.W.2d 335 ( 1995). 
However, in 1994, the Legislature amended § 
45-103.02, which now provides the following: 
(1) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, in-
terest as provided in section 45-103 shall accrue 
on the unpaid balance of unliquidated claims 
from the date of the plaintiff's first offer of settle-
ment which is exceeded by the judgment until the 
rendition of judgment if all of the following con-
ditions are met: 
**300 (a) The offer is made in writing upon the 
defendant ... ; 
(b) The offer is made not less than ten days prior 
to the commencement of the trial; 
( c) A copy of the offer and proof of de livery to 
the defendant . . . is filed with the clerk of the 
court in which the action is pending; and 
( d) The offer is not accepted prior to trial or with-
in thirty days of the date of the offer, whichever 
occurs first. 
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(2) Except as provided in section 45-103.04, in-
terest as provided in section 45-104 shall accrue 
on the unpaid balance of liquidated claims from 
the date the cause of action arose until the rendi-
tion of judgment. 
(Emphasis supplied.) § 45-103.02 
(Cum.Supp.1996). Thus, under the amended ver-
sion of§ 45-103.02, compliance with the four con-
ditions is no longer a prerequisite for an award of 
prejudgment interest if interest is prov1ided for in 
Neb.Rev.Stat. § 45-104 (Reissue I 993) and the 
claim is liquidated. Before analyzing whether in-
terest is available pursuant to § 45-104 and the 
claim is liquidated, it is necessary for us to resolve 
the question of whether the amended prejudgment 
interest statute is applicable in the instant case. 
[22][23] Where an amendment to a statute makes a 
procedural change, it is binding upon a tribunal on 
the effective date of the amendment and is applic-
able to pending cases that have not been tried. 
Stansbury v. HEP. Inc., 248 Neb. 706, 5.39 N.W.2d 
28 ( I 995); Behrens v. American Stores Packing 
Co., 236 Neb. 279, 460 N.W.2d 671 (1990). See, 
also, Jackson v. Branick Indus., 254 Neb. 950, 581 
N.W.2d 53 (1998). In the instant *43 case, the 
amendment became effective July 16, 1994, and the 
case was tried on November 28 and 29, 1995. 
Therefore, the amended § 45-103 .02 was in effect 
at the time of the trial, and thus, the new statute will 
apply if the amendments to the statute we:re proced-
ural in nature. 
[24] A substantive law creates duties, rights, and 
obligations, whereas a procedural law prescribes 
the means and methods through and by which sub-
stantive laws are enforced and applied. Stansbury v. 
HEP, Inc., supra. See, also, Jackson v. Branick In-
dus., supra . In the instant case, the amendments to 
§ 45-103.02 did not create a new substantive right 
to prejudgment interest on liquidated and unliquid-
ated claims, since that right was already provided 
for in the statute. Rather, the amendme:nts to the 
statute merely altered the method for exercising the 
right to prejudgment interest in a cause of action 
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where the claim is liquidated. Therefore, because 
we determine that the amendments to the statute 
were procedural in nature, the district court erred in 
not applying the amended version of§ 45-103.02 to 
determine whether prejudgment interest should be 
awarded in the instant case. Nevertheless, it still 
must be resolved whether interest is provided for 
pursuant to § 45- l 04 and whether Sophia's claim is 
liquidated. 
[25][26] First, with regard to whether interest is 
available pursuant to § 45-104, this section states in 
relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise agreed, in-
terest shall be allowed at the rate of twelve percent 
per annum ... on money received to the use of an-
other and retained without the owner's consent, ex-
press or implied, from the receipt thereof .... " Un-
der this section, an agent is chargeable with interest 
at the legal rate from the time that the money is 
wrongfully withheld from the principal. See Pearl-
man v. Snitzer, 112 Neb. 135, 198 N.W. 879 (1924) 
. In the case at bar, because Robert, in his capacity 
as Alphons' agent or attorney in fact, wrongfully 
converted to his own use and retained money be-
longing to Alphons without Alphons' consent, in-
terest is allowable pursuant to § 45-104. 
[27] Second, with regard to whether Sophia's claim 
is liquidated, it is well settled that a claim is liquid-
ated when there is no reasonable controversy either 
as to the plaintiffs right to recover or as to the 
amount of such recovery. See, Blue Tee Corp. v. 
CDI Contractors, Inc., 247 Neb. 397, 529 N.W.2d 
16 (1995); Lange Indus. v. Hallam Grain Co., 244 
Neb. 465, 507 N.W.2d 465 ( 1993). *44 There must 
be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the 
plaintiffs right to recover. Id. 
[28][29] Since the damages were liquidated and no 
reasonable controversy existed **301 as to Robert's 
conversion of $33,495.05 in principal and interest 
from Alphons' certificates of deposit to his own 
use, Sophia was entitled to prejudgment interest as 
a matter of law on that amount from the time that 
Robert received the certificates of deposit. See 
Fletcher v. Mathew, 233 Neb. 853, 448 N.W.2d 576 
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( 1989). The record reveals that the amount of pre-
judgment interest on the certificates of deposit, as 
set forth in exhibit 32, shall be callculated as 
$17,873.74. However, a reasonable controversy did 
exist regarding Robert's disbursements from Al-
phons' checking account. Therefore, Sophia's claim 
on her cross-appeal is not liquidated, and Sophia is 
not entitled to prejudgment interes.t on the 
$8,117.53 in disbursements from the checking ac-
count. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judg-
ment is modified to provide a total r,ecovery of 
$59,486.32, and as modified, it is affirmed in all 
other respects. 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
WHITE, C.J., participating on briefs . 
Neb.,1998. 
Cheloha v. Cheloha 
255 Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 
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ARTHUR 
V. 
KILPATRICK BROS. CO. 
No. 5203. 
Feb. 14, 1929. 
Appeal from District Court, Blaine County; Hugh 
A. Baker, Judge. 
Action by Edward J. Arthur against the Kilpatrick 
Bros. Company. Judgment for defendant was 
entered, and, after plaintiffs subsequent death, no-
tice of appeal was filed and served in name of de-
ceased plaintiff. On defendant's motion to dismiss 
appeal. Granted. 
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PERCURIAM. 
This was an action to quiet title to real property, in 
which judgment was entered in favor of defendant, 
on November 15, 1927. Some time in th«! month of 
December, 1927, plaintiff died intestate, and no ad-
ministrator has been appointed to represent his es-
tate. On January 30, 1928, notice of appeal was 
filed and served in the name of the deceased 
plaintiff. Thereafter motion to dismiss the appeal 
was filed in this court, mainly on the ground that an 
appeal may not be taken in the name of a deceased 
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person, without a substitution of, or voluntary ap-
pearance*801 by, a representative of such deceased 
party. 
Edward B. Arthur, a son of the deceased plaintiff, 
filed an affidavit, to which was attached as an ex-
hibit a power of attorney executed by Edward J. Ar-
thur, deceased, on November 16, 1926, under 
which it is claimed Edward B. Arthur was given the 
authority and power, among other things, to convey 
all property of Edward J. Arthur, and that, pursuant 
thereto, the property in controversy had been 
deeded to Catherine J. Arthur after the entry of 
judgment in the cause and prior to the death of Ed-
ward J. Arthur, and that she elected to continue the 
action and appeal the same in the name of the ori-
ginal party, under the provisions of C. S. § 6652. 
On the same date of the filing of the affidavit above 
referred to, a motion was filed to have Catherine J. 
Arthur substituted as appellant, for the reason that 
she is the real party in interest. A subsequent affi-
davit of Edward B. Arthur set forth the names of 
certain heirs of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, re-
ferred to the conveyance to Catherine J. Arthur, and 
stated: "As no administrator has been appointed in 
this state or elsewhere for the said deceased, Ed-
ward J. Arthur, this affiant respectfully requests 
that the said action be continued in the name of Ed-
ward J. Arthur in case it should be determined by 
this court that the said premises constitute part of 
his estate." 
Affidavits were also filed by others of the Arthur 
family, deposing that respective affiants knew that 
the purpose, object, and intention of Edward J. Ar-
thur, deceased, in executing the power of attorney 
to Edward B. Arthur, was to give and grant unto the 
latter power and authority, among other things, to 
convey property of the said Edward J. Arthur. 
C. S. § 6652, provides: "An action or proceeding 
does not abate by the death or any disability of a 
party, or by the transfer of any interest therein, if 
the cause of action or proceeding survive or contin-
ue. In case of the death or any disability of a party, 
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the court, on motion, may allow the action or pro-
ceeding to be continued by or against his represent-
ative or successor in interest. In case of any other 
transfer of interest the action or proceeding may be 
continued in the name of the original party, or the 
court may allow the person to whom the: transfer is 
made to be substituted in the action or proceeding." 
Having in mind the provisions of the foregoing stat-
ute, the situation to be addressed on the: motion to 
dismiss is (I) the request of Catherine J. Arthur, as 
grantee of the property under deed of Edward J. Ar-
thur, by Edward B. Arthur, attorney in fact, before 
the death of Edward J. Arthur, to be substituted as 
appellant; and (2) if the efficacy of the deed to 
Catherine J. Arthur be inquired into, and it is held 
to be of no force or effect by reason of failure of 
the power of attorney to extend to the right of con-
veying real estate belonging to Edward J. Arthur, 
the application to have the action continued in the 
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of 
his heirs. 
If there were no question as to the sufficiency of the 
power of attorney, claimed to authorize the deeding 
of the property to Catherine J. Arthur, undoubtedly 
she would have the right to be substituted as appel-
lant, coming within the provisions of the last sen-
tence or clause of C. S. § 6652, supra, covering a 
transfer during the lifetime of the original party, 
such as is purported to have occurred herein. In 
such circumstances it is unnecessary to decide 
whether, upon the death of the transferor and ori-
ginal party, the action could be continued in his 
name, since the request is made by the transferee or 
assignee to be substituted. Her right, however, to 
continue the action or to be substituted as appellant 
being disputed, it appears to us that she must 
present satisfactory evidence of the grounds upon 
which she relies to be made a party to the action in 
her own right entirely. This involves, therefore, a 
consideration of the power of attorney, under which 
it is contended the property formerly belonging to 
Edward J. Arthur, deceased, was conveyed to her 
and is now her property, subject of course to de-
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termination of the litigation involving the title. 
The instrument is denominated "special power of 
attorney," and admittedly does not expressly give 
Edward B. Arthur the power to convey real estate 
of Edward J. Arthur, but grants him "full power and 
authority to do and perform all and every act and 
thing whatsoever requisite and necessary to be done 
in and about the premises (concerning all property 
belonging to Edward J. Arthur within the State of 
Idaho) as fully to all intents and purposes as he 
might or could do if personally present, hereby rati-
fying and confirming all that his said attorney, Ed-
ward B. Arthur shall lawfully do or cause to be 
done by virtue of these presents." It is seen that this 
power of attorney contains no authority to convey 
real estate, eo nomine, and as such instruments are 
subject to strict interpretation, without regard to pa-
rol evidence, and are not to be construed as author-
izing acts beyond those specified (see I Cal. Jur. p. 
748 et seq.), our conclusion is that the deed to Cath-
erine J. Arthur was ineffective by reason of insuffi-
ciency of the power of attorney to authorize con-
veyance of real estate. It follows, therefore, that the 
request of Catherine J. Arthur to be substituted as 
appellant in the cause and to continue the same in 
her name and right must be denied. 
The request that the action be continued in the 
name of Edward J. Arthur, deceased, in behalf of 
his heirs, if granted, would not be a substitution, 
and, by the provisions of C. S. § 6652, "In case of 
the death *802 or any disability of a party, the 
court, on motion, may allow the action or proceed-
ing to be continued by or against his representative 
or successor in interest," it is clearly expressed that 
a substitution of a representative or successor in in-
terest of the deceased is necessary in order to have 
the action continued. 20 Cal. Jur. 544; Lowe v. Su-
perior Court, l 65 Cal. 708, 134 P. 190. 
There is no proper party appellant before the court, 
and the appeal must be dismissed. It is so ordered. 
All concur. 
Idaho 1929. 
Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co. 
47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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C 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
EATON 
V. 
McWILLIAMS et al. 
No. 5798. 
May 26, 1932. 
Appeal from District Court, Canyon County; John 
C. Rice, Judge. 
Action in equity by A. L. Eaton against W. H. 
McWilliams and others for the cancellation of an 
assignment of a contract of sale of real property and 
for the return of money paid thereunder. From a 
judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Appeal and Error 30 C:=1008.1(8.1) 
30 Appeal and Error 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(I) Questions of Fact, Verdicts, and 
Findings 
30XVI(l)3 Findings of Court 
30k I 008 Conclusiveness in General 
30k I 008. I In General 
30k 1008.1 (8) Particular Cases 
and Questions 
30k l 008. l (8. l) k. In General. 
Most Cited Cases 
(Formerly 30kl008(1)) 
Court's finding under evidence that principal did 
not ratify agent's unauthorized act in assigning land 
contract held conclusive on appellate court. 
Principal and Agent 308 (;;;:;,97 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308Hl(A) Powers of Agent 
308k95 Express Authority 
Page 1 
308k97 k. Construction of Letters or 
Powers of Attorney. Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney to sell land must be strictly con-
strued. 
Principal and Agent 308 C:=103(6) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
3081II(A) Powers of Agent 
308k98 Implied and Apparent Authority 
308k 103 Purchases, Sales, and Con-
veyances 
308kl03(6) k. Sales and Convey-
ances in General. Most Cited Cases 
Power of attorney to sell land and convey complete 
title did not include power to assign contract and 
receive payment therefor. 
Principal and Agent 308 C:=122(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308IIl(A) Powers of Agent 
308k 118 Evidence as to Authority 
308k 122 Declarations and Acts of 
Agent 
308kl22(1) k. Declarations and 
Acts in General. Most Cited Cases 
Statement in assignment of land contract that agent 
was lawfully authorized to execute assignment held 
not binding upon principal. 
Principal and Agent 308 C:=147(3) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(C) Unauthorized and Wrongful Acts 
308k147 Duty to Disclose or Ascertain 
Authority 
308kl47(3) k. Special Agency. Most 
Cited Cases 
Where power of attorney authorized ag,~nt only to 
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sell land, one taking assignment of contract from 
agent, and paying him therefor, did so at his peril. 
Principal and Agent 308 €=>169(3) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308Ill Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308Ill(D) Ratification 
308k 168 Implied Ratification 
308k 169 In General 
308k 169(3) k. Acts Not Amounting 
to Ratification. Most Cited Cases 
That principal attempted to secure settlement from 
agent assigning land contract without authority held 
immaterial, as regards rights of assignee, where ef-
forts were unsuccessful. 
Principal and Agent 308 ~175(2) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308III Rights and Liabilities as to Third Persons 
308III(D) Ratification 
308k 175 Operation and Effect 
308k 175(2) k. Agent's Contracts. Most 
Cited Cases 
Principal's ratification of agent's sale of land upon 
credit did not impart validity to agent's unauthor-
ized assignment of contract from which principal 
received no benefit. 
*259 Herman Welker, of Weiser, John H. Norris, of 
Payette, and Walter Griffiths, of Caldwell, for ap-
pellants. 
Cleve Groome, of Caldwell, for respondent. 
LEEPER, J. 
The plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in 
Canyon county, Idaho. On the 13th day of March, 
1928, the plaintiff executed a written power of at-
torney in favor of the defendant W. H. Mc Williams, 
which authorized him only to sell and convey the 
aforesaid premises, to execute a deed therefor, and 
to do all acts necessary to convey a complete title. 
The defendant McWilliams, acting under the power 
of attorney, thereafter made a contract for the sale 
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of the premises to one Earl F. McClure for the sum 
of $1,000, $100 of which was paid down, and the 
balance being payable at the rate of $ 100 per year. 
Pursuant to this contract, McWilliams as attorney in 
fact for Eaton executed and acknowledged a deed to 
the premises, and thereafter kept the contract, deed, 
and abstract in his possession for a considerable 
length of time, instead of depositing them in escrow 
in the First National Bank of Caldwell as provided 
by the contract. The down payment of $100 was re-
ceived by Mc Williams and was never accounted for 
to Eaton. McWilliams was entitled to $:50 as com-
pensation for making the sale, and expended $17 
for conveyancing and abstracting costs. On March 
4, 1929, and prior thereto, McWilliams had en-
deavored to sell this contract to the defendant 
Pence, who had offered him $646 for it. This 
Mc Williams refused to accept, but made a deal with 
Pence that the latter should advance $500, taking 
the contract in pledge as security, together with a 
written assignment thereof, and that he 
(McWilliams) would endeavor to sell the contract 
elsewhere and out of the proceeds pay Pence. This 
McWilliams was unable to do, and later he agreed 
to take the balance of $146 from Pence, which was 
paid to him. All of this $646 was converted by 
McWilliams and he never paid over any portion of 
it to Eaton, nor did he account therefor. After the 
assignment was made the defendant Pence received 
from the purchaser on the contract the total sum of 
$164, covering payments of principal and interest 
from the year 1929, and on October 26. 1930, the 
purchaser paid the further sum of $121 to the First 
Security Bank of Payette, in which institution the 
papers had been placed by Pence. 
During the time occupied by these transactions 
Eaton was living in Montana and was never present 
in Idaho. McWilliams advised him by letter that he 
had made the sale some time in the fall of 1928, but 
nothing was remitted to him, and he did not know 
of the details of the deal with McClure until he re-
turned to Idaho in February of 1930. At that time 
McWilliams concealed the fact that he had so sold 
the contract to Pence, but admitted having drawn 
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some money on it. On August 12, 1930, Eaton 
again returned to Idaho, and saw McClure and 
Pence. He had an argument with Pence about the 
division of a $38 check given for damages to the 
land by a drainage ditch constructed across it, and 
*260 finally compromised by dividing it equally, 
Mr. Pence acting as intermediary and dividing the 
money. At that time McClure advised him that 
McWilliams had assigned the contract to Pence, 
and they had some further discussion about that 
matter. This was the first time that Eaton knew of 
the assignment, and he later went to the Payette 
bank and inspected the papers. Shortly after this, 
Eaton employed an attorney, who thereafter served 
notice upon the bank and in November, 1930, filed 
this action on behalf of Mr. Eaton, seeking cancel-
lation of the purported assignment, for the return of 
moneys theretofore paid by McClure, and for the 
delivery of the deed, contract, and abstract to him. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff 
granting him full relief, from which this appeal is 
taken by defendants Mc Williams and Pence. 
We have carefully inspected the record and find no 
error. The power of attorney given to McWilliams 
clothed him only with the power to sell, and must 
be strictly construed. "In accordance with the rule 
requiring powers of attorney to be strictly con-
strued, a power of attorney to sell lands must be 
strictly construed and cannot be extended by con-
struction. Hence an authority to sell must be strictly 
pursued and acts beyond those which are legitim-
ately necessary to carry the particular power into 
effect will not bind the principal, although, in the 
absence of restrictions, the agent has the undoubted 
power to do those things which are usually done in 
making such sales." 2 C. J. 611, § 245. Obviously, 
the power to assign the contract and receive pay-
ment therefor is not included within the purview of 
the written power of attorney, by the limitations of 
authority therein expressed. Pence being the assign-
ee of the contract, and having full knowledge of the 
terms of the power of attorney, certainly knew or 
should have known that McWilliams was acting 
beyond the scope of his agency. Indeed, as a matter 
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of law, that agency was entirely terminated and no 
longer existed after the sale was completed. This 
case does not involve any question as to the appar-
ent scope of an agent's authority, because the spe-
cific written limitation was known to the purchaser, 
and the record does not disclose that this was ever, 
subsequent to its execution, changed or enlarged in 
any manner by the principal. A person who makes a 
payment to an agent acting without the scope of his 
employment does so at his peril. Whalen v. Vallier, 
46 Idaho, 181,266 P. 1089; Nielson v. Westrom, 46 
Idaho, 686, 270 P. I 054. 
Appellant contends that Eaton ratified the assign-
ment and isis therefore bound. We have searched 
the record for evidence of ratification and found 
none. Eaton moved with reasonable rapidity to re-
cover his property as soon as he learned of the 
transaction on August 12, 1930, and prior to this 
time he had no knowledge of it. Apparently he did 
not know of many facts connected with the assign-
ment, particularly the purchase price, and he never 
received any of the consideration. That he attemp-
ted to secure settlement from McWilliams is imma-
terial, in view of the fact that his efforts were un-
successful. Pence did not rely upon anything said or 
done by Eaton at any time, and it appears to us that 
almost every element essential to ratification is 
missing in this case. Black-well v. Kercheval. 29 
Idaho, 473, 160 P. 741. The finding of the court, 
upon this record, that there was no ratification is 
conclusive upon us. The statement contained in the 
assignment to the effect that McWilliams was law-
fully authorized to execute it amounts to no more 
than a declaration of the agent and is not binding 
upon Eaton. Cupples v. Stanfield, 35 Idaho, 466, 
207 P. 326; Cox v. Crane Creek Sheep Co., 34 
Idaho, 327, 200 P. 678. As to whether or not 
McWilliams was empowered to sell upon credit un-
der the terms of the power of attorney we are not 
called upon to decide, since Eaton ratified the deal. 
This ratification, however, does not impart validity 
to the transaction between McWilliams and Pence, 
of which Eaton knew nothing and from which he 
received no benefit. 
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The judgment is affirmed. Costs to respondent. 
LEE, C. J., and BUDGE, GIVENS, and VARIAN, 
JJ., concur. 
Idaho 1932. 
Eaton v. McWilliams 
52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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Supreme Court ofldaho. 
JENSEN 
V. 
SIDNEY STEVENS IMPLEMENT CO. 
No. 3621. 
Dec. 4, 1922. 
Appeal from District Court, Bear Lake County; 
Robt. M. Terrell, Judge. 
Action by Thomas C. Jensen against the Sidney 
Stevens Implement Company. From a judgment for 
plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and re-
manded. 
West Headnotes 
Principal and Agent 308 €=:>48 
308 Principal and Agent 
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308Jl(A) Execution of Agency 
308k48 k. Nature of Agent's Obligation. 
Most Cited Cases 
It is an agent's first duty to communicate to his 
principal any facts relating to the business of his 
agency which he should in good faith under their 
trust relations have made known to his principal. 
Principal and Agent 308 €;=69(1) 
308 Principal and Agent 
308JJ Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308JI(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69( 1) k. In General. Most Cited 
Cases 
The law guards the fiduciary relation between prin-
cipal and agent with jealous care, and seeks to pre-
vent the possibility of a conflict between the agent's 
duty and his personal interest, and forbids him act-
ing adversely to the interests of his principal either 
for himself or others. 
Principal and Agent 308 €=:>69(2) 
308 Principal and Agent 
Page I 
30811 Mutual Rights, Duties, and Liabilities 
308II(A) Execution of Agency 
308k69 Individual Interest of Agent 
308k69(2) k. Duty of Agent to Ac-
count for Profits of Agency. Most Cited Cases 
If an agent makes a profit in the course of his 
agency because of his failure to inform his principal 
of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of 
due diligence he should have ascertained for his 
principal, the profits of such transaction as a matter 
of law will belong exclusively to the principal. 
*1003 Jones, Pomeroy & Jones, of Pocatello, and 
D. C. Kunz, of Montpelier, for appellant. 
Budge & Merrill, of Pocatello, and A. B. Gough, of 
Montpelier, for respondent. 
LEE,J. 
Respondent brought this action to recover from ap-
pellant a balance on account of wages ea.med while 
in its employment. Appellant, by way of answer 
and *1004 cross-complaint, alleged that it was a 
Utah corporation, qualified to transact business in 
the state of Idaho, and had for many years main-
tained a branch establishment at Montpelier in said 
state, where it was engaged in selling farming im-
plements and other merchandise, in the course of 
which it acquired the ownership of real property 
hereafter referred to; that until August, 1919, re-
spondent was in its employment, and his duties 
were to collect accounts, look after its real estate, 
and find purchasers for the same, collect rents, and 
attend to all of its business matters arising in that 
locality, subject to the direction of appellant; that in 
May of that year it was the owner of certain real es-
tate, specifically described, comprising about I 20 
acres of farm land in Bear Lake county, which it 
listed for sale with respondent, together with other 
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of its real estate; and that it was at the time winding 
up its affairs and closing its business at said branch 
house. It further alleges that respondent was under 
instructions, and that it was his duty, to obtain the 
best possible price for said property, and to keep 
appellant fully informed with respect to all matters 
affecting the sale of such property, but that re-
spondent failed to do so, but that respondent while 
so employed, and when occupying such fiduciary 
relationship, failed to disclose to appellant the true 
conditions regarding offers made for the farm land 
in question, and thereby induced appellant to sell 
said premises to respondent for a much less sum 
than respondent had been offered for the property 
by a prospective purchaser, to whom he afterward 
resold the same for an advance of $1,000. Appel-
lant asked to have the balance claimed for wages 
set off against the excess obtained by respondent 
upon the resale of this property, and judgment for 
the remainder. 
Respondent answered said cross-complaint, in ef-
fect admitting the relationship of principal and 
agent as alleged, that the real estate in question had 
been listed with him for sale, that he had purchased 
the same from his principal without having dis-
closed the facts to appellant as to a previous offer 
from a third party, and that, after obtaining a con-
veyance of the same, he had soon thereafter con-
tracted to resell said premises to the party who had 
made the offer before he had purchased the 
premises, for $1,000 in excess of the price for 
which he had purchased the land from his principal, 
and had subsequently closed such sale for $850 in 
excess of what he had paid his principal for the 
land. 
The cause was tried to a jury, which returned a ver-
dict in favor of respondent for his wages, and failed 
to make any direct finding upon the affirmative is-
sues tendered by the cross-complaint. 
There is practically no conflict in the testimony re-
garding the material issues presented by the plead-
ings. On May 7, 1919, respondent, by letter ad-
dressed to appellant's home office at Ogden, Utah, 
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informed it that he had an offer of $2,600 cash for 
this farm. The letter does not disclose who was 
making this offer, but respondent testified at the tri-
al that it was in fact his own offer. Two days later 
appellant replied, rejecting the offer, but stating that 
it would accept $3,000 as its lowest price, with the 
condition that such price was subject to change at 
any time prior to acceptance. On the 12th day of 
May following, respondent again wrote to appel-
lant, stating that he had decided to purchase the 
land for himself and his boys at the price of $3,000. 
This offer appellant accepted, and respondent paid 
$2,000 and gave a mortgage for the remainder. 
The witness Berry, who had been negotiating with 
respondent for the purchase of this land, testifies 
that about the 7th of May respondent, with other 
members of his family, came to his place, which 
adjoined the land in question, and that he made re-
spondent an offer of $3,600 for the land. Respond-
ent never informed appellant as to this offer, and 
gave as a reason for not doing so that the condition 
which Berry attached with regard to the lease 
caused him to believe that the offer would not be 
acceptable. Upon respondent securing title to the 
premises, negotiations were renewed between Berry 
and himself, which resulted in Berry agreeing to 
purchase the land from respondent for the sum of 
$4,000. Before the deal was consummated, Berry 
ascertained that respondent had just previously pur-
chased the land from appellant for $3,000, and de-
murred to paying this much of an advancement. Re-
spondent and Berry adjusted their differences by 
agreeing upon a consideration of $3,850, which sale 
was finally consummated on June 9th. 
There is a conflict between the testimony of Berry 
and that of respondent as to when Berry made the 
offer of $3,600 which respondent reject,ed without 
submitting the same to his principal, he giving as a 
reason that Berry's offer imposed some condition 
with reference to the lease that made such offer of 
less value than that of $3,000 which he had made. 
But it is not controverted that Berry made this offer 
prior to respondent receiving the letter from his 
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principal quoting him a price of $3,000, so it is 
clear that respondent, after having submitted his of-
fer of $2,600, which was rejected, and prior to the 
counter proposal from his principal to sell for 
$3,000, had received from Berry an offer of $3,600, 
which he failed to disclose to his principal. Re-
spondent admits in his testimony that the statement 
contained in his letter of May 12th to his principal, 
wherein he says that a Mr. Groo was the party who 
had made the offer of $2,600, was not true, and that 
Groo had not made such an *1005 offer, but that, 
on the contrary, the offer was intended to be for 
himself. 
From these conceded facts it is clear that respond-
ent did not exercise toward his principal in the mat-
ter of the sale and purchase of this real estate such 
good faith as the law requires an agent to exercise 
toward a principal. The entire transaction was car-
ried on by correspondence, and it was his duty be-
fore purchasing this land for himself to fully dis-
close all of the facts and circumstances regarding 
the negotiations then pending with any other pro-
spective purchaser, so that appellant would be fully 
advised of the situation. The court correctly instruc-
ted the jury that: 
"Loyalty to his trust is the first duty which an agent 
owes to his principal. It follows as a necessary con-
clusion that the agent must not put himself in such a 
relationship that his interests become antagonistic 
to those of his principal. Fidelity in the agent is 
what is aimed at, and as a means of securing it the 
law will not permit the agent to place himself in a 
situation in which he may be tempted by his own 
private interest to disregard that of his principal. So 
it is the duty of the agent to make his principal a 
full and complete disclosure of all facts relative to 
the subject of his agency which it may be material 
to the principal to know. And, if an agent makes 
any profit in the course of his agency because of his 
failure to inform his principal of facts known to 
him, or which in the exercise of due diligence he 
should have ascertained for his principal, the profits 
of such transaction, as a matter of law, will belong 
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exclusively to the agent's principal. The law guards 
the fiduciary relation, which the relation of princip-
al and agent is, with jealous care. It seeks to pre-
vent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall 
work with an eye single to the interest of his prin-
cipal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his 
principal, either for himself or for others. * * *" 
The jury in rendering a verdict for respondent, 
failed to apply to the admitted facts in this case the 
rule of law thus given to it by the court. It was not 
until some 60 days after this transaction that appel-
lant became aware of respondent's breach of trust, 
and demanded an accounting for the $850 he had 
received for this land in excess of what he had paid 
his principal. The demand was refused, and re-
spondent subsequently brought this action to recov-
er from appellant the balance of his wages in part 
earned while the transaction relative to the land sale 
was pending. We think that appellant was entitled 
to set off its demand against respondent's claim for 
these wages, and to recover judgment for the excess 
received by respondent for the sale of said land. 
Appellant complains of that part of the court's in-
structions which is as follows: 
"In this connection, you are advised that, if you 
find that the defendant and cross-complainant has 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
transaction whereby the plaintiff purchased the land 
in question was not made in good faith, and like-
wise that the defendant and cross-complainant has 
proved each and every material allegation of its 
cross-complaint, then your verdict should be in fa-
vor of the defendant and cross-complainant." 
We think that this instruction does not correctly 
state the law applicable to the admitted facts in this 
case, because it is equivalent to an instruction that 
it was incumbent upon appellant to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the transaction 
whereby the respondent purchased the land in ques-
tion was not made in good faith. All of the material 
facts and circumstances relating to the agency set 
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forth in the cross-complaint were in effect admitted 
by respondent, either by his pleading or his testi-
mony. The fact of his having purchased the real 
property which had been listed for sale with him, 
under both express and implied conditions that he 
should sell it for the best interests of his principal, 
prevented him from purchasing the same on his 
own account without first making a full and com-
plete disclosure to his principal of all offers of pur-
chase by others, and of all the facts and circum-
stances connected with the sale of this property. His 
admission that he did not do so would relieve the 
appellant from the requirement that it assume the 
entire burden of proof of establishing the agent's 
want of good faith. That is, the question of good 
faith on the part of respondent must be determined 
from all the facts and circumstances of the case, 
and we do not think that the burden of establishing 
this by a preponderance of the evidence shifted to 
appellant, in view of the admissions of respondent 
in his answer to the cross-complaint and also in his 
testimony. 
The cause is reversed and remanded, with instruc-
tions to grant a new trial. Costs awarded to appel-
lant. 
RICE, C. J., and McCARTHY and DUNN, JJ., con-
cur. 
BUDGE, J., took no part. 
Idaho 1922. 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co. 
36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIALJ.)~ffl~~lf.r,lU:,:Cj~,t, 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADff"tm 
In the Matter of: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
MAGISTRATE DIVISION 
Case No. CVIE0905214 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM 
On February 26, 2010, the Court conducted a hearing on the claim of the State of 
Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (Department) against George Perry's estate. 
The Department seeks to recover Medicaid benefits paid to Mr. Perry's wife, Martha 
Perry. The personal representative of Mr. Perry's estate, Barbara McCormick, is 
represented by Peter Sisson and the Department by Corey Cartwright. The parties have 
agreed to the relevant facts and have presented written memoranda and made oral 
argument. 
I. Background. 
During George and Martha Perry's marriage, Martha owned a home at 2104 
Tendoy Drive in Boise. On November 18, 2002, by quitclaim deed, Martha transferred 
this property to herself and George. On July 31, 2006, again by quitclaim deed, the 
property was transferred to George alone. 1 
Over the years, Martha's health has failed and, since October 1, 2006, she has 
received assistance from the Medicaid program to pay for her nursing home care. At the 
time of George's death, February 25, 2009, Medicaid had provided over $100,000.00 in 
benefits to Martha. In March 2009, Ms McCormick, in her capacity as personal 
1 The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from Martha and that he had 
the authority to transfer the property to himself. 
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representative of George's estate, sold the Tendoy home and has preserved the net 
proceeds of the sale in an estate account. This money is the only significant asset of 
George's estate. 
On April 15, 2009, the Department filed its claim against George's estate and on 
June 4, 2009, Ms. McCormick filed a notice of disallowance of the claim. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code 15-3-806, on June 15, 2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance 
of Claim which is now before the court. 
II. Issues Presented. 
The ultimate issue is: May the Department recover Medicaid benefits that it has 
paid to Martha (who is still living) from George's estate--the proceeds of the sale of the 
Tendoy home? Under the Department's reasoning, since Martha had an interest in the 
Tendoy home during the marriage (and after federal statutory changes in 1993), it may 
recover benefits paid in an amount equal to Martha's ownership interest from the 
proceeds of the sale of the home. The personal representative (PR) argues that the 
Department may only recover, from George's estate, an amount equal to Martha's 
interest in the Tendoy home at the time of her death. Since Martha is still living and 
neither this home nor its proceeds will ever pass to her, the PR denies that the 
Department may recover any amount. 
The foundation of the Department's claim is Idaho Code 15-56-218(1) which 
provides: 
Recovery of certain medical assistance.-(1) Except where exempted or waived 
in accordance with federal law medical assistance pursuant to this chapter 
paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-five (55) year so age or older when 
the individual received such assistance may be recovered from the individual's 
estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM Page 2 
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(b) While one (1) spouse survives, except where joint probate will be authorized 
pursuant to section 15-3-111, Idaho Code, a claim for recovery under this section 
may be established in the estate of the deceased spouse. 
(emphasis added) 
The only Idaho case dealing with recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of 
the recipient's spouse is Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman 132 Idaho 
213 (1998). 2 Jackman's essential holding is that the Department is not limited to the 
estate of the recipient for recovery of Medicaid benefits, but may recover appropriate 
amounts from the estate of the recipient's spouse. The case was remanded to the probate 
court for a determination of whether the Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an 
interest in community property, at the time of her death, the value of which, the court 
suggested, could be recovered from her husband's estate. 
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's interest 
in property-any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the time of the 
recipient's death. 3 
The Department's claim depends upon an interpretation of the definitions of 
"estate" and "assets" found in Idaho and federal statutes. 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l) 
provides: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance co1Tectly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
2 In re Estate of Kaminsky 141 Idaho 436 (2005) involved a claim to recover Medicaid benefits from the 
recipient's estate and was decided on the grounds that the Department's claim was untimely. 
3 Jacknum certainly suggests that the time of the recipient's death is the determinative time: "The record 
before us does not disclose whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time ofHildor's 
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property property may therefore be part of Hildor's 
"estate" that 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B) and (4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments." Id. at 216. (emphasis added) 
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(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate, 
This statute goes on to define "estate" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4): 
For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a deceased 
individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State ... any other real and personal property 
and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time 
of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
(emphasis added) 
Finally, 42 U.S.C.1396p(h) contains general definition provisions: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income and 
resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including any income 
or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but 
does not receive because of action--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's 
spouse. 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate because 
Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse; 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of "estate" and 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person transferred to her spouse. The 
court cannot accept this interpretation. 
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The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N. Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received Medicaid 
benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the estate of Verna Witz, 
Clarence's wife. The Wirt.:: court analyzed the federal statutory definitions of "estate" and 
"asset" as quoted above and held that " ... any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to 
Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wirtz's death are subject to the department's recovery 
claim." Id at 886. This ruling depends, however, on an awkward interpretation of the 
term "other arrangement" in 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz 
interpreted the "other arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. 
The bulk of the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fa5hion 
on the death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of property of 
this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context of the surrounding 
language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include transfers of a similar, automatic 
nature not any possible transfer. 
The case of Estate o,f Barf?, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008) provides a more 
reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory language. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did not 
have an interest in at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale 
for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates 
from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from the "estate" of the 
Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would not be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, to the 
extent the 1993 amendments allow states to expand the definition of "estate" for 
Medicaid recovery purposes. the language of the federal law clearly limits that 
expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. 
Id at 71._(emphasis added) 
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III. Conclusion. 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of property 
made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of 
a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was no joint 
tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have conveyed any 
interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The Department may not 
recover Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Department's Petition for Allowance of claim is 
denied. 
DATED This JO" day of March, 2010> . 
1 
_ / 
l~~~ 
Hon. Christo'])~ M. Bieter 
Magistrate Judge 
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BOISE ID 83720-0036 
Date: 10 March, 2010 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTA TE OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
Case No. CV IE 0905214 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
EXEMPT: I.C. § 31-3212 
TO: BARBARA K. MCCORMICK, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE, AND HER 
ATTORNEY OF RECORD, PETER SISSON, ATTORNEY AT LAW, AND TO THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT THE STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF 
HEAL TH AND WELFARE (hereinafter "the Department"), appeals pursuant Idaho Code § 1 7-
201 and Rule 83, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, as follows: 
1. The title of the court from which the appeal is taken is the Magistrate Division of 
the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for the County of 
Ada, Magistrate Judge Christopher M. Bieter, presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 Y:\MRCases\Estate\PerryM\D Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd 
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2. The title of the court to which the appeal is taken is the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada. 
3. The Department appeals from the ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM filed 
March 10, 2010. 
4. This appeal is taken upon matters oflaw. 
5. This matter was heard by oral argument on February 26, 2010, at Boise, Idaho; 
however, no evidentiary hearing was had and no testimony or evidence was taken. The hearing 
was tape recorded and the recordings are in the possession of the clerk of the court. 
6. The issues on appeal are: 
1. Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney 
held by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha 
Perry's real property? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code 
§ 56-218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George 
Perry? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p as pre-empting application ofldaho Code § 56-218? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to 
the facts of this case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 Y:\MRCaseslEstate\PerryMID Court\Notice of Appeal.wpd 
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DATED this 18th day of March, 2010, 
W. Cf) Y CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
--
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, 
postage pre-paid, to the following: 
BARBARA K MCCORMICK 
C/O PETER C SISSON 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
2402 W JEFFERSON ST 
BOISE ID 83702 
DATED this _j!L_ day of March, 2010. 
fv~Qdiiliq_ ru.iauL 
Marchel e Premo, Legal Assistant 
Division of Human Services 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOUR TH JUDICIAL DISTRIC;~•;s J 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
GEORGED. PERRY, 
Deceased 
Case No. CY-IE-0905214 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
This case is before the Court on Appellant Idaho Department of Health and Welfare's 
(Depaitment's) motion for stay pending appeal. For the reasons that follow, the motion will be 
granted in part and denied in part. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Department made a claim against the Estate of George D. Perry (George) for 
reimbursement of amounts expended by the Medicaid program on behalf of George's wife Martha, 
who survives George and is confined to a nursing home. The personal representative of the estate, 
Barbara McCormick (Personal Representative), is the daughter of George and Martha .. It appears 
that she may be a beneficiary of the estate. The Personal Representative denied the claim. The 
magistrate, Hon. Christopher M. Bieter, upheld the Personal Representative's denial of the claim, 
and the Department now appeals. The present motion before the Court is to stay distribution of the 
assets of George's estate pending the outcome of this appeal. The Personal Representative has no 
objection to the stay, except to the extent necessary to pay her costs and attorney fees. 
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ANALYSIS 
The Department asserts that the Personal Representative is not entitled to pay costs and 
attorney fees from estate funds because she has a fiduciary responsibility to the estate and creditors 
and therefore cannot use estate funds to advocate for her personal interests. 
Idaho Code§ 15-3-720 provides: 
If any personal representative or person nominated as personal representative 
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether successful or not, he 
is entitled to receive from the estate his necessary expenses and disbursement~. 
including reasonable attorney's fees incurred. 
At least two Idaho cases have discussed whether a personal representative is entitled to 
reimbursement for attorney fees incurred in pursuing his or her own interests. In Eliasen v. 
Fitzgerald, 105 Idaho 234,668 P.2d 110 (1983), the court allowed attorney fees to the personal 
representative on a finding that the litigation was pursued in good faith, including the representative's 
resistance to efforts to remove him. In Matter of Estate of Berriochoa, 108 Idaho 474, 700 P.2d 96 
(1985) the personal representative was also a beneficiary under the will and incurred attorney fees in 
asserting his claim to certain assets of the estate. There, the court held that he was not entitled to 
attorney fees under the foregoing statute because he was litigating solely his own personal interests. 
The present case is clearly distinguishable. Here, the claimant is the Department; the personal 
representative is simply defending the appeal. There is no allegation that she is doing so in bad faith. 
The fact that denial of the Department's claim may increase the amount available to the beneficiaries 
does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty absent some showing of bad faith. Indeed a personal 
representative who is also a beneficiary would breach a fiduciary duty by failing to dispute 
unmeritorious claims, and should not be required to front the attorney fees to do so on the basis of a 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 2 
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personal interest (a greater share) if successful. The Department's interpretation wouid render the 
statue essentially meaningless, in any case in which the personal representative is also a beneficiary. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the motion is granted in part and denied in part. 
The Personal Representative shall distribute no funds or assets of the estate to any beneficiary, 
except for payment of expenses and attorney fees incurred in this appeal, until further order of the 
Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this I'\* day of May, 2010. 
District Judge 
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United States Mail, one copy of the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER as notice 
pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.R.C.P. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes 
addressed as follows: 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from an order disallowing a creditor's claim in a probate proceeding. It 
involves Medicaid, also known as "medical assistance," and estate recovery, as provided by 
Idaho Code § 56-218. Estate recovery is a program required by federal and state law that seeks 
to recover assets of deceased Medicaid recipients, from their estates, to reimburse the taxpayers 
for expenditures made during the Medicaid recipient's life. This matter involves the 
Department's claim filed in the estate of the deceased spouse of a Medicaid recipient. 
Course of Proceedings 
The personal representative was appointed in this estate on March 19, 2009. The 
Department filed a contingent1 claim, in the amount of$106,251.08, on April 15, 2009. On June 
2, 2009, a Notice ofDisallowance of Claim was filed by the personal representative. On June 15, 
2009, the Department filed its Petition for Allowance of Claim. Hearing was held on the 
Department' Petition on February 26, 2010. On March 10, 2010, Judge Bieter issued his Order 
Disallowing Claim. This appeal followed. 
Statement of the Facts 
George D. Perry ("George") was born 
age of 79. Martha J. Perry ("Martha") was born 
and died February 25, 2009, at the 
and at the time this brief is 
written is believed to be still living. Martha was previously known as Martha Jean Boyle and, no 
later than September 18, 1977, was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real 
property in Ada County. At some point in time later, Martha and George were married. On 
1Idaho Code§ 15-3-810. 
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November 18, 2002, Martha executed a Quitclaim Deed, with the grantor named as "Martha Jean 
Boyle" and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & George Donald Perry." At some point, with 
Martha's health declining, George and Martha needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical 
care. About July 31, 2006, George purported to transfer Martha's interest in the real property to 
himself, signing a Quitclaim Deed on behalf of Martha as her Power of Attorney. About 
September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the Department for medical assistance to help 
pay for Martha's medical care. Since October l, 2006, the Department has provided payment for 
Martha's medical care, through the Medicaid program, in the sum of at least$ l 08,364.23. (This 
was the amount on April 27, 2009. Medicaid expenditures are ongoing.) 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by 
George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real property? 
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation ofldaho Code§ 56-
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Perry? 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C.. § 1396p as 
preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218? 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2cl 6 (1998) to the 
facts of this case? 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 83(u)( 1) sets forth the standard of review for appeals to the 
district court from the magistrate's division, as follows: 
Upon an appeal from the magistrate's division of the district court, not involving a 
trial de novo, the district court shall review the case on the record and determine 
the appeal as an appellate court in the same manner and upon the same standards 
of review as an appeal from the district court to the Supreme Court under the 
statutes and law of this state, and the appellate rules of the Supreme Court. 
Rule 83( u )( 1 ), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The Idaho Supreme Court in Hawkins v. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho 785,589 P.2d 532 (1978), explained the import of Rule 83(u)(l): 
We read [I.R.C.P. 83(u)(l)] as saying that a district court, in making an 
appellate review of a magistrate's decision, should perform that task in the same 
manner as this Court performs its appellate review of the trial decision of a district 
court. In reviewing a magistrate's findings, therefore, the district courts should 
adhere to the well recognized rule that findings based on substantial and 
competent, though conflicting, evidence will not be set aside on appeal. Prescott 
v. Prescott, 97 Idaho 257, 542 P.2d 1176 (1975); Jsaguirre v. Eschevarria, 96 
Idaho 641, 534 P.2d 471 (1975); I.R.C.P. 52(a). 
Furthermore, upon the appellate review conducted in a district court, the 
district court is, as is this Court on an appeal where the district court has been the 
factfinder, empowered to affirm, reverse, remand (including remand for a new 
trial with instructions), or modify the judgment. I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2). Where the trial 
court's findings of fact are confused or in conflict, or where findings on a 
particular issue are lacking, and resort to the record does not show clearly what 
findings are correct, the district court ordinarily will not modify the judgment. 
Frederickson v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 15 Idaho 41, 96 P. 117 (1908); 58 C.J.S. 
Appeal and Error§ 1874 (1958). The district court will either remand for new 
findings, or, alternatively, act under LC.§ 1-2213(2) and I.R.C.P. 83(u)(2) and 
conduct a partial or whole trial de novo. 
Hawkins, 99 Idaho at 788-789, 589 P.2d at 535-536. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires that a trial court, sitting without a jury, enter 
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specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. In the Matter of the Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 
316, 678 P .2d 108 (Ct. App. 1984), the Idaho Court of Appeals explained this requirement: 
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P., requires a trial court in all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury to "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." The rule also 
provides that "[i]f an opinion or memorandum decision is filed, it will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear therein." 
Ordinarily, in reviewing a decision of the district court on appeal from a 
magistrate, we must determine from the trial court (magistrate) record whether 
substantial evidence supports the magistrate's findings of fact and whether those 
findings support the magistrate's conclusions oflaw. Nicholls v. Blaser, I 02 Idaho 
559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981); Ustickv. Ustick, 104 Idaho 215,657 P.2d 1083 
(Ct.App.1983). If so, and if correct legal principles have been applied, then the 
district court's decision affirming a magistrate's judgment will be upheld. Id. Only 
where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
See Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103 Idaho 217, 646 P .2d 988 ( 1982); In re 
Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162,525 P.2d 357 (1974). 
Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112. 
In the case of In re Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho 162, 525 P.2d 357 (1974), the Idaho 
Supreme Court was presented with a district court's affirmance of a magistrate's refusal to admit 
a will to probate. The magistrate's decision was rendered by memorandum opinion, without the 
entry of specific findings of fact and conclusions oflaw. Jd. at 163. Reversing the district court, 
the Supreme Court stated: 
Even though IRCP 52( a) recognizes that findings of fact and conclusions 
of law may be embodied in a memorandum opinion, still both the findings and 
conclusions must be specially stated if they are to fulfill their designed purpose. 
This court has held that the absence of findings of fact may be disregarded by the 
appellate court if the record is so clear that the court does not need their aid for a 
complete understanding of the issues. However, in this case the record is not that 
clear. The assignments of error are directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to 
sustain the magistrate's decision. It cannot be determined upon what facts the 
magistrate based his decision. 
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*** 
When the district judge was considering the appeal in this case, explicit 
findings of fact and separate conclusions of law by the magistrate would have 
clearly reflected the basis of the magistrate's decision, and then the district court 
more readily could have determined whether facts sustained the magistrate's 
decision and whether he had correctly applied the appropriate principles oflaw. 
Moreover, with such findings of fact, the district court could have properly 
determined whether this was such a case as should have been tried de nova before 
the district court. I.C. § 1-2213. 
Estate of Stibor, 96 Idaho at 164,525 P.2d at 359. (citations omitted). 
II. 
MEDICAID IS NOT A FEDERAL PROGRAM 
ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE, IT IS A JOINT STATE-
FEDERAL PROGRAM. 
To the uninitiated, Medicaid law can be obscure and unintuitive.2 While outsiders may 
view Medicaid as a federal program administered by the state, it is in fact a joint state-federal 
program. Federal enactment provides a framework and the states then enact their own laws to 
provide medical assistance to their own citizens and receive federal financial participation. 
Medicaid is intended to provide care for the needy. Unlike social security disability or 
Medicare, there are no premiums or payroll taxes for Medicaid. Instead, it is a welfare program 
funded by state and federal general fund revenues. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. 
Medicaid is a strictly means-tested program, available only to those of the most limited 
resources. For example, an elderly single person must have no more than $2,000 in available 
resources to qualify for assistance. 
2Indeed, one federal court has noted that Medicaid law is of"labyrinthine complexity" and called it "almost 
unintelligible to the uninitiated." Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 (2nd Cir. 1976). 
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Where a married couple is involved, and only one of them needs nursing home care, the 
law takes care not to impoverish the at-home spouse. Resources such as the couple's home and 
automobile are not counted in establishing eligibility. In this way, the nursing home spouse can 
qualify for Medicaid while the at-home spouse3 can retain the resources needed for his support. 
However, there is a trade-off for the public's largesse. Restrictions are imposi;:d on both 
spouses' ability to transfer assets to third parties. Penalties are imposed for transfers of assets 
within federal "look back" dates, which are either three or five years prior to Medicaid 
application, depending on the circumstances and date of transfer. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p( c ). Likewise, Idaho law criminalizes transfers of assets to qualify for Medicaid, and 
transfers of assets by either spouse, without adequate consideration, can be set aside by the 
courts. Idaho Code§§ 56-227 and 56-218(2). 
Medicaid has always been intended to provide only for the needy. In 1993, Congress 
strengthened federal law relating to estate recovery and asset transfers in response to widespread 
reports of abuse. Among the changes made were longer look back periods, an expanded 
definition of assets subject to estate recovery, and penalties for asset transfers. The legislative 
history accompanying these actions shows Congress' intent that a couple's assets be traced to 
facilitate recovery: 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The proi=ram must identilfy 
and track resources (whether or not excluded for eli&ibility purposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility. home and community-based services., 
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain 
3In Medicaid parlance, this person is known as the "community spouse." This has nothing to do with 
community property law, since federal Medicaid law ignores state community property principles, but rather refers to the 
spouse that lives "in the community" rather than in an institution. 
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for 
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the 
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
survivine spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 1993), Section 5112. (emphasis added). 
The federal Medicaid framework anticipates transfers between spouses for the: sole 
purpose of providing a necessary living for the at-home spouse. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 
l 396p(c). The federal law uses terms such as "for the sole benefit of the individual's spouse." 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). When eligibility is determined, all of the assets of both spouses 
are taken into consideration, without regard to whether the property is separate or community 
property or whether it has been transferred from one spouse to the other. See IDAP A 
16.03.05.735 to . 752. The eligibility process involves complicated provisions meant to ensure 
that the at-home spouse has enough resources to provide for himself. See id. It is obvious that 
these provisions are not intended to provide an inheritance for the couple's heirs. To the 
contrary, they are intended to make necessary medical care available to one spouse, provide for 
the necessary living expenses of the other, and that is all.4 
III. 
ESTATE RECOVERY IS PART OF THE WHOLE 
PROCESS OF MEDICAID FOR THE ELDERLY. 
The 1993 amendments to the Medicaid law (often referred to as OBRA '93) made estate 
recovery mandatory to the states. OBRA '93 also created the anti-spousal impoverishment 
4There are also provisions to provide for minor or disabled children, but those provisions are not relevant here. 
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provisions that permitted the spousal transfers referred to above. Prior to OBRA '93, the at-
home spouse would be left destitute and unable to provide for himself. With OBRA '93, the 
Medicaid spouse was allowed to transfer property needed for the at-home spouse's living, and 
the at-home spouse was allowed to retain sufficient resources to maintain his household. OBRA 
'93 also enacted the expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) and Idaho 
Code § 56-218( 4)(b ). Of course, these enactments are all related and support the legislative 
intent quoted in the house report, above. The intent was to prevent the impoverishment of the at-
home spouse, but at the same time, provide for recovery of the couple's assets after both had 
passed away and no longer needed them. 
The process for this is estate recovery. Estate recovery involves the recovery of the assets 
of the couple from the probate estate. Probate law is uniquely state law; there is no federal 
probate law. Accordingly, there is no part of the federal-state Medicaid partnership that is more 
completely governed by state, rather than federal, law. It is state probate and marital property 
law that defines what property is available for payment of creditors from the probate f:state. 
Likewise, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) specifically anticipates that the states will define what other 
property, not included in the probate estate, will be included in Medicaid recovery: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a. 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets includ,ed 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyf:d to 
a survivor. heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement:. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (underline added). 
Estate recovery is an anticipated and expected part of providing Medicaid for the elderly. 
The restrictions on the amount of assets and resources the couple can retain are relaxed, but the 
trade-off is that once the need of the couple for those assets has ended, they must be n:~paid into 
the treasury to offset the expense to the taxpayers and provide for the needs of others similarly 
situated. Federal and state law is not intended to provide an inheritance to the able bodied heirs 
of Medicaid recipients and their spouses, at taxpayer expense, but only to provide for the elderly 
couple and return the retained assets to the treasury when they are no longer needed. 
IV. 
IDAHO LAW HAS ALWAYS PLACED THE 
RESPONSIBILITY ON SPOUSES TO PROVIDE 
NECESSARY CARE AND SUPPORT FOR EACH OTHER. 
Idaho recognizes the responsibility of spouses to provide for one another. Idaho Code § 
32-901 states that "Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of mutual respect, 
fidelity and support." In the case of Edminston v. Smith, 13 Idaho 645, 92 P. 842 (1907), a wife 
entered into a contract for lodging and her landlord brought an action to recover from the 
husband. The question before the court was whether the husband could be liable for a contract 
for lodging entered into only by the wife. The Idaho Supreme Court held in the affim1ative: 
On the part of the husband, it is contended that he is not liable, for the reason that 
the complaint shows that the credit was extended to the wife on her promise, and 
not upon any implied liability of his. 
*** 
The liability of the wife, if any, rests on her contract and promise to pay, while the 
husband's liability for a necessary, such as board and room, grows out of and is 
incident to his marital duties, and arises therefrom by operation oflaw. The wife 
is entitled to these necessaries at the husband's expense, but, ifhe neglects to 
furnish them and she cannot secure them on his credit, and can do so on the faith 
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of her own promise to pay the bill, she is certainly entitled to procure them in that 
manner. If the creditor parts with his goods on the faith of the wife's promise to 
pay, he is entitled to recover against her if the debt is not paid. The fact that she is 
obliged to obligate herself can in no way relieve the husband of his duty and 
responsibility in the matter. The wife has a right, on the other hand, to have the 
husband holden for the debt, so that, if it can be collected from him, she may be 
relieved of that obligation. The creditor is entitled to hold the husband, although 
he is not willing to part with his goods without the additional assurance of the 
wife's personal obligation to pay the debt. 
* * * 
We conclude that the husband is unquestionably liable for the debt, and that a 
good cause of action is stated against him. 
Edminston, 13 Idaho at_, 92 P. at 843-44. Clearly, the Idaho legislature's choice in Idaho 
Code§ 56-2 I 8, of making one spouse's estate liable for medical expenses paid on behalf of the 
other is not unusual or unprecedented. Indeed, it only makes sense that the couple's money 
should be used first for their own care, and only after Medicaid is reimbursed, can the remainder 
be distributed to the heirs.5 
V. 
IDAHO LAW CLEARLY PROVIDES FOR RECOVERY IN 
THIS CASE. 
Idaho Code § 56-218(1) permits the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse 
of a Medicaid recipient: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistance 
may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both; 
5While the heirs sometimes complain that Medicaid recovery takes their inheritance, this program benefits them 
as well as the needy couple. Without the Medicaid program, the couple would have to liquidate their assets to pay for 
their own care. Medicaid rates are substantially lower than private pay medical rates, and therefore, the heirs are more 
likely to have something left for their inheritance because their decedent was a Medicaid recipient. 
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Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) (underline added). This law, on its face, is not limited to the community 
or other property the Medicaid recipient owned at death. Indeed, there is no limitation of any 
kind on what property of the spouse's estate is subject to recovery. Where a statute is. 
unambiguous, there is no need for construction. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho State 
Dept. of Agriculture, 143 Idaho 366,368, 146 P.3d 632,634 (2006). 
Even though federal Medicaid law, as discussed above, ignores state community property 
principles, by rule the Department recovers only property which had been community property or 
jointly held property after October 1, 1993 (the effective date of OBRA '93). ID APA 
16.03.09.900.20 states: 
20. Limitations on Estate Claims. 
* * * 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the value of the 
assets of the estate that had been. at any time after October 1. 1993. community 
property, or the deceased participant's share of the separate property, and jointly 
owned property. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 (underline added). However, the rules also make it clear that transfer of 
property between spouses will not eliminate the Department's right ofrecovery. IDAPA 
16.03.09.900.24 states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased 
participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage settlement agreement or 
other such agreement may be voided if not for adequate consideration. (3-30-07) 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The Department's rules have the same force and 
effect as law. Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615,619, 84 P.3d 551,555 (2004). 
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Clearly, Idaho law permits the Department's claim in this estate and the claim was 
required to be allowed against the estate. 
VI. 
IDAHO'S SPOUSAL RECOVERY LAW IS NOT 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
A. State Law Will Only Be Preempted Where Congress Intends to Occupy an Entire Field of 
Law or Where a State Law Directly Conflicts with Federal Law. 
The Magistrate did not use the terms "preempted" or "preemption." However, since, as 
discussed above, Idaho law unambiguously permits the Department's claim and recovery in this 
case, he could only have concluded that Idaho law is preempted by federal law. The court stated: 
The federal statutory definition of "estate" does not include transfers of 
property made by a Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim 
against the estate of a Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only 
recover against property in which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time 
of her death. Martha Perry conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during 
her lifetime. There was no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other 
arrangement" that would have conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at 
George Perry's death. The Department may not recover Medicaid benefits paid to 
Martha from the proceeds of the sale of this property. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. Likewise, the case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 
2008), relied upon by the Magistrate, was based on federal preemption of a portion of 
Minnesota's spousal recovery law. Therefore, the Magistrate must have concluded that Idaho 
Code § 56-218(1) is preempted by federal law. 
When it comes to preemption, however, the question is not what "[t]he federal statutory 
definition of' estate"' includes, but whether federal law directly conflicts with state law. It does 
not. 
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Federal law only preempts state law where Congress has evidenced an intent to occupy a 
given field or where state law is in direct conflict with federal law: 
[S]tate law can be pre-empted in either of two general ways. If 
Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling 
within that field is pre-empted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state 
regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent 
it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comp1'l 
with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to 
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. 
Boundary Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 377, 913 P.2d 1141, 1147 
(1996), quoting Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 
L.Ed.2d 443 (1984). Therefore, to show that Idaho Code§ 56-218 is invalid, the personal 
representative must show that either Congress intended to occupy the entire field, or that the 
Idaho statute directly conflicts with the application of federal law. 
That Congress did not intend to occupy the entire field is abundantly clear. Congress 
intended that the states enact their own legislation governing estate recovery. The Medicaid law 
specifically requires the states to establish estate recovery programs: 
[T]he State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance 
correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
* * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or 
older when the individual received such medical assistance, the State 
shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate,, but only 
for medical assistance consisting of-
(i) nursing facility services, home and 
community-based services, and related hospital and prescription 
drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services. 
under the State plan. 
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,._.., 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (underline added). Moreover, as shown, above, certain parts of the 
Medicaid program are optional and may be adopted, or not, as the State desires. Such provisions 
require enabling legislation or rule making by the State. 
Idaho Code § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p. For the personal representative to show that section 56-218 is preempted, she must 
show that the Idaho statute directly conflicts with federal law. This she cannot do. 
B. The Federal Statute Anticipates Recovery of Assets Transferred to a Surviving Spouse. 
The federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), defines what payments are recoverable and 
does not restrict from whom recovery is made. Medicaid does much more than pay for nursing 
care for the elderly poor. It also pays for medical care for families receiving temporary support, 
and for the blind and disabled under the AABD (Aid for the Aged, Blind and Disabled) program. 
Funds expended for such care, however, are not recoverable in an estate recovery case. Rather, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) mandates estate recovery only for payments made to certain elderly 
persons. 
Note the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) which restricts what payments may be 
recovered (discussion regarding from whom recovery may be made follows): 
(b) Adjustment or recovery of medical assistance correctly paid under 
State plan 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correcth~: 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that 
the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
(A) In the case of an individual described in subsection 
(a}( l}(B} of this section . . .. 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or 
older when the individual received such medical assistance . . . . 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (underline added). It is important to realize that the primary purpose of 
this section is to define what payments may be recovered, rather than from whom those payments 
are recovered. 
The Magistrate focused on the language in section 1396p(b)(l)(B) which requires 
recovery "from the individual's estate" and rules that the State cannot reach beyond property 
owned by the recipient at death. Order Disallowing Claim, pp. 4, 6. This, however, ignores both 
the plain language and the context of the statute. 
Subsection (b)(4) defines the term "estate" as used in this subsection: 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect 
to a deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other 
assets included within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of 
State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, 
in the case of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), an·y: 
other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent 
of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a survivor. heir. or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Importantly, the individual's estate, for purposes of 
section l 396p, goes far beyond traditional concepts of a probate estate6 and includes ''·other 
assets" of the individual, as well as "assets ... conveyed to a survivor." This is important 
because "assets" has a special meaning in Medicaid law. "Assets" is defined in subsection (h) of 
section l 396p to include the property of the spouse of the recipient: 
6See also Be/she v. Hope, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 917 (Cal. App. 1995) ("Estate" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, 
must be interpreted broadly, and included the assets of a non-testamentary trust which contained property placed there by 
the decedent recipient and which attempted to convey property to decedent's heirs avoiding estate recovery). 
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(h) Definitions 
In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
( 1) The term "assets". with respect to an individual. includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, 
including any income or resources which the individual or such individual's 
spouse is entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, 
with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or 
such individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative 
body, acting at the direction or upon the request of the individual or 
such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § l396p(h) (emphasis added). Thus, for estate recovery purposes, "assets" includes 
income and resources of the individual's spouse, including property transferred to the spouse 
from the Medicaid recipient. 
Therefore, by definition, the estate of the individual, for purposes of section l 396p, 
includes the property of the spouse. Contrary to the Magistrate's ruling that 42 U.S.C. § l396p 
forbids recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse, this section specifically permits recovery 
from the property of the surviving spouse. 
While it is true that federal Medicaid law (like all public assistance law) is difficult to 
construe unless the entire statute is read in context, a review of section 1396p, alone, reveals the 
intent of Congress to view the property of the recipient and the recipient's spouse as the same 
and subject to the same limitations. 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(2), the very next subsection after the 
section that defines what payments may be recovered, provides, in part, as follows: 
(2) Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made 
only after the death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any .... 
42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(2) (underline added). Recovery is permitted only after the death of the 
surviving spouse because the spouse is permitted to possess and use the couple's property during 
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. ..._. 
his lifetime. If the State were limited to property in the possession of the recipient at the time of 
her death, then why would the State be prohibited from recovering until after the death of the 
spouse? 
Likewise, subsection ( c) of this section imposes a penalty on the recipient for asset 
transfers by the recipient's spouse: 
(c) Taking into account certain transfers of assets 
(l)(A) In order to meet the requirements of this subsection for purposes 
of section 1396a(a)(18) of this title, the State plan must provide that if an 
institutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual (or, at the option 
of a State, a noninstitutionalized individual or the spouse of such an individual) 
disposes of assets for less than fair market value on or after the look-back date 
specified in subparagraph (B)(i), the individual is ineligible for medical 
assistance for services described in subparagraph (C)(i) (or, in the case of a 
noninstitutionalized individual, for the services described in subparagraph 
(C)(ii)) .... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (underline added). Again, if the recipient spouse could simply transfer her 
assets to her spouse and, thereby, cut off the State's claim to those assets, then it would be 
pointless to penalize the recipient for further transfers by the spouse. Instead, however, the 
spouse is only permitted to use the couple's property and cannot give it away. This is because 
the State has the right to recover from those assets after the death of the recipient and the spouse. 
If the spouse is prohibited from giving the couple's property away to avoid the State's claim 
during life, why should he be permitted to avoid the State's claim by giving the property away at 
death?7 
Clearly, the very nature of section 1396p is to treat the property of the recipient and the 
property of the recipient's spouse as the same for the purposes of estate recovery. 
7 See also 42 U.S.C. § 1396p( c )(2) (Assets may only be transferred to the spouse or certain other parties having 
an interest in the property. 
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C. The Idaho Supreme Court's Decision in the Jackman Case Necessarily Upholds the 
Validity ofldaho Code § 56-218( ]). 
In the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 
P.2d 6 (1998), the Idaho Supreme Court upheld recovery from the estate of the non-Medicaid 
spouse. In the Jackman case, just as alleged here, the Medicaid spouse, Hildor, transferred all 
her property to her spouse, Lionel. Hildor passed away first and Lionel passed away two weeks 
later. Jackman was appointed personal representative of Lionel's estate and the Department filed 
an estate recovery claim. The personal representative challenged the Department's claim on 
numerous grounds including federal preemption. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld Idaho's 
spousal recovery law, holding that the expanded definition of estate permitted by federal law8 and 
adopted by Idaho Code § 56-218( 4)(b ), together with the definition of assets found at 42 U .S.C. § 
1396p(h)( 1 ), validated recovery of property that had, at any time after October 1. 1993. been 
community property. 
The Jackman decision must be read carefully because of the way it was decided. The 
final decision is an edited version, altered on re-hearing, of the original decision of the court. It 
is helpful to understand the original decision and the reason for the court's alteration on 
rehearing. In the court's first decision, the Supreme Court held wholly in favor of the 
Department. Upon Petition for Rehearing, the Supreme Court modified its decision because the 
effective date of the federal law on which they had relied in their original opinion was after the 
date of the couple's marriage settlement agreement. The court, therefore, held that recovery 
would be limited to property that had been community property after the effective date of the 
842 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). 
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federal law, "OBRA 93."9 Effectively, the court upheld spousal recovery against the federal 
preemption argument, but in the Jackman case, the couple's property had been divided by a 
marriage settlement agreement in March, 1993. prior to the effective date of the law: 
We conclude that this definition of"assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8 .. 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l}. "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by LC. § 15-1-201(15). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (underline added). The definition of "assets" the 
Supreme Court is referring to is that found in 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(h), discussed above, which at 
that time was found in section 1396p( e). Therefore, what the Court was referring to, was a 
definition where "assets," for purposes of estate recovery, included the assets of the spouse and 
assets a spouse divests herself of, such as by signing a marriage settlement abTfeement or a deed. 
As noted, above, in Jackman, the court altered its decision because it determined the 
transfer of assets from Hildor to Lionel occurred prior to the enactment of OBRA '93 which 
included both 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) and 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The court remanded the 
matter for a determination of what community property the parties had acquired since their 
marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the Department was not permitted to recover the 
9This limitation is embodied in IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20, limiting spousal recovery to property that had been 
community property at any time after October 1, 1993. 
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property transferred through the marriage settlement agreement was because of the timing: the 
marriage settlement agreement divided the property before the effective date of OBRJ\ '93. 
Note that because Hildor died first, whatever property she possessed on death necessarily 
became the sole and separate property of Lionel before his death. Therefore, even in the 
Jackman case the court approved recovery of property that had become the sole and s,eparate 
property of Lionel. 
The Magistrate found Jackman inapplicable and believed it required property to be 
community property at the time of death of the Medicaid recipient for recovery to be made. The 
Magistrate said: 
The case was remanded to the probate court for a determination of whether th1~ 
Medicaid recipient (Hildor Knudson) had an interest in community property, at 
the time of her death, the value of which, the court suggested, could be recovered 
from her husband's estate. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 3. However, this goes too far. In Jackman there was a marriage 
settlement agreement that divided the couple's assets before the effective date of OBRA '93. 
This same marriage settlement agreement maintained the separate nature of proceeds from the 
separate property: 
As authorized by I.C. § 32-906( I), this provision maintained the separate 
character of the assets transmuted into Lionel's separate property by the 
agreement, as well as "the income, rents, issues, profits, capital gains, and othi~r 
earnings or increase" on this separate property. The agreement did not prevent the 
accumulation of other community property by Lionel and Hildor after the date of 
the agreement and before Hildor's death. The record before us does not disclose 
whether Lionel and Hildor had any community property at the time of Hildor's 
death. If they did, Lionel's interest in that community property may be part of 
Lionel's estate, and may therefore be part ofHildor's "estate" that 42 U.S.C. § 
13 96p(b )( 1 )(B) and ( 4) authorizes the Department to recover and apply against the 
balance of the Medicaid payments. 
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Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216,970 P.2d at 9 (underline added). The entire issue before the Supreme 
Court was whether the Department could recover from Lionel's estate. The only context for 
property transfers was the marriage settlement agreement. The only reason the marriage 
settlement agreement made a difference was because it was executed prior to October 1, 1993. 
The whole upshot of the Supreme Court's decision was that if the marriage settlement agreement 
had been executed after October 1, 1993, it would have been irrelevant and the Department's 
recovery would have been permitted. Accordingly, there was no issue as to property transfers 
after October 1, 1993. The question on remand was not what Hildor owned at death, but what 
community property had accumulated after the marriage settlement agreement. The ri~asoning of 
the Magistrate swallows up the entire decision of the Court by reference to chance phraseology 
that has nothing to do with the issue before the court. 
The view of the Magistrate is that property transferred by a Medicaid recipient before 
death cannot be recovered. But in Jackman the marriage settlement agreement did exactly that. 
Therefore, if the Magistrate is correct, then the Supreme Court's entire discussion of OBRA '93 
and its effective date, the definition of assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e) (now 1396p(h)), and the 
expanded definition of estate are all superfluous. The Court could just as well have said, "since 
there was marriage settlement agreement and the property was transferred before her death, there 
can be no recovery." 
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VII. 
THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT'S 
INTERPRETATION OF MINNESOTA LAW IN IN RE 
ESTATE OF BARG DOES NOT INV ALIDA TE IDAHO LAW. 
The personal representative found her challenge to Idaho law on a Minnesota case, In re 
Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (2008). In Barg the Minnesota Supreme Court found that 
Minnesota's spousal recovery statute was partially preempted by federal law. As discussed 
above, the Jackman case relied on the interaction between Idaho law and federal law. Therefore, 
the Barg holding and the Jackman holding, in which each state's highest court was interpreting 
its own law, is not necessarily inconsistent. 
A. The Barg Decision Did Not Consider the Decisive Issue in Jackman. 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Jackman, found 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(1) 10 significant in 
their analysis. The original decision stated the following: 
Federal law encompasses recovery both from the estate of the recipient as 
well as from the estate of the surviving spouse. The federal definition of asset is 
significant. Federal law includes within the recipient's estate "all real and 
personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate ... " and 
"any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had 
any legal title or interest at the time of death ..... " 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4); LC. § 
56-218( 4 ). Under federal law, Hildor's assets would include her income and 
resources as well as Lionel's income and resources. The agreement does not 
affect the status of the assets that federal law considers to be part of the recipient's 
estate because the definition of assets includes "income or resources which the: 
individual or such individual's spouse is entitled to but does not receive because 
of action by a person ... with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the 
individual or such individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l)(B). Jackman's 
signing of the agreement constituted action by a person on behalf of Hildor an,l 
Lionel. Federal law does not prohibit the Dq,artment from recovering the balance 
of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's estate. 
1°Now 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l). 
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Jackman, original opinion, p. 4 (Exhibit C to Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance) (underline added). On rehearing, the Supreme Court did not retreat from their 
original holding except to recognize the marriage settlement agreement was executed before the 
"assets" definition of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l)(B) came into effect: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e) .. Therefore, 
it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department to recover 
the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. This is true 
even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid payments for 
calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, authorizes the 
Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "other assets." Without the 
definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are 
only those included within Hildor's estate, as defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). 
Lionel's separate property, including the community property transmuted by the 
agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-7, 970 P.2d at 9-10 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court didn't 
change its mind about the effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l). In fact, by necessary implication, it 
stated that with the definition of assets contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(l) the transferred 
assets would have been part of Hildor's estate, and therefore, subject to recovery. 
This is the same reasoning used by the North Dakota Supreme Court in In re Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000): 
Our inquiry, therefore, is narrowed to whether Clarence Wirtz had "real and 
personal property and other assets in which [he] had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death, including such assets conveyed" to Verna Wirtz through "other 
arrangement." 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l), asset is defined as: 
(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all incom~ 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
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any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such 
individual's spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at the 
direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
See Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 
P .2d 6, 9 (ld.1998) ( concluding the definition does not apply to assets disposed of 
on or before August 10, 1993). 
Thus, the department can assert a claim against real or personal propert¼ 
and other assets in which Clarence Wirtz had any legal title or other interest at his 
death, including income and assets conveyed through "other arrangement." 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885 (underline added). The North Dakota Supreme Court then went on to 
decide what the terms "interest" and "other arrangement" mean in the federal statute and 
concluded: 
We conclude consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light 
of the Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a 
legislative intention to allow states to trace the assets of recipients of medical 
assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse 
dies. 
We hold any assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before 
Clarence Wirtz's death and traceable to her estate are subject to the department's 
recovery claim. However, the recoverable assets do not include all property ever 
held by either party during the marriage. Cf Estate of Jobe, 590 N. W .2d 162, l 66 
(Minn.Ct.App.1999). 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) contemplates only that assets in which 
the deceased recipient once held an interest will be traced. It does not provide that 
separately owned assets in the survivor's estate, or assets in which the deceased 
recipient never held an interest, are subject to the department's claim for recovery. 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d at 886 (italics in original; underline added). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Barg, did not even consider the effect of this important 
definition of "assets" found critical in both Jackman and Wirtz. It cannot be said that if the 
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Minnesota Supreme Court had been informed of this definition it might not have reached the 
same conclusion as the Idaho and North Dakota Supreme Courts. 
8. The State of Minnesota Has Already Amended its Law to Overcome the Barg Holding. 
The Barg decision is an anomaly with limited application. It runs directly contrary to 
other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and Wirtz. It is understandable, then, that 
Minnesota has already amended its state law to overcome the holding of its supreme court in 
Barg. Without objection, the Department provided a copy of changes made to Minnesota law in 
2009 (Exhibit F to its Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim), for the 
express purpose of remedying the Barg decision. This legislation makes it clear that a Medicaid 
recipient's marital assets, at death, include assets jointly owned at any time during marriage, even 
when transferred by the Medicaid spouse to the non-Medicaid spouse. This is exactly the effect 
of the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Jackman. 
Obviously, if Minnesota can overrule Barg by a statutory change, it is state law and not 
federal law,per se, that creates the problem. The Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of 
Idaho's existing law already overcomes the Barg decision. Like the North Dakota Supreme 
Court in Wirtz, the Idaho Supreme Court has already held that Idaho's law permits recovery 
under the circumstances of this case. These holdings are not necessarily inconsistent with Barg. 
The Barg decision has limited application to Minnesota and has already been made in-elevant by 
a change in Minnesota law. 
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VIII. 
EVEN IF THE BARG CASE WERE APPLIED IN IDAHO, 
THE DEPARTMENT MUST STILL RECOVER BECAUSE 
THE GIFT OF THE DECEDENT TO HIMSELF WAS 
INVALID. 
If Barg is to be the law in Idaho, it is critical to determine what property was transferred 
by the Medicaid recipient to her spouse. In the court below, the Department challeng1~d the 
validity of the Quitclaim Deed by which the decedent purported to convey the Medicaid 
recipient's real property to himself, through a power of attorney. The Magistrate made no 
findings of fact in this regard, but concluded, apparently as a matter of law, that the transfer was 
valid. In a footnote, the court said: 
The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power of attorney from 
Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 1, fn I. 
A. As a Matter of Law, the Power of Attorney Did Not Authorize the Decedent to Make a 
Gift to Himself. 
The Medicaid recipient, Martha Perry, brought the real property of this estate into the 
marriage as her sole and separate property. Exhibit A to Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance of Claim. She later transferred the property to herself and to George, granting George 
an interest in the property. Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of 
Claim. George later transferred Martha's interest to himself. Exhibit A to Affidavit of Barbara 
K. McCormick. However, the transfer of Martha's interest to George, was not performed by 
Martha, but by George using his power of attorney for Martha. See id. The power of attorney, 
however, contains no provision permitting gifting, much less, self-gifting. Exhibit G to 
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Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Indeed, the power of attorney 
includes some language clearly prohibiting self dealing. See Exhibit G, to Memorandum in 
Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, 11 G and H. George's gift to himself was, therefore, 
invalid, and failed to eliminate Martha's interest in the real property. While this failure is 
irrelevant under Jackman, it is important if the court follows Barg. 
It is black-letter law that a power of attorney does not grant authority to make gifts absent 
an express provision in the power of attorney granting that power. As stated in 3 Am .. Jur. 2d 
Agency§ 87, "The authority of an agent to make a gift on behalf of the principal musit be 
express." Courts have uniformly supported this view. In Kunewa v. Joshua, 83 Hawaii 65,924 
P.2d 559, 565 (Haw.Ct.App.1996), the court explained: 
Moreover, courts have routinely held that in the absence of express written 
authorization, an agent may not gratuitously convey the principal's property to 
himself. See, e.g., Hodges v. Surratt, 366 So.2d 768 (Fla.App.1978) (agent 
exceeded authority in appropriating for agent's own use funds in decedent 
principal' s checking account in the absence of clear language to that effect in the 
power of attorney), cert. denied, 3 76 So.2d 76 (Fla.1979); In re Estate of 
DeBelardino, 77 Misc.2d 253, 352 N.Y.S.2d 858, 863 (Sur.Ct.1974) (power of 
attorney, no matter how broadly drawn, cannot be held to encompass an 
authorization to attorney-in-fact to make gift to himself ofprincipal's property; 
such a gift carries with it a presumption of impropriety and self-dealing, a 
presumption which can be overcome only with the clearest showing ofprincipal's 
intent to make the gift), aff'd, 47 A.D.2d 589, 363 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1975). 
Kunewa, 83 Hawaii at 71, 924 P.2d at 565; see also Matter of Estate of Crabtree, 550 N.W.2d 
168 (Iowa, 1996) ( absent express grant in power of attorney, of power to make gift, 
attorney-in-fact did not have that power); Aiello v. Clark, 680 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Alaska 1984) (in 
the absence of express authority to make a gift, none may be made); Cheloha v. Cheloha, 255 
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Neb. 32, 582 N.W.2d 291 (1998) (no gift may be made by an attorney in fact to himself unless 
the power to make such a gift is expressly granted in the instrument itself). 
Idaho law is consistent with these pronouncements. In Idaho, powers of attorney are 
strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified. Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 
Idaho 306,274 P. 800 (1929); accord Eaton v. McWilliams, 52 Idaho 145, 12 P.2d 259 (1932). 
In the case of Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003 (1922), the 
Idaho Supreme Court said: 
... [I]f an agent makes any profit in the course of his agency because of his faillure 
to inform his principal of facts known to him, or which in the exercise of due 
diligence he should have ascertained for his principal, the profits of such 
transaction, as a matter oflaw, will belong exclusively to the agent's principal. 
The law guards the fiduciary relation, which the relation of principal and agent is, 
with jealous care. It seeks to prevent the possibility of a conflict between duty and 
personal interest. It demands that the agent shall work with an eye single to the 
interest of his principal. It forbids him from acting adversely to his principal, 
either for himself or for others. 
Jensen, 36 Idaho at_, 210 P. at 1005 (underline added). 
Likewise, Idaho Code§ 32-912 requires an "express power of attorney" for one spouse to 
convey or encumber community property: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, excwt that neither the 
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
convey or encumber community property, either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
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Idaho Code § 32-912 ( emphasis added). 11 The title company may have recognized this defect 
when it required the signature of Martha on the closing statement when the personal 
representative sold the real property. 12 See Exhibit D to Affidavit of Barbara K. McCormick. 
The term "express power of attorney" means more than a general power of attorney. 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, defines "express" as follows: 
Clear; definite; explicit; plain; direct; unmistakable; not dubious or ambiguous. 
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and distinctly stated. Made known 
distinctly and explicitly, and not left to inference. Manifested by direct and 
appropriate language as distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. 
The word is usually contrasted with "implied." 
Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Edition ( citation omitted). There is no express language in the power 
of attorney at issue. At best, the authority to make gifts at all, much less to oneself, is implied, 
not express. 
Therefore, even if the court were to find that Barg were controlling law in Idaho, the 
estate is still subject to the Department's claim: The deed George executed conveying Martha's 
interest in the property to himself, using his power of attorney for Martha, is ineffective to 
extinguish Martha's interest in the real property. 
11 The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, adopted in 2008, was not in effect at the time of the transfer of Martha's 
interest to George, but it also includes the requirement for an express grant of authority to make a gift of the principle's 
property. Idaho Code§ l5-12-201{l){b), {c). 
12Barbara K McCormick signed not only as personal representative for George's estate, but also as attorney in 
fact for Martha. 
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B. The Magistrate Failed to Make Any Findings of Fact That Could Support the Personal 
Representative's Argument oflnterspousal Agency. 
The personal representative argued before the magistrate that there was an exception to 
the clear law requiring an express authorization in a power of attorney to make gifts to oneself. 
See Reply Memorandum in Support of the Personal Representative's Objection to Department of 
Health and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim, section D. However, if this argument was 
accepted by the court, it would have required findings of fact that the circumstances under which 
such "interspousal agency" could be found are present. No evidence was presented, and 
therefore, the court could, at best, make inferences from the documents and facts in the record. 
Still, such findings would be required to support such a ruling. 
As set forth in the Matter of Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho 316, 320, 678 P .2d 108, 112 
(Idaho App., 1984) 
Only where the record is so clear as to give the appellate court a complete 
understanding of the material issues and the basis of the magistrate's reasoning 
will the absence of findings of fact not result in a remand for adequate findings. 
Estate of Spencer, 106 Idaho at 320,678 P.2d at 112 (citations omitted). In this case, the 
Magistrate failed to make any findings of fact upon which to base its ruling that gifting was 
authorized by the power of attorney. Therefore, even if Barg is to apply to this case, and even if 
the gift isn't invalid as a matter oflaw, the matter must still be remanded for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. 
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IX. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Idaho Code § 12-117 provides as follows: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or political 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be, shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
Idaho Code § 12-117 (underline added). Idaho Code § 56-218(1) clearly and unambiguously 
permits the Department's claim in this estate. The personal representative has advanced an 
erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute. The Barg case relied upon by the personal 
representative is clearly not the law in Idaho. The court in Barg failed to even consider the 
critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman. The 
personal representative, in disallowing the Department's claim, has acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law and the Department should be awarded its attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
1. Did the Magistrate err in determining that the general power of attorney held by 
George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real prop1erty? 
Yes. As a matter of law, the power of attorney, lacking any express authority to make 
gifts, or gifts to oneself, is insufficient to have given the decedent authority to convey Martha 
Perry's real property to himself. The Magistrate made no findings of facts that could in any way 
support the personal representative's theory of"interspousal agency." 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 32 O:\Appellants Brief.wpd 
000557
·-
2. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of Idaho Code § 56-
218, in refusing to allow the Department's claim against the estate of George Peny? 
Yes. Idaho Code § 56-218 unambiguously permits the Department's claim against this 
estate. 
3. Did the Magistrate err in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p as 
preempting application of Idaho Code§ 56-218? 
Yes. The Idaho Supreme Court has already overruled similar preemption claims in 
Jackman, and permitted the Department to recover from the estate of the spouse in cases such as 
this. The North Dakota Supreme Court in Wirtz reached the same conclusion. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Barg, relied upon by the Magistrate, did not consider the definition of "assets" 
found important in Jackman and Wirtz. 
4. Did the Magistrate err in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding in 
Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213 (1998) to the facts of this 
case? 
Yes. The Magistrate's holding that assets transferred from the Medicaid recipilent to her 
spouse cannot be recovered ignores the entire underlying reasoning and holding in Jackman. 
5. Is the Department entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
Yes. There is no reasonable basis in fact or law for the disallowance of the Department's 
claim in this estate. 
DATED this 8 day of July, 2010, 
h/~2=~ 
w. co~ CAiTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The Personal Representative of the Estate of George D. Perry, Barbara McConnick 
("PR"), agrees with the Department's statement of the Nature of the Case as far as it goes. This 
case requires interpretation of a federal statute ( 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )) and consideration of 
whether the Department's application ofldaho law (LC. § 56-218) violates federal law and is 
therefore preempted by federal law. Federal law requires the states to make claims against the 
probate estates of Medicaid recipients to recovery correctly paid benefits. Federal law also 
allows the states to expand the definition of "estate" to include non-probate assets owned by a 
recipient at the time of the recipient's death. Idaho has chosen this expanded definition of 
"estate." LC.§ 56-218(4). Nothing in the federal medical assistance statutes authorizes a direct 
medical assistance estate claim against the estate of any person other than the recipient of 
benefits. 
Under federal law, the states are permitted to pull back into a recipient's estate any 
property or other assets in which the recipient held a legal title or interest at the time of the 
recipient's death (to the extent of the interest). Idaho's estate recovery statute, LC. § 56-218, 
requires that a medical assistance claim be filed against the estate of a deceased recipient, but 
also requires that a claim be asserted against the estate of a surviving spouse who neve:r received 
medical assistance benefits. The Department's interpretation and application of LC.§ 56-218 in 
this estate recovery claim conflicts with federal law because the Department asserts a claim 
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against George's estate which does not contain any assets in which Martha held an interest at the 
time of her death. 
Course of Proceedings 
The PR restates the course of proceedings comprehensively as follows. 
Date Event 
2/25/2009 George Perry died testate 
3/18/2009 Application for Informal Probate of Will filed 
3/19/2009 Personal Representative appointed 
3/19/2009 Letters Testamentary signed appointing Barbara McCormick as PR 
4/7/2009 Information to Heirs and Devisees (giving Department notice) 
4/13/2009 Department filed estate recovery claim against Estate 
5/28/2009 90 day inventory served identifying all property as George's separate property 
6/4/2009 PR filed Notice of Disallowance of Claim 
6/11/2009 Department Petitioned for Allowance of Claim 
6/25/2009 PR filed Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim 
rf~t/2009 PR filed Affidavit and Memo in Support of PR's Objection to Dept's Claim 2010 Telephonic Status Conference with Judge Bieter. Court and parties agree that 
the Department be given three (3) weeks to file Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Allowance and Personal Representative be given two (2) weeks 
after that to file Reply Brief prior to hearing set for 2/26/2010 
1/29/2010 Department filed Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance 
2/19/2010 PR filed Reply Brief in Opposition to Petition for Allowance 
2/26/2010 Hearing On Petition for Allowance of Claim before The Honorable J. Bieter 
3/10/2010 Magistrate issued Order Disallowing Claim 
3/18/2010 Department filed Notice of Appeal to District Court 
5/3/2010 Martha Perry died 
Statement of Facts 
The PR agrees with the Department's Statement of Facts, aside from the use of the word 
"purported" in reference to the 2006 quit claim deed. The PR respectfully refers the Court to the 
Affidavit of Barbara McCormick and the exhibits attached thereto, for a more complete and 
detailed rendition of the facts. Since this appeal was filed, Martha died on May 3, 2010. The 
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only property that Martha owned at the time of her death was one financial account located at 
Wells Fargo. The balance of this Wells Fargo checking account was paid to the Department on 
August 13, 2010. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the PR is entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b )( 5) and LC. § 12-117, the PR claims attorney fees on appeal. The 
Department's decision to appeal the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim lacks any reasonable 
basis in fact or in law. The law does not support the Department's manner of applying LC. § 56-
218 and making a claim against property in which the Medicaid recipient has no title or interest 
at the time of her death. If this was not apparent prior to this case, the proceedings below made 
the law in this area quite clear. 
The authorities cited in the briefing before the Magistrate, including but not limited to the 
U.S. Solicitor General's amicus brief before the United States Supreme Court in In Re Estate of 
Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008), the oral argument and The Honorable Christopher M. 
Bieter' s Order Disallowing Claim all support the conclusion that the Department did not have a 
reasonable basis in law or fact to bring this appeal. The Department's appeal asserts an 
erroneous interpretation of clear, unambiguous federal statutes. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING RECOVERY OF 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE BENEFITS CORRECTLY PAID 
i. Statutory Framework. 
The Medicaid program is jointly funded with the states as a "cooperative endeavor in 
which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 
65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into 
state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). After this, 
the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its 
own program within the federal requirements, and the Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services ("CMS"), one of several federal agencies under HHS, administers the program and 
approves state plans. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 
(2006). 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider 
assets of both husband and wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396r-5(c) (2000). There are several provisions in place to protect the community spouse (the 
spouse not applying for Medicaid) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of 
assets needed to qualify the applicant for Medicaid. The value of the couple's home is not 
included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-.S(c)(5); 42 
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U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(l) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also c~ntitled to 
an allowance of income and assets designated for his or her needs that is not consider,ed available 
to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Furthermore, the 
recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, to his or 
her community spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of 
community spouses to contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses 
against the accommodation of the community spouse's need for his or her own support. 
ii. Federal Medicaid Recovery Provisions. 
It is important to understand pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid recovery, to give context 
to the post-1993 changes, and because pre-1993 law is the basis for the sole case in Idaho upon 
which the Department relies exclusively for its position - i.e. Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998). Prior to amendments adopted in the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act ("OBRA") of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute stated a 
general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except --
* * * * 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he 
received such assistance, from his estate. 
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42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, 
to recover Medicaid benefits paid to recipients 65 or older. and the statute specified the recovery 
would be from the recipient's estate 1• 
Section l 396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 19932. As 
amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover 
Medicaid payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual. with limited exceptions. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 amendments changed section I 396p(b) in several ways. 
First, the 1993 amendments lowered the age criterion for recovery from 65 to 55. Second, the 
1993 amendments made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. 
Third, the amendments added a definition of "estate." which itself had both mandatory and 
permissive elements. As amended, the general nonrecovery rule and the relevant exception read 
as follows: 
(I) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made. except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
* * * * 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the individual's estate * * *. ( emphasis added) 
1 The statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the 
recipient's surviving spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovel)' before the 
death of a surviving spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The 
pre-I 993 federal law contained no definition of the term "estate." 
2 OBRA of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § \3612(a), {c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(l), (4) (2000)). 
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Id. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(l)(B) retained the express reference to recovery 
from the recipient's estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the 
recipient's estate is only permitted after the death of the recipient's surviving spouse.3 As with 
the pre-1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or 
reference to, recovery from a surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, 
with a mandatory provision that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that 
authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the scope of probate law: 
[T]he term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual -
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within 
the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent o(such interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of "estate" for Medicaid 
recovery purposes that includes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be 
part of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on 
the recipient's death. For example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right 
of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the 
surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the optional expanded 
3 "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made only after the death of the individual's surviving 
spouse, if any* * *." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
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definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be included in his estate, rather than passing directly to 
the surviving joint tenant. Thus federal statutes place limits on the state's powers to define the 
scope of recovery of medical assistance benefits correctly paid. The limits are set forth in 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p. Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 
(2006). 
iii. Idaho's Medicaid Recovery Provisions. 
Idaho Code LC.§ 56-218, entitled "RECOVERY OF CERTAIN MEDICAL 
ASSISTANCE" states in pertinent part, 
(1) Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was fifty-
five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such assistimce may 
be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, 
for such aid paid to either or both: ... 
(4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which thf: 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of 
such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life 
estate, living trust or other arrangement. ( emphasis added). 
Idaho has adopted verbatim the optional federal provision that authorizes states to expand 
the definition of"estate" beyond the scope of probate law. LC.§ 56-218(4). Therefore, it 
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follows that Idaho is required to abide by the interpretation of the language in the federal statute 
that CMS and HHS promulgate. Idaho's Supreme Court 
has long followed the rule that the construction given to a statute by the executive 
and administrative officers of the State is entitled to great \Veight and will be 
followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise. 
Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P .2d 309 (1979). This same principle holds true with regard 
to HHS' s reading of the Medicaid statutes. In Wisconsin Dept of Health & Family Servs. v. 
Blumer, 534 U.S. 473,497, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002), the Court stated, 
The Secretary's position warrants respectful consideration. Cf. United States v. 
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shala/a, 512 U.S. 
504, 512 (1994) (reliance on Secretary's "significant expertise" particularly 
appropriate in the context of "a complex and highly technical regulatory program" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 
43-44 (1981) (Secretary granted "exceptionally broad authority" by Congress 
under the Medicaid statute). 
B. THE DEPARTMENT MUST ACT CONSISTENTLY WITH FEDERAL LA iN. 
In In the Matter of Appeal of Stafford, 181 P .3d 456, 461 (2008), our Supreme Court 
stated, 
Following passage of the MCCA [Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act], the 
director of the Department requested the Attorney General's opinion as to whether 
legislation was required to implement its provisions. The Attorney General 
responded: 
While participation in the Medicaid program is voluntary, a state that 
chooses to participate must comply with all requirements imposed by the 
federal statutory provisions and by regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services .... (emphasis added). 
One of the requirements imposed on state plans in order to participate in the Medicaid 
program and receive federal funding is that the state must "comply with the provisions of [ 42 
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U .S.C. § l 396p] with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly 
paid, transfers of assets, and treatment of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l8) (2000). To 
the extent a state statute "seeks to reach further than § 1396p(b )(1 ), it cannot stand." Bucholtz v. 
Belshe, 114 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 1997). The same holds true for state regulations, such as 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 and 16.03.09.900.24, which cannot reach further than 42 U.S.C. § 
l 396p(b )(I). 
The Department does not have a choice in this matter. It must follow federal law 
governing Medicaid estate recovery claims4. The Department argues that Idaho law is "clear" 
and supports its claim against George's estate. Appellant's Brief, p. 11-13. This contention does 
not withstand scrutiny. Once mandatory federal restrictions on the scope of estate recovery are 
considered, it becomes very clear that the Department's claim asserted in George's estate 
violates federal law as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p. 
Idaho law currently allows the state to seek recovery for medical assistance paid "from 
the individual's estate, and the estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both." 
LC. § 56-218( l ). The PR has challenged the manner in which the Department applies I.C. § 56-
218( 1 ), not the language of that statute itself. This is because there may exist some 
circumstances in which an asset in which the Medicaid recipient holds an interest at death passes 
to the surviving spouse's estate upon the Medicaid spouse's death. In that circumstance, the 
asset would be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate. For example, assets held jointly 
with rights of survivorship would fall into this category. So the actual language used in LC. § 
4 The Department does recognize that it "is bound by federal law." Department's Memorandum in Support, p. 15, 
f.n. 11. 
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56-218(1) is not offensive to the federal mandate, only the manner in which the Depaitment has 
chosen to exercise estate recovery claims against community spouse estates in Idaho. 
In order to be consistent with federal law, the Department's claims against a Medicaid 
spouse's estate must be against "assets in which the individual [Medicaid recipient] had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death, to the extent of such interest." The Department's claim in 
this probate, however, is against assets in which the Medicaid recipient (Martha) has no legal 
title or interest at the time of her death. The Magistrate recognized this core issue in his Order 
Disallowing Claim, p. 3, stating, 
Jackman does not directly address the critical question for our case: To what 
time, during the marriage, may the court look in assessing a Medicaid recipient's 
interest in property - any time (after 1993) during the couple's marriage or the 
time of the recipient's death. (f.n. omitted). 
The Magistrate sought an answer from the Department's counsel at the hearing on this 
very issue. He asked counsel, 
And where does the authority come from that says that the interest in that prop,erty 
may be determined at any time in the marriage of these people after '93? What 
says that it's not the time that the recipient dies, but it includes a period of timE: 
when she had an interest other than- other than at the time of her death? 
Tr., p. 25, LL. 21 through p. 26, LL. 3. 
The Department's counsel was unable to answer that question. His first response was "I 
think I can help that by analogy, Your Honor. And that's if you look at a different section that's 
not part of our case here ... " Tr., p. 26, LL. 4-7. The Court continued to press for an answer to 
this question and counsel for the Department remained unable to present one. See Tr., p. 28, LL. 
2 through p. 33, LL. 18. Finally, the basis for the Department's position came out. The 
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Magistrate stated, "your argument depends on a definition of assets and that's different, you're 
arguing, then, than the definition of the estate of the person." Tr. LL. 19-22. Department's 
counsel answered "Yes." Tr., p. 33, LL. 23. 
The Magistrate stated in his Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4, 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate 
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's 
spouse; 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of 
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person 
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation. 
( emphasis added). 
As discussed below, the Magistrate properly ruled in rejecting the Department's argument. 
C. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 
479 U.S. 272,280, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). Even when Congress has not chosen 
to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-
empt state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state 
and federal laws is impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-
143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when th<::: state law 
is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective:s of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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D. THE DEPARTMENT'S APPLICATION OF I.C. § 56-218 AND ITS REGULATIONS 
CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAW AND ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
i. The Department's Claim, Based On An Erroneous Application Of I.C. § 56-218, 
Conflicts With Federal Law. 
The Department argues that because LC. § 56-218 appropriately implements the estate 
recovery mandate of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, the PR cannot show that this statute conflicts with 
federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 15. This argument entirely misses the mark. It is the 
Department's practice of using LC.§ 56-218 to improperly expand the scope of estate recovery 
claims that violates federal law. If the Department applied the language of LC .. § 56-218 
consistently with federal law and only made claims against assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an interest in at death, there would be no conflict. But conflict preemption occurs 
when the state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purlPoses and 
objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 
(1941 ). Compliance with both state and federal law is impossible when the Department makes 
overly broad estate recovery claims based on LC. § 56-218 that violate federal law. 
In 1998, our Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 
Idaho 213,215,970 P.2d 6, 8-10 (1998), held that the version of LC.§ 56-218 then in effect 
(pre-OBRA 1993) authorized the Department to recover against the surviving spouse's estate but 
expressly recognized that such recovery was limited by federal law to assets that were part of the 
Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under state probate law. The Jackman Court recognized 
that federal law does preempt the authority granted to the Department by LC. § 56-218, and held 
that the only asset that might be recoverable from the surviving spouse's estate was community 
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property accumulated by the couple after the execution of their marriage settlement agreement. 
Id. at 215-216. Our Supreme Court has already recognized, therefore, that federal law does 
preempt in the area of Medicaid recovery claims - i.e. with respect to LC. § 56-218. The 
Department argues that estate recovery is really controlled by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 11-
12. Our Supreme Court in Jackman and Stafford, as well as the plethora of federal authority 
cited supra, completely rebuts this contention. 
ii. The Department's Regulations Conflict With Federal Law. 
As discussed infra, the Department has misread and misapplied Jackman for over a 
decade. Unfortunately, what ensued after the Jackman decision in 1998 was that the Department 
enacted rules, adopted policies and made claims in married couple Medicaid cases as if the Court 
had ruled on the very issue it explicitly did not rule upon. Simply because the Department enacts 
regulations on its misreading of the Jackman decision and no one objects does not mean those 
regulations are consistent with federal law. 
In Jackman, the Court held that the community spouse's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by agreement, was not part of the Medicaid recipient's estate 
and not subject to the Department's recovery claim. Jackman, 132 Idaho at 216-217. The 
Department cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24, its regulation allowing it to void a marriage 
settlement agreement, as support that Idaho law controls, not federal law. Appellant's Brief, p. 
12. This regulation proves nothing except that the Department enacted an overly broad 
regulation that violates federal law based on an erroneous reading of Jackman and that this 
regulation has gone unchallenged. 
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The Department also cites IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20 as support for its position stating, "By 
rule, the Department makes its recovery from property in which the Medicaid spouse had an 
interest at some point in the past. IDAPA 16.03.09.900.20." (emphasis added). Id. This 
regulation is just as offensive as the statute in Minnesota that was struck down by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) because it was 
inconsistent with federal law5 Barg is discussed in detail in the next section of this brief. 
E. A RECENT lVIINNESOTA SUPREME COURT DECISION AND THE 
PROCEDURAL AFTERMATH OF THAT DECISION ARE DIRECTLY ON POINT 
AND SUPPORT AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE'S ORDER. 
In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 2008) is the latest state court decision on 
point and is on all fours with the instant case. The Court's analysis in Barg provides an in-depth 
and exhaustive review of other state court cases analyzing the issue. Reading Barg in its entirety 
is very instructive because Minnesota's department of health and welfare made the vety same 
argument in support of its recovery action as the Department makes in this action. Th 1: facts of 
Barg, when pared down to the essentials, are essentially the same facts present in this probate. 
For the Court's convenience, the PR has appended a complete copy of Barg to this Memorandum 
as Appendix 1. 
In Barg, supra at 73-74, the Minnesota Supreme Court struck down a provision of the 
state's Medicaid estate recovery statute that allowed recovery from the estate of a surviving 
5 The offending Minnesota statute allowed recovery against assets of the estate "that were marital property or jointly 
owned property at any time during the marriage." Both IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 and 16.03.09.900.20 are in conflict 
with federal law and are therefore preempted by it. These regulations must be repealed or amended to comport with 
clear federal mandate that the Department may only recover against resources in which the Medicaid recipient had 
an interest in at death. 
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spouse for any assets jointly owned by the couple at any point during their marriage. In that 
case, Mrs. Barg transferred her partial interest in the couple's home to her husband when she 
entered a nursing home. She died without leaving a probate estate and her husband died soon 
thereafter. The county then sought recovery against Mr. Barg's estate for the amount of 
Medicaid benefits paid out on behalf of Mrs. Barg. The Barg Court determined that the county 
could recover only from assets that the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest in at the: time of 
her death. Mrs. Barg had no legal interest in any property when she died because she had 
transferred her interests to her husband while she was alive. Therefore, the Court ruled that the 
county had no way to seek recovery from Mr. Barg's estate6• Id. 
The Supreme Court of Minnesota discussed 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) in depth. This 
discussion is directly applicable to the instant case because Idaho has adopted the federal 
language in that statute verbatim in J.C. § 56-218. In discussing the statutes at issm: the Court 
addressed and rejected the state's argument that the "other arrangement" phrase opened the door 
for the broader recovery allowed under Minnesota's statute. The Court stated in pertinent part, 
We turn to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a 
surviving spouse's estate allowed under Minnesota law is consistent with 
federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15 a11ows the state to recover 
from a surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were 
marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." 
(Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority 
does not conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 
1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 amendments were intended to 
expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this argument for 
6 These are the same facts present in the instant case. Martha transferred her interest in the couple's home to her 
husband in 2006, prior to applying for Medicaid benefits. She retained no legal interest in that real property, nor in 
the proceeds from the sale of that real property, which are the only assets that make up her husband's estate. 
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broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with 
the dual goals of federal law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance 
available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting community spouses from 
pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 
1396p(b)(l) allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 
1396p(b )(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include assets in which the 
recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" 
recovery allowed by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favori111g 
the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its language. 
Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-
1993 federal law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of 
assets that were jointly owned during the marriage but transferred by the 
recipient spouse prior to her death . ... 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional 
definition of "estate" allows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the 
extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further 
describes the assets that a state may include in this expanded estate. The clause 
describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are 
"conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers back to the immediately 
preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any 
legal title or interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to 
whom "such" assets may have been conveyed--a "survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual." Id. ( emphasis added). And finally, the clause describes 
several methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place --
"through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, 
or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient 
having a legal interest at the time of death. When we construe a federal statute we 
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... _ 
must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter v. 
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To 
read "other arrangement" to include a lifetime transfer would be to read the words 
"at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other arrangement" 
cannot include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. 
"[O]ther arrangement" ends a list of examples of conveyances that occur at the: 
time of death. The list ofrecipients of the conveyance, "a survivor, heir, or assign 
of the deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid 
recipient, must have died for the conveyance to occur. A recipient cannot have 
heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "assign of the 
deceased" during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language 
and its context, the conclusion of the Wirtz court that "other arrangement" is 
sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the, 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient did 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to deatb 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the def"mition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th;nt it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
Id. at 68-71. 
The State of Minnesota filed a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court seeking to 
overturn the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Barg. In May of 2009, the U.S. Solicitor 
General submitted an amicus curiae brief authored by not only that office but joined by the 
attorneys from the Department of HHS in response to the U.S. Supreme Court's order inviting 
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the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States. This is the most recent legal 
briefing by HHS on the issue. The United States' brief examines and rejects each and every 
argument posited by the State of Minnesota seeking to expand Medicaid estate recovery beyond 
that allowed by federal law. For the Court's convenience, the entire United States Solicitor 
General's amicus curiae brief is appended hereto as Appendix 2. 
The import of the United States' briefing in this matter cannot be overemphasized. The 
legal positions taken in that briefrepresent HHS's interpretations of federal law. CMS, as noted 
above, is governed by HHS. By accepting federal support for its Medicaid program, Idaho is 
legally obligated to abide by HHS/CMS interpretations of federal Medicaid law. Congress has 
extended HHS extremely broad authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. 
In its 2009 briefing, HHS expressly rejects the interpretation and application that the 
Department relies upon in using I.C. § 56-218 to support the claim made against the Estate of 
George Perry. The United States/HHS in Barg, supra at p. 8-9, stated in pertinent part, 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision is correct and does not warrant 
further review. The federal Medicaid Act permits recovery of correctly paid 
benefits from the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse, but limits that 
recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest alt 
the time of her death ... 
A. The Decision Of The Minnesota Supreme Court Is Correct 
1. The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly concluded that the 
Medicaid Act forbids petitioner from seeking to recover correctly paid 
benefits from assets in which the Medicaid recipient had no legal interest at 
the time of her death. 
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·--· 
... the Medicaid Act, which permits recovery only after the death of 
the recipient's surviving spouse7, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2), authorizes a State to 
file a reimbursement claim against the surviving spouse's estate, up to the 
value of any assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the 
time of her death. 
The Minnesota estate-recovery law exceeds the scope of that 
authorization. It permits the State to recover from a surviving spouse's 
estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or 
jointly owned property at any time during the marriage," Minn. Stat. Ann. § 
256B.15, subd. 2 (2007) (emphasis added), without regard to whether the 
recipient retained an interest in the assets at the time of her death. Becau:Se a 
State may not recover correctly paid Medicaid benefits except to the extent 
authorized by federal law, see 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l), Minnesota's statute 
conflicts with federal law and is therefore preempted. . . . ( emphasis added). 
The United States Supreme Court decided not to grant cert and did not review the 
Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Barg. 
F. IDAHO'S APPELLATE COURTS HAVE NOT DECIDED THE ISSUE AT BAR 
In 2005, our Supreme Court considered the Department's claim filed in the probate of a 
Medicaid recipient's estate whose spouse survived him. In Re Estate of Kaminsky, 141 Idaho 
43 6, 111 P. 3d 121 (2005). Al though the issue in Kaminsky was the timeliness of the 
Department's claim, the Court did recognize that the Department's recovery claim was properly 
made only against the Medicaid recipient's estate. The Court stated, 
Only persons with few financial resources qualify for assistance and assistance 
comes with strings attached. Included in these strings is a right on the part of 
the State, pursuant to I.C. § 56-218, to obtain reimbursement of Medicaid 
7 The Department argues that because federal estate recovery does not occur until after both spouses die, this 
somehow is in conflict with the clear statutory language which mandates that only assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient had an interest in at death are subject to recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 17-18. The Department's 
argument finds no support in the statutes. Nor does the argument find support in logic. Permitting recovery after 
both spouses have died makes sense because it is only at that time that a final determination can be made as to what, 
if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death. 
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assistance from the estate of a recipient. Under any reasonable definition, 
this right of recovery constitutes a "claim" against the recipient's estate. 
( emphasis added). 
Id. at 439. 
i. The Jackman Decision Is Neither Dispositive Nor Controlling. 
As it argued below, the Department's primary argument on appeal is that Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213,970 P.2d 6 (1998) is dispositive. 
Appellant's Brief, p. l 9-22. A thorough reading of the Department's briefing and the case law 
reveals the following: 1) The Department cites and relies heavily upon a Jackman opinion that 
Idaho's Supreme Court withdrew. The withdrawn opinion is not Idaho law, has absolutely no 
precedential value and is not binding upon this Court or any com1; and 2) The Department relies 
on dicta in the substituted and published Jackman decision to bootstrap itself into a position of 
arguing that somehow the law is settled in this area by the withdrawn Jackman opinion 8. 
8 The Department also confuses pre-eligibility transfers and look-back rules with post-eligibility rights. From that 
confusion it then makes an incorrect assertion regarding the community spouse's right to property post-eligibility. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 18. The look back period referred to in 42 U.S.C. g 1396p(c) applies when one spouse applies 
for Medicaid. Contrary to the Department's argument, once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, any resources 
belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the community spouse can do 
whatever he wants with them. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(4). 
The import of this statute was discussed in a June 29, 1999 letter to Idaho attorney Rod Gere from Robert Reed, 
Chief of the Medicaid Branch of the HHS Division of Medicaid and State Operations for Region X. This letter was 
copied to Karl Kurtz, then acting Director of the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and stated in part, 
Thus, after the eligibility determination any resources belonging to the community spouse are 
solely the property of that spouse. That spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them, 
including leaving them, via a will, to particular heirs that do not include the institutionalized 
spouse. 
See also, April 5, 2000 letter from Ronald Preston, HHS Associate Regional Administrator for Region I stating in 
part, 
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In its November 2, 1998 Jackman decision, the opinion clearly notes "Substitute Opinion 
The Court's Prior Opinion Dated June 16, 1998, Is Hereby Withdrawn.'' See Department Exhibit 
E, p. 2. The Internal Rules Of The Idaho Supreme Court (amended January 3, 2008) found on 
the Idaho State Judiciary website under Idaho Court Rules (www.isc.idaho.~ov), Rule l 5(f) 
states in full: 
(f) Unpublished Opinions of the Court. At or after the oral conference following 
the presentation of oral argument or the submission of the case to the Court on the 
briefs, the Court, by unanimous consent of all justices. may determine not to 
publish the final opinion of the Court. If an opinion is not published, it may not 
be cited as authority or precedent in any court. (emphasis added). 
The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion was never published. The Court withdrew it and 
issued a substitute opinion. The June 16, 1998 Jackman opinion may not be cited as authority or 
precedent in this Court, or any other for that matter. Yet the Department cited the withdrawn 
opinion repeatedly before the Magistrate. Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for 
Allowance, p. 13-14. Even more surprisingly. the Department again cites that withdrawn and 
unpublished opinion before this Court, even though the PR raised Idaho Supreme Court Rule 
l S(t) in the briefing below. See PR ·s Reply Memo, p. 19; Appellant"s Brief. p. 23. The 
Department's continued reliance on and citation to this unpublished opinion is improper. The 
withdrawn Jackman opinion carries absolutely no weight on the issue before this Court and the 
Thus, after the month in which an institutionalized spouse is determined eligible for Medicaid, any 
resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse. That is, the 
community spouse can do whatever he or she wants to with them. 
The above-cited HHS letters are attached hereto for the Court's convenience as Appendix 3. The 
Department errs when it asserts that federal law treats the property of the recipient and that of the spouse as 
the same for purposes of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p. 18. Clearly it does not. 
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Department is prohibited by rule from citing it as authority or precedent in any Idaho court. It 
certainly in no way establishes law in Idaho. Yet the Department would have this Court 
speculate as to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar, 
because of reasoning or rationale in an opinion that the Court never published and withdrew9• 
That leaves the Department with the November 2, 1998 Jackman decision that was 
published to support its position. The fundamental problem with the Department's reliance on 
the published Jackman decision is that the Court was dealing with a situation that pre--dated the 
OBRA-1993 amendments. The Supreme Court in Jackman stated repeatedly and was very 
careful to make sure that its opinion was restricted to the version of federal law applicable to the 
controversy before it - in other words the decision was applicable only to cases arising pre-
OBRA 1993. Jackman was explicitly restricted to the facts in that case. The Court made this 
very clear when it stated its holding that, "We conclude that section 56-218( 1) of the Idaho Code 
(LC.), as it existed at times applicable to this case, ... " ( emphasis added). Jackman, supra at 
214. 
The Court also stated, 
We conclude that this [the post-OBRA 1993] definition of "assets" Js not 
applicable to the agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and 
Hildor on March 8, 1993. The defmition of "assets" contained in the 1993 
amendments to the federal statute does not apply "with respect to assets 
disposed of on or before the date of the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993] ." 
Pub. L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). Therefore, it [the post-OBRA 1993 definition of 
"assets"] does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Department 
to recover the balance of Medicaid payments from Lionel's separate property. 
9 Either the Department has misstated the holding of the published Jackman decision in its brief on appeal (see last 
four lines of first full paragraph, Appellant's Brief, p. 19) or it is once again improperly citing the unpublished 
opinion. In either event, the Department is ascribing a holding to Jackman that the Court simply did not make. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 23 
000588
........ 
Jackman, supra at 216. 
The Department argues that because the Court discussed the OBRA 1993 amendments 
that this somehow settles the issue. Appellant's Brief, p. 22. Justice Johnson's statements in 
Jackman, upon which the Department so heavily relies, are simply dicta or dictum. "Dicta" is 
defined as, 
Opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the 
specific case before the court. Expressions in the court's opinion which go 
beyond the facts before court and therefore are individual views of author of 
opinion and not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent. (emphasis 
added) 
Dictum is defined as follows: 
The word is generally used as an abbreviated form of obiter dictum, ... 
Statements and comments in an opinion concerning some rule of law or legal 
proposition not necessarily involved nor essential to determination of the case 
in hand are obiter dicta, and lack the force of an adjudication. . . . ( emphasis 
added). 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1991). 
Justice Johnson's comments on how to interpret the post-OBRA amendments in federal 
law were not involved in or necessary to the holding in the published Jackman decision which 
was a pre-OBRA 1993 case. The Court says as much - repeatedly. The Department itself 
admits as much when it states that, "there was no issue as to property transfers after October 1, 
1993" at issue in Jackman and the question before the Jackman Court "was not what Hildor [the 
Medicaid recipient] owned at death. 10" (emphasis added). Appellant's Brief, p. 22. 
10 While briefing the matter before the Supreme Court in 1998, the Department also admitted that any 
comments the Court might make on the issue of whether the definition of "assets" in the post-OBRA 
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The Magistrate also appropriately recognized that Jackman does not control this post-
OB RA 1993 case and does not support the Department's misapplication of I.C. § 56-218. The 
following exchange occurred between counsel and the Court. 
THE COURT ... I really have been struggling to deal with the definitions 
of estate and assets in both the state and federal's schemes .... I perceive the 
State as saying that Jackman [sic) allows the Court to look at any time, any 
period of time, in which the recipient of benefits had an interest in property . . 
. . I don't see that Jackman [sic) says that. ... Because I think we've got to 
look at the published opinion, not the first one. What does that leave us. 
And I don't think it leaves us much. 
At least that's how it feels to me, that it doesn't necessarily say to me that 
the State may look to any period of time after 1993 that a Medicaid beneficiary, 
Medicaid recipient had an interest in property. I don't think it [Jackman] makes 
that determination .... I don't think it [Jackman) makes a determination of 
where in that period of time the estate may look at the recipient's interest in 
property. ( emphasis added). 
Tr., p. 12, LL. 18 through p. 13, LL. 25. 
No matter how much the Department would like to draw implications or speculate about 
the Jackman decision based on the unpublished opinion, the fact remains -Jackman does not 
control the outcome of this case. This Court should affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing 
amendments was applicable in defining the breadth of an estate recovery action was dicta. The Department 
stated in its Limited Response to Petition for Rehearing, p. 8 (provided below in the Department's 
Exhibits), "While not essential for the court's decision in this case, the property Hildor conveyed to Lionel 
through the marriage settlement agreement is certainly part of the definition of "estate" and is subject to 
recovery in this case." (emphasis added). The Department admitted in its briefing before the Magistrate 
and this Court that it is relying upon an "implication" that it draws from that opinion. Department's Memo 
in Support, p. 14; Appellant's Brief, p. 24. The Department's perceived "implication" in the Jackman 
decision - what is really dicta - is entirely insufficient to establish law in Idaho on the post-OBRA issue 
before this Court. 
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Claim, and do so unencumbered by the Department's efforts to shackle the Court's analysis with 
dicta from the Jackman opinion. 11 
G. FEDERAL LAW CONTAINED IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(B)(4)(B) IS CLEAR AND 
UNAMBIGUOUS. THE DEPARTMENT'S POSITION, BASED ON THE GENERAL 
DEFINITION OF "ASSETS" IN 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l), IS WITHOUT MERIT. 
Federal law says nothing about allowing recovery from assets in which the Medicaid 
recipient does not have an interest at death 12• The U.S. Solicitor General's brief before the U.S. 
Supreme Court plainly rejects the Department's argument relying on the definition of "assets" in 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) stating, 
2. Petitioner [State of Minnesota] argues (Pet. 25-28) that the text of the 
Medicaid Act imposes no limit on permissible recovery from the estate of the 
Medicaid recipient's surviving spouse, because the Act defines the term 
"assets" to include "all income and resources of the individual and of the 
individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). According to petitioner, "[b]y 
including resources of both 'the individual' and 'of the individuals spouse' in 
the meaning of 'assets,' Congress clearly intended that the spouse's resources 
fall within the scope of§ 1396p(b)(4)(B)." Pet. 27. 
Petitioner is incorrect. Although the general statutory definition of 
"assets" does encompass resources of both "the individual" (i.e., the 
Medicaid recipient) and "The individual's spouse," the particular provision 
11 Even if the Court concluded that the Jackman opinion's dicta upon which the Department relies was actually a 
holding in the case, the Court should still rule in the PR's favor for all the reasons urged by the PR. It is well past 
time for Idaho law to be brought into line with mandatory federal statutes which require that estate recovery in Idaho 
be limited to recovery against assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest in at death. 
12 See e.g., 42 CFR § 433.36(h) entitled "Adjustment and recoveries" states as follows: 
( 1) The agency may make an adjustment or recovery from funds for Medicaid claims co1rectly paid 
for an individual as follows: 
(i) From the estate of any individual who was 65 years of age or older when he or she 
received Medicaid; and 
(ii) From the estate or upon sale of the property subject to a lien when the individual is 
institutionalized as described in paragraph (g)(2) of this section. ( emphasis added). 
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of the Medicaid Act at issue here refers specifically to any "assets in which 
the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death." 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). Petitioner's argument finds it necessary to 
rewrite that clause to read "'any* * * assets in which [either or both the 
individual and the individual's spouse] had any legal title or interest."' Pet. 26 
(brackets and asterisk in original) (emphasis added). But this editing doe,~ 
nothing less than make the statute say the opposite of what it says. The plain 
language of the operative provision of the Act refutes petitioner's readings. 13 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity about limiting spousal 
estate recovery to the value of assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a 
legal interest at the time of death, the presumption against preemption do1es 
not come into play, Pet. 28 ... (emphasis added). 
U.S. Solicitoramicusbriet:p. 10-12. 
The Department fails to even mention the U.S. Solicitor General's briefing in its 
Appellant's Brief The PR anticipates it will argue, as it did below, that it is not governed by 
HHS's position as expressed in the amicus brief14· The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in 
fact HHS's (and therefore CMS 's) opinion on the issue. As noted above, a federal agency 
interpreting federal statutes is entitled to great weight by the court and HHS has extremely broad 
authority in the Medicaid area. Blumer, supra. The Secretary of HHS in essence spoke through 
its counsel in presenting its position before the U.S. Supreme Court in Barg. The U.S. Supreme 
Court agreed with the U.S. Solicitor General and refused to grant cert in Barg. 
13 (footnote 2 in the original) In describing the operation of the amended estate-recovery provision, the legislative 
history of the 1993 amendments also focused on the assets of the individual who had received Medicaid benefits, 
rather than the resources of both the individual and his or her spouse. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 213, 103d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 835 (1993) ("At the option of the State, the estate against [which]••• recovery is sought may include any 
real or personal property or other assets in which the beneficiary had any legal title or interest at the time of death, 
including the home.") (emphasis added) (footnote original) 
14 See Department's Memo in Support, p. 15, f.n. 11. 
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i. Basic Rules Of Statutory Construction Support The Magistrate's Decision. 
Applying well-established rules of statutory construction also supports the conclusion 
that the Department's position is without merit. Subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)'s definition 
of"estate" is specific to "this subsection." That definition is specific to subsection (b) of 42 U.S. 
C. § 1396p. In contrast, subsection 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l)'s definition of "assets" applies 
generally to "this section (i.e. all of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p) and is included in the "definitions" 
section at the end of the statute. When interpreting statutory definitions and provisions, specific 
definitions take precedence over general definitions. See e.g., In re Drainage District No. 3, 40 
Idaho 549,553,235 P.2d 895 (1925), citing Sutherland on Statutory Construction, sec. 387. The 
more specific definition of"estate" under (b)(4) supplants or takes precedence over the broader, 
more general definition of assets in (h)(l ), thereby imposing limits on what is recoverable in 
Medicaid recovery actions. The Department's interpretation attempts to superimpose the 
general definition of "assets" improperly upon the specific definition of "estate" that applies in 
42 U.S. C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The U.S. Solicitor General explicitly rejected this flawed statutory 
analysis. See U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, supra at 10-12. 
ii. The Department Has Misread Or Failed To Read The Barg Opinion. 
The Department argues that the Barg court did not consider the definition of the word 
"assets" in its opinion. The Department also argues that had the Barg Court simply considered 
the definition of"assets", it would have ruled as the court did in In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 
N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). Appellant's Brief, p. 25-26. In its request for attorney fees on appeal, 
the Department reiterates this contention stating, "the court in Barg failed to even consider the 
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critical federal definition of assets the Idaho Supreme Court found important in Jackman." 
Appellant's Brief, p. 32. Even a cursory reading of Barg rebuts these arguments completely. 
The Barg Court discussed and rejected Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.2000), and 
explicitly addressed and rejected the Department's definition of "assets" argument stating, 
... Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed 
that authority to extend to assets that were transferred before the death of 
the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 
882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other 
than the Medicaid recipient's estate have construed that authority to reach only 
assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, that 
is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional stat!! 
probate law or included in the estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 
1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 (limiting 
recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probat1:! 
law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 (same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 {holding that 
recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid recovc~ry 
statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid 
recipient's estate as defined under state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 
at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of' estate' in [ section] 
1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits 
recipient 'had any legal title or interest in at the time of death"'); see also In re 
Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *4 
(Tenn.Ct.App. Nov. I, 2006) ( explaining that courts that have allowed recovery 
against estates of surviving spouses have required that recipient had int1:!rest in 
assets at time of death) .... 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting 
principle requiring an interest at the time of death is Wirtz. . .. Concluding 
that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied 
on the Congressional intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking 
Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-86. . .. 
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We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 
amendment is ambiguous in the sense implied in Wirtz. The plain meaning of 
"other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b )( 4), is 
arrangements other than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the 
time of the Medicaid recipient's death . ... 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret: the 
federal law to allow recovery of assets in which the Medicaid recipient didl 
not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the 
rationale for finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at 
all emanates from the authority granted in the federal law to recover from 
the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death 
would not be part of the recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by even~ 
decision except Wirtz, to the extent the 1993 amendments allow states to 
expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, lhe 
language of the federal law clearly limits that expansion to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold 
that Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent th~Lt it 
authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's estate of assets that the 
recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any time 
during the marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subiect to 
an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of her death. (Emphasis 
added) 
Barg, supra at 68-71. Either the Department failed to read Barg or it has misread it. 
iii. Wirtz Is An Anomoly That Should Not Be Followed In Idaho. 
The Department argues that Barg is an anomaly with limited application that "runs 
contrary to other state supreme court decisions such as Jackman and In re Estate of Wirtz ... " 
Appellant's Brief, p. 26. As the Barg Court's comprehensive state survey mak1~s clear, Wirtz is 
in fact the anomaly. Jackman cannot be cited for the proposition the Department would like to 
cite it for (i.e. the unpublished opinion), so that leaves Wirtz standing alone. The Department's 
argument inherently recognizes the weakness in the Wirtz court's reasoning because the 
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Department does not even assert the same position that the Wirtz court relied upon to justify its 
decision - i.e. a tortured reading of the words "other arrangement." See Barg, supra at 70. 
Recognizing the clear weight of cogent, well-reasoned authority, the Magistrate rejected 
the untenable "asset" definition argument and the Wirtz reasoning. The Magistrate stated, 
To paraphrase the Department's argument, it may recover from George's estate 
because Idaho Code 56-218(1) allows recovery from the estate of a recipient's 
spouse; 42 U .S.C. 1396p(b )( 4) includes the word "assets" in its definition of 
"estate" and 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l) says "assets" includes property that a person 
transferred to her spouse. The court cannot accept this interpretation. 
The reasoning urged by the Department is similar to that presented in 
Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.Dakota 2000). Clarence Wirtz had received 
Medicaid benefits and North Dakota sought to recover the payments from the 
estate of Verna Witz [sic], Clarence's wife. The Wirtz court analyzed the federal 
statutory definitions of "estate" and "asset" as quoted above and held that'' ... any 
assets conveyed by Clarence Wirtz to Verna Wirtz before Clarence Wi1iz's death 
are subject to the department's recovery claim." Id. at 886. This ruling depends, 
however, on an awkward interpretation of the term "other arrangement" in 42 
U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B). The North Dakota court in Wirtz interpreted the "other 
arrangement" language independently from the rest of the section. The bulk of 
the section refers to transfers of property that occur in an automatic fashion on the 
death of the owner, such as joint tenancies, survivorship transfers and life estates. 
It would have been a drafter's nightmare to list every imaginable transfer of 
property of this type. Consequently, the more natural interpretation in the context 
of the surrounding language is that "other arrangement" is meant to include 
transfers of a similar, automatic nature not any possible transfer. ( emphasis 
original). 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 4-5. The Magistrate went on to note that the Minnesota Supreme 
Court in Barg, supra at 71, provided a "more reasonable interpretation of the federal statutory 
language." Id. 
The Magistrate concluded, 
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The federal statutory definition of"estate" does not include transfers made by a 
Medicaid recipient before she died. When making a claim against the estate of a 
Medicaid recipient's spouse, the Department may only recover against property in 
which the recipient spouse had an interest at the time of her death. Martha Perry 
conveyed all of her interest in the Tendoy home during her lifetime. There was 
no joint tenancy, right of survivorship or "other arrangement" that would have 
conveyed any interest in this property to Martha at George Perry's death. The 
Department may not recovery Medicaid benefits paid to Martha from the 
proceeds from the sale of this property. 
Order Disallowing Claim, p. 6. The Magistrate was correct and this Court should affirm 
that decision. 
H. MINNESOTA'S POST-BARG LEGISLATION DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
DEPARTMENT'S POSITION IN THIS CASE. 
The Department argues that because the State of Minnesota has amended its statutes in an 
attempt to overcome the Barg holding, this proves that federal law governing estate recovery 
claims are actually dictated by state law. Appellant's Brief, p. 26. This argument simply ignores 
federal law and ignores the state of the law in Idaho15• Federal law limits the scope of estate 
recovery to assets in which the Medicaid recipient has an interest in at death. State law then 
15 The Department asserts that it is "obvious" that federal provisions are intended to allow recovery "of the 
couple's assets." Appellant's Brief, p. 8-9. It is interesting to note, however, that when the Department 
cites and relies on the House Committee Report 42 U.S.C. § I 396p(b)(4) in its brief, p. 7-9, it underscores a 
lot of language but consistently fails to highlight the very language that is key to the resolution of the issue 
at bar. The Department ignores the fact that right after the words "estate of the individual or the surviving 
spouse" the House Report contains the following language, 
The tenn "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of a deceased individual and all 
other assets in which the individual had any legally cognizable title or interest at the time of 
death, including assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, 
life estate, living trust or other arrangement. (emphasis added) 
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. This is the exact same language the Department ignores when it cites 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(4) and argues that federal law does not control the breadth of estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, p, 8-10. 
The Department consistently ignores the language that limits the overly broad approach it has practiced for years 
and which violates federal law. This same limiting language appears in J.C.§ 56-218(4). The Department cannot 
prevail by simply ignoring clear, controlling, mandatory federal language. 
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enters into the analysis to determine whether the Medicaid recipient retained an interest in any 
assets at death. As the Magistrate found, pursuant to state law Martha retains no interest in the 
house sale proceeds that make up George's estate because she conveyed her interest in the home 
to George in 2006. 
Simply because a state legislature enacts a law in a blatant attempt to skirt mandatory 
federal limitations on estate recovery claims does not mean that the state law will withstand 
challenge. In fact, a recent district court decision out of Minnesota illustrates that courts in that 
state continue to uphold the federal limitations contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p despite: contrary 
state law. See Douglas Coumy v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 21-CV-09-477, August 4, 
2010) (Minnesota court grants summary judgment against the county concluding that the 
Minnesota law authorizing recovery against third parties of correctly paid medical assistance 
benefits conflicts with, and is thus preempted by, federal Medicaid law.). 
Minnesota has not "remedied" anything by its new law. It has only made matk:rs worse 
by clouding marital property law in Minnesota and raising serious practical and constitutional 
concerns. The changes in the Minnesota statute impair the separate property rights of all married 
individuals, because their property rights will be modified by operation oflaw if one or the other 
applies for medical assistance benefits. This obviously discriminates against married individuals 
and their spouses on the basis of receipt of federally secured benefits. Further litigation 
challenging these statutes is sure to follow in Minnesota. The Minnesota legislature's recent 
actions do nothing to change the conclusion that the Department's claim herein violatc:s federal 
law. 
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I. THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE IRRELEVANT. 
The Department repeatedly invites this Court to engage in a policy debate on the intent 
behind the federal law, contending that the estate recovery laws are not intended to protect an 
inheritance for children. Appellant's Brief, p. 7-8, 10-11, 17. The Department's opinion of 
public policy, Congressional intent, or the purpose of the Medicaid statutes is irrelevant. This 
Court need not, indeed may not, engage in policy interpretations when faced with clear, 
unambiguous federal statutes .. 
Analysis of a statute or regulation always begins with the literal language of the 
enactment. Friends ofFarm to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 
P.3d 9, 14 (2002) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has established that it 
will not look to the legislative intent of a regulation where the express written 
language of the regulation is unambiguous. Friends of Farm to Market, 13 7 
Idaho at 197, 46 P .3d at 14 ( citing Lawless v. Davis, 98 Idaho 175, 560 P .2d 497 
(1977)). "Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to 
construe the language .. " Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, then a 
court may not interpret the language to include an unwritten legislative intent. 
Stafford, supra at 464-465. As Minnesota's Supreme Court noted in discussing the same types 
of policy arguments made by the Department in this case, "[that] argument would take us too far 
down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of the plain meaning of its 
language." Barg, supra at 69. 
J. THE DEPARTMENT IS PRECLUDED FROM RAISING ISSUES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
The Department cites LC. § 32-901 as authority to support its reading of LC. § 56-218. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 10-11. The Department did not raise this argument in the proceedings 
below. Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. 
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Fodge, 121 Idaho 192,195,824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). Similarly, the Department relh::s on 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 for the first time on appeal. Appellant's Brief, p. 12. These arguments 
are not entitled to consideration on appeal 16 • 
K. GEORGE, AS HIS WIFE'S AGENT, HAD LEGAL AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN 
THE TRANSFER AT ISSUE ON HER BEHALF. 
i. Martha's Power Of Attorney Satisfied The Requirements Of I.C. § 32-912. 
The Department asserts that George's action in utilizing the power of attorney violates 
I.C. § 32-912. Appellant's B1iet~ p. 27-30. This assertion is incorrect. A thorough review of the 
power of attorney itself totally rebuts the Department's contention. The power of attorney form 
Martha si!:,JUed is incredibly comprehensive. It starts out stating in all capital letters that the 
"powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." The power of attorney then goes 
into great detail explaining a very wide variety of powers that are granted to George, as agent. 
Those powers include, under paragraph (H), entitled "Estate, trust, and other beneficiary 
16 Even if the Court did consider J.C.* 32-901, the Department's argument lacks merit and does nothing to 
advance its position. Again, the U.S. Solicitor General and HHS most recently rejected the exact same type 
of argument stating, 
3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act also finds little support in the Act's other 
provisions concerning the treatment of spousal assets. See Pet. 27-28. As petitioner notes, th{: 
Medicaid Act generally considers the community spouse's assets for purposes of determining 
whether an institutionalized individual is eligible to receive benefits. But the Act also exempts 
certain property, such as the couple's home, from consideration, 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(I0, 1396r-
5(c)(5). and allows the community spouse to retain certain amounts of resources and income that 
are not considered available to pay for the applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and 
(f)(2). Moreover, once the institutionalized spouse is determined to be eligible for benefits, 
the Medicaid Act provides that "no resources of the community spouse shall be deemed 
available to the institutionalized spouse." 42 U.S.C. 1396r-S(c)(4). The Medicaid Act, in 
short, imposes significant limitations on petitioner's asserted principle that "spouses are 
expected to support each other." Pet. 27. To read Section 1396p(b)(4)(B) in accordance with 
its plain terms thus is consistent with the broader statutory scheme. ( emphasis added). 
U.S. Solicitor General amicus brief, p. 11. 
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transactions" the power "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principal."17 Martha 
expressly authorized George as her agent to make gifts on her behalf. A "gift" is "a voluntary 
transfer of property to another made gratuitously and without consideration." Black's Law 
Dictionary ( 6th ed. 1991 ). By including the qualifier that George, as agent, may exercise "any 
gift" on her behalf, Martha broadened that power to authorize George to make gifts to any 
person, including himself. The Magistrate held that although this language was not the "clearest 
kind of authority" he agreed that the gifting language in paragraph H "certainly can be read that 
way." Tr., p. 11, LL. 12-13. Martha's power of attorney satisfied LC.§ 32-912.18 
The gifting authority that Martha gave to George must also be read in conjunction with 
the other powers Martha granted to her husband, specifically the power to exercise all powers 
with respect to Medicaid" that she could exercise. Paragraph (K) entitled, "Benefits from Social 
Security, Medicare, Medicaid, or other governmental programs, or military service" authorizes 
Martha's husband as her agent 
"To ... file ... claims to any benefit or assistance under any federal, state, local 
or foreign statute; and in general, exercise all powers with respect to ... 
government benefits, including but not limited to Medicare and Medicaid~, 
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disabili~y. 
( emphasis added). 
17 The full sentence that contains this language states, "To accept, receipt for, exercise, release,, reject, renounce, 
assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal." ( emphasis added). 
18The fact that a title company required the PR to sign off on the closing statement for Martha is not equivalent to a 
legal finding that Martha's power of attorney was somehow deficient, as the Department implies. Appellant's Brief, 
p. 30. That signature requirement is simply the title insurer covering its bases because the couple was married at the 
time of the closing and Martha was still alive. It is standard procedure for a title insurer to have everyone possible 
sign off as a liability avoidance precaution. 
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As discussed supra, conveying the Medicaid spouse's interest in the couple's home to the 
community spouse is expressly sanctioned by federal law. Such a transfer is typical in cases of 
married couples where one needs long-term care and will be qualifying for Medicaid benefits. 
Martha's power of attorney not only contemplated that her agent/husband could make such an 
interspousal transfer, it expressly authorized it. The combination of the comprehensive power to 
"exercise any gift" and the comprehensive power to "exercise all powers with respect to ... 
Medicaid" expressly establishes that George acted well within his authority as Martha's agent in 
executing the deed that the Department challenges. 
The Department cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions to support its argument 
that Martha's power of attorney was somehow insufficient. Appellant's Brief, p. 28-29. All of 
these cases are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In none of those cases did the power 
of attorney contain the specific gifting and Medicaid planning language that Martha's power of 
attorney contains. In none of those cases did the power of attorney contain any gifting language 
whatsoever. Jn none of those cases was an interspousal transfer at issue. In none of those cases 
was Medicaid at issue. 
In addition, every case the Department cites involved agents who were not spouses. In 
the Department's cited cases, the non-spouse agents were conveying assets to themselves or to 
other third parties, often in contravention of the principal's estate distribution plan or somehow 
in contravention to what the principal would have intended. In this case, Martha's agent was her 
husband, conveying Martha's interest in a home in which he was residing, to himself, while his 
wife was in a nursing home. Martha had already taken action to put George's name on the title 
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herself, indicating her intent he have ownership of the home. George is the natural object of 
Martha's bounty. 
The interspousal transfer makes sense and was contemplated by the power of attorney 
Martha put in place specifically to allow such actions. There simply are no concerns present in 
this case regarding financial abuse of the principal, negation of the principal's estate plan or 
fraud on the principal as was at issue in the cases the Department relies upon. 
"Powers of attorney are to be construed in accordance with the rules of interpretation of 
written instruments generally .... " 19 In construing a written instrument, a court must consider 
it as a whole and give meaning to all provisions of the writing to the extent possible.20 "The 
intention of the donor or 6,yantor is to be gathered from the instrument of creation."21 Reading 
the power of attorney in its entirety, one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document. In 
addition to the introductory language indicating that the powers conveyed to George are broad 
and all-encompassing, the powers under each paragraph provide great detail emphasizing and 
d . h 1· 22 un ersconng t at cone us1on . 
19 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency§ 30, at 533-34 (1986). 
20 Selkirk Seed Co. v. State Insurance Fund, I 35 Idaho 434, 437, 18 P. 3d 956 (2000), citing Magic Valley 
Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 565. 808 P . .2d 1303, 1310 ( 1991 ). 
21 49 C.J. §§ 34, 40. See also 72 C.J.S. Powers§ 22 (1951) 
22 Paragraph (A) entitled "Real property transactions" authorizes George to deal with her real property 
on such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper; and to ... convey ... and in any 
way or manner deal with all or any part of any interest in real property whatsoever, irrcluding 
specifically, but without limitation, real property lying and being situated in the State ofldaho, 
under such terms and conditions ... as my Agent shall deem proper. (emphasis added). 
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The Department argues that Martha's power of attorney contained restrictions on 
George's authority in ,-r,-r G and H. Appellant's Brief, p. 28. The language referred to prohibits 
the agent from designating himself as a beneficiary under an insurance contract (i-1 G) and 
changing the principal 'swill or trust so that the agent benefits from that change (,-r H). These 
standard provisions, however, do not prohibit George from engaging in the interspousal transfer 
at issue and simply do not apply to this case23 . 
ii. Martha's Power Of Attorney Met The Requirements Of I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq .. 
I.C. § 15-5-501 et seq. was in effect at the time Martha signed the power of attorney. I.C. 
§ 15-5-502 stated in pertinent part, 
All acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during 
any period of disability or incapacity of the principal have the same effoct and ... 
The authority granted under this paragraph also includes the authority to "cancel" notes, mortgages, security interest, 
or deeds to secure debt, which is equivalent to "giving away" assets of the principal. Paragraph (B) entitled 
"Tangible personal property transactions" includes the power to, 
in any way or manner deal with all or any part of any real or personal property whatsoever, 
tangible or intangible, or any interest therein, that I own at the time of execution or may thereafter 
acquire, under such terms and conditions, and under such covenants, as my Agent shall deem 
proper." (emphasis added). 
Paragraph (H), discussed above, also includes language granting the agent power to" ... in general, exercise all 
powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability." The 
other paragraphs in Martha's power of attorney consistently imbue George with authority to act with total and 
absolute discretion. The Department's counsel actually agreed with this conclusion when he stated at the hearing," . 
. . this is a very comprehensive power of attorney." Tr., p. 7, LL. 5-6. 
23 This language is typical "anti-slayer" language which is included in such forms to prohibit an agent from 
engaging in transactions that are contrary to public policy, such as the agent taking out life insurance or changing an 
estate plan to name himself as beneficiary and then murdering the principal and thereby profiting from those actions. 
The meaning of these boilerplate restrictions should not stretched beyond reason, as the Department's argument 
encourages. None of the concerns that underpin these type of "agent as bad actor" provisions is present in this case 
where we have an agent/spouse who is the natural object of the principal's bounty acting in a manner that is fully 
authorized by other language in the power of attorney and acting in a manner that Martha would have wanted. 
Martha would have signed the deed at issue were she able to do so. Instead, she authorized her husband to do it for 
her under a power of attorney that was adequate to accomplish her wishes in this regard. 
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bind the principal and his successors in interest, as if the principal were compe:tent 
and not disabled. 
The power of attorney meets I.C. § 15-5-501 's requirement that it contain words "showing the 
intent of the principal that the authority conferred shall be exercisable notwithstanding the 
principal's subsequent disability or incapacity." The Idaho statute which governs Martha's 
power of attorney did not mandate that Martha was required to use any specific language or 
"terms of art" in order to imbue her spouse/agent with the requisite authority to make the 
interspousal transfer at issue. Yet as discussed above, the power of attorney does contain such 
language. The power of attorney at issue is completely sufficient under the law then in effect to 
grant Martha's spouse/agent, George, the full and complete authority to engage in the 
interspousal transfer at issue. 
iii. Idaho's Recently Enacted Uniform Power Of Attorney Act Also Supports The 
Magistrate's Ruling. 
In 2008, Idaho's legislature overhauled our Uniform Power of Attorney Act and required 
that specific gifting language be included in the power of attorney if the principal wanted her 
agent to have that authority. J.C.§ 15-12-20l(l)(b/4 • These changes were made, in part, to 
guard against elder abuse. In the official comments to Article 2 of the Model Act it states, 
The rationale for requiring a grant of specific authority to perf01m the acts 
enumerated in subsection (a) [adopted as LC.§ 15-12-201(1)] is the risk those 
acts pose to the principal's property and estate . ... 
Subsection (b) [LC.§ 15-12-201(1)(b)] contains an additional safeguard 
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an 
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to 
24 This Act was constructed from a review and revision of the National Conference of Commissioners On Uniform 
State Laws' Uniform Power of Attorney Act dated July, 2006 ("Model Act"). 
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create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an 
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with ~~ift 
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependent of the 
agent without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. 
This comment underscores the point that the concerns present when examining an agent 
making a gift to himself are generally not present when a spouse/agent is involved. George 
utilized the powers given him by his wife to convey Martha's interest in the couple's home to 
himself. The new Uniform Act, LC. § 15-12-217(2), specifically recognizes that there will 
continue to be powers of attorney which contains language "granting general authority with 
respect to gifts" which authorize the agent to make gifts to themselves. Although the standards 
encompassed in the new Act are more restrictive than those that governed Martha's power of 
attorney, even the new law recognizes the fact that powers of attorney are to be read less 
stringently when the spouse is the one engaging in an interspousal transfer25 . 
In this case, when all of these factors are considered, the Magistrate correctly concluded 
that George acted consistently with the authority granted him in Martha's power of attorney. 
The amendments made in 2008 and the policy rationales behind those amendments lend 
additional support for the legal conclusion Martha's power of attorney was sufficient to allow 
George as her agent to effectuate the interspousal transfer. 
25 In addition, the new Act's I.C. § 15-12-217(3) indicates that even if the principal's objectives are not 
actually known to the agent, the agent may make gifts of the principal's property in what he determines to 
be the principal's best interest, taking into account such facts as the nature of the principal's property, the 
principal's foreseeable need for maintenance, the principal's history of making gifts, and eligibility for 
government benefit program assistance. Thus even under the new Act it appears permissible for an 
agent/spouse with gifting power to engage in exactly the type of interspousal Medicaid-motivated transfer 
at issue in this case. 
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iv. The Court Should Infer From The Undisputed Facts And Circumstances That 
Common Law Interspousal Agency Existed And Validates The Transfer. 
stated, 
In Lowry v. Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 713, 779 P .2d 22 ( Ct. App. 1989), the Court 
We have noted that community real property can be validly encumbered 
only if both spouses join in executing the instrument of encumbrance. LC. § 32-
912. The statute evinces a legislative policy of protecting community real 
property from creditors, unless both spouses agree in writing to incur the debt. 
Thus, the statute usually requires two signatures. However, an exception to this 
general rule exists if one spouse is authorized to act as an agent for the 
management and disposition of community real property. Noble v. Glenns 
Ferry Bank, Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,367,421 P.2d 444,447 (1966). Our Supreme 
Court has held that such an agency may be created by an express power of 
attorney, as authorized by I.C. § 32-912, or may be inferred from the 
circumstances and conduct of the parties. Noble, 91 Idaho at 368, 421 P .2d at 
448. 
See also, Noble v. Glenns Ferry Bank Ltd., 91 Idaho 364,421 P.2d 444 (1966) (existence 
of the wife's agency was a question of fact to be determined by the finder of the facts 
from the husband's and wife's dealings, circumstances, and conduct). 
George and Martha's dealings, circumstances and conduct support a ruling that an 
interspousal agency can be inferred from the undisputed facts of this case. Consideration of the 
facts and circumstances present, including the actions Martha took in putting the power of 
attorney in place, the comprehensive language it contains, and the Magistrate's factual findings 
( discussed below), supports this Court affirming the interspousal conveyance based on the 
alternative ground of common law interspousal agency. 
v. The Magistrate Made Findings of Fact On The Power Of Attorney Issue. 
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The Department argues that the Magistrate made a legal conclusion unsupported by 
findings of fact when he stated, "The court has determined that George Perry held a valid power 
of attorney from Martha and that he had the authority to transfer the property to himself." Order 
Disallowing Claim, f.n. 1. Appellant's Brief, p. 27, 31. The Department ignores what occurred 
at the hearing. The Magistrate's legal conclusion as stated in the Order was supported by 
explicit findings of fact made at the hearing. There is no prohibition against a magistrate making 
oral findings of fact. See e.g., State v. Revenaugh, 133 Idaho 774, 776, 992 P.2d 769 (1999). 
The Magistrate ruled from the bench on the power of attorney issue stating, 
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and -- because I 
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H, 
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be 
read that way . .. 
But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of 
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is 
that document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as 
possible, it seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real 
property. 
So I'm going to make a determination for purposes of this case that 
that is a valid power of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including 
giving Martha Perry's interest in that property. 
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (t!mphasis 
added) 
Tr., p. 11, LL. 8-25; p. 12, LL. 1-11. 
The Magistrate clearly ruled not only that paragraph H in the power of attorney was 
sufficient to satisfy I.C. § 32-912, but also that the comprehensive nature of the document 
supported a conclusion that Martha's power of attorney gave George sufficient authorilty to 
legally effectuate the interspousal transfer. The Magistrate found as a matter of fact that Martha 
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intended to give George the necessary authority in the power of attorney to transfer the property 
to himself. There is no need. as the Department argues, to remand for further factual findings in 
order to support the Magistrate's legal conclusion on the power of attorney issue, nor to find that 
interspousal agency existed under the circumstances of this case sufficient to uphold the transfer 
on that basis as \Vell. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, the Personal Representative respectfully requests that the 
Court affirm the Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim in its entirety. 
DA TED this 26th day of August, 2010. 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
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Mille Lacs County Attorney, Melissa M. Saterbak, Asst. Mille Lacs County Attorney, Milaca, MN, for appellant Mille Lacs 
County. 
Thomas J. Meinz, Princeton, MN, for respondent Michael Barg. 
Julian J. Zweber, St. Paul, MN, for amid curiae Elder Law Section of the Minnesota State Bar Association and National 
Senior Citizens Law Center. 
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Robin Christopher Vue-Benson, Asst. Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for c1micus curiae 
Minnesota C.ommissioner of Human Services. 
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en bane. 
OPINION 
MEYER, Justice. 
The Mille Lacs County Family Services and Welfare Department (County) filed a claim against the Estat«! of Francis E. 
Barg (Estate), seeking to recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of his predeceased wife, Dolores Barg. The 
Estate partially allowed the claim, and disallowed the other part. The district court, conduding that Dolores Barg's 
interest in the couple's property was limited because she had conveyed it to her husband before her death, evaluated 
her interest as a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. The C.ounty appealed, arguing that it was e·ntitled to 
recovery from the full value of the property. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, partially allowing the claim 
and evaluating Dolores Barg's interest in the property as a joint tenancy interest equivalent to one-half the value of the 
• II 
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property. In re Estate of Bilrg, 722 
57 
N.W.2d 492, 497 (Minn.App.2006). We affirm in part and reverse in part. 
Factual and Procedural Bilckground. 
The parties have stipulated to the facts in this case. Dolores J. Barg was oom in 1926, married Fratnds E. Barg in 
1948, and remained married to him until her death in 2004. In 1962 and 1967, in two separate transac:tions, the Bargs 
took title as joint tenants to real property in Princeton, Minnesota. Their home was located on this property. On October 
24, 2001, Dolores Barg entered a nursing home in Mille Lacs County, at first paying the costs herself. In December 2001, 
she applied for long-term Medicaid benetits.(fn1) 
An asset assessment for Dolores Barg was completed in February 2002. The Bargs' marital assets including their 
homestead totaled $137,272.63.(fn2) Approval for long-term Medicaid benefits was given retroactive tc, December 1, 
2001. 
On February 27, 2002, Francis Barg executed his will, nominating the couple's son Michael F. Barg ilS personal 
representative, leaving his estate to his surviving descendants, and making no provision for his wife. Dolores Barg 
transferred her joint tenancy interest in the homestead property to Francis Barg on July 2, 2002, when lier daughter and 
guardian of her estate, Barbara Anderson, executed a Guardian's Deed. Also in July 2002, Barbara Anderson deleted 
Dolores Barg's name from certificates of deposit the couple held jointly at Bremer Bank. There is no alle~ation that these 
actions were improper or fraudulent. 
On January 1, 2004, Dolores Barg died, having received $108,413.53 in Medicaid benefits. At the time of her death, 
assets belonging to either Dolores or Francis Barg included three certificates of deposit, a checking account, and an IRA 
account, all in the name of Francis Barg alone; one certificate of deposit payable to the funeral home for Dolores Barg's 
funeral; two vehicles, together worth approximately $9,000; the homestead titled in Francis Barg's name, valued at 
$120,800; and miscellaneous household goods and furniture. All of these assets had been jointtv held at some time 
during the couple's 55-year marriage. 
On May 27, 2004, Francis Barg died, never having received Medicaid benefits. On July 30, 2004, the County filed a 
claim against Francis Barg's estate, seeking to recover $108,413.53, the full amount Dolores Barg had received in 
Medicaid benefits. 
Michael Barg disallowed $44,533.53 of the claim, and allowed $63,880. The County petitioned for an allowance of 
the full claim, arguing that the entire value of the marital property, both the homestead and the .:ertificat«!S of deposit, 
was subject to its claim because Dolores Barg's joint tenancy interest gave her a right to use of the entire property. The 
district court concluded that Dolores Barg's interest in the property at the time of her death was 
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equivalent to a life estate, and upheld the partial disallowance. 
The County appealed. The court of appeals explained that, based on In re Estate of Gu/Iberg, 652 N. W.2d 709 
(Minn.App. 2002), the County's ability to recover against Francis Barg's estate was limited to Dolores's interest in marital 
or jointly owned property at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 496. The court decided that property law 
principles should be applied to determine the nature of that interest and that under federal law and Gu/Iberg, Dolores 
Barg retained a joint tenancy interest in the homestead at the time of her death. Id. at 497. The c1::,urt valu,ed that 
interest as an undivided one-half of the property's value, and remanded the case to the district court for a l'ecalculation 
of the amount of the claim that was allowable. Id. 
The County petitioned for review. The Estate opposed review but sought conditional cross-review on th,e issue of 
whether federal law permits the State to recover at all from a surviving spouse's estate. We granted review, as well as 
cross-review, and asked for briefing on whether the Estate had adequately preserved for review the issue of' "whether 
the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a 
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surviving spouse." We granted requests by the Minnesota CommiSSioner of Human Services to file an c1micus curiae brief 
aligned with the County and to participate in oral argument.(fn3) We also granted requests by the Eidt~ Law Section of 
the Minnesota State Bar Association and the National Senior Otizens Law Center to file an amicus curiae brief aligned 
with the Estate. After oral argument, we asked the parties for supplementary briefing on the relationship of the 2003 and 
2005 amendments of Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, sutxls. 1 and lc·lk (2006), to the authority the County ar~1ues exists under 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (2006) and Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2 (2006), and how that relationship affects 
preemption analysis and the scope of recovery permissible under Minnesota law. 
Statutory Framework. 
Congress enacted Medicaid in 1965 as Title XIX of the Social Security Act to ensure medical care to individuals who 
do not have the resources to cover essential medical services. Martin ex rel. Hoff v. Oty of Rochester; 642 N. W .2d 1, 9 
(Minn. 2002). Medicaid was intended to be the payor of last resort. Id. The program is jointly funded with the states as a 
"cooperative endeavor in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them 
in furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). 
Participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into state medical assistance plans, and submit those 
plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. III 
2003). After this, the states can receive federal payments. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000). Each state administers its own 
program within the federal requirements, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)(fn4) administer 
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the program and approve state plans. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. One of the requirements imposed on state plans is that 
they must "comply with the proviSions of [42 U.S.C. § 1396pJ with respect to liens, adjustments and rec1Jveries of 
medical assistance correctly paid, transfers of assets, and treabnent of certain trusts." 42 U.S.C.. § 1396ct{a){18) (2000). 
To receive Medicaid, a person must qualify as either "categorically" or "medically" needy. Estilte of Atkinson v. Minn. 
Dep'tofHuman Servs., 564 N.W.2d 209, 210-11 (Minn.1997). A person is "categorically needy" if he is eligible for other 
specified federal assistance programs. Id at 211. A person is "medically needy" if he incurs medical expenses that 
reduce his income to roughly the level of those who are categorically needy. Id. To qualify as medically needy a person 
may have income no higher than a defined threshold and may own assets of no more than a defined value. Id. If the 
assets of a Medicaid applicant and her spouse exceed the qualifying threshold, they must "spend down" their assets until 
they are at or below the qualifying threshold. Id. If a potential Medicaid recipient transfers assets below fair market value 
within a certain pericx1 of time before eligibility, the recipient is deemed ineligible for benefits for a time period mandated 
by statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2000). This prOVision prevents people who are not needy from becoming eligible for 
Medicaid by transferring their assets away. 
When determining the eligibility of a married person to receive Medicaid, states consider assets of both husband and 
wife as available to the spouse requesting benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-S{c) (2000). But there are several provisions in 
place to protect the community spouse(fnS) from being impoverished as a result of the spend-down of assets needed to 
qualify the applicant for Medicaid. See Atkinson, 564 N.W.2d at 211; 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (2000). The value of the 
couple's home Is not included among assets considered eligible to pay for medical care. Id§ 1396r-S{c)(5); 42 U.S.C. § 
1382b(a)(1) (2000). The community spouse of a Medicaid recipient is also entitled to an allowance of income and assets 
designated for his or her needs that is not considered available to pay for the recipient spouse's medical care. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396r·S(d). Furthermore, the recipient spouse has the right to transfer assets, including an interest in the homestead, 
to his or her community spouse. 42 U . .S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Medicaid thus balances the obligation of community spouses to 
contribute to the payment of medical expenses for their recipient spouses against the accommodation of the community 
spouse's need to provide for his or her own support. 
Federal Medic.aid Recovery Provisions. 
Although it is not applicable to the facts before us, it is useful to start with the pre-1993 federal law on Medicaid 
recovery, because it is relied on in the parties' arguments and is the basis for the rationale of several relevant cases. 
Prior to amendments adopted in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1993, the federal Medicaid statute 
stated a general principle that there should be no recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject 
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to several exceptions, one of which is relevant here: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the 
State plan may be made, except •• 
• • • • 
(B) in the case of any other individual who was 65 years of age or older when he received such 
assistance, from his estate. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (1988). Under this pre-1993 law, states were allowed, but not required, to recover Medicaid 
benefits paid to recipients 65 or older, and the statute specified the recovery would be from the recipient's estate. The 
statute also provided that this recovery from the recipient's estate could only be made after the death of the recipient's 
surviving spouse. Id.§ 1396p(b}(2) (1988). Despite this prohibition against recovery before the death of a surviving 
spouse, there was no express mention of recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. The pre-1993 federal law 
contained no definition of "estate." 
Section 1396p(b) was amended as part of the OBRA amendments of 1993. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1993, Pub.L. No. 103-66, § 13612(a), (c), 107 Stat. 312, 627-28 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l), (4) 
(2000)). As amended, the federal law retained the general prohibition against states attempting to recover Medicaid 
payments correctly paid on behalf of an individual, with limited exceptions. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2000). But the 1993 
amendments changed section 1396p(b) in several ways. First, they lowered the age criterion f<>r recovery from 65 to 55. 
Second, they made recovery allowed by the exceptions mandatory rather than permissive. Third, they added a definition 
of "estate," which itself had both mandatory and permissive elements. As amended, the general nonreciovery rule and 
the relevant exception read as follows: 
(1) No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under 
the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
•••• 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •. 
Jd. The amended version of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) retained the express reference to recovery from the recipient's 
estate. Furthermore, as was true pre-amendment, this recovery from the recipient's estate is only permitted after the 
death of the recipient's surviving spouse: "Any adjustment or recovery under paragraph (1) may be made• only after the 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any • • •." 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2) (emphasis added). And hke the pre-
1993 version, the amended federal statute contains no express authorization for, or reference to, recover,, from a 
surviving spouse's estate. 
The 1993 amendments added a definition of "estate" for purposes of Medicaid recovery, with a mandatory provision 
that looks to state probate law and an optional provision that authorizes states to expand the definition beyond the 
scope of probate law: 
[TJhe term "estate", with respect to a deceased individual •• 
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included within the individual's estate, as 
defined 
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for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State* * * any other real and personal property and other assets in 
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which the individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint 
tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). Under this provision, a state has the option to adopt a definition of 
"estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes that indudes some assets which, under ordinary probate law, would not be part 
of the Medicaid recipient's estate, because they would pass immediately to someone else on the recip~:!nt's death. For 
example, when two persons hold property in joint tenancy with a right of survivorship and one dies, the deceased joint 
tenant's interest ordinarily passes directly to the surviving joint tenant and is not part of the probate estate. Under the 
optional expanded definition allowed by federal law, for Medicaid recovery purposes the interest of a deceased joint 
tenant who had received Medicaid would be induded in his estate, rather than passing directly to the surviving joint 
tenant. 
Minnesota s Medicaid Recovery laws. 
Minnesota has long had a policy of requiring participants in the Medicaid program and their spouses to use their own 
assets to pay their share of the cost of care during or after enrollment. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(a) (2006). To 
implement this policy, since 1987 Minnesota law has provided for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid from the estate of a 
recipient or the estate of the recipient's surviving spouse. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. la (originally ena1cted as Act of 
June 12, 1987, ch. 403, art. 2, § 82, 1987 Minn. Laws 3255, 3347). As relevant here, subdivision la provides that, "on 
the death of the survivor of a married couple, either or both of whom received medical assistance, • • '' the total 
amount paid for medical assistance rendered for the person and spouse shall be filed as a claim against the estate of the 
[recipient] or the estare of the surviving spouse." Id. (emphasis added). A claim against the estate of a surviving spouse 
for medical assistance provided to the recipient spouse may be made up to "the value of the assets of the estate that 
were marital property or jointly owned property at any time during the marriage." Id., subd. 2 (emphasis added). 
The broad estate recovery authority contained in subdivisions la and 2 was supplemented in 2003 by amendments 
to the statute expanding subdivision 1 and adding subdivisions lc-lk. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 1.4, art. 1:2, §§ 40-50, 
2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1751, 2205-17. These amendments implement the optional expanded definition of 
"estate" authorized in the 1993 amendments to the federal law. See Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 1(a)(2} (2006); 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The 2003 amendments to the Minnesota estate recovery law modify common lctw to provide for 
continuation of a recipient's life estate or joint tenancy interest in real property after his death for the purpose of 
recovering medical assistance, Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(3) (2006), and include that continued interest in the 
recipient's estate. Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lg, lh(b), 1i(a), 1j. The 2003 amendments also establish specific 
procedures for exercising claims against these continued life estate and joint tenancy interests, as well as procedures 
and waiting periods that differ according to whether the recipient's spouse, dependent children, or other relatives 
62 
living in the homestead survive the recipient. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 48-49, 200] Minn. Laws 1st Spec. 
Sess. 1751, 2213-17 (codified as amended at Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subds. 1i and 1j). In this case, the ec,unty filed its 
claim under subdivisions la and 2 and did not rely on provisions added in the 2003 amendments. 
The issues presented in this case involve several questions about the relationship between the recovery provisions of 
federal and Minnesota Medicaid law. The court of appeals held that a partial disallowance of the County's daim was 
proper, relying on its earlier decision in Gu/Iberg that the broad authorization in subdivision 2 for recovery up to the value 
of all assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned at any time during the maniagewas partially 
preempted by the 1993 amendments to the federal law that limit the expanded estate to assets in which the recipient 
spouse had a legal interest at the time of her death. Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 595-96 (citing GJ/lberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714). 
The County, and its supporting amicus curiae the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, argue that 
the court of appeals was wrong, both here and in Gui/berg, in finding any preemption of the broad estate recovery 
authorized in subdivisions la and 2. They contend that there was nothing in the federal statute prior to thEt 1993 
amendments that limited the states' authority to pursue estate recovery of Medicaid benefits paid, and that: the 1993 
amendments were intended by Congress to expand state options, not limit them. Alternatively, the County argues that 
even if recovery is limited to the assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, Dolores Barg had 
an interest in the property notwithstanding the conveyance to her husband, and the court of appeals erred in valuing 
that interest as only one-half the value of the homestead. 
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The Estate and its supporting amid curiae counter that federal law authorizes recovery only from a recipient's estate, 
and Minnesota law that allows recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is therefore preempted.(fn6) The Estate argues 
that recovery is also barred because, to the extent recovery is allowed from the estate of a surviving spouse, federal law 
limits that recovery to the value of assets in which the recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death, and 
subdivision 2 of section 256B.15 is preempted to the extent it allows broader recovery. Finally, the Estate argues that 
there should be no recovery here because Dolores Barg had no legal interest 
63 
in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, having conveyed her interest to her husband 
during her lifetime. 
Thus, the issues presented are as follows. First, does federal law preempt the authorization in Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, 
subd. la, for recovery of Medicaid benefits paid for a recipient spouse from the estate of the surviving spouse? Second, if 
such recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is not preempted, does federal law limit the recovery to assets in which 
the recipient had an interest at the time of her death, preempting the broader recovery allowed in Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, 
subd. 2, as to assets owned as marital property or in joint tenancy at any time during the marriage? Third, if recovery is 
limited to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death what, if any, interest did Dolores Barg 
have in the homestead or the certificates of deposit at the time of her death, and specifically, was the c:ourt of appeals 
correct in holding that Dolores Barg had a joint tenancy interest for purposes of estate recovery even though she 
transferred that interest to her husband during her lifetime? We address these issues in turn, after first reviewing basic 
preemption principles. 
I. 
Whether federal law preempts state law is primarily an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. 
Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 9. The application of law to stipulated facts is a question of law, which we also review de novo. 
Morton Bklgs., Inc. v. Comm'rofRevenue, 488 N.W.2d 254,257 (Minn.1992). 
Congressional purpose is"' the ultimate touchstone"' of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 
U.S. 497, 504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Oerks Int1 Assn, Loeol 1625 v. ScMrmerhom, 375 
U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 ( 1963}}. Our primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertam the intent of 
Congress. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause · start[s] 
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that 
[is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Opollone v. Uggett Group, Inc., SOS U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 
120 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 s.ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11 (citing Opollone, 505 U.S. at 516,518, 112 
S.Ct. 2608). 
Congress may preempt state law in several ways. Cal. Fed. Sdv. & Loan Assn, 479 U.S. at 280, 107 S.Ct. 683. First, 
it may do so with express language preempting state law. Id. Second, it may do so by fully occupying the field, that is, 
"congressional intent to pre-empt state law in a particular area may be inferred where the scheme of federal regulation 
is sufficiently comprehensive to make reasonable the inference that Congress 'left no room' for supplementary state 
regulation." Id at 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683 (quoting Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). Here, it is clear that Congress 
neither expressly preempted state law nor so completely occupied the field as to leave no room for state action, because 
the Medicaid program specifically permits and even requires action by participating states. Martin, 642 N.W.2d at 11. 
The third kind of preemption is at issue in this case. Even when Congress 
64 
has not chosen to displace state law expressly or by fully occupying the field, "federal law may nonetheless pre-empt 
state law to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law." Cd/. Fed. Sav. & Loan Assh, 479 U.S. at 281, 107 S.Ct. 683. 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible, Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, 
Inc. v. Pau( 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or when the state law is "an obs,tacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Odvidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 
S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
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II. 
We now turn to the question of whether Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, which requires Medicaid recovery against 
the estate of a surviving spouse, is preempted by federal law, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l)(B). Because only 
conflict preemption may be applicable, we seek to determine whether compliance with both statutes is impossible or 
whether the state law stands as an obstade to accomplishment of the purposes of the federal law. 
The County seeks recovery here under subdivision la of section 256B.15, which authorizes--indeed requires--
recovery of Medicaid benefits from the estate of the surviving spouse of a recipient. The Estate argues that this state law 
authorization to recover from the estate of the surviving spouse is preempted because it conflicts with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
(b){l}, which prohibits recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits except from the estate of the recipi;?nt of the 
benefits. 
The federal statute establishes a general prohibition against recovery of correctly paid Medicaid benefits, subject to 
three specified exceptions: 
( 1) No adjustment or lc'a1~ of any medical assistance correctly paid on beholf of an individu;}! under 
the Slilte plan may be made, except that the State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the following 
individuals: 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(1) (emphasis added}. Only one exception potentially applies to the circumstance of this case: 
(B) In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the individual received such 
medical assistance, the State shall seek adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate • • •. 
Id§ 1396p(b)(l)(B) (emphasis added). Because this express exception to the general rule against recovery of 
Medicaid benefits directs that recovery come from the recipient's estate and makes no reference to a surviving spouse's 
estate, the Estate argues that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law. Because 
exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, Comm'r v. Clark, 489 IJ.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 
1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 (1989), it appears on its face that recovery from the surviving spouse's estate is not permitted by 
federal law. 
Two courts have agreed with this analysis and conduded that section 1396p(b)(l)(B) authorizes recovery only from 
the recipient's estate and does not allow recovery from the estate of a surviving spouse. Hines v. Dep't al' Pub. Aid, 221 
Ill.2d 222, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d 148, 152-53 (2006); In re Estate of Budney, 197 Wis.2d 948, 541 N.W.2d 245, 
246 (1995), rev. denied546 N. W.2d 471 (Wis. 1996). The Wisconsin Court of Appeals explained that the federal statute 
never "counter[ed] the initial blanket prohibition" 
65 
on recovery by authorizing recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. Budney, 541 N.W.2d at 246, The Illinois 
Supreme Court noted that under federal and Illinois law, the state had authority to seek reimbursement fmm the 
recipient's estate a~er the death of his surviving spouse. Hines, 302 Ill.Dec. 711, 850 N.E.2d at 153. But instead, as 
here, the state sought recovery from the estate of the surviving spouse. Id. The court explained that federal law allows 
only three exceptions under which a state may seek reimbursement and "[a)II are specifically directed to the estate of 
the recipient. No provision is made for collection from the estate of the recipient's spouse." Id. The court declined to add 
to the unambiguous language of the federal statute or to recognize exceptions beyond those specified in the federal law. 
Id. 
The Commissioner argues that Hines and Budneywere wrongly decided, misinterpreting the federal statute, 
particularly in light of the presumption against preemption. The County contends that this statutory exception to the 
nonrecovery principle allows recovery generally against individuals who received benefits a~er age 55, and does not 
narrowly limit the sources of recovery. The County asserts that the reference to the individual's estate is merely a 
designation of the timing for recovery rather than a limit on the scope of recovery, because the language does not say 
that the state may recover "only" from the individual's estate. The County argues that absent such express limiting 
language, and applying the presumption against preemption, section 1396p(b}(1)(B) merely specifies one potential 
source of rec.overy, the recipient's estate, and does not preclude others, such as a spouse's estate. 
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In our view, the plain language of section 1396p(b)(1)(B) comports far more closely with the inteirpretation of the 
Illinois Supreme Court in Hines than with the County's expansive view of the authority imparted by that provision. 
Moreover, we know of no court that has adopted the County's broad view of that language alone. Ind!eed, in explaining 
the then-existing law in a report on proposed OBRA amendments in 1993, a House Report referred only to the possibility 
of recovery from the estate of the recipient, even when describing recovery after the death of a surviving spouse: 
Under current law, a State has the option of seeking recovery of amounts correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under its Medicaid program from the individual's estate if the individual was 65 yea~; or older at 
the time he or she received Medicaid benefits. The State may not seek recovery from the benf1ficiary's 
estate until the death of the surviving spouse, if any, and only if the individual has no surviving minor or 
disabled child. 
H.R.Rep. No. 103-111, at 208 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 535 (emphasis added). In contrast, 
describing the proposed 1993 amendments to the Medicaid recovery law passed by the House, the same House Report 
stated that newly-required state estate recovery programs would have to "provide for the collection of the amounts 
correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving Sl)Ouse." Id. Thus, when the House wanted to describe recovery from the surviving spouse's estate, it said so 
clearly. 
Nevertheless, despite the seemingly plain language providing only for recovery from the recipient's estate, we 
acknowledge that several courts have interpreted the federal recovery provisions to allow recovery from the estate of a 
surviving 
66 
spouse. The courts reaching this condusion have for the most part relied on the 1993 amendments to the federal law 
that allow the states to adopt an expanded definition of estate for purposes of Medicaid recovery. For e>cample, the New 
York Court of Appeals explained, in dicta, that although federal law did not expressly provide for recovery of Medicaid 
payments from the "secondarily dying spouse's estate," the 1993 amendments gave the states power to recover against 
the spouse's estate for certain categories of assets. In re Estate ofOaig, 82 N.Y.2d 388, 604 N.Y.S.2d 908, 624 N.E.2d 
1003, 1006 ( 1993). The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the Craig interpretation that the 1993 expanded estate 
provision gave the states the option to recover against a surviving spouse's estate assets conveyed through joint tenancy 
or right of survivorship. In re Estate of Thompson, 586 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1998). Indeed, the court in Thompson 
rejected the ruling in Budney that recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is not allowed under federal law on the 
basis that the Budneycourt had not considered the optional expanded definition of "estate." Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 
850. The North Dakota court concluded that "consideration of all the relevant statutory provisions, in light of the 
Congressional purpose to provide medical care for the needy, reveals a legislative intention to allow states to trace the 
assets of recipients of medical assistance and recover the benefits paid when the recipient's surviving spouse dies." Id. at 
851. Ttle court explained that. under the circumstances, it made no difference whether recovery was Fron, one estate or 
the other: 
Because the expansive federal definition of "estate" in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) extends only to assets in 
which the medical assistance benefits recipient "had any legal title or interest in at the time of death," It is 
i1 IT'Jiltter of little moment whether the department seeks to rerover the benefits paid by t.Wng a dc,im in 
the estilte of the recipient after the death of the recip;ent's sufYiving spouse or by filing a claim in the 
surviving spouse's estare. 
Id. n. 3 (emphasis added). Finally, in Idaho Department of Health and Welf.1m v. Jackman, 1.32 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6, 9-10 ( 1998), the Supreme Court of Idaho also ruled that some recovery of Medicaid benefits cc,uld be made from the 
estate of a surviving spouse, but held that such recovery was preempted by federal law except to the extent of assets 
that had been in the recipient's estate as defined by state probate law. 
These courts provide little explanation for their conclusions that the statutory language expressly mentioning 
recovery only from the recipient's estate also allows recovery from the surviving spouse's estate. We infer that the courts 
viewed the authority to recover from assets that were part of the recipient's estate after the death of the surviving 
spouse to fairly imply authority to recover those assets from the surviving spouse's estate to which they had passed on 
the death of the recipient. In other words, to the extent assets in the surviving spouse's estate are there bEcause they 
had passed to the surviving spouse from the estate of the recipient, recovery from those assets in the surviving spouse's 
estate is, in essence, recovery from the recipient's estate. 
, I /,I 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appears to have made a similar unspoken inference in assessing preemption of 
California Medicaid recovery laws in two cases. &Jcholtz v. Be/she, 114 F.3d 923 (9th Or.1997); Citizens Action League v. 
Kizer, 887 F.2d 1003 (9th Or.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1056, 110 S.Q. 1524, 108 l.Ed.2d 764 (1990}. In both cases, 
the 
67 
Ninth Orcuit addressed whether califomia's Medicaid recovery law was preempted by pre-1993 amendment federal law. 
The califomia law allowed the state to seek recovery not only from the estate of the deceased Medicaid recipient, but 
.,. against any recipient of the property of that decedent by distribution or survival.'" Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005 (quoting cat. 
Welf. & Inst.Code§ 14009.5 (West. Supp.1989)). Thus, (alifomia law allowed the state to trac:e assets of the deceased 
Medicaid recipient and seek reimbur.;ement from the recipients of those assets. 
In Kizer the plainbffs were individuals who had owned property in joint tenancy with a Medicaid recipient and had 
succeeded to ownership by right of survivorship upon the death of the Medicaid recipient. Id. ,3t 1005. To determine 
whether (alifornia's claimed right of recovery from these surviving joint tenants was inconsistent with federal law, the 
court looked to section 1396p(b)(l)(B), which, as discussed above, provided the general prohibition ag.ainst recovery with 
the exception for individuals who were 65 years old when they received assistance. Id. at 1006. The Ninth Orcuit noted 
that the federal statute provided only for recovery from the individual's "estate," and in the absence of a federal statutory 
definition of estate, looked to common law for the meaning of the term. Id. at 1006. The court held thait an "estate" 
under common law did not include property held in joint tenancy at death, and therefore the California law that allowed 
recovery against such property went beyond the recipient's estate and was too broad. Id. at 1008. The court in Kizer did 
not expressly address the issue of whether assets within the definition of "estate" could only be reached by a claim 
against the recipient's estate, or whether federal law would permit the state to follow those assets and make the claim 
against a surviving joint tenant--or, as here, a surviving spouse. 
Several years later, still applying pre-1993 federal law, the Ninth Orcuit again addressed a preemption challenge to 
the same broad california Medicaid recovery provision. Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 924. At issue in Bucholtz was application of 
the state recovery law to assets of Medicaid recipients that had been subject to three forms of joint interests: inter vivos 
trusts, tenancy in common, and community property. Id. at 924. The court applied the Kizer principle th,it ,,. use of the 
word "estate" in the [federal] recoupment provision limits a state's recovery to property which descends to the recipient's 
heir or the beneficiaries of the recipient's will upon death,'" id. at 925 (quoting Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1005), to each of the 
forms of shared interest at issue. The court concluded that, like the joint tenancy in Kizer, property held m an inter vivos 
trust is not part of the decedent's estate under California common law, and therefore was not part of the estate subject 
to recovery under the federal law. Id. at 926. In contrast, the court explained, a decedent's interest in pri:)perty held in 
tenancy in common or community property is subject to disposition and administration as part of the dec,edent's estate 
under California law. Id. at 926-27. The Ninth Grcuit concluded not only that the decedent's interest in property held in 
those forms was subject to recovery under the federal law, but also held, albeit without explanation, that recovery could 
be sought from the heirs or beneficiaries who received that property: "[California] may, however, pursue people who 
received property held by the decedent in the form of tenancy in common or community property." Id. at 928 (emphasis 
added). Like other courts, the Ninth Orcuit seems to have inferred that the federal law's reference to recc,very from the 
Medicaid recipient's "estate" conferred 
68 
authority to follow the assets from that estate and recover them from the people who received the property. 
Thus, the courts that have considered the issue are split on the question of whether the narrow reference in section 
1396p(b)(l) to recovery from the estate of the Medicaid recipient allows recovery only through a direct claim against that 
estate, or whether recovery is also allowed from those who received covered assets from the Medicaid reci1Dient's estate, 
including the estate of a surviving spouse. Were this an ordinary question of statutory interpretation, we w1:>uld condude 
that the plain language of the federal statute provides only for recovery against the Medicaid recipient's estate, as the 
IllinOis court persuasively reasoned in Hines. But we are influenced by the principle that preemption of stat1! laws is 
disfavored, combined with the fact that allowing recovery against a surviving spouse's estate is cor1sistent with both the 
federal provision precluding recovery from the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a survivin9 spouse as 
well as with the purposes of the federal legislatlon.(fn7} These additional considerations lead us to conclude that the split 
in authority, in these particular circumstances, illustrates sufficient ambiguity about the intent of the federal estate 
recovery language that we cannot say that Minnesota's requirement in Minn.Stat. § 2568.15, subd. la, to seek 
reimbursement from the estate of a surviving spouse conflicts with federal law such that it is preempted. 
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Accordingly, we hold that federal law does not preclude all recovery from the estate of a survivin9 spouse, and the 
authorization in subdivision la to make a claim against the estate of a surviving spouse is therefore not preempted. The 
question remains whether federal law limits the scope of recovery against the estate of a surviving spouse and, in 
particular, whether that recovery may reach all property previously held by the Medicaid recipient spouse either as 
marital property or jointly with the surviving spouse during the marriage, as allowed by Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. 2. 
III. 
We tum to a determination of whether the scope of recovery from a surviving spouse's estate allowed under 
Minnesota law is consistent with federal law. Subdivision 2 of Minn.Stat. § 256B.15 allows the state to recover from a 
surviving spouse's estate "the value of the assets of the estate that were marital property or jointly owned property at 
any time dun'ng the marriage." (Emphasis added.) The County argues that this broad estate recovery authority does not 
conflict with federal law because the pre-1993 version of section 1396p(b) should be construed broadly and the 1993 
amendments were intended to expand, not restrict, state estate recovery authority. In asserting this 
69 
argument for broad estate recovery authority, the County emphasizes that it is consistent with the dual goals of federal 
law of recouping Medicaid expenses to make assistance available to more qualifying recipients, while protecting 
community spouses from pauperization during their lifetimes. The Estate argues that, because section 1396p(b)(l) 
allows recovery only from a recipient's estate and section 1396p(b)(4) allows expansion of the estate only to include 
assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, the "any time during the marriage" recovery allowed 
by subdivision 2 is preempted. 
The County's argument would take us too far down the path of favoring the purpose of the law at the expense of 
the plain meaning of its language. Significantly, no court has embraced the County's argument that the pre-1993 federal 
law authorized recovery from a surviving spouse's estate of assets that were jointly owned during the m,miage but 
transferred by the recipient spouse prior to her death. Indeed, of the courts that have interpreted federal law to allow 
direct claims against the estate of a surviving spouse, only one has construed that authority to extend to assets that 
were transferred before the death of the Medicaid recipient, and that court relied on language from the 1993 
amendments to support that extension. See In re Estate of Wirtz 607 N.W.2d 882, 885-86 (N.D.2000). 
Other courts that have recognized authority to recover from a source other than the Medicaid recipient's estate have 
construed that authority to reach only assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time o,f her death, 
that is, assets which were part of the recipient's estate as defined by traditional state probate law or included in the 
estate under an expanded definition allowed by the 1993 amendments to federal law. See Bucholtz, 114 F.3d at 925-27 
(limiting recovery to assets that were part of recipient's estate as defined by state probate law); Kizer, 887 F.2d at 1006 
(same); Jackman, 970 P.2d at 8-10 (holding that recovery from surviving spouse's estate allowed by Idaho Medicaid 
recovery statute is limited by federal law to assets that were part of the Medicaid recipient's estate as defined under 
state probate law); Thompson, 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3 (recognizing that "expansive definition of· estate' in [section] 
1396p(b}(4} extends only to assets in which the medical assistance benefits recipient · had any legal title cir interest rn at 
the time of death"'); see also In re Estate of Smith, No. M2005-01410-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3114250 at *·4 
(Tenn.ct.App. Nov, 1, 2006} (explaining that courts that have allowed recovery against estates of surviving spouses have 
required that recipient had interest in assets at time of death). 
Similarly, in relying on the 1993 amendments as authority for recovery from a surviving spouse's estate, our court of 
appeals acknowledged that the 1993 amendments limit the assets subject to recovery to those in which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal interest at the time of her death. See Gu/Iberg, 652 N.W.2d at 714 (holding that Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. 2, authorization to reach assets that were marital property or owned jointly at any time dunng the 
marriage, is partially preempted by federal law limitation to assets in which recipient had interest at time of death). And 
the court of appeals acknowledged that limitation again in this case. /Jarg, 722 N.W.2d at 496 ("After Gu/Iberg, the 
state's ability to recover was limited to the recipient's interest in marital or jointly owned property at the time of the 
recipient's death."). 
As noted above, the only decision to deviate from this limiting principle requiring 
70 
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an interest at the time of death is i-wrtz. Although the North Dakota court had acknowledged in its earlier Thompson 
decision that recovery allowed under section 1396p(b) is limited to assets in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest 
at the time of death (indeed that was the basis on which the court rationalized allowing recovery from the surviving 
spouse's estate), 586 N.W.2d at 851 n. 3, the court held in Wirtz that any assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to 
his spouse before his death were subject to recovery from the surviving spouse·s estate, 607 N.W.2d at 886. The court 
stated that limiting recovery under section 1396p(b) to "assets in the surviving spouse•s estate that the Medicaid 
recipient had legal title to and conveyed through joint tenancy, tenancy-in-common, survivorship, life estate, or living 
trust" would ignore the words "interest" and "other arrangement" in the federal law. mrtz, 607 N.W.2d at 885. 
Concluding that the words "interest" and "other arrangement" are ambiguous, the court relied on the Congressional 
intent it perceived "to allow states a wide latitude in seeking Medicaid benefit recoveries." Id. at 885-136. The court did 
not explain why the same purpose acknowledged in Thompson was consistent with the limitation to n~overy from assets 
in which the recipient had an interest at the time of death, yet also justified abandoning that limitation in Wirtz. 
We cannot agree that the "other arrangement" language in the 1993 amendment is ambiguous 1n the sense implied 
in mrtz. The plain meaning of "other arrangement," read in the context of section 1396p(b)(4), is ammgements other 
than those expressly listed that also convey assets at the time of the Medicaid recipient's death. 
We return again to the language of the federal statute. The federal optional definition of "estate" t1llows inclusion of 
any other real and personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest 
at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to a surviv1:>r, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, 
living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The "including" clause further describes the assets that a state may 
include in this expanded estate. The clause describes those assets in two ways--first by the limiting adjective "such," and 
second by the language describing how and to whom "such assets" are "conveyed." The "such" limitation plainly refers 
back to the immediately preceding clause describing the assets as those "in which the individual had any legal title or 
interest at the time of death." The including clause then describes to whom "such" assets may have bee,n conveyed--a 
"survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual." Id. (emphasis added). And finally, the clalJse describes several 
methods by which the conveyance of "such" assets might take place -- "through joint tenancy, tenancy in common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement." Id. 
Inclusion in the list of examples of "such assets" is predicated on the recipient having a legal interest at the time of 
death. When we construe a federal statute we must, if at all possible, give effect "to every word Congress used." Reiter 
v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 s.a. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979). To read "other arrangement" to include a 
lifetime transfer would be to read the words "at the time of death" out of the statute. The conclusion that "other 
arrangement" cannot 
71 
include lifetime transfers is further supported by the additional context. "[O]ther arrangement·· ends a list of examples of 
conveyances that occur at the time of death. The list of recipients of the conveyance, "a survivor., heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual," leaves no doubt that the "individual," a Medicaid recipient, must have died for the conveyance to 
occur. A recipient cannot have heirs or survivors during his or her lifetime. Nor can there be an "ctssign of the deceased" 
during the recipient's lifetime. In light of the plain statutory language and its context, the concluslon of the Wirtz court 
that "other arrangement" is sufficiently ambiguous to include lifetime transfers is unreasonable. 
We conclude that there is no principled basis on which to interpret the federal law to allow recovery of assets in 
which the Medicaid recipient did not have an interest at the time of her death. As explained above, the rationale for 
finding authority to recover from a surviving spouse's estate at all emanates from the authority gr;:tnted in the federal law 
to recover from the "estate" of the Medicaid recipient. Property transferred prior to death would m)t be part of the 
recipient's estate. Further, as recognized by every decision except Wirtz, ta the extent the 1993 amendments allow 
states to expand the definition of "estate" for Medicaid recovery purposes, the language of the federal law clearly limits 
that expansion to assets in which the recipient had an interest at the time of her death. Accordingly, we hold that 
Minn.Stat.§ 2568.15, subd. 2, is partially preempted to the extent that it authorizes recovery from the surviving spouse's 
estate of assets that the recipient owned as marital property or as jointly-owned property at any timedurin1~ the 
marriage. To be recoverable, the assets must have been subject to an interest of the Medicaid recipient at the time of 
her death. 
t . :// l. I· •r.n • s/ N/hnnk~/1:1\!.. I ,. .. ,, .......... , __ ·-- '- -
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IV. 
This brings us to the question of whether Dolores Barg had any interest 1n property at the time of her death that 
would allow the County to make a claim against the estate of her surviving spouse, despite her transfor of her joint 
interest in the property prior to her death. As we have noted, the court of appeals acknowledged the interest-at-time-of-
death limitation on spousal estate recovery, but nevertheless found that for these purposes Dolores retained a joint 
tenancy interest at the time of her death that made the value of that interest recoverable from Francis;'s estate. Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496, 497. Eschewing reference to either marital property law or probate law to detennine the nature of 
any interest at the time of death, the court of appeals looked to standard real property law and Gu/Iberg in deciding that 
Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest. Id. at 496-97. We do not agree. 
The court of appeals determined that Dolores retained a joint tenancy interest in the property baSE!d on its 
understanding that the court in Gu/Iberg had recognized a continuing joint tenancy interest because the lifetime transfer 
was an "other arrangement," and because the court apparently understood section 1396p(b)(4) to "explicitly allow[] a 
state to broaden the definition [of estate] beyond the meaning used in probate law and to include joint-tenancy interests 
that have been prewously conveyed to a spouse." Id. at 497. Section 1396p(b)(4) cannot be construed to indude lifetime 
transfers of property in the phrase "other arrangement" because the plain language and the context re.1uire that phrase 
to be limited to conveyances occurring upon the death of the recipient. For that reason, we cannot 
72 
agree with the court of appeals' characterization of section 1396p(b)(4) as allowing the expanded definition of estate to 
include "previously conveyed" joint tenancy interests. The language of section 1396p(b)(4) requires that any interest 
included in the expanded estate must be one in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at the time of her death, 
not one that was previously conveyed. We conclude that Dolores did not retain a joint tenancy interest iin the property at 
the time of her death, because that interest was effectively and legally transferred before her death. 
The question remains whether Dolores had any other interest in the property at the time of her deal:h that may be 
considered part of an expanded estate for recovery purposes under Minnesota law. We agree with the court of appeals 
that courts should not look to marital property law to find such an interest, because the statute in which marital property 
is defined limits the definition to the purposes of that chapter. Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subds. 1, 3b (2006);(fn8) see Barg, 
722 N.W.2d at 496. Similarly, we agree that the recognizable interests at the time of death cannot be limited to those 
defined by probate law, because the purpose of section 1396p(b)(4) is to allow states to expand the defi11it1on of estate 
beyond probate law. See Barg, 722 N.W.2d at 497. We therefore agree that real property law principles, informed by 
principles of probate law, should be the basis for ascertaining any interests at the time of death. Any interest recognized 
must be consistent with the underlying foundational rationale that recovery from a surviving spouse's estate is allowed 
only because of its relationship to the recipient's estate, from which federal law expressly allows recovery. With those 
principles in mind, we caution that for an interest to be traceable to and recoverable from a surviving spouse's estate, 
the interest must be (1) an interest recognized by law, (2) which the Medicaid recipient held at the time o,f death, and 
(3) that resulted in a conveyance of an interest of some value to the surviving spouse that occurred as a result of the 
recipient's death. Further, to the extent the interest is not part of the standard probate estate, Minnesota law must have 
expanded the definition of estate to indude the interest, as authorized by section 1396p(b)(4). 
Dolores's joint ownership in the homestead and certificates of deposit no longer existed at the time of her death. No 
other recognizable interest has been identified. 
The County argues that the reference to marital property in subdivision 2 reflects the Minnesota legisl21ture's intent 
to make all marital property subject to spousal estate recovery. But subdivision 2 makes no reference to an interest at 
the time of death or to re-defining the probate estate to include all marital property, even property transferred prior to 
death. This is not surprising because subdivision 2 was enacted long before the optional estate definition authority was 
added to federal law. 
The district court indicated that because Dolores was married to Francis even after the transfer of her interest in the 
homestead, she retained some interest in the property. But whatever that interest, it dissipated at Dolores's; death, 
rather than resulting in transfer of an interest of value to Francis. 
We conclude that Dolores had no interest in assets at the time of her death that were part of a probate estate or an 
expanded estate definition permissible under federal law, and therefore there is no 
· II ' I, • I I. I sl 
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basis for the County's claim against the estate. 
Finally, we note that in 2003 the Minnesota legislature amended section 2568.15 by extending thei definition of 
estate for Medicaid recovery purposes to indude assets owned by a recipient spouse in joint tenancy c,r life estate at the 
time of her death. Act of June 5, 2003, ch. 14, art. 12, §§ 40-50, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 17S 1, 2205-2217 
{codified as amended at Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subds. 1, lc-lk). The amendments do not mention the other forms of 
conveyance at death listed in the federal definition of "estate," except that the "right of survivorship" is mentioned with 
respect to joint tenancies. Id. subds. 1(a)(6), lg, lh(b). Thus, the legislature chose only to indude twc, forms of 
ownership in the expanded definition of estate. Also, as provkfed in the federal law, the inclusion of joint tenancy and life 
estate interests in the recipient's estate is expressly limited to interests the recipient owned at the time of death. 
Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subds. lh(b)(2), li{a). The amendments further limit the scope of recovery by e:<empting from the 
reach of subdivisions le through lk a "homestead owned of record, on the date the recipient dies, by the recipient and 
the recipient's spouse as joint tenants with a right of survivorship." Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. l(a)(6). In 2005, the 
legislature retroactively made the provisions continuing life estates and joint tenancies effective only for life estate and 
joint tenancy interests created on or after August 1, 2003. Act of July 14, 2005, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 4, art. 7, 2005 Minn. 
Laws 2454, 2649 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 256B.15, subd. l(c)). 
It is difficult to discern the intended reach of the 2003 amendments.(fn9) If the pre-2003 law allowed recovery 
against the surviving spouse's estate as argued by the County, there was little need to enact the 2003 a1mendments to 
reach those assets in the case of a recipient who leaves a surviving spouse. The parties apparently agree that the 2003 
amendments do not apply to or influence this case, for reasons that are not clear to us. 
It suffices to say that even if the 2003 amendments were applicable, they would provide no basis fa,r the County's 
claim. The new subdivision 1i specifically applies to circumstances in which a Medicaid recipient against whom a recovery 
claim could otherwise be filed is survived by a spouse. Minn.Stat.§ 256B.15, subd. li(b). That subdivision provides 
procedures for filing a claim without making a recovery until the death of the surviving spouse. Id., subdl. l(f). If this 
subdivision were to be applied to this case, several limitations would preclude recovery. Dolores Barg, the recipient, 
owned no life estate or joint tenancy interest at the time of her death. If she had owned a joint tenancy at the time of 
her death, it would have been a homestead owned of record by her and her spouse as joint tenants with a right of 
survivorship, and thus exempted from the reach of subdiViSion li. Id., subd. 1(a)(6). Finally, that joint tenancy was 
established in the 1960s, well before August 1, 2003. 
In summary, we hold that federal law does not preempt all Medicaid recovery from spousal estates, and Minn.Stat. § 
256B.15, subd. la, is therefore not preempted to the extent it allows claims against the estate of a surviving spouse of a 
Medicaid recipient. However, the allowable scope of spousal estate recovery is limited. Subdivision 2 of SE.'Ction 256B.15 
is preempted to the extent that it allows recovery from assets in which the deceased Medicaid recipient did not have a 
legal interest at the time of death, and to 
74 
the extent that it permits recovery beyond the extent of the recipient's interest. Finally, we hold that Dolores Barg had no 
interest in property at the time of her death that can form the basis for recovery against the estate of Francis Barg. 
V. 
We have concluded that the County's claim for full recovery against all the assets in Francis Barg's estate was 
preempted by federal law because recovery is limited to assets in which Dolores had an interest at the time of her death, 
but the question of the appropriate remedy remains, because the County argues that the Estate waived the right to deny 
the claim in its entirety. Although we have decided as a matter of law in our preemption analysis that the state is 
preempted from requiring reimbursement from assets in a spouse's estate in which the recipient spouse had no interest 
at the time of her death, that does not resolve the remedy issue here. Although a state may not compel payment from a 
spouse's estate beyond the scope authorized by federal law, federal preemption does not preclude an estate from 
voluntarily paying all or part of a claim that could not be compelled. 
Here, the Estate only partially disallowed the County's claim, thus allowing the remainder of the claim. Minnesota 
Statutes§ 524.3-806(a) (2006) provides that, on petition of the personal representative after notice to the claimant, the 
t s:// "t r,n . t s/ N/hon ,,./rri "' 
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court may "for cause shown permit the personal representative to disallow" a previously-allowed claim. But the personal 
representative made no such request here. When questioned at the hearing in district court whether the personal 
representative was challenging the entire claim of the County, the representative affirmed that he was challenging only 
the part already disallowed. When the district court affirmed that partial disallowance and the County appealed, the 
Estate did not file a notice of review in the court of appeals to challenge the implicit award to the County of the allowed 
part of its daim. A respondent who does not file a notice of review to challenge an adverse ruling of the district court 
waives that issue in the court of appeals. See Minn. R. av.App. P. 106; Ford v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. 
Co., 294 N.W.2d 844, 845 (Minn. 1980). Having partially allowed the County's claim and having then failed to properly 
seek a reversal of that allowance in both the district court and court of appeals, the Estate will not be permitted to seek 
that relief for the first time in this court. 
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court's denial of the 
County's claim for full recovery is affirmed. The court's remand for an award to the County based on the existence of a 
joint tenancy interest is reversed. The matter is remanded to the district court for entry of judgment bc1sed on the partial 
allowance made, but not subsequently challenged, by the Estate. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
ANDERSON, PAUL H., J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
DIETZEN, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of the argument and submission, took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this case. 
Footnotes: 
FNl. "Medicaid" is the popular name for this cooperative federal-state program. See42 U.S.C. § 13Sl6-1396v (2000). 
In Minnesota it is referred to as "medical assistance." Minn. Stat. § 2568.02, subd. 8 (2006). 
FN2. For purposes of determining eligibility of one spouse for Medicaid, the value of a couple's home is excluded. 42 
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (5) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(1)(2000). In the asset assessment for Dolores !Barg, $104,875 
was excluded. This amount corresponds to the value of the home, one jointly-owned vehide, and a burial lot. When 
completing the asset assessment, a portion of the couple's resources is reserved for the needs of the spouse not 
applying for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c)(2), (f)(2)(A) (2000). Protected assets for the nonrecipient !;pause, Francis 
Barg, were calculated to be $24,607. 
FN3. The Commissioner's motion to supplement the record on review is granted as to the following documents: 
North Dakota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 95-016; Indiana Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. CJS-012; Idaho 
Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No. 01-006; and Minnesota Medicaid State Plan, Transmittal No., 06-10. The motion is 
denied as to the e-mail correspondence dated November 4, 1999. 
FN4. Formerly the Health care Financing Administration (HCFA). See Wis. Dep't of Health & Family St~. v. Blumer, 
534 U.S. 473, 479 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 (2002). 
FN5. Throughout this opinion, our discussion of spouses is premised on circumstances similar to those· of the Bargs. 
One spouse, who we refer to as the recipient spouse, applies for and receives Medicaid benefits. The other, who we refer 
to as the community or surviving spouse, receives no Medicaid benefits and survives the recipient spouse. 
FN6. The Estate sought cross-review on this issue of "whether the county may recover Medicaid benefits correctly 
paid on behalf of a predeceased spouse from the estate of a surviving spouse." We requested briefing on whether that 
issue had been adequately preserved for review. The County argues that the Estate failed to preserve the issue because 
it only partially disallowed the County's claim, it confirmed before the district court that only the disallowed portion of the 
claim was contested, and it asked the court of appeals to affirm the district court's deciSion. The County's arguments go 
to the scope of the remedy available in this case, an issue that we address infra. But this issue also has a legal aspect 
independent of the specifte scope of recovery available in this case. That legal component is necessary to a thorough 
analysis of the preemption issues presented here, and we will therefore address the issue in that context. No new or 
controverted facts are needed in order to address this purely legal question, and no prejudice will result from our 
consideration of the issue because the parties addressed the issue in their briefs to the district court, the court of 
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appeals, and this court. See Watson v. United Ser\.'S. Auto. Assn, 566 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Minn.199'7). 
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FN7. The United States Supreme Court has described Congress's passage of the anti-impoverishment provisions as 
an effort to "protect community spouses from • pauperization' while preventing financially secure couples from obtaining 
Medicaid assistance." Wis. Dep't of Health a Family Ser\.'S. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, 4'80, 122 s.a. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935 
(2002). Allowing recovery from a spouse's estate does not risk impoverishing a community spouse, bE!Cause the spouse 
must be dead for the recovery to occur. Nor does it impede the furnishing of Medicaid benefits to other impoverished 
individuals; indeed, it can be expected to do quite the opposite. See West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't of Ha1lth & Human 
Ser\-5"., 289 F.3d 281, 285 (4th Or.2002) (noting that Congress expected the estate recovery provisions to allow 
government to realize savings of $300 million over five years, and that the savings have been even grieater). 
FN8. Formerly Minn.Stat. § S18.54, subds. 1, 5 (2004). 
FN9. Toe parties' supplemental briefs shed little light on this question. 
MN 
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QUESTION PRESB~ED 
The Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. 1396 en seq., gen-
erally forbid.a participating States from recovering cor-
rectly paid beneftta. The statute requiree, however, that 
a Stat.e aeek to recover the coat of nursing home M?rvicee 
paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 56 from 
tbe Individual's probate eetate, after both the individual 
and her surviving apouae have died. The statute also 
permit.a (but doea not require) a State to recover from 
.. any other real and personal property and other aeaeta 
In which the Individual had any legal title or intereet at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includ-
ing such asseta conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of 
the deceased individual through Joint tenancy, tenancy 
in common, aurvtvonhip, lite estate, living trust. or oth-
er arrangement." '2 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(B). 
The question presented ta whether, under Section 
1396p(b)(4)(B), a State that seekl to recover correctly 
paid beneftts from the estate of the recipient's surviving 
spouse ta limited to recovering the value of assets in 
which the recipient bad a legal intereet at the time of 
her death. 
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LBO voe, DIRECTOR, Mn,T E LACS CoUNTY. 
MINNEBOrA. FAMILY SSKVICES A.ND WKLFARE 
DEPARTMENT, ET AL., PETITIONERS 
"· 
MICHAEL F. BARG 
ON PliTITION FOR A WRIT' or CBRTIORARJ 
TO TH& SUPRSM6COURT01' MINNESOTA 
BRIEi' FORTHB UNrl'EDSTATESASA.lUCUSCUJlIAB 
Thia brief ia tiled ln response to the Court's order 
inviting the Solicitor General to expreae the viewa of the 
United States. In the view of the United Stare., the peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
STATEMENT 
1. a. The Medicaid program. established in 1965 in 
Title XIX of the SoctaJ Security Act (Medicaid Act), 42 
U.S.C. 1896 d aeq., ia a cooperative tederal-etate pro-
gram under which the federal government provld• fund-
Ing to Statea to provide medical aui1tance to eligible 
needy persona. Harri.a v. McRa,, 448 U.S. 297, 301 
(1980). 
To participate in the Medicaid prorram, a State must 
develop a plan epeeitytng, among other thinga, the cate-
gortee of lndividuala who will receive medical aulatance 
(1) 
=~ 
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\l.Dder th• plan and the apeef.ftc kinda of medical care and 
.. rv1c:.a that will be covend. '8 U.S.C. 1898a. State 
Medicaid plana are reviewed bJ' the Cent.en for Medi-
care and Medicaid Serrieea {CMS) Clormeiv the Bealtb 
Ou-e F1n.ancfns Admlnlatration) In the Dapartment of 
Health aad Ruman ~cee (HHS). 48 U.8.0. 1898; ... 
68 Fed. R ... 85,48T (2001). It CMS approv .. a State'• 
plan. tb• State 1a thereatt.r eligible for federal retm-
bunement tor • apedfted pereentap of the amount. 
.. expended • • • • medical mtatanee under the Stat. 
plan." 42 U.8.C. 18Nb(a)(l), 18Nd(b). 
b. Tbe Medicaid A.ct raquirea partfdpatJng Statee 
to provide Medicaid benallta to the .. categol"lea)-
ly needy." that fe. t.boee penona eJlalbl• tor l'lnaadal u-
etatanee under specifled federal programa. A.tki,.,. 
T • .R-i~ -t'M U.S. UM, 167 (1986); aee '2 U.B.C. 
18Na(a)(10)(A)(J)(IV). (VI) and (VII). 
The Act alao perm1ta Stai. to extend beneftte to 
the .._edtcalq neec:17." that. la, •penN>n.a lrldn• the abil-
ity to pa:, for medlMl e:xpeneee, bat wltb bacomee too 
larp to qualify for cateaorloal IINJatance." SelttNUwr.,.. 
0<rav POfdMrS, 461 U.S. N, 87 (1981); ... 42 U.S.C. 
18Na(a)(10)(C). To qaallt;r u medJcalb' needy. a peraon 
mq h_.e Income no htper tbU a defined threabold and 
m~ own aaeta ot no more than a defined •alae. If the 
wet. of • Medicaid applicant eJ1:~ th• quali(yfus 
t.hreahold. •h• mu•t "•pend down" her .... ta until the7 
are at or below the quaHt)1Da threahold. a .. a U .8.C. 
18Na(a)(17). 
When a married SMt1"9on la l.uatltutwnallHd In a nun-
tns home or other tadliQ', tb• Medicaid Act eonatd..,. the 
ueeta of both the tnadtattonallsed epouae and the non-
lnadtatlonalf.Nd, or "community.• apoaee tn detenntn-ln• the appUcant."• ellctbDlty for beaeftte. 48 U .s.c. 
: "r'N ~ 
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18961'-G<c). To prevent the commumty apouee rrom beiaa 
lmpoverlabed u • reaalt of a required apead-d,IJWII or 
UMt8, the at.atat.e esempte certain ...eta, aucb u the 
coapJ•·• bom• and an automobile, d U.S.C. UJmltt<aXl), 
taaer-a(c)(&), &11d allow. the comma.alt;y apow to retain 
• c.rtaln lffel of rellOW"Cee and lacome that...-. not con-
aldered available to pq ror the appltcant•a medical care. 
U U .8.0. 18"1"-l(d) and (t)(I). See WU001U'it1 D.-p i qf 
H.altl, .. FGWIU. a.,.,,.. .,_ a,",,...., 5M U.S. ,'1'.8, '80 
(2002) (aatl-lmpcwerlaluneat provWoaa are lntAn1:led to 
Mprotect. comm~Dit:, apouw tr-om •pauperlsatlon• while 
preveatfns ftnandal17 aeou~ c»upl .. from obtatntu,r 
.II.Heald......._...,_ Furthermore, llltboup the :Medi-
caid Act general~ forbtda a Medicaid appUcaat or her 
spowM: from trauterrlna &tllleta at below market •ala• In 
order to become •Helble tor beueftta, 42 U.S.O. 
18Np(c)(l)(A), the atatute eapr ... 17 permit.a the applt-
cant to ~-- ....., mclucUnc an IAtenat ID the hiome-
st.ead, t.o the communlt,y •pou-, '2 U.8.0. 18Np(,c)(2). 
Once the laatltudonaltsed apouae la determined 1~ be 
elislbl• tor beDeftta, tbe atat.ute provfdea that .. n1i, re-
aoarce• ot the community apoaae •hall be deemed avail-
able to the tn.titatloaaltzed apouae." U U.S.O. 189er-
lS(e)(4). 
c. Aa • pneral raJe, tbe Medicaid Act torblda Stat.a 
trom aeeldq recOYery of Medicaid beneftta that were 
eorrect.17 paid. "2 u.s.c. 18Np(b)(l); - alao "2 u .. e.c. 
1S98a(a)(18). The atatu&e provtdea an eueptlon. t11ow-
ever. for reoover,y from tbe Mtatea of certain tnatltutton-
alised and older beaeftotartea. 
Before 1998, the Medicaid Act'• recove17 provlafon 
permitted, but did not. require, Statea to reccwer benllflt.a 
paid oa bebalf of certain lndtvldaala, from the indtvldu· 
ala' eatatea. 42 U.S.C. 18Np(b)(l)(B) (1981). In 1998, 
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Congreae amended Section 1396p to require States to 
recover correctly paid benefit.a in certain circumatancea. 
Omnibus Rewncillatlon Act of 1993 COBRA 1993), Pub. 
L. No. 103-66, 113612, 107 StaL 62'7. Aa amended, the 
Act'• eetat.recovery provialoa requires States to aeek 
recover, in the caae of an iJidividual who was perma~ 
nent11 inatitutionalued, '2 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(A), and in. 
the cue of a person who received, at age 55 or thereaf-
ter, nuning facility servicee, home aud community-
based services, or related hospital and prescription drug 
services, 42 U.S.C. 1S96p(b)(l)(B). In addition, a State 
baa the option t:o seek recovery of the coat or ot.her itema 
or aervlcea paid on behalf of lndlvtduals over the age of 
56. Ibid. The recoveey .. may be made only after the 
death of the individual's surviving spouse, if any," and 
only at a time when the individual hu no aurvtvfnr chil-
dren under the age of 21 or chlldren who are blind or 
disabled. 42 U.8.C.1396p(b)(2) and (2)(A). Such recov-
er, may be waived in casea where it "would work an un-
due hardship." '2 U.S.C.1396p(b)(3). 
The statute provfdea for recoveey of the coat of bene-
fit.I paid on behalf of an individual over the age of 55 
from "the Individual's estate." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B). 
The term "estate," t'or tboee pul'J)08ea, "1hall include all 
real and personal property and other uaeta Included 
within the individual's estate, aa denned ror purpoaee of 
State probate law." 42 U.S.C. 1396p(bX4)(A). The stat-
ute further provides that an individual's "estate" 
may include, at the option or the State • • • , any 
other real and personal property and other aaaeta In 
which the individual had any legal title or lntereat at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), in-
cluding such aaaete conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
BYign ol t.he deceaaed individual through joint ten-
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ancy, tenancy ID common, survivonhip, life eatate, 
living t.ru1t, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(')(B). 
2. Since 1987, Minnesota law bu provided for recov-
ery of Medicaid beneftta from the estate of a reclplent.'s 
surviving spouse, aa well aa from the eetate of a recipi-
ent.. Act or June 12, 1987, ch. 408, art. .2, f Erl (Minn. Stat., 
Ann. t 266B.15 (2007)). Minnesota's estate-recovery law 
provid• that U[a] claim againet the eatate of a surviving 
spouse who did not receive medical assistance, for medi-
cal aaalstance rendered for the predeceaaed apouae, la 
lfmit.ed to the value of the aaeete of the estate that were 
marital property or Jointly owned property at any time 
durlni t.he marriage." Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 256B.15, subd. 
2 (2007). 
a. In 2006, petitioner tiled a claim against the est.ate 
of Francia Barr, In which be sought recovery of Medicaid 
benefit. paid on behalf of Mr. Barg's predeceaaed 
spouae, Dolores Barr. Pet. App. 4L 1 
a. Darin1 their marriage, the Barga purchased real 
property in Princeton, Minnesota, to which the, took 
title aa joint tenant.a. In 2001, Ma. Barg entered a nurs-
ing home, and shortly thereafter applied for, and re-
ceived, long-term Medicaid benefftl. Pet. App. 2a-3a. 
Ms. Barg aubeequently tranaferred her joint tenanc, 
intereat in the homeetead property to Mr. Barg. At the 
time ot the tranafer, the asaeased value of the property 
wu S120,800. Ma. Barg also tennlnated her ownership 
interest in certificates of deposit the couple had held 
jointly. Id.. at 3a-4a. 
1 On March 2, 2009, tllia Courtp-ant«I the State otMlnnelota't con-
ditional motion to lnc«vene u a J*t.Y allped witll petitioner Voe. All 
~ in thJa brfelto '"petlUonar"' nrfff to peutionlr VOL 
01d i.a:ea:01 600Z 91 ·rnr =~ 
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Ma. Bars died ln 2004, havln1 received a tot.al of 
,1oe,,11.68 In medlcal-ualatance benefit.a throu1h the 
atate Medicaid prosram. Mr. Bars died five montha 
later. Pet. App. u. 
b. In h1I claim agalnat Mr. BUT• eat.ate, peUtloner 
aou1ht to recover the full amount of Medtcald benefit.a 
pafd on bebaJt of ML Barg. Pet. App. 4L Respondent, 
who la the repreaentatwe of Mr. Barg'1 ..tat., allowed 
"8,880 u a claim •ainet the ntate. but d1aallowed 
$44,538.13. Ibid.. 1 
Petitioner ftled a claim-allowance petitiol'l in state 
coart. The diatrict court upheld the partial diaallowanc:e. 
PeL App. 48a-61L The coart reJted on the Minneeota 
Court of Appeala• decl.llon In /fl ,.. .Ettaw of Gwllwrg, 
661 N. W.2d 701 (2002), which held that. Mlnneaota'• 
eetate-recovery law la preempted luofar u it permita 
reeoverJ' up "to the value of tbe uaeta or t.he eetate that 
were marital propertJ" a IDJ point in the man-tap, be-
cauae '2 U.S.O. 1396p(bXZXB) permit.a recovery only "to 
the extent of" the Medicaid recipient'• Interest at the 
time of deat.11. G~. 961 N.W .!d at 714. The court 
concluded that. at time of her deatJI, Ml. Bug'a intereet 
in the uaete ol Mr. Bari'• eat.ate tbM ,vere marital prop-
el't.7, includin1 a lil .... tate lnterat ID the homeatead and 
a personal property allowmce, t.otaled '88,880. Pet.. App. 
60a·61L 
c. The Mlnneaota Court. of Appeal• ravened and 
remanded for recalculation of petitioner'• allowable 
claim. Pet. App. 52&-Na. Like the dlltrlct court, the 
• lt.pandenr• part.Ill' 10aw111C1 ~ ..., applJ"llltlJ l"llted • 
t.hepNlnlNtha& Ma. Bq(l)hld aaa.hllflntallttn the bomatNd, 
valued a&.._.., ii& the tlnwathtrdlltJI, ~tbelntAlr'Ylvoltnm-
f•, and (2) .. aatitled to a pnoaaJ pnpat, allonnce In CM amount 
~seooo. S..Pe&.App.-
: '(},f3'0ti:f 
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court of appeala concluded that., under federal law, the 
claim waa neceauril7 limited to the value of Me. Barg's 
interest ln speclfted aueta at the tJme ot her death. 
/d. at 68a (citing Gullbn-g, 662 N.W.2d at 714). The 
court of appeala concluded, however, that Ms. Barg'1 
intA!rest in the homestead at the time of her death wu a 
joint tenancy intereet, valued u a one-half interest In the 
property's value of $120,800, or $60,400. Id. at 62a. 
d. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, concluding that petitioner wu not 
entitled to full recovery from Mr. Barg's eat.ate. Pet. 
App. la-45a. 
AJJ an initial matter, the court rejected respondent's 
contention that federal law completely preempt. Minne-
sota's estate-recovery law inaolar u it permit.a recovery 
from the estate of the Medicaid recipient's surviving 
spouse. Pet. App. 19a-30a. The court concluded that 
allowing recovery from a surviving spouae's estate is con-
@l1tent with both the Act's pre~luaion or recovery from 
the Medicaid recipient's estate until after the death of a 
in:arvlving spouse, 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(2}(A), u well aa the 
purpoaea of the Medicaid Act's recovery provisiona. Pel 
App. 29a. 
The court concluded, however, that federal law ltmlta 
the :,cope of recovery againat a surviving spouse's 
estate to the value of 88Set.a in which the recipient spouse 
had an interest "at the time of death," 42 U.S.C. 
1396p(b)(4)(B), and thereby preempt.a Minnesota's 
estate-recovery law Insofar aa ft permit.a the State 
to reach any other asaeta "that were marital proper-
ty or jointly owned property at a.n, time during th. ffl(JJ--
riag•." Pet. App. 31a (quotin1 Minn. Stat. Ann. 
I 256B.16, subd. 2 (2007)); see id. at 30&-37a. 
: ~ 
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The court tGrther concluded that Ma. Bars did not 
ha,,e ~ lntereat. lD the bomeatead or bank account.a at. 
the time of her death. becauM ehe bad tl'anaferred her 
interwt in tboee ... te to Mr. e.,.. betm-w abe died. The 
court theralore held that petitioner had no lepl entitle-
ment. to aat.iafaetion ot the Si.we cl.;m lrolD tboee -- · 
-i.. Pet. App. 1'7a....._ Bat. becauae reepondent bad 
partiall7 allowed pet,it.tonw• c:Jabn. and iw¥er cbaDe~ 
t.be dtat.rlct eoart•a award ol t.llat parUal allOW1111ce of 
'81,880, the MiDDeaota Supreme Court held th& peti-
tioner could recOYel" t.hat amount. Id. at '8a 46a. 
Dl8C1JIMIION 
The Mianeeota Sapreme Court"• dedidou la correct 
uad doea not WUT'llllt t'urtber rwvtew. Tb• federal 
Medicaid Act pG"DUUI 1"9Ceff'erJ' al c:orrecU7 paid benaftta 
trom tbe •tate of the Nelpl•t'a aanhlnc apoaae. bat 
ltmtta t.hat reeGTff7 to the value ot uaeta la whJcb the 
recipient. bad a lep ID.tenet at. the time other death. 
Althoasb th• l"'elll1lt ID tbla caae dUl'en ft"OIII tile Nllalt in,.,. n /lflfoN q/Wim. eOT N.W.2d 882 (N.D. IOOO). the 
dtffeNDce ID&7 not reflect. • dlaqreement a.boat tJae 
meanin& of federal Kedicald law, but only ••sent con-
clmou about when. under atate law, u tndfvfdaal re-
tmu a lepl lnterut ID UNta eonv41J,Wd to a •poaae. The 
pettt.ton for a writ of eertJorarl •lloald be denied. 
A. Th• Dect.toa OITH Mina..._ .. ,._.. Coan Ia c... 
r.a 
1. The Mlnneaota Supreme Coa.rt correotly con-
cluded that the Medicaid Act torbtda pedtJoner from 
-•klna' to reoover co~ paid benetlte trom aaaet.a In 
•htch the Medicaid recipient had DO lesa,1 bltene& at tbe 
time other death. 
tWa:ai E.li!!lri2 91 ·rnt 
----------- - __ , _______ _ 
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Under the Medicaid Act. a State generalq ma_y not 
Nek to rec0'9'8r coaaectq paid Medicaid benefit.a. "2 
U.S.C. 1896p(b)(l). The Act providN. bowwer, that a 
State (1) ,,...,. aeek. recov9r7 ot auntas home and re-
lated beneftta paid cm t..balf ot an lndffidual OYer tlle..,. 
ot 66 from "'the tndnidual'• eatate,. u deftmed by abate 
probate law; and (2) maw, at lta option. dllftn• ~. tndt-
ridual'• •tate• more broadly t.o include any ...... ta In 
wblch the iDdhrldual had any lepl title or lntereet at. the 
time of death (to tb• extent. of aucb lnter.t.). lndudfnar 
euch -eta conveyed to a eantTor, heir or a..ea'8n of the 
deee-d tnclividaal tbroush joint tenancy. t.enane!7 In 
common, auntronblp, life Ntat.e, lhing troet.. or ot..ber 
arnmpment.." "2 U.S.O. 11Mp(b)(1)(B). (b)(4)(A) and 
(B). Thu.a, th• Medicaid Am., which permtta reeovery 
only after the death of the reetptut'• a,u,tvhqr epoaM. 
a U.S.C. 18Np(b)(2), aat.horlsea a State to ffle a retm-
bunement c1alm qalnat the aamvtnc epouae'a eata&4, 
up to the •alue of any wet.a In which the Medfcakl reef~ 
tent had a lesal tnteruL at the time of her death. 
The Mlnneaota •tate-reeov-,, law exceed• tbe acope 
of that authortaatton. U permtta the St.ate to recover 
from a aal"Ytvhla apoua•'• •tate MUie value ot the .... ta 
of the eatate that were marital property or Jotntly owned 
property cal °"W ff,,.. dlfring UN mon-iac,e,,. Minn. Stat. 
A.ma. I 268B.16, 1111bd. 2 (200'1) (emphuia added), without 
resard to whether tbe recipient. retained aa lntereat In 
the 1111Mta at the time of her deatll. BecauN a State may 
not. recover correctly paid Medicaid beneftta except to 
the extent authorised by federal law, aee '2 U.S.O. 
13Np(b)(l), Mlnneaota'• atatute eonfflc:ta wfth federal 
law and le therefore preempted. S•• Col~.,. F«I. 
s,111. ~ Loa" A••'n v. G1'Cnu, ,11 U.S. ffl. 280-282 
(1981). 
000640
·-
10 
2. Petitioner argues (Pet. 25-28) t.b&t the ten ot the 
Medicaid Act impo.se.t no limit. on penntaaible recoveey 
trom t.he estate ot the Medicaid recipient's surviving 
spouee, because t.he Act definee the term "aeeete" to in-
clude .. all lncome and reeow,:ea of the individual and of 
the individual's spouse." 42 U.S.C.1396p(hX1), Accord-
ing to petitioner, "(b 'Jy including resources of both 'the 
Individual' and 'of the individual's epouee' in the meaning 
of 'aaeete,' Congreu clearly Intended that the apouae's 
resources fall within the scope of I lS96p(bX4XB)." Pet. 
'l7. 
Petitioner ia incorrect. Although the general atatu-
tory definition of "aaseta" does encompaaa resource• of 
both "the individual" (i.e., the Medicaid recipient) and 
"the individual's spouae," the particular provision of the 
Medicaid Act at fasue here reten specffleally to ~ .. as-
set& in which tlae individual had any legal title or inter-
eat at the time of death." 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(,)(B) (em-
phaala added). Petltloner'e argument finds it necuaary 
to rewrite that clause to read "'any • • • aaaeta in 
which [llithdr or bot/& ti&. individual and the i·ndiviclual'• 
,pouH] had any legal title or intereat.'" Pet. 26 (brack-
')' eta and asteriks in original) (emphaeie added). But this 
editing doea not.hlng leea than make the statute aay t.he 
opposite of what It aaye. The plain language of the oper-
ative provision of the Act retu tea petitioner's reading.' 
• In d81Criblns th• QJ)el'StlOG or the amended .w.e-recover;r pro,-
viaion. the leglllative hiltory ol th• 1991 amendmenta allo foc:ua«I on 
the uaet.a of tht individual who hid NCeived Medicaid beneflta. rat.It• 
than the reaourcea al both the individual and hil or h• ,pou.._ See 
R.R. Cont. Rep. No. 211, load eon,., 11& Sell. 886 (1988) ( .. At tht 
option of the State. the ntat.e against [ which) • • • reet19.-Y LI IOUlb~ 
may Include any NIAi or penonal plJl*tJ • other uNla In which t.w 
~td t.l::IS0!0l 600Z 91 ·1nr 
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3. Petitioner's reading of the Medicaid Act aJao ftnda 
little support in the Act's other provtatona concerning the 
treatment of epoueal ueete. See Pet. 27-28. Aa peti-
tioner notea, t.he Medicaid Act generall1 considers the 
community spouse's uaeta for purpoeee of determining 
whether an inatltuUonal.lzed individual ia eligib1e to re-
ceive benefit.a. But the Act also exempts certain prop-
erty, such aa the couple', home. from consideration, 42 
U.S.C. 1382b(aX1), 1396r-5(c)(5), and allows the commu-
nity spouu to retain certain amounts of resources and 
inCQme t.hat are not considered available to pay for the 
applicant's medical care, 42 U.S.C. 1396r-5(d) and (1)(2). 
Moreovert once the inatitutionalized spouse fa deter-
mined to be eJigible for benefits, the Medicaid Act pro-
vide• that "no reaourcea of the community spouse shall 
be deemed available to the fnatftutfonaJfzed spouse." 42 
U.S.C. 1896r-6(cX4). The Medicaid Act, in short, im-
poeee eignlllcant 1lmltaUona on petitioner's asserted 
prindple that "spouses are expected to support each 
other." Pet. 'l:1. To read Section 1396p(bX4)(B) in accor-
dance with it.a plain terma thua fa consistent with the 
broader statutory scheme. 
4. Because Section 1396p(b) leaves no ambiguity 
about limitJng spousal estate recovery to the value of 
888eta in which t.he Medicaid recipient had a legal inter-
est at the Ume of death, the presumption again.et pre-
emption does not come into play, Pet. 28 (cfttng Mtdtron· 
ic, Int:. v. Loh.f', 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996))--even assum-
ing, arguendo, that thia presumption hu force tn the con-
text of a comprehensive federal-state cooperative pro-
gram like Medicaid in which the State's program la sub-
~ hid any lepl dtle or lnterllt at tM t1me of death, locludtn, 
the home. '1 (emphm added). 
Std ~:01 600e 91 ·enc 
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jec:t to federal approval. And for similar reaeone, peti-
tioner's auggeetion that the decision below improperl7 
enforces againat Lhe State "Caln ambiguoua conditfon" on 
the acceptance of federal !unda Wlder Spending Clauae 
legialation lacka 11111 merit. Pet. 28 n.8 (citing Arli,sgtcm 
Cffl&. Sela. Did. Bd. of Edvc. v, Mu'7'hf, 548 U.S. 291, 
296 (2006)). 
Petitioner alao em (Pet. ZO..Z3, 28 n.8) ln ueerting 
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's Interpretation of 
Section 1896p(b)(4}(B) la lnconalatent with the interpre-
tation of the re.sponaible federal agency. HHS haa net-
t.her promulgated regulation• nor iaaued guidance inter-
preting Section 1896p(b)(4')(B) to authorize the kind of 
eetate recovery that petitioner urges in this cue. To be 
sure, CMS in 2007 approved Minnesota·• state plan 
amendment incorporating lbs statutory apoaeaJ recovery 
proviaiona. See Pet. App. 89a-98a. But CMS'• approval 
fa not the equivalent ot binding interpretive guidance. 
Ct. 42 C.F.R. 430.lG(a)(l) (a etate plan or plan amend-
ment Is deemed approved lf CMS does not act. within 90 
days aft.er eubmiaeion). Moreover, CMS'• approval fol-
lowed binding Judlclal decialona In MJnneaota•a own 
court.a interpreting the Medicaid Act to limit recovery to 
aaaeta in which the Medicaid recipient had an interest at 
time of death. See, 1.g., /11 n Esta.le of~' 662 
N.W.2d 709, 714 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002). As aet forth 
above In this brief, see p. 9, •pro, HHS also interpret.a 
the Medicaid Act to limit recovery in that manner. 
B. Th• Deciaton Below Dou Not WUTaDt Furtll• am.,.. 
1. Petitioner contende (Pet. 24-25) that review la 
warranted to reaolve a conflict between the dedeion be-
low and the North Dakota Supreme Court•a dec:taton In 
: ~ 
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Wini, ,uprc1.• In Wins, much u in tbia cue, a Medicaid 
recipient had t.ranaferred ueet.a t.o bfa apouae before hla 
death, and t.be State sought to recoYer the coat of the 
Medieaid beneflta from the spouse's eatate after her 
death. The court held that the Stat.a wu pennitted un-
der 42 U.S.C. 1896p(b)(4)(B) to recover the value of an7 
aueta ufJl which the deceaaed recipient once held an in· 
tereat," Including aaaeta conveyed to hie spouse before 
hla death. Wim, 80'1 N.W.2d at 881. 
But the different reeulta in thia cue and in Wim may 
not. reffect a dlaagreemeat aboat the meaning of !edenl 
Medicaid law. Notabl;y, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court, like the Minnesota Supreme Court. stated that 
the State .. [could] assert a claim agalut real or penonal 
4 Ju the Mlnaaota Supr9m8 Coutt. .ncud (l'eL App. lla-21&), two 
och• et.ate courtl haw eonc:tucs.d that SectlGII 18Np(b) aut.bort- re-
C1J9917 oaly from U. ..... ol a Medieaid recipleni, and no& from ta 
--ofhilor her apouae. SeeHiwlf v, o.pa,,,,.,_ ~/Pt,b. Aid, & 
N.E.2d 1'8 (m 2008): /,a,w B**ofllwltwf, 6'1 N.W .Id 141(Wfa. Ct. 
App. 1991). But. thoNdectalona and the dedlbl belolf an not In con-
ffle&. Both Hitwa and ... an ~t wltb tbe pr(Ddpi. that a 
State may reeo+w trvm che--vt a MllcHcul l"IIClp19at'1111rYMnt 
SJ10UN tflt. all'dla ltt oplloa unda' SeccfGn 1890p(bX4XB) to deftDe 
thelndlvldual"1 eatatemcn bnldlJtblD lt.llcW!nedundlratatepro-
bate law. See Hiw, 860 N.E.%d at lU-llf (aplainlns tllatbe et.ate 
teplatute could lmedlt!ned tberedplenr111tat.elnlladl •W'aJ' • to 
prvtid• lor ret#lfllrJ ot catlln -tram the .... of hla IIUrffllnt 
apouN, 1M had ebotm not to do .o); ...,,., 5'1 N.W .Jd at 241 Is 
n.a (holdmr tha • ttat.e atatut.e authorilina lblJ NCOYe7 tram a.., 
rivfns •poua'• •t.at.e exceeded the Stat.'1 aat.hority mxfar a U.S.O. 
1391p(b). wlibaut conakla1nr whather It would have been pmnfutble 
fortbeStawt.orweov.-ft'OlllUMIUnMnglpOUM'llltatathawlua~ 
...-.1n whkh tll• recipient had - intaW& I& the tJme of death). Re-
1pondentbeN. In aft1'9"1lt.doeana&~the f6melota8upnme 
Court'• eondllllon dll&. State .. panniUal tAI ...... ft'OID tile ..... 
oh tunmllC lpouN Ill IOfflHircufflllaaea Set BP. In Opp. 1, 1-9, 19. 
l.ld 1..1:190:et 600Z 9t ·rnr : i.at.:J 
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propert)', and other ueete in whieh [the recipient] had 
any legal UUe or other Int.net CIC Ai, dM:&ll&.,. Wirt,, 80'1 
N.W.2d at. 886 (emphuia added); see alao ibid. ("Our 
inquiry • • • ia • • • whether [the recipient] had 
'real and personal property and other aaeta tn which 
[be] had any legal titJe or intereat at CM Um. of d«JCh.. ") 
(emphaala added). Although itl reasoning fa not entirely 
clear, t.he court In Wini appeared to conclade that the 
reeipient in that cue, despite formal conveyance of cer-
tain aeset.e before death, retained an interen in the rele-
vant propert)' until hia death. when the inteNlt wu con-
veyed to bla apouae through "other arrangement."' 60'1 
N.W.2d at 886 (quoting 42 U.S.C.1396p(b)(4XB)). The 
court did not. elabonte on the nature of that tntereat, 
although it referred to the State'• argument tbat 
the recipient had retained a "marital or equitable i:nter-
eat" in the ueeta at the time of hla death, i<L at 888, and 
noted that other court.a had interpreted Sectlon 
1396p(b)(4)(B) to reach etate-law community-property 
and home1tead lntereata, uL at 885. 
The different reeulte reached by the North Dakota 
Supreme Court and the court below on similar fact.a tbue 
may reflect not contlictin1 interpretaUone of federal 
Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under 
state law, a epouee ret.alm a legal mtereet in property 
conveyed to hta or her epoaee. Compare Win•, 607 
N.W.2d at 886-M, with Pet. App. 38a-40a (cOftcladJng 
that, aft.er M1. Barg tranaferred her lntereat In the 
homestead and bank accounts, she no longer had a lepl 
tntereet that could have been conveyed to Mr. Barg upon 
her death), and id. at 40a (noting that Minnesota law 
"makee no reterence to • • • re-deftning the probate 
eatate to include all marital property. even property 
tnmaferred prior to death"). 
8ld IA:1l.0:0l 600Z 9t ·1nr 
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Even If the decialona In Wirla and thla cue do reflect 
a dtaagreement aa t.o proper Interpretation of the Medi-
caid Act, thle Court.•• review would not be warranted. 
The Mlnneaota Supnme eourr, lntspl'etadon of federal 
law 11 correct. and to date, on)J the North Dakota 811• 
preme Court hu allowed Medfc:atd rec:oveq follcnrfna an 
inter vtvoa tranater ot Uletl between spouaee. Aanm-ln• argaendo that Lhe Nortb Dakot.a Supreme Coart ma-
undentood federal Medicaid law, rather than atmp'7 
applied a peculiar feature of ltl own property law, the 
North Dakota court bu not had an opportmut, to con-
alder HHS'• Interpretation, and the conflict may work 
itself out aa the fuue la further lddreaaed in the lower 
coorta. 
2. Although petitioner (Pet. 31-38) ia correct that 
eetate-recoveey etrorta are Important to the Medicaid 
prolJ'am, queatfou concerning the scope of the Act.'• 
estate-recovery pro-riaiou ba.,e not arfaen frequently, 
and relatively few Stata have opted to seek eat.ate recov-
eq to the maximum extent permitted b7 federal law. 
See Office of A.Nfatant Secretary for Policy & Eftlua-
tion, HHS, Poliq/ St'. No. I, M,dtca.idBatat. Rm,,, 
Cou.cticme tbl. , (Sept. 2006) (only nine States mate 
maximum use of federal poltq opUona); eee al8o Pet.. 81. 
Moreover, altbourb the federal Medlcal.d Act Um1tll 
estate recoveey to thOH aueta bl which the Medicaid 
recipient had a legal intereet at the time of her death. the 
nature and extent of euch lntereata remain largel7 the 
domain ot state law. Notably, M.lnnaot.a'1 Governor hu 
propoeed redefining marital property Int.ere.ta to permit 
ree09e17 of medical aaaiatance trom the estate of the 
later-1urvifln1 1pouse in thll contut. See Gownlor'a 
Rtcom~ Mi11fl .. ola8ta.t, Bwlo.C, f010-11 Bi-
mnicu B'Mlg.C, HumGn Sffllfc• DlfJ'r 182 (Ju. 2'1, 
6td r..t1l.0:el 60liE 91 ·tnr :i.at.:1 
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2009). That. proposal haa not become law, nor baa it been 
reviewed by the Secretary ot HHS. The proposal, how-
ever, euggeata that Mlnneaota may be able to work tCr 
ward greater auet recovery consistent. with the clear 
terms of f'ederal Medicaid law. 
CONCLUSION 
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied. 
Respectfully sabmitted. 
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DF..PAATMENT OF HEAL Tl I A HUMAN S"RVICES HEAL TH CARE FlNANCJNG ADMINISTRATION 
Dria11 f'!. Batteita. Anomcy- At•LMV 
22.4t W.a1cr Slrffl 
Suite 212 
Plymovth. M&biNChuset11 02360 
Dear Mr. Barrcira 
April'· 2Cm 
~· ,.-J(r~,r~ 
GtYO'Nllall l-....-4' 
T~.M.A.01111)) 
1·hiJ tt m reply to your letter~ tna1rcr of a,.~, by ~mity spou~ You adviftd 
us thM it iJ the puvti<M'I m&he l>m,tOft of"Mcdiul A~sistance (DMA) &hat the post-cliaihilily 
t,.n,fer made by COtMWnity ~ ~ Mtdiuid dgqualifica&ion 'fhu,. you re.ifUr,tcd 
that we nod(y OMA ofil,. need to cume i1110 contpJianc-c -ilh Feckral law 
Under the tnntf'er of bids pro'-'r.uc)ft3 in I I 917(c) ut'thc Sotlal Security Aa (the AcO. transftrs 
betWftn spoutet are e,ccmpt from 1ny transfer pcaahy Uwder t11e 'f'OUal ~
.,.o.wo.,. ort1tM ortJR Act. 011C1S ~,.,, i1 ctece,12.mcd. ew tetCMneSoldle ~ftit., 
,pov,e are no to..., COM!dered ..-RabJe to the lnstiluttonmlte4 ..-, Thul. after lhc wt. 
in wfnch 1ft instiMioaaJizcd .,.. is ........... d .... ror Medicaid • ..., mour~ bclonp. 
to the community tp(NllC ar, .-Jy rltt pi opa,-, of !"'1 sp()U!C, lhat iA. the eon.nunity ,pcMJte 
can do wflatf:ftr he o,r llhc wants to whh tlttm. 
We will be wrifing • lcctH to Mark F. Reynolds, Adiftt& Com1THbft1nct. OMA. advisina him 1h11 
Selle pohcy need'I to be~ 10 be COll)fttcnt wich Ftderal req11ircmca11 We app,~ttc )'OUf 
intem1 in the Med"~ ptC)lr,m and 1br hrmsing this fllltla' to our auffttion. 
P'6te contact J\llen Bryan if you tt.vo all)· que.aions. lie cu be~ ac (M 7) ~6!;, t 2"6 
~....na.• . ( 
. ~ ,UfJl-4 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE POWER OF ATTORNEY CONTAINS NO EXPRESS 
GIFTING AUTHORIZATION AND THIS FACT IS 
DISPOSITIVE IN THIS APPEAL. 
The personal representative contends that because George Perry, using his power of 
attorney for Martha, conveyed Martha's property to himself before she died, 1 the Department 
may not recover the property and it can be distributed to George's heirs. This argument relies on 
the validity of the purported transfer. If the transfer by George to himself was invalid., then the 
personal representative's argument completely fails and, even if Medicaid law is interpreted as 
the personal representative suggests, the Magistrate must be reversed and the Department's claim 
allowed. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The standard of review for interpretation of an instrument, such as the power of attorney 
in this case, is set forth in the case of Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 192 P .3d 1036 (2008): 
This Court's standard ofreview of a lower court's interpretation of an 
instrument depends on whether the instrument is ambiguous. C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 
135 Idaho 763, 765, 25 P.3d 76, 78 (2001) (citing DeLancey v. DeLancey, 110 
Idaho 63, 65, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (1986)). The question of whether an instrument is 
ambiguous is a question oflaw, over which this Court exercises free review. Id. In 
deciding whether a document is ambiguous, this Court must seek to determine 
whether it is "reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation." Bondy v. Levy, 121 
Idaho 993, 997, 829 P .2d 1342, 1346 ( 1992). "In the absence of ambiguity, tht: 
document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according to 
the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument." C & G,, 135 Idaho 
1When this matter began, Martha Perry was still alive. The Department has been informed by the personal 
representative that Martha passed away on May 4, 2010. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 1 C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000657
at 765, 25 P .3d at 78 ( citing Juker v. Am. Livestock Ins. Co., 102 Idaho 644, 645, 
637 P.2d 792, 793 (1981)). 
Chavez, 146 Idaho at 219, 192 P .3d at 1043. Here, the power of attorney is unambiguous. The 
fact that the power of attorney lacks any express gifting power is not "reasonably subject to 
conflicting interpretation." Therefore, the interpretation of the power of attorney is a question of 
law. Even if it were ambiguous, then evidence of intent would be required, of which there is 
none but the document itself. 
8. The Personal Representative's Interpretation of the Power of Attorney Is Incredibly 
Strained and Not Reasonable. 
The personal representative takes seven sequential words out of context and constructs a 
nonsensical sentence that he claims grants power to the principle to make a gift to himself of 
Martha's real property. She contends the power of attorney gave George powE:r "To ... exercise 
... any ... gift ... for the principle." See Respondent's Brief, p. 36 (top). She then incorrectly 
states that the full sentence is found in footnote 17 of her brief. Actually the seven words are 
taken from a much longer sentence with 164 words: 
(H) Estate, trust, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept, receipt 
for, exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim 
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or payment 
due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and exercise any power 
over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary control; establish a revocable 
trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates at the death of the 
principal and is then distributable to the legal representative of the estate of th1;: 
principal; and, in general, exercise all powers with respect to estates and trusts 
which the principal could exercise if present and under no disability; provided, 
however, that the Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or 
amend a trust revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trnstee of any 
trust for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent unless 
specific authority to that end is given. 
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Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ,i 
H (underline added). This paragraph is clearly intended to grant the agent the power to accept 
gifts and exercise powers for the benefit of the principle. In no way can this language be 
reasonably construed to grant George the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's property. 
Indeed, the same paragraph contains several clauses prohibiting self dealing: 
... establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal that terminates 
at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the legal representative: of 
the estate of the principal ... provided, however, that the Agent may not mah: or 
change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust revocable or amendable by the 
principal or require the trustee of any trust for the benefit of the principal to pay 
income or principal to the Agent unless specific authority to that end is given. 
Exhibit "G" to the Department's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, ,i 
H (underline added). 
If a text is long enough, words can be pieced together to say almost anything. For 
example, some people claim to find hidden messages in the Bible.2 The phrase extracted by the 
personal representative is: "To ... exercise ... any ... gift ... for the principle." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 36 (top). What does it mean to "exercise" as gift? One can "make" a gift, "give" a gift, 
"accept" a gift, but "exercise" a gift? One can exercise a "power," but a not a '·'gift." Such a 
construction exists only in the imagination of the personal representative. In s1;!arching the 
"allstates" and "allfeds" databases on Westlaw, this construction is not found in any case.3 
2See e.g. http://www.nmsr.org/biblecod.htm. 
3The personal representative's claim that ,i B of the power of attorney permits gifting of jpersonal property 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 39 fn. 22 (carried over from previous page)) is similarly vacuous. Broad a1uthority to purchase, 
sell and transact business is not authority to make a gift, especially to oneself. 
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The simple fact is that the power of attorney lacks any express provision giving George 
the power to make gifts to himself of Martha's real property. 
C. The Lack of Express Gifting Power Is Fatal to George's Purported Transfer of the 
Property to Himself. 
The personal representative seems to argue that even without express gifting authority, 
the gift should still be valid because the power of attorney is "incredibly comprehensive" and 
because "one is struck by the comprehensiveness of the document." Responde:nt's Brief, pp. 35 
and 38. The argument seems to be that the right to make gifts should be inferred from the tone of 
the document. However, this argument is a two-edged sword. The fact that the power of 
attorney is comprehensive suggests the drafter omitted gifting powers on purpose. 
More importantly, it is express gifting language that is required by the authorities cited by 
the Department at section VIII(A) of the Appellant's Brief and that is required by Idaho Code§ 
32-912: 
32-912. Control of community property. - Either the husband or the 
wife shall have the right to manage and control the community property, and 
either may bind the community property by contract, excypt that neither the 
husband nor wife may sell, convey or encumber the community real estate unless 
the other joins in executing the sale agreement, deed or other instrument of 
conveyance by which the real estate is sold, conveyed or encumbered, and any 
community obligation incurred by either the husband or the wife without the 
consent in writing of the other shall not obligate the separate property of the 
spouse who did not so consent; provided, however, that the husband or wife may 
by express power of attorney give to the other the complete power to sell, 
convey or encumber community property. either real or personal. All deeds, 
conveyances, bills of sale, or evidences of debt heretofore made in conformity 
herewith are hereby validated. 
Idaho Code § 32-912 ( emphasis added). There is nothing "express" in the power of attorney 
used by George in his attempt to convey Martha's property to himself. 
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D. The Power of Attorney Didn't Grant Gifting Powers Before the Uniform Power of 
Attorney Act and Does Not Grant Them after. 
The personal representative claims that the power of attorney "Met The Requirements of 
LC. § 15-5-501 et. seq." Respondent's Brief, p. 39. The personal representative seems to 
suggest that under the former law, George's gifting to himself would have been authorized. This 
is incorrect. The section cited by the personal representative reads as follows: 
15-5-502. Durable Power of Attorney Not Affected by Disability. All 
acts done by an attorney in fact pursuant to a durable power of attorney during any 
period of disability or incapacity of the principle have the same effect and inure to 
the benefit of and bind the principle and his successors in interest as if the 
principle were competent and not disabled. 
Idaho Code § 15-5-502 (1982) (underline added). This section (nor any other section of the old 
law) grants powers to the agent that are not found within the four comers of the power of 
attorney. 
The personal representative also suggests the Uniform Power of Attorney Act,. adopted in 
2008, would not have required express gifting language for an agent who was also a spouse. 
Respondent's Brief, pp. 40-41. This is also incorrect. Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(1) provides as 
follows: 
15-12-201. Authority that requires specific grant- Grant of general 
authority 
( 1) An agent under a power of attorney may exercise the following 
authority on behalf of the principal or with the principal's property only if the 
power of attorney expressly grants the agent the authority and exercise is not 
otherwise prohibited by other agreement or instrument to which the authority or 
property is subject: 
(a) Create, amend, revoke or terminate an inter vivos trust; 
(b) Make a gift; 
( c) Create or change rights of survivorship; 
( d) Create or change a beneficiary designation; 
( e) Delegate authority granted under the power of attorney; 
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(f) Waive the principal's right to be a beneficiary of a joint and survivor 
annuity, including a survivor benefit under a retirement plan; or 
(g) Exercise fiduciary powers that the principal has authority to deleg8lte. 
Idaho Code § 15-12-201 (underline added). The personal representative points to the comments 
in the Uniform act for the proposition that the "default rule" would not apply to the spouse as 
agent. Respondent's Brief, p. 40 (bottom). The personal representative quotes the folllowing 
language in the comment, but incorrectly inserts the bracketed material making it appear that this 
comment applies to the requirement for an express authorization to make a gift: 
Subsection (b) r1.c. § 15-12-20l(l)(b)] contains an additional safeguard 
for the principal. It establishes as a default rule that an agent who is not an 
ancestor, spouse, or descendant of the principal may not exercise authority to 
create in the agent or in an individual the agent is legally obligated to support, an 
interest in the principal's property. For example, a non-relative agent with gift 
making authority could not make a gift to the agent or a dependant of the agent 
without the principal's express authority in the power of attorney. In contrast, a 
spouse-agent with express gift-making authority could implement the principal's 
expectation that annual family gifts be continued without additional authority in 
the power of attorney. 
Official Comment to Article 2 of the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. However, comrary to the 
personal representative's insertion, the comment does not apply to section 15-12-20 l (l )(b) at all, 
it applies to section 15-12-201(2)4 which provides as follows: 
(2) Notwithstanding a grant of authority to exercise authority in 
subsection (1) of this section, unless the power of attorney otherwise provides, an 
agent that is not an ancestor, spouse or descendant of the principal, may not 
exercise authority under a power of attorney to create in the agent, or in an 
individual to whom the agent owes a legal obligation of support, an interest in the 
principal's property, whether by gift, right of survivorship, beneficiary 
designation, disclaimer or otherwise. 
4That this comment applies to subsection (2) is clearly and correctly shown by the compiler of the Idaho Code in 
the Official Comment following Idaho Code~ 15-12-201 in the official Michie publication of Titles 14-17, at page 468 
(second column, halfway down). 
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Idaho Code§ 15-12-201(2). In other words, subsection (1) prohibits the making of gifts, or 
doing the other things specified in that section, without express authority, and subsection (2) 
imposes an additional restriction that applies to non-relatives. The comment in no way suggests 
that an agent-spouse can make gifts, whether to himself or others, without an express grant of 
authority. 
Therefore, neither the original power of attorney law, nor the current power of attorney 
law permits the making of gifts without express authority within the power of attorney. 
E. There Was Absolutely No Benefit to Martha in George Transferring Martha's Real 
Property to Himself. 
The personal representative also incorrectly makes it appear that Idaho Code § 15-12-
217(3) would permit George's gift to himself in this case. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fn. 25. 
However, section 15-12-217 doesn't eliminate the requirement for express gifting authority. 
Instead, it applies where gifting has already been authorized. Moreover, this siection imposes 
additional requirements for making gifts: 
(3) An agent may make a gift of the principal's property only as the agent 
determines is consistent with the principal's objectives if actually known by the 
agent and, if unknown, as the agent determines is consistent with the principal' s 
best interest based on all relevant factors, including, but not limited to: 
(a) The value and nature of the principal's property; 
(b) The principal's foreseeable obligations and need for maintenance; 
( c) Minimization of taxes, including income, estate, inheritanc,e, 
generation-skipping transfer and gift taxes; 
(d) Eligibility for a benefit, a program, or assistance under a statute or 
governmental regulation; and 
(e) The principal's personal history of making or joining in making gifts. 
Idaho Code§ 15-12-217 (underline added). 
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The personal representative suggests that the transfer was in Martha's best interest in light 
of eligibility for government benefit programs. Respondent's Brief, p. 41, fu. 25. This ignores 
the fact that the home is not counted when it comes to eligibility for Medicaid. 42 U.S.C. § 
l 396r-5( c )( 5). It was completely unnecessary for Martha to divest herself of the home in order to 
qualify for Medicaid. This transfer benefitted George, not Martha. There was nothing in this for 
Martha at all. 
The personal representative makes several other statements that are completely 
unsupported by any evidence in the record. She states that "Martha would have signed the deed 
at issue were she able to do so." Respondent's Brief, p. 39, fu. 23. There is absolutely no 
evidence in the record to support that claim. To the contrary, the evidence in the record is that 
Martha, as the personal representative states, "put George's name on the title"5 to the property-
while retaining her own interest in the property. Moreover, she gave George a power of attorney 
that did not include gifting powers, and to the contrary, imposed specific restrictions on self 
dealing. 6 See ,r,r G and Hof the Power of Attorney (Exhibit "G" to the Department's 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim). Contrary to the suggestions of the 
personal representative, the power of attorney did not give all power to Georgt::, it limited those 
powers. The only evidence of Martha's intent to be found in the record is the documents 
5Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-8. 
6The personal representative calls these anti-self-dealing provisions "standard provisions" and "boilerplate." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 39 (first paragraph and fn. 23). However, it is 1 H that the personal representative relies upon. 
Therefore, apparently, the personal representative's view is that part of1 His important and represents the intent of the 
principle, but the other parts of that same paragraph are mere "boilerplate." These sections are as important as any others 
in the power of attorney and demonstrate that George, as the agent, was not given "comprehensive" authority; he was 
given limited authority as the document clearly shows, and was limited to the powers actually expressed thc!rein. 
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themselves, which documents evidence the intent to retain, not give away, her interest in her real 
property. 
Also, there is no evidence that Martha was not competent to sign a Quitclaim Deed at the 
time George purported to transfer the property to himself. Likewise, there is no evidence in the 
record to support the personal representative's claim of title company "standard procedure" as 
stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 36, fn. 18. There is also no evidence that transfers of the home 
are "typical in cases of married couples" as stated at Respondent's Brief, p. 37. 
Finally, the personal representative states that there are no concerns here of"negation of 
the principle's estate plan." Respondent's Brief, p. 38. That assumes, however, evidence of an 
estate plan contrary to the plain language of the documents in the record. The docum1~nts in the 
record suggest only an intent on Martha's part to retain her property, not give it away. No 
evidence to the contrary is found in the record. 
F. The Alleged "Finding of Fact" Is, at Best, a Conclusion of Law. 
The personal representative claims the Magistrate made oral findings of fact to support 
the personal representative's claim of "interspousal agency." Respondent's Brief, p. 43. There 
are, however, no findings of fact. There are simply unexplained and unsupported conclusions of 
law. The statements of the Magistrate cited by the personal representative are the Magistrate's 
conclusions drawn from the four comers of the document itself. The lines quoted by the personal 
representative are the following: 
The power of attorney issue was - is interesting to me and - because I 
don't think that that - that paragraph where the word gift is written, paragraph H, 
is the clearest kind of authority to make a gift of property. It certainly can be mad 
that way ... 
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But I think - when everything - all of the language in that power of 
attorney is considered, it's so - the intent that you just can't get around is that 
document was entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, it 
seems to me, including the right to deal with interest in real property. So I'm 
going to make a determination for purposes of this case that that is a valid power 
of attorney for purposes of dealing with - including giving Martha Perry's int(;:rest 
in that property. 
So I'm going to decide that question for purposes of this case. (emphasis 
added) 
Respondent's Brief, p. 43 ( emphasis by personal representative omitted; underline added). There 
is nothing here but reference to the document itself. This is a legal, not a factual dete1mination. 
Henderson v. Henderson Inv. Properties, L.L.C., 148 Idaho 638, , 227 P.3d 568,570 (2010); 
Panike & Sons Farms, Inc. v. Smith, 147 Idaho 562,566,212 P.3d 992, 996 (2009). The 
Magistrate made no findings of fact that would support the personal representative's claim that 
there was somehow implied spousal authority for George's self dealing. 
G. The Failure of Georg<::'s Gift of Martha's Property to Himselfls Sufficiient to Require 
Reversal of the Magistrate and the Allowance of the Department's Claim. 
The personal representative's disallowance of the Department's claim rests entirely upon 
the Minnesota case of Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52 (Minn. 2008). The holding in the Barg 
case was that the state could recover only property in which the decedent had "any title or 
interest" at the time of death. In this case, it is clear that George's purported conveyance to 
himself fails and, therefore, Martha had an interest in the real property, or its proceeds, both at 
the time of her death and George's. Therefore, the Department's claim, even if Barg is applied 
in Idaho, must be allowed in this case. The Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be 
reversed. 
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II. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. The Personal Representative Is Asking the Court to Eviscerate Idaho's Medicaid Payment 
System. 
The personal representative attempts to minimize the importance of her attack on the 
Department's recovery of Medicaid payments by claiming she is merely challenging the 
"application" of Idaho Code § 56-218, as if the Department is on some frolic unexpected by the 
legislature that passed this law. However, the fact scenario presented in this case is exactly the 
kind of case this law was enacted to deal with. Either an elderly Medicaid recipient has a spouse 
or does not. Where a single person applies for long term care Medicaid, she must have spent all 
her available resources except the last $2,000 before she can be eligible. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). 
She can keep her house if she intends to return home, but it is completely subj,~ct to estate 
recovery. Her heirs will receive nothing until Medicaid is repaid in full. However, under the 
personal representative's argument, if one of a married couple needs assistance, she may simply 
convey her home to her spouse, and it is then forever protected from estate recovery. Her heirs 
will get the house when she and her husband pass away ( or, according to the view of the personal 
representative, the husband can simply give the property to the children whene:ver he likes). The 
taxpayers are left holding the bag and have subsidized and protected the inheritance of the 
Medicaid recipient's non-dependent children. 
Obviously, when the legislature approved a plan to protect the elderly poor and their 
spouses, this is not what they had in mind. This is what is in issue in this case. The personal 
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representative wishes the court to nullify the requirement to reimburse Medicaid anytime the 
Medicaid recipient has a spouse.7 
B. Standard of Review. 
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which the court exercises free 
review. Curlee v. Kootenai County Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391,224 P.3d 458 (2008) citing 
State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827,829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001). 
A. 
III. 
MEDICAID IS A PROGRAM FOR THE POOR AND IS NOT 
INTENDED TO SUBSIDIZE THE INHERITANCE OF NON-
DEPENDENT CHILDREN OF MEDICAID RECIPIENTS. 
Medicaid Estate Recovery Is Simple in Concept. 
Medicaid for elderly couples is simple in concept. Long term care is very expensive. 
Many elderly couples are unable to pay for needed medical care. Medicare does not cover long 
term care. Medicaid is not insurance as Medicare or Social Security is. There is no payroll tax to 
support it. It is a public welfare program funded by the general funds of the state and federal 
government. It is intended to be the payer of last resort. The elderly can obtain medical 
assistance (Medicaid) without divesting themselves of all their assets. Where a couple is 
involved, there are complex rules to allow one spouse to obtain needed medical care while the 
other remains living in the community. When both spouses have passed away, their assets are 
recovered to reimburse the Medicaid program and provide for others who are in need. 
7The personal representative has also asked the court to strike down the Department's rules, also approved by 
the legislature, which implement the recovery law where there is a spouse. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. 
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B. The History of Estate Recovery Reveals a Clear Intent to Recover the Assets of this 
Estate. 
The history of Idaho's estate recovery program is relevant here. While Idaho has long 
had estate recovery laws relating to public assistance, the first iteration of Idaho's modern estate 
recovery law was passed in 1988. The first paragraph provides as follows: 
56-218 Recovery of certain medical assistance. 
( 1) Medical assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an 
individual who was sixty-five (65) years of age or older when the individual 
received such assistance may be recovered from the estate, or if there be no estate 
the estate of the surviving spouse, if any, shall be charged for such aid paid to 
either or both; provided, however, that claim for such medical assistance corre:ctly 
paid to the individual may be established against the estate, but there shall be no 
adjustment or recovery thereof until after the death of the surviving spouse, if any, 
and only at a time when the individual has no surviving child who is under 
twenty-one (21) years of age or is blind or permanently and totally disabled. 
Transfers of real or pt::rsonal property by recipients of such aid without adequate 
consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action in the district court. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) (1988). Not coincidentally, 1988 was the year Congress pass.ed the 
Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA). The MCCA included provisions that for the first 
time permitted one spouse to qualify for Medicaid long term care without impoverishing the 
community (or at-home) spouse. 8 This process includes allowing spouses to make transfers 
between themselves. The concern of the legislature to be able to recoup these transferred assets 
can be read in the language of the original estate recovery statute. 
Congress has always sought to counter the attempts of some to use the Medicaid program, 
not as a payer oflast resort, but as an estate planning tool to protect and retain their own assets. 
The language of the congressional committee, cited by the court in Cohen v. Commissioner of 
Div. of Medical Assistance, 423 Mass. 399,668 N.E.2d 769 (1996) is often quoted: 
8The MCCA was later repealed, but the anti-spousal-impoverishment provisions for Medicaid were retained. 
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The Committee feels compelled to state the obvious. Medicaid is, and 
always has been, a program to provide basic health coverage to people who do not 
have sufficient income or resources to provide for themselves. When affluent 
individuals use Medicaid qualifying trusts and similar "techniques" to qualify for 
the program, they are diverting scarce Federal and State resources from 
low-income elderly and disabled individuals, and poor women and children. This 
is unacceptable to the Committee. 
H.R.Rep. No. 265, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 72 ( 1985). 
Cohen, 423 Mass. at 403-4, 668 N.E.2d at 772. By 1988, the committee report for the MCCA 
continued to echo these same concerns: 
The Committee is informed that a number of States have not made 
effective use of the authorities under current law to prevent affluent individuals 
from disposing of resources in order to qualify for Medicaid nursing home 
coverage. In the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement program for 
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing 
home patients to their non-dependent children. 
H.R. Rep. No. 105(JI), 100th Cong., 1 ST Sess. 1987, p. 73 (reprinted at 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
857, 896, 1987 WL 61566, p. 31). 
The battle had not ceased, of course, in 1993, when OBRA '93 was passed.9 This law 
included provisions which expanded the powers of the states to recover Medicaid benefits. The 
accompanying legislative history shows Congress's intent that assets divided for purposes of 
Medicaid eligibility be tracked and recovered. 
Under the Committee bill, States are required to establish an estate 
recovery program that meets certain requirements. The program must identiify 
and track resources {whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) of 
individuals who receive nursing facility, home and community-based services. 
and other specified long-term care services. The program must promptly ascertain 
9The battle still hasn't ended, of course. In 2006 the president signed the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 giving 
the states additional tools to assure couple's assets are used for their own care or available for recovery, rather than being 
protected for the Medicaid couple's heirs. The provisions of the DRA go to enhanced asset transfer penaltlies and the 
treatment of annuities and are not in issue here. 
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when the individual and the surviving spouse, if any, dies, and must provide for 
the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid on behalf of the 
individual for long-term care services from the estate of the individual or the 
surviving spouse. The term "estate" is defined as all real and personal property of 
a deceased individual and all other assets in which the individual had any legally 
cognizable title or interest at the time of his death, including assets conveyed to a 
survivor, heir, or assign through joint tenancy, survivorship, life estate, living 
trust, or other arrangement. 
H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 {May 25, 1993), Section 5112. {emphasis added). 
Among the tools provided in OBRA '93 is the addition of a definition of "asst::ts" for 
purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p which provides as follows: 
{h) Definitions 
In this section,, the following definitions shall apply: 
(I) The te1m "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all 
income and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse is 
entitled to but does not receive because of action-
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
(B) by a person, including a court or administrative body, with legal 
authority to act in place of or on behalf of the individual or such individual's 
spouse, or 
(C) by any person, including any court or administrative body, acting at 
the direction or upon the request of the individual or such individual's spouse. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p{h)(l) (emphasis added). "This section," of course, is 1396p. "Assets" 
includes the "resources" of the individual and the spouse and includes resoum:;:s transferred by 
the individual or the spouse. "Resources" are defined in subsection (h)(5): 
(5) The term "resources" has the meaning given such term in st::ction 
1382b of this title, without regard (in the case of an institutionalized individual) to 
the exclusion described in subsection (a)(l) of such section. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(5). The reference to section 1382b and the exclusion in subsection (a)(l), 
is to the couple's home. In other words, the "assets" defined in subsection (h){l) specifically 
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includes the couple's home whether held by one, the other or both. It is hard to imagine language 
that more clearly includes the property at issue in this case. 
Another tool given to the states by OBRA '93 was the expanded definition of estate found 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4): 
(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or :interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), including such assets conveyed to 
a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). The personal representative argues that the definition 
of assets in subsection (h) doesn't apply to this section. However, subsection (h) says, "[i]n this 
section" and doesn't make an exception for subsection (b). Subsection (b), of course, is the 
section that mandates estate recovery. 
The personal representative urges the court to ignore the legislative history and find that 
Idaho's estate recovery law preempted by federal law. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. However, the 
personal representative herself cites Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 
581 (1941), for the proposition that "Conflict preemption also occurs when the state law is 'an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."' 
Respondent's Brief at 12. If one is to determine whether the state law is "an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" one must inquire 
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into what the purposes and objectives of Congress are. Clearly the intent of Congress and the 
legislature is relevant and important to deciding this case. 10 
Understanding that Congress has said that Medicaid is for the poor, that it "should not 
facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to their non-dependent 
children." and that the state should "track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility 
purposes)" and collect them "from the estate of the individual or the surviving spouse," one can 
only make one of three conclusions: (1) Congress didn't mean what it said; (2) Congress made a 
huge mistake in drafting the law; or (3) the personal representative is wrong. 
IV. 
THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE RELIES UPON A 
SINGLE PHRASE OF THE FEDERAL MEDICAID LAW 
READ OUT OF CONTEXT. 
A. The Personal Representative's Entire Preemption Case Relies on Reading a Phrase of 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p out of Context. 
The personal representative's argument is that any property transferred by a Medicaid 
recipient to her spouse, while she is alive, is forever off-limits to Medicaid estate recovery. She 
arrives at this argument because 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B) contains the following language: 
(8) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest) .... 
10The personal representative also states that where a statute is unambiguous it must be read literally and no 
legislative intent is necessary. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative, however, offers her own statutory 
construction and interpretation asserting that "asset" in 42 U.S.C. § l 396p(b)( 4) doesn't mean what the definition in 
subsection (h) says it means. Respondent's Brief, p. 28. If we are to read the statute literally, then the definition of 
"asset" provided in subsection (h)(l) must be applied in subsection (b)(4). 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 17 C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief. wpd 
000673
w 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(B). The argument is that if the individual divests herself of her property 
during life, it may not then be recovered after her death. 
The problem with this argument is, of course, that it is overly simplistic and totally 
ignores the entire body of Medicaid law including (I) an eligibility system that permits spouses 
to freely transfer property between themselves, 11 (2) a definition of "assets" that includes 
property transferred to the spouse during the eligibility process and specifically includes the 
home, 12 (3) the expansive nature of subsection (b)(4) and it's purpose in recapturing the couple's 
assets, 13 ( 4) the legislative history and purpose of Congress, 14 and (5) the absurd and unfair 
results of this narrow interpretation. 15 
B. Subsection (b)(4) Was Intended to Expand the Scope of Property to Be Recovered, Not 
Limit it. 
Recall that subsection (b)(4) was part of OBRA '93 and that part of the intent of OBRA 
'93 was to "identify and track resources (whether or not excluded for eligibility purposes) ... and 
... provide for the collection of the amounts correctly paid by Medicaid ... from the estate of the 
individual or the surviving spouse." H.R. Rep. 103-111, P.L. 103-66, OBRA 1993 (May 25, 
1993), Section 5112 ( cited above). This section is very broad and expansive: 
11 See discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief. 
12See discussion on page 15 of this Brief. 
13See discussion on page 16 of this Brief. 
14See discussion beginning at page 13 of this Brief. 
15See discussion beginning at page 34 of this Brief. 
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( 4) For purposes of this subsection, 16 the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual-
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets17 included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 18 and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case 
of an individual to wl1om paragraph ( 1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and personal 
property and other assets in which the individual had any legal title or interest at 
the time of death (to the extent of such interest), includinK such assets conveyed 
to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, 
tenancy in common, survivorship, life estate, living trust, or other arrangement. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
Thus, when the language relied upon by the personal representative is read in context 
with the remainder of the subsection and the definition of "assets" in subsection (h), it becomes 
clear. The phrase beginning with "including" shows the breadth of this section. In case the 
drafters missed something, they included the words "or other arrangement." The North Dakota 
Supreme Court found this language sufficiently expansive to include property such as that at 
issue in this case. In re Estate of Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2000). 19 
The personal representative contends that the "including" phrase only applies to property 
which passes instantly at death. Respondent's Brief, p. 7. This distinction, however, is not found 
10The "subsection" is 42 US.C. § 1396p(b) which includes the federal mandate that stat,~s pursue estate 
recovery. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b )( 1 ). 
17The personal representative says the word "assets" used here should not be given the definition found at 
subsection (h)(l) of this section. Respondent's Brief p. 28. However, if Congress did not want the expansive definition 
of "assets" to apply here, it could have used the word "property" or some other undefined word. 
18The personal representative, taking the Department's argument out of context, says "[t]he Department argues 
that estate recovery is really controlled by state law." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. Of course, what the Department 
actually said was that state law defines what property is available for purposes of both state probate law and Medicaid 
estate recovery. Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-10. This subsection and the following clearly confirms the Department's 
position. 
19The personal representative suggests the Department believes Wirtz to be weak because the Department does 
not rely solely on the "other arrangement" language. This is simply because the issue in this case is controlled by Idaho 
Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), discussed below, and Wirtz is merely 
persuasive authority. 
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anywhere in the law and is not supported by the language of the law itself. For example, where a 
living trust is created the "legal title or interest" is passed immediately. Estate of Hull v. 
Williams, 126 Idaho 437,443, 885 P.2d 1153, 1159 (App. 1994). The beneficiary holds only the 
beneficial, not legal, interest, and no legal interest passes on death. Subsection (b)(4), when read 
in context, is clearly intended to capture all property the Medicaid recipient, by whatever means, 
may have attempted to shelter or protect. 
C. The Jackman Court Ignored the Same Preemption Arguments Being Made Here. 
The record in this case includes a lengthy binder of exhibits included with the 
Departments Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. Included in these 
exhibits is the full set of briefs filed in the Supreme Court in Idaho Department of Health and 
We(fare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P .2d 6 (1998). The Department provided these 
documents so the court could see that these very same preemption arguments have already been 
made to the Idaho Supreme Court.20 The Respondent's Brief in Jackman gives as an issue on 
appeal, the following: 
3. Does Federal Medicaid law allow the state to recover a recipient's 
Medicaid costs from the estate of the surviving spouse beyond a tracing of the 
recipient's assets owned at the time of death. 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Respondent's Brief, p. 
5. The discussion of this issue begins at page 16 of the brief and continues to page 23. These 
same preemption arguments were continued in the Respondent's Rehearing Brief. Memorandum 
20The Department also provided a copy of the superceded decision in the Jackman case. Contrary to the claims 
of the personal representative (Respondent's Brief, p. 22), the Department has never cited that decision as Jmthority. 
However, like the underlying briefing it is important to provide context for the Court's ultimate holding, especially in 
light of the identical arguments being made in this case. The personal representative, apparently, would prc~fer Jackman 
be taken out of context. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 20 C:\Documents and Settings\cartwriw\Desktop\Appellants Reply Brief.wpd 
000676
in Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim, Exhibit "D" Rehearing Brief, pp. 27-33. The 
Respondent in Jackman also made the same arguments the personal representative makes here 
regarding the inapplicability of the federal definition of"assets" at pp. 27-8. Yet, the only place 
that the Idaho Supreme Court found the Department preempted was in the appllication of Idaho 
Code§ 56-218 to a transfer of property that took place before the effective date of OBRA '93. 
The remainder of the court's discussion deals with the timing of the particular transfer in the 
Jackman case. The court stated: 
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid 
payments for calendar quarters be2innin2 on or after October 1, 1993, 
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r 
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(e)(l1. 
"other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate. as defined by LC. § 
15-1-201(15). 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P.2d at 216-7 (emphasis added). Once the OBRA '93 changes 
were in place, the preemption argument failed. 
The personal representative argues as follows: 
Conflict preemption occurs when compliance with both state and federal laws is 
impossible. Fla. Lime Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143,83 
S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963). Conflict preemption also occurs when the 
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 
85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
Respondent's Brief, p. 12 (underline added). The Medicaid system exists to provide health care 
for the poor. The personal representative does not explain how Idaho Code § 56-218,, in any 
way, makes compliance with the federal Medicaid law impossible. Certainly the personal 
representative is not arguing that the "full purposes and objectives of Congress" include 
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preserving an inheritance for non-dependent children. Therefore, the personal representative has 
not shown how both federal Medicaid law and Idaho Code§ 56-218 are in conflict. 
D. The 1993 Changes in OBRA '93 Are Central to the Court's Holding in Jackman. 
The personal representative argues that the Supreme court's discussion of OBRA '93 in 
Jackman is merely dicta. Respondent's Brief, p. 24. Similarly, the personal representative 
suggests that Jackman is a pre-OBRA '93 case and is, therefore, not relevant. Respondent's 
Brief, pp. 13, 23-4. Actually, Jad.wan is a post-OBRA '93 case with a pre-OBRA '93 property 
transfer. The discussion of OBRA '93 is central to the court's holding, and Jackman is an 
important case because it demonstrates what Congress did with OBRA '93 and how the outcome 
of the case would have been different had the transfer been after the effective date of OBRA '93. 
If the personal representative is correct, the Court could have simply said that the assets 
were transferred before death, and therefore, the Department cannot have a claim. That is not 
what the Court did. The court began with the over-arching holding: 
The Department asserts that LC.§ 56-218, as it existed21 at times 
applicable to this case, authorized recovery of the balance of the Medicaid 
payments from Lionel's estate. We agree. 
Jackman, 132 ldaho at 8,970 P.2d at 215. The Court then goes on to state that the Department 
was preempted from recovering the assets conveyed by the Medicaid recipient to her husband 
before the effective date of OBRA '93. If the Court had agreed with the personal representative's 
preemption argument in this case, it could have simply said that transferred property was out of 
21 The personal representative reads this "as it existed" language out of context and says that the court was 
limiting it's holding to the facts of the case because it was pre-OBRA '93. Respondent's Brief, p. 23. However, if one 
reads the context, it is clear the court is talking about the "if there be no estate" language that existed in the original 
statute (see page 13) and was changt:d in 1998, the same year Jackman was decided. 
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the Department's reach forever. However, the Court went to great pains to discuss the effective 
date of OBRA '93 and the effect that had on their holding in the case. The court discussed the 
expanded definition of estate enacted by OBRA '93 and discussed the federal definition of 
"assets." There was no disagreement by the court on the legal effect of the federal definition of 
"assets." Rather, the court merely concluded that because the marriage settlement agreement was 
executed before the effective date of OBRA '93, it did not apply to the transfe1Ted property: 
We conclude that this definition of "assets" is not applicable to the 
agreement, which Jackman signed on behalf of Lionel and Hildor on March 8, 
1993. The definition of "assets" contained in the 1993 amendments to the federal 
statute does not apply "with respect to assets disposed of on or before the date of 
the enactment of this Act [Aug. 10, 1993]." Pub.L. 103-66, § 1361 l(e). 
Therefore, it does not apply to the agreement and does not allow the Departm(;:nt 
to recover the balance of the Medicaid payments from Lionel's separak: property. 
This is true even though 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4), which applies to Medicaid 
payments for calendar quarters beginning on or after October 1, 1993, 
authorizes the Department to recover the Medicaid payments from "othe1r 
assets." Without the definition of "assets" contained in 42 U .S.C. § 
1396p(e)(l), "other assets" are only those included within Hildor's estate, as 
defined by I.C. § 15-1-201(15). Lionel's separate property, including the 
community property transmuted by the agreement, is not part of Hildor's estate. 
Jackman, 132 Idaho at 9-10, 970 P .2d at 216-7 ( emphasis added). The obvious and necessary 
inference is that with "the definition of 'assets' contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p([h])(l), 'other 
assets"' would include the property transferred by the Medicaid recipient to her husband through 
the marriage settlement agreement. 
The personal representative says that the Department is asking this court to "speculate as 
to what our highest Court would have opined had it ruled on the issue at bar." Respondent's 
Brief, p. 23. However, the necessary implication from the Court's language is direct and the 
inference is necessary and unavoidable. Things that are necessarily implied are not speculative, 
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they are real and can have legal effect. There can be implied consent (State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007)), implied authority (Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure 
Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112,206 P.3d 473,476 (2009)), and implied promises (Gray v. 
Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378,387,210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009)) among other things. 
There is no need to speculate about the meaning of the Court here. The Court was clearly 
explaining the effect of OBRI\ '93 when it comes to spousal recovery in Idaho. 22 
E. The Solicitor General's Briefls Not Legal Authority. 
The personal representative is incredulous that the "Department fails to even mention" 
the Solicitor General's brief. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. The reason for this, of course, is that the 
Solicitor General's brief is not legal authority and is not binding on anyone. The personal 
representative, without any authority at all says: "The U.S. Solicitor General's position is in fact 
HHS's (and therefore CMS's) opinion on the issue." Respondent's Brief, p. 27. However, the 
personal representative grants government attorneys, including the undersigned, too much 
authority. While an attorney may represent an agency, a governmental agency's official 
pronouncements come through the promulgation of regulations and rules. The Department is not 
bound by the statements of a government attorney in an amicus brief, however well masoned it 
may be. 23 Likewise, undersigned does not have authority to make official pronouncements for 
the Department of Health and Welfare. Those are made by rule-making. 
22 At page 26, fn.11 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative states that even if the court finds the 
Court's discussion of OBRA '93 to be part of the Supreme Court's holding, it should still rule in favor of the personal 
representative. The personal representative seems to be suggesting this court over-rule the Idaho :Supreme Court. 
23lt is easy to think of Medicaid as a federal program and the states as mere contract administrators. This is not 
the case. The two sovereigns are partners in this program. If the federal government believes a state has failed to abide 
by its rules, it can deny federal financial participation, whereupon the state has administrative and legal remedies. 
Neither party is bound by the statements of the other's attorney in briefing. 
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That said, the personal representative has only cited those portions of the Solicitor 
General's brief with which it agrees. The Solicitor General's brief also finds that In re Estate of 
Wirtz, 607 N.W.2d 882 (N.D.. 2000) is not necessarily in conflict and suggests that the Supreme 
Court deny certiorari because the state of Minnesota is remedying it's problem by the same 
legislation the personal representative says is "clouding marital property law in Minnesota and 
raising serious practical and constitutional concems."24 Respondent's Brief, p .. 33. 
The Solicitor General recognized that the issue here is really what state: law allows to be 
recovered, and noted that Wirtz is not necessarily in conflict with the Minnesota Supreme Court's 
holding in Barg: 
Although its reasoning is not entirely clear, the court in Wirtz appeared to 
conclude that the recipient in that case, despite formal conveyance of certain 
assets before death, retained an interest in the relevant property until his death., 
when the interest was conveyed to his spouse through "other arrangem«~nt." 607 
N.W.2d at 885 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4)(B)). The court did not elaborate on 
the nature of that interest, although it referred to the State's argument that the 
recipient had retained a "marital or equitable interest" in the assets at the time of 
his death, id. at 883, and noted that other courts had interpreted Section 
1396p(b )( 4)(B) to reach state-law community-property and homestead interests, 
id. at 885. 
The different results reached by the North Dakota Supreme Court and the 
court below on similar facts thus may reflect not conflicting interpretations of 
federal Medicaid law, but only different views of when, under state law, a spouse 
retains a legal interest in property conveyed to his or her spouse. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, p. 14 
(underline added). 
24The personal representative cites the case of Douglas County v. Lindgren (Minn., 7th Jud. Dist., No. 
21-CV-09-477, August 4, 2010) and leaves the reader with the impression that the Douglas Coun(y case invalidated 
Minnesota's new marital property law. This is incorrect. The Douglas County case had nothing to do with the issues 
presented here. A copy of that case is attached as Appendix A. 
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Continuing to recognize the importance of state law on this issue, the Solicitor General 
noted that Minnesota was already enacting legislation to change the outcome of the Barg 
decision: 
Moreover, although the federal Medicaid Act limits estate recovery to 
those assets in which the Medicaid recipient had a legal interest at the time of her 
death, the nature and extent of such interests remain largely the domain of state 
law. Notably, Minnesota's Governor has proposed redefining marital property 
interests to permit recovery of medical assistance from the estate of the 
later-surviving spouse in this context. See Governor's Recommendation, 
Minnesota State Budget, 2010-11 Biennial Budget, Human Services Dep 't 132 
(Jan. 27, 2009). That proposal has not become law, nor has it been reviewed by 
the Secretary of HHS. The proposal, however, suggests that Minnesota may be 
able to work toward greater asset recovery consistent with the clear tenns of 
federal Medicaid law.25 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Minnesota's Petition for Certiorari, pp. 15-16 
(underline added). The Department provided a copy of this legislation as Exhibit "F" to the 
Department's Memorandum m Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim. 
So, if the Solicitor General's brief is entitled to as much weight as the personal 
representative claims, then the Barg case is oflittle or no application in Idaho, since Idaho is a 
community property state and Minnesota is not, and Idaho's marital property and probate laws 
are quite distinct from Minnesota's. 
A final word concerning the Solicitor General's brief: The personal representative 
claimed that the Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General. Respondent's Brief, p. 27. 
However, unless the personal representative has knowledge not available to the rest of us, the 
reasons for the denial of certiorari remain unknown and could have been for a hundred different 
25The personal representative speculates that Minnesota's new law will be found unconstitutional. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 33. The Solicitor General didn't seem to be so pessimistic. 
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reasons. All the denial of certiorari states is: "Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota denied." Vos v. Barg, 129 S.Ct. 2859 (2009). 
F. Other Provisions of State and Federal Law Make Sense Only If the Property of this Estate 
Is Recoverable. 
At page 4 of Respondent's Brief, the personal representative correctly notes that in 
determining eligibility of a married person, the assets of both the husband and wife are 
considered. As already noted transfers of assets can be freely made from one spouse to the other. 
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(2). Since both of a couple's assets are considered for eligibility purposes, 
it doesn't really matter. Somehow, in the mind of the personal representative, all this changes at 
recovery time. The assets of both spouses no longer matter. It is only what the Medicaid spouse 
had (generally nothing if they transfer the home to the spouse) at death that can be recovered. 
Still, even where the Medicaid spouse dies first, no recovery can be made from her estate until 
after the death of the non-Medicaid spouse. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(2). This doesn't make sense. 
The personal representative says this is because "it is only at that time that a final determination 
can be made as to what, if any, interest the Medicaid spouse has in any property at her death." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 20. Yet, below, the personal representative contended that Martha's 
interests could be decided now, even while she was still alive.26 Even if it were true that 
determination of property rights requires waiting until after the death of both, that is a problem 
for the state probate courts, not for federal Medicaid. No, the reason is more simple: the non-
26In her "Reply Memorandum in Support of Objection to Department's Petition for Allowance of Claim," the 
personal representative said, "The Court should find that Martha has absolutely no interest in the house sale proceeds that 
make up George Perry's estate, and that she will not have any such interest at her death." Reply Memorandum etc. p. 15. 
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Medicaid spouse is entitled to use the couple's assets for his own support during his lifetime; 
after both are dead and the assets are no longer needed, they are subject to recovery. 
Along this same line, the personal representative quotes a few lines of a 1999 letter to the 
Department she claims stands for the proposition that "once one spouse qualifies for Medicaid, 
any resources belonging to the community spouse are solely the property of that spouse and the 
community spouse can do whatever he wants with them." However, when the letter is read in 
context, it becomes clear that the question that was asked was whether the Medicaid spouse 
would suffer an eligibility penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration. 
The question was not whether the spouse can do "whatever he wants" with the couple's assets. 
When eligibility is being established, if an applicant has transferred assets without 
adequate consideration within what is known as a "look-back" period, an eligibility penalty is 
imposed: the person cannot be eligible for Medicaid until a certain amount of time has passed 
calculated by how much the applicant has given away. The question asked by Mr. Gere was 
whether the Medicaid spouse, once eligibility has been established, would suffer an eligibility 
penalty if her spouse transferred assets without adequate consideration: 
The transfer of assets from the community spouse to his or her heirs via a will is 
not grounds for invoking a penalty against the institutionalized spouse for 
transferring assets for less than fair market value. 
Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). In concluding, the letter states: 
In the event an institutionalized spouse has already been determined eligible for 
Medicaid, the resources belonging to the community spouse have no impact QI! 
the institutionalized spouse's eligibility, and transferring those resources to 
various heirs via a will likewise does not affect the institutionalized spouse's 
eligibility. 
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Respondent's Brief, Appendix 3 (underline added). Clearly, the language stating the spouse "can 
do whatever he or she wants to with them" refers to not having an effect on the eligibility of the 
Medicaid spouse. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(2) provides: 
(2) Transfers of real or personal property, on or after the look-back dates 
defined in 42 U.S.C. 1396p, by recipients of such aid, or their spouses, without 
adequate consideration are voidable and may be set aside by an action itn the 
district court. 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(2) (underline added). This language has been in Idaho Code§ 56-218 since 
the original 1988 law. See page 13. Idaho Code§ 56-218 is a specific version of the more 
general fraudulent transfers act found at Chapter 9 of Title 55. Virtually every state has a similar 
act. Therefore, while it is true that the non-Medicaid spouse can "do whatever he ... wants to" 
with the assets without affecting the Medicaid spouse's eligibility, any transfer without adequate 
consideration is voidable. 
G. The Department's Construction ofldaho Code§ 56-218 Is Entitled to Deference. 
The personal representative may find Idaho Code § 56-218(2) "offensive" just as it does 
the Department's regulations .. 27 However, the personal representative cites Kopp v. State, 100 
Idaho ] 60, 595 P.2d 309 (1979) for the proposition that agency construction is entitled to "great 
weight and will be followed by the courts unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise." 
The actual quote is: 
27Respondent's Brief, p. 15. 
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The construction given a statute by the executive and administrative 
officers of the State is entitled to great weight and will be followed by the Court 
unless there are cogent reasons for holding otherwise.28 
Kopp, 100 Idaho at 163, 595 P.2d at 312. While the personal representative intended this to 
apply to the federal Medicaid agency, it would apply to the same extent to the Department. Kopp 
after all was referring to a state, not federal, agency. 
The Department's rules establish the Department's construction of its law in this area. 
The Department has cited IDA.PA 16.03.09.900.20 and .24. Rule 900.20 makes it clear that the 
Department's claim against a spouse's estate extends to all property that had been jointly owned 
or separately owned by the Medicaid spouse after the effective date of OBRA '93. Rule 900.24 
states: 
24. Marriage Settlement Agreement or Other Such Agreement. 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates assets 
for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of the deceased 
participant or the spouse. * * * 
IDAPA 16.03.09.900.24 (underline added). The personal representative deflects the court from 
the important part of this rule by referring to avoidance language in the final sentence ( omitted 
above). Respondent's Brief., p. 14. However, this rule is important because a marriage 
settlement agreement is a living transfer of assets. This is the agreement in qu,estion in Jackman. 
But it also includes "other such agreement which separates assets for a married couple" which 
would include the Quitclaim Deed in this case. This rule makes it clear that the transfer of an 
28The Department recognizes that this holding in Kopp has been greatly weakened in latc:r cases including J.R. 
Simplot Co., Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Com 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). 
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asset from one spouse to the other does not eliminate the Medicaid debt recoverable from the 
estate of either spouse.29 
V. 
THE LAW IN IDAHO IS WHAT IS IMPORT ANT IN THIS 
CASE. 
A. The Correct Question ls Whether the Property of this Estate, Even If Martha Transferred 
It, Remains an "Asset" Subject to Estate Recovery. 
The personal representative refers ( out of context again) to a colloquy with the Magistrate 
and claims the Department "was unable to answer that question." Respondent's Brie1~ p. 11. 
The problem was not the Department's response to the Magistrate's question, however, but, with 
respect to the Magistrate, the fact that the Magistrate was asking the wrong qui~stion. The 
Magistrate asked: 
THE COURT: Get me to - to the place statutorily that the timing includes 
- sort of the time of death is certainly part of the - of the equation because in the 
federal statute and in the state statute 218(4)(8), that's what they're looking at. 
But get me to the part that says - that was transferred, which I'm assuming you're 
arguing means at any time during their marriage and when she was receiving -- I 
mean, would it also include a transfer made before she was receiving any - any 
Medicaid benefits? 
Tr. p. 24, 1. 19 top. 25. 1. 6 (underline added). The Magistrate was focusing on the question of 
the timing of the transfer (if it took place) between Martha and George. The underlying 
assumption was that if Martha had executed a Quitclaim Deed to George, then the property was 
29The personal representative complains that in citing this rule and Idaho Code§ 32-901, the Department is 
raising new issues for the first time on appeal. Respondent's Brief, p. 34. The personal representative is confusing 
"issues" with "authorities." The issue has always been the same one: Whether Martha's property conveyed by George to 
himself is subject to recovery. The Department is merely citing additional authorities relating to this issue. If additional 
authorities could not be cited much of the Respondent's Brief would have to be excluded. 
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no longer an "asset" subject to recovery. This assumption, of course, was wrong and the 
Department attempted to refocus on the Magistrate on the correct question: 
that-
MR. CARTWRIGHT: Ifl could be a little bit bold, Your Honor. I think 
THE COURT:: Be bold, please. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that's the wrong question. 
COURT: Okay. 
MR. CARTWRIGHT: I think that the correct question is not was this 
property transferred. The correct question is was this property the property of the 
individual. 
Tr. p. 25, 11. 9-20 (underline added). This is the correct question because, the whole point of the 
definition of assets in 42 U.S .. C. § 1396p(h)(l) is that the term assets includes property 
transferred by the Medicaid recipient to the spouse. It wasn't important when the asset was 
transferred (so long as it was after OBRA '93), or even if it was transferred. The important 
question was whether even after any purported transfer, it is subject to recovery under the 
expanded definition of estate found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4). In this case, it clearly was. 
There are several factors that make this so. The first, of course, is the definition of asset 
found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h)(l) which as been thoroughly discussed. Another is Idaho Code§ 
56-218(1) itself, which effectively alters marital property law in Idaho when it comes to the 
property of Medicaid recipients and their spouses. Idaho Code§ 56-218(1) states that: 
... medical assistance ... may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the 
estate of the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both .... 
Idaho Code§ 56-218(1). This statute affects both probate and marital property law. The 
legislature is not required to put all statutes affecting probate in the probate code and is not 
required to put all statutes affecting marital property in the marital property law. It can place 
statutes affecting these matters anywhere it likes. 
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The Department attempted to explain this to the court in the lines following those already 
quoted above. At Tr. p. 26, l. 4 to p. 28, l. 1, the Department explained how Idaho Code § 56-
218 can change marital property law by reference to a more obvious example found in Idaho 
Code§ 56-218(4)(b). That section, which adopts the language found in 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b)(4) 
states, in part, as follows: 
( 4) For purposes of this section, the term "estate" shall include: 
* * * 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets ... including 
such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the deceased individual 
through .. .life estate .... 
Idaho Code § 56-218( 4). This section modifies the common law in Idaho when it comes to life 
estates. In essence, it says that where a Medicaid recipient transfers real property to a "survivor, 
heir, or assign" and retains a life estate, that life estate interest is not extinguished on death, but 
remains an "asset" of the estate. 30 The Department concluded: 
That is the same thing, is the effective date of the law says that we've 
modified Idaho's property transfer and marital property law, or the legislature has, 
by Idaho Code section 56-218 to say if this person is on Medicaid in the futun:, 
this property remains subject to recovery. 
Tr. p. 27, 11. 20-25 (underline added). 
Because the correct question is, under Idaho law (together with the federal definition of 
assets and expanded definition of estate) is the property in this estate an "asset"' subject to 
recovery, the whole tortured "at the time of death" argument become irrelevant. This is not an 
attempt to grab back property transferred away. Rather, this is merely recognizing tha.t under 
30 See e.g. State Dept. of Human Services v. Willingham, 206 Or.App. 156, 136 P .3d 66 (2006) ("For purposes 
of the recovery of medical assistance paid by the state during the lifetime of the holder of a life estate interest, the life 
estate continues to exist after the death of the person holding the interest"); In re Estate of Laughead, 696 N.W.2d 312 
(Iowa 2005) (life estate in fann owned by deceased Medicaid recipient was required to be included in the estate for 
purposes of estate recovery). 
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Idaho and federal law, whether transferred or not, the property of this estate, like the life estate 
discussed above, is an "asset" of Martha's subject to estate recovery. 
B. Barg Has No Applicability in Idaho. 
The personal representative claims that In Re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W. 2d 52 (Minn. 
2008) "is on all fours" with this case. In light of the fact that it is state law, not federal law, that 
governs what property is subject to estate recovery, this seem highly unlikely. While the 
Minnesota Supreme Court can best interpret Minnesota's probate and marital property laws, 
other states are better at interpreting their own laws as the Idaho Supreme Court has done in 
Jackman. 
As noted in the Appellant's Brief, beginning at page 23, the Barg court did not even 
consider the federal definition of "assets" found in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). The personal 
representative contends otherwise, apparently because the court there used the word "assets." 
However, one can search high and low and find no reference (even oblique) to the definition of 
assets in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h). It was simply not raised before the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
Barg isn't even good law in Minnesota any more. 
VI. 
ABSURDITY, INEQUITY AND UNFAIRNESS WOULD 
RESULT FROM THE PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE'S 
INTERPRETATION. 
As already mentioned on page 11, above, if the personal representative's argument is 
correct, then those who are single must reimburse Medicaid and can pass no property to their 
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heirs until Medicaid is paid in full, while those with spouses have no obligation to reimburse 
Medicaid and their non-dependent children receive a windfall31 at taxpayer expense. 
Likewise, if a married couple (or perhaps the couple's children) get the advice of an 
attorney, they will not have to reimburse Medicaid, but if they are too ignorant or unsophisticated 
to transfer their assets away, their estate will have to pay. 
Again, under the personal representative's argument, where the Medicaid spouse dies 
first, a home which becomes the sole and separate property of the surviving spouse by operation 
of law will be subject to recovery, but on the other hand, if the Medicaid spouse had signed a 
Quitclaim Deed, making the property the non-Medicaid spouse's sole and separate property, a 
moment before death, there can be no recovery. 
CONCLUSION 
The fact that the power of attorney lacked express language allowing George Perry to 
make a gift, especially to himself~ of Martha's real property, is sufficient, all alone, to require the 
Magistrate's Order Disallowing Claim should be reversed. Even if the conveyance w1ere valid, 
the Department retains the right to recover the property of this estate as "assets" of the estate 
under both state and federal law. 
DATED this 16 day of September, 2010. 
!4)~/4=3 W. CgR'. y CARTWRIGHT 
Depufy Attorney General 
31 It is not unfair to use this word. If Medicaid had not paid their antecedent's medical bills, their inheritance 
would have been consumed by those costs. 
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.._, 
JUL. 2 8 2010 
STA TE OF :MINNESOTA IN DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF DOUGLAS DOUGLAS COUNTY SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
EI LED 
Douglas County, 
Plaintiff, 
AUG O 4 2n10 
~9urt File No.: 21-CV-09-477 
Court Ad2t7'{7 
V. ----------Deputy 
Alexandra Kjerstyn Lindgren and 
Bruce Dale Lindgren, 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on for hearing on May 19, 2010 on cross motions for 
Summary Judgment A hearing was held in front of the Honorable David R. Batu~y at the: 
Douglas County Courthouse, Alexandria, Minnesota. Plaintiff, Douglas County, was 
represented by attorney Megan Burkhammer. Defendant Alexandra Lindgren was represcmted 
by attorney Jo Ellen Doebbert. Defendant Bruce Lindgren was present and unrepresented. The 
matter was taken under advisement on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 12, 
2010. 
Based upon the file and records herein, the Court hereby makes the following: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
all respects. 
ORDER 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 
The attached Memorandum is hereby incorporated by reference, and approved in 
It is so ORDERED this .fl!_ 'I[, of~~~;;...t====----' 
Hon. David R. Battey 
Judge of District Court 
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JUDGMENT 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order constitutes the Judgment of this Court. 
Dated: Au tK t} , 2010 
Rhonda Bot 
Douglas County Court Administrator 
By:~ ?${uµ_) 
Deputy Court Administrator 
- . --- -· ·--------- . . ··-- ·----- -·-·- -- . ~- ... - . - - -
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MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiff Douglas County brings this claim against Defendants Alexandra Lindgren and 
Bruce Lindgren, alleging it is entitled to recover the value of certain gifts given to Defendants by 
their mother. The parties agree that this is a legal issue, and for the purpose of thi:; motion, none 
of the facts are disputed. Douglas County moved for partial summary judgment with respect to 
the gifted homestead, alleging that, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595, subd. 
4b(5), Defendants are required to pay a portion of their mother's long-tenn medical assistimce, 
originally paid for by Medicaid. Defendants move for summary judgment, claiming that !tection 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) is preempted by federal law. 
Facts 
On December 31, 2003, Dale and Marlys Lindgren ("Mr. Lindgren and Mrs. Lindgren"), 
transferred an undivided one-half interest in their home to their children, Alexandra and B:ruce 
Lindgren ("Defendants"). On March 18, 2004, Mr. and Mrs. Lindgren transferred the rest of 
their interest in the home to Defendants. At the time, the house was valued at $109,000. 
- O~-November i9, 200(~. L~~ ~ ~itted to the Be~y Ho~~. a11ursing · 
facility in Alexandria, Minnesota. Alexandra Lindgren then applied for long-term care benefits 
on her mother's behalf beginning in January, 2006. Douglas County approved the applica1fon. 
However, because of the uncompensated transfers, Minnesota and Federal law required Mrs. 
Lindgren be subject to a penalty period during which she was ineligible for medical assistance. 
Despite the statutorily-mandated ineligibility period, Bethany Home requested a waiver 
of the penalty period because continued denial of eligibility would lead to undue hardship. Mrs. 
Lindgren 's bills were not being paid, and she was facing eviction. Douglas County granted the 
waiver, and at the same time informed Mrs. Lindgren that the case would be rcferre:d to the 
3 
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Douglas County Attorney's office. During the thirty six months following the homestead's 
transfer, Mrs. Lindgren received $53,893.30 in government-paid medical assistance. Evt:ntually 
Mrs. Lindgren passed away on October 13, 2009, and this action was brought by Douglas 
County against Defendants, the recipients of the transfer, pursuant to Minnesota Statutes section 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) to recover the $53,893.30. 
Analysis 
MINNESOTA ST A TlITES SECTION 2S6B.059S, SUBD. 4b(S) IS PREEMEPTED, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS APPROPRIATE 
A. Summary Judgment Standard 
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Stringer v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club. 
UC, 105 N.W.2d 746, 753 (Minn. 2005) (citing Minn. R Civ. P. 56.03). A court is to e~JIIIline 
all "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,-amhdmissions on-£1e; together with the 
. _affi_flav;i_~:_inp~sjnE:9.M.JI!Q!~9n f<_>r s~j~gqi~nt.. Mjnn. ll. q:v, ];>. 56.03. Sumn~ ... 
judgment should be granted only when it is clear no fact issue remains, and it WO\l~d be 
unnecessary to inquire further into the facts. Larson v. Independent School Dist. No. 314. 
Braham, 252 N.W.2d 128, 130 (Minn. 1977). 
For the purpose of these Motions, the only issue this Court must decide is whether 
MiMesota's statutorily-created claim being asserted against Defendants is preempted by 11ederal 
law. If that provision is not preempted, then it is clear that Defendants are liable. If the 
provision is preempted, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment. 
4 
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B. Minnesota's Statutory Cause Of Action Against Transferees Under Minnesota 
Statutes Section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) Directly Conflicts With Federal Law 
And ls Preempted 
Medical assistance, better known as Medicaid, is an "enonnously complic.ated" program. 
Stephenson v. Shala/a, 87 F.3d 350,356 (9th Cir. 1996). To properly rule on the!,e Motions, it is 
essential to understand the relevant statutory framework governing Medicaid. In 1965, <:;ongress 
enacted Medicaid as a part of the Social Security Act. In re Estate of Barg, 152 N. W.2d 52, 58 
(Minn. 2008). The program is jointly funded with the states.· Id. To receive·fund.ing; a s1:ate 
must create a medical assistance plan by enacting legislation and rules governing Medicaiid 
within the state, and submit that plan to the United States Secretary of Health and Human 
Services. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396). Each state administers its own plan, however those 
plans must comply with the Federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a). Relevant to this case is section 
1396a(l 8), which requires that states "comply with the provisions of section 1396p of this title 
with respect to liens, adjustments and recoveries of medical assistance correctly paid." 
( emphasis added). 
-. 'i~~M~e-;~ia.- medic~! assistmce f~; ~-eedy pe~~~ is gov~~ by Chapter 256B. 
Eligibility for medical assistance is governed by Minnesota Statutes sections 256B.055-
256B.057. When a person be.lieves that she is eligible under one of these sections,, she may 
apply for assistance. Even if someone is otherwise eligible, that person may be deemed 
ineligible if she transferred property for less than fair market value within seventy-two months 
prior to the application. Minn. Stat.§ 256B.0595. The person is deemed to be ineligible for an 
amount oftime based on the amount of the uncompensated transfer. Id. subd. 2(b). Despite this 
penalty period, the determining agency must waive that penalty period if not doing so would 
cause undue hardship. Id. at subd. 4b(5). When the penalty is waived, a cause of etction arises 
5 
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against the transferee for any amount of medical assistance paid within seventy-tv,o months from 
the date of application for assistance, or for the uncompensated amount, whichevc:r is less. Id. 
Defendant asserts that 42 U.S.C. § 1396p preempts Minnesota Statutes se<:tion 
256B.0595. To make this determination, the Court must look at the language of those sec:tions. 
Federal Law - 42 U.S.C. § 1396p 
Section 1396p addresses, among other things, a state's ability to recoup correctly paid 
medical assistance. Specifically, subdivision (b)(l) states: 
''No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of 
an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf of an 
individual under the State plan in the case of the following individuals: 
(A) [Inapplicable exception]. 
(B) [Inapplicable exception]. 
(C) [Inapplicable exception]." 
Minnesota Law- Minn. Stat § 2S6B.0595, subd. 4b(5) 
Minnesota Statutes section 256B.0595 governs prohibitions on and penalti,es for 
also enumerates exceptions to this prohibition. Subdivision 4b(5) is one of those c:xceptio:ns. It 
states: 
"[A person or a person's spouse who made a transfer prohibited by subdivision 1 b 
is not ineligible for medical assistance services if] the local agency determines 
that denial of eligibility for medical assistance services would cause undue 
hardship and grants a waiver of a penalty resulting from a transfer for less 
than fair market value because there exists an imminent threat to· the 
individual's health and well-being ... When a waiver is granted, a ccruse of 
action exists against the person to whom the assets were transferred for that 
portion of medical assistance services granted within 72 months of tlae date 
the transferor applied for medical assistance and satisfied all other 
requirements for eligibility, or the amount of the uncompensated tr,ansfer, 
whichever is less, together with the costs incurred due to the action. The 
action shall be brought by the state unless the state delegates this 
6 
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responsibility to the local agency responsible for providing medical 
assistance under this chapter." ( emphasis added). 
Preemption Standard 
Defendants allege that Federal law, specifically 42 U.S.C. § 1396p, preempts 
Minnesota's statutory cause of action set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 25613.0595, subd. 
4b(5). The preemption doctrine is rooted in the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution1, and invalidates any state law contradicting or interfering with an Act of Co1ngress. 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) ("state law that conflictswith federal law 
is 'without effect."') (citation omitted). Congressional intent is the basis by which the Court 
determines whether a state law is preempted. Gade v. Nat'/ Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass 'n, 505 U.S. 
88, 96 (1992). Preemption is generaJly disfavored, unless the Congress clearly intended it. 
Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516. 
There are three main categories of preemption: (1) express preemption, which occms 
when Congress specifically states its intent to preempt in the text of the Federal la.w; (2) field 
the field" in that area of law; and (3) conflict preemption, which applies when state and fe:deral 
law directly conflict, making it impossible to comply with the requirements of both. Engl'ish v. 
General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1990). A preemption analysis requires an examin.11.tion of 
Congressional intent, using both the text and purpose of the statute. Medtronic, /r.!c. v. Lohr, 518 
U.S. 470, 484-5 (1996). Defendants argue that the conflict preemption doctrine applies, and 
preempts Minnesota's statutory cause of action in section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5). 
The language of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l) is clear. It directs that states shall not rc<:over 
correctly-paid medical assistance unless recovery would fall under one of the three: listed 
1 The "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pur:suance 
thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. 
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exceptions. Id. ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on behalf 
of an individual under the State plan may be made ... ") ( emphasis added). There is no dispute 
that Minnesota's statutory cause of action against a transferee who received prop~~rty from a 
medical assistance recipient does not fall within one of the exceptions listed in se1;tion 
1396p(b)(l). Thus, bringing an action against a transferee under Minnesota's section 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) conflicts with the Federal mandate prohibiting recovery under thf: State 
plan for correctly-paid medic:al assistance. Even in light of the presumption against preemption, 
this Court fails to see how bringing a cause of a:ction-parsuantto-section-256B.0595,--subd. 4b(5) 
would not violate 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(l). Minnesota's statutory cause of action under section 
256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) is preempted by 42 U.S.C. § l396p(b). 
The County argues that "section 2S6.0S95 does not conflict with and is not preempted by 
the federal estate recovery laws embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p because Minnesota Statutes 
section 256.059~ has nothing whatsoever to with estate recovery." Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Sum. J. 8. 
This statement, however, misinterprets section 1396p. Section 1396p does not simply apply to 
r~~~~rinc~-rr;; :;~di~d~F;-·~;t~t~.iba'i:s a- ~~~s "~tt~~pt t~ recover any ~edicar~~tsimce 
correctly paid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(bXl) ("No adjustment or recovery of any medical 
assistance correctly paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made ... ") 
( emphasis added). This prefatory language is not qualified or limited, and it applic:s to any 
attempt by a state to recover correctly-paid medical assistance. 
When bringing a cause of action under section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5), it i!; impos!iible to 
comply with 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b), and the conflict preemption doctrine requires this Cowt find 
the cause of action created by section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(S) preempted. 
8 
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Legislative Inunt and Policy 
The County argues that legislative intent and public policy dictate a finding that the cause 
of action created by section 2568.0595 subd. 4b(5) not be preempted. For this proposition, the 
County cites a portion of the House Report for the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act o,f 1988 
("MCCA"), which states, "in the view of the Committee, Medicaid-an entitlement prognun for 
the poor-should not facilitate the transfer of accumulated wealth from nursing home patients to 
their non-dependent children." H.R. Rep. No. 100-105, at 73 (1988), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 896. While this quote is on-point, it must be taken in context. The relevant 
portion of the MCCA was added to the bill because a number of states were not effectively 
utilizing the ineligibility period for medical assistance recipients who transferred 1,roperty for 
less than market value. Id. lbus, the MCCA created a mandatory ineligibility period for !those 
people who disposed of assets for less than fair market value. 
The County is correct; Congress was in fact concerned that people would transfer assets 
for less than fair market value. However it addressed the issue by requiring a period of 
ineligibili~ f~; tho;~ ~o di;r it did n~t=k;;~-~j;;tli~~~sibility f~;-~tes w ~~te separa~- -..... 
claims against third parties for medical assistance correctly paid. The Court acknowledge!. that. 
from a policy standpoint, preempting Minnesota's cause of action against transferees could lead 
to individuals transferring large amom1ts of assets to non-dependent children in hopes of 
receiving publicly-funded assistance; however, it is clear Congress considered this, and added 
the ineligibility period to combat this potential problem. 
For those reasons, the Court finds that 42 U.S.C. section 1396p(b) preempts MiMei;ota 
Statutes section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5). Because section 256B.0595, subd. 4b(5) iis preempted, 
summary judgment is granted in favor of the Defendants. 
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Douglas County 
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1022 BROADWAY 
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District Court 
Seventh Judicial District 
Court File Number: 21-CV-09-477] 
Case Type: Civil Other/Misc. 
Notke of Entry of 
Jfudgment 
In Re: DOUGLAS COUNTY vs AJexandra Kjentyn Lmdgre-n,--Bru~e-Dale 
Lindgren 
You are notified that judgment was entered on August 04, 2010 . 
Dated: August 4, 2010 
Court Administrator 
B~ w5m, Ji) 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Douglas County District Court 
305 8th Avenue W 
Alexandria MN 563 08 
320-762-3033 
cc: MEGAN ELIZABETH BURKHAMMER 
A true and correct copy_ of this notice has been served by mail upon the parties herein at 
the last known address of-each, pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
77.04. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MA TIER OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-IE-0905214 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
• 
This case is before the court on a motion for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-117. 
For the reasons that follow, the motion will be denied. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an appeal from a magistrate's order denying the Idaho Department of Health and 
Welfare's (the Department's) claim for Medicaid reimbursement from the estate of George D. PeITy. 
Barbara McCormick (McCormick) is the personal representative of the estate. After filing the 
appeal, the Department sought a stay of disbursement or distribution of any estate funds pending the 
outcome of the appeal. The personal representative did not oppose the stay, except to the extent that 
such a stay would prohibit payment of her attorney fees in defending the appeal. The Court 
ultimately granted the stay except for payment of McCormick's counsel's fees. McCormick then 
filed the pending request for attorney fees and costs incurred in relation to the Department's motion 
to stay, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-117. 
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ANALYSIS 
Idaho Code§ 12-117 provides in relevant part: 
(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative proceeding or 
civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency or politicaI 
subdivision and a person, the state agency or political subdivision or the court, as 
the case may be. shall award the prevailing pa11y reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and other reasonable expenses, if it finds that the nonprevailing party 
acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
(2) If a party to an administrative proceeding or to a civil judicial proceeding 
prevails on a po11ion of the case, and the state agency or political subdivision or 
the court, as the case may be, finds that the nonprevailing paity acted Vv ithout a 
reasonable basis in fact or law with respect to that portion of the case, it shall 
award the partially prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and 
other reasonable expenses with respect to that portion of the case on which it 
prevailed. 
This Court is not convinced that Idaho Code§ 12-117 is applicable to a motion during the 
course of an appeal (or any other civil action.) While subsection (2) of the statute addresses an award 
to a party who prevails on a portion of the case, it appears that the language is designed to allow a 
court to apportion attorney fees after the outcome of the case, not at each event or decision within the 
case. This is intended to be similar to the language in Rule 54(d)(l )(B) regardi:ng determination of th 
prevailing party and apportionment of costs. For these reasons, the Court denies the motion for costs 
and fees at this time, without prejudice to renewing it at the conclusion of the appeal. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this liv'& day of October 2010. 
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NQ, __ __,,=:::.----t-
A.M.---
l~AR 1 6 2011 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIST~is1fepHER D. RICH, 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GEORGE D. PERRY, 
Deceased. 
Case No. CV-IE-2009-05214 
MEMORANDUM DEClSION 
AND ORDER 
By NICOL TYLER 
DEP\JfY 
Currently before the Court is an appeal from the March 10, 2005, order of the Honorable 
Christopher M. Bieter, dismissing the State's Medicaid reimbursement claim in probate 
proceedings. For the reasons stated below, the opinion of the magistrate will be affirmed. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
George D. Perry ("George") died February 25, 2009. His late wife, Martha J. Perry 
("Martha" or "recipient"), was the owner, as her sole and separate property, of certain real 
property in Ada County prior to her marriage to George. On November 18, 2002, well into the 
couple's marriage, Martha executed a quitclaim deed on the real property, with the grantor 
named as "Martha Jean Boyle" (her prior name) and the grantee as "Martha Jean Perry & 
George Donald Perry." Several years later, with Martha's health declining, George and Martha 
needed assistance in paying for Martha's medical care. To qualify for government assistance 
with medical costs, the couple and Martha, individually, could not exceed certain maximum asset 
criteria. On or about July 31, 2006, George made the transfer now in dispute, assigning 
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Martha's remaining interest in the real property to himself alone, by signing a quitclaim deed on 
behalf of Martha pursuant to a power of attorney. 
A few months later, on or about September 15, 2006, George and Martha applied to the 
Department of Health and Welfare for medical assistance to help pay for Martha's medical care. 
Since October 1, 2006, Martha has been a recipient of medical payments. The Department 
provided payments for Martha's medical care through the Medicaid program in the sum of at 
least $108,364.23. 
Although it was Martha's health which was in decline, George predeceased Martha. 
After George passed away, the Appellant, Human Services Division of the State Attorney General, 
(the State) sought funds from his estate, specifically from the sale of the property, as reimbursement 
for taxpayer funds previously expended on his wife's behalf. The magistrate denied this request, 
holding that because Martha had conveyed her interests in the property during her Ii fetime, she had 
no interest in the property from which the State could seek reimbursement. The Attorney General 
subsequently filed this appeal. Martha, the recipient, died while this appeal was pending. 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether the magistrate erred in determining that the general power of attorney held 
by George Perry gave him authority to make a gift to himself of Martha Perry's real 
property. 
Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation ofldaho Code § 56-
218, in refusing to allow the State's claim against the estate of George Perry. 
Whether the magistrate erred in its application and interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p as preempting application of Idaho Code § 56-218. 
Whether the magistrate erred in failing to apply the Idaho Supreme Court holding 
in Idaho Depanment of Health and Welfare v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 
6 ( 1998) to the facts of this case. 
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E. Whether the State is entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V 
When a district judge considers an appeal from a magistrate judge, the district judge is acting 
as an appellate court, not as a trial court. State v. Kenner, 121 Idaho 594, 826 P 2d 1306, 1308 
(1992); IRCP 83(u)(l). Accordingly, the standards of review are the same as those applied by the 
Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals in a regular appeal: the district court upholds the lower 
court's factual findings if based on substantial and competent, though conflicting, evidence; and 
affirms conclusions of law which demonstrate proper application of legal principiles to the facts 
found. Hentges v. Hentges, 115 Idaho 192, 194, 765 P .2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1988). Interpretation of 
an instrument, such as the power of attorney, is a question of law. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 
212, 192 P.Jd 1036 (2008) 
Where issues on appeal involve questions of law, a reviewing court exercises free review. 
Clements Farms, Inc. v. Ben Fish & Son, 120 Idaho 185, 814 P.2d 917 (1991 ). An issue involving 
statutory construction and interpretation is a question of law, which is reviewed de nova. State 
Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Housel, 140 Idaho 96, 100, 102, 90 P.3d 321,325,327 (S. Ct. 2004). 
ANALYSIS 
21 I. Power of Attorney and Transfer of Property 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
The parties agree that the transfer of Martha's interest in the property to George was not 
performed by Martha, but by George acting pursuant to a power of attorney from Martha. The 
State argues that the magistrate erred in its determination that George had the authority and valid 
power of attorney to transfer Martha's interest in the property to himself. The State argues that 
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George could only make a valid transfer with an express power of attorney, which specifically 
granted him the authority to make gifts of Martha's property on her behalf. It argues that the 
magistrate failed to make any requisite factual inquiry regarding whether Martha consented to the 
transfer by interspousal agency or any other form of consent. 
Although not addressed in detail in the magistrate's written opinion, at the hearing this issue 
was addressed and decided by the magistrate. The magistrate made a factual and legal 
determination regarding the extent of the authority granted to George, and found that although the 
gifting language in paragraph H was not the "clearest kind of authority," "[i]t certainly can be read 
that way"; and considering "all of the language in that power of attorney"'', "the document was 
entitled to give George Perry as broad of authority as possible, .. including the right to deal with 
interest in real property." 
Idaho Code § 32-912 prohibits either spouse, individually, from conveying the community 
estate, unless by use of an "express power of attorney." 
As cited by the parties, the opening statement of the power of attorney, which declares in all 
capital letters that "powers granted by this document are broad and sweeping." A subsequent 
section states: 
(H) Estate, tmst, and other beneficiary transactions. To accept., receipt for, 
exercise, release, reject, renounce, assign, disclaim, demand, sue for, claim 
and recover any legacy, bequest, devise, gift or other property interest or 
payment due or payable to or for the principal; assert any interest in and 
exercise any power over any trust, estate or property subject to fiduciary 
control; establish a revocable trust solely for the benefit of the principal 
that terminates at the death of the principal and is then distributable to the 
legal representative of the estate of the principal; and, in general, exercise 
all powers with respect to estates and trusts which the principal could 
exercise if prnsent and under no disability; provided, however, thai: the 
Agent may not make or change a will and may not revoke or amend a trust 
revocable or amendable by the principal or require the trustee of any trust 
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for the benefit of the principal to pay income or principal to the Agent 
unless specific authority to that end is given. ( emphasis added) 
The Court agrees with the State that the language relied upon by the personal representative 
in Paragraph H is attenuated, and appears to refer to the agent's ability to act with regards to 
additional property that the principal may obtain. However, Paragraph A of the power of attorney 
allowed George to convey Martha's interests in real property as he deemed proper. The power of 
attorney was executed in 2005 prior to the enactment of the current Uniform Power of Attorney Act, 
Idaho Code§ 5-12-101 et seq, in 2008. The present act requires express authority to make gifts, but 
it is not applicable here. No authority has been cited requiring such language prior to the adoption 
of the act. Based on the record before it, this Court affirn1s the interpretation by the magistrate. 
II. Statutory Interpretation and Preemption 
This appeal also involves a question of statutory interpretation. A statute must be construed 
as a whole, taking the literal words of the statute, which words must be given their plain, usual, and 
ordinary meaning. Thomson v. Ci(v of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 (2002); State v. Hart, 
135 Idaho 827, 25 P.3d 850 (2001 ). If a statute is not ambiguous, the court does not construe it, but 
simply applies the ordinary meaning. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 
P.2d 974 (l 987). Unless the result is palpably absurd, or legislative intent is clearly to the contrary, 
a court must assume that the legislature means what is clearly stated in the statute. Miller v. State, 
110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968 (1986); Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 82 P.3d 445 (2003). 
Both parties agree that the Medicaid program is a jointly funded and "cooperative endeavor 
in which the Federal Government provides financial assistance to participating States to aid them in 
furnishing health care to needy persons." Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 
L.Ed.2d 784 (1980). Thus, participating states enact legislation and rules, incorporate them into 
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state medical assistance plans, and submit those plans to the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human 
Services ("HHS") for approval. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b) (2000 & Supp. Ill 2003). 
At issue in this case are those provisions dealing with the ability of the State to recover costs 
of medical care from the estate of the recipient and the recipient's spouse. The State argues that the 
state and federal provisions allow it to recover costs from the estate of the recipient and the 
recipient's spouse if those assets were once part of the recipient's estate and were transfeITed from 
the recipient to the recipient's spouse. In other words, the State argues that LC. § 5(,-218( 1) allows 
recovery from the estate of a recipient's spouse, including any "assets" within tbe definition of 
"estate" under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b )( 4). The definition of "assets" includes property transferred to 
one's spouse prior to death under 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l). 
The personal representative argues that the magistrate's position is correct. The magistrate 
held that the State's ability to recover costs is limited to those "assets" which were transferred to the 
recipient's spouse at the time of death by operation of law. Because the recipient transferred her 
property prior to her death, and because that transfer was not of the same nature considered in the 
statutes allowing state cost recovery, the magistrate disallowed the State's claim. 
A. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4) 
Title 42 of the United States Code, Section I 396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and 
recoveries, and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[ a ]djustment or recovery of medical 
assistance correctly paid under a State plan" and requires "the State shall seek adjustment or 
recovery from the [receiving] individual's estate" under certain circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396p(b)(l)(A),(C)(i). Subsequent sections further define what is meant by an individual's "estate," 
and define which forms of property are subject either to mandatory or discretionary recovery by a 
state. Those provisions state: 
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(4) For purposes of this subsection, the term "estate", with respect to a 
deceased individual--
(A) shall include all real and personal property and other assets included 
within the individual's estate, as defined for purposes of State probate law; 
and 
(B) may include, at the option of the State (and shall include, in the case of 
an individual to whom paragraph (1 )(C)(i) applies), any other real and 
personal property and other assets in which the individual had any legal 
title or interest at the time of death (to the extent of such interest), 
including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or assign of the 
deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m common, 
survivorship, life estate, living trnst, or other arrangement. 
The State disputes the magistrate and personal representative's interpretation, which places 
emphasis on the phrases limiting the property and assets of the recipient of benefits held "at the time 
of death." The magistrate found that this definition of "estate" did not permit a state agency to look 
back and recover property interests that the recipient divested prior to death. Thi~: Court agrees. 
The language and definition of "estate" is broad, and includes all interests, including any which may 
have automatically transferred upon the death of the recipient. However, it goes without saying that 
where a recipient has long ago been divested of any particular interest, it would not fall within that 
17 individual's estate. Moreover, nothing in this provision seeks to preserve interests that were 
113 
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divested well before death, something which the drafters were clearly able to articulate in those 
provisions dealing with Medicaid eligibility requirements. 
Indeed, when addressing the eligibility requirements for assistance, under ~ l 396p( c )(1 )(A), 
the drafters made those who transfer property "for less than fair market value" ineligible for 
assistance. The State argues that it would be absurd to prohibit the recipient and/or recipient's 
spouse from disposing of assets below market value in eligibility determinations, while allowing 
assets to be transferred at no cost post-eligibility for purposes of avoiding reimbursement or 
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recovery payments in probate. However, § 1396p(c)(l)(A) deals specifically with eligibility, not 
recovery. Had the drafters sought to include this same provision in the area of pro bale and recovery 
matters, they easily could have made such distinction. The Court notes, however, that even in the 
context of eligibility, "[ a]n individual shall not be ineligible for medical assistance ... to the extent 
that (A) the assets transferred were a home and title to the home was transfcn-cd to (:i) the spouse of 
such individual[.]" 42 U.S.C. 1396p(c)(2). Thus, even in the stricter setting of eligibility 
determinations, the drafters recognized and pennitted the transfer of a recipient's interest in the 
home to that recipient's spouse. In addition, the drafters were clearly able to artiiculate specific 
instances and circumstances where look-back dates should be used to counteract suspect transfers of 
property. 
Finally, for reasons which will become apparent later, the Court notes that provision (B) 
allows the state latitude in applying this expanded definition of ''estate," except "in the case of an 
individual to whom paragraph (l)(C)(i) applies[.]" Paragraph (l)(C)(i) addresses "[a]djustment or 
recovery of medical assistance", mandating state recovery of medical assistance where benefits were 
paid to any individual of 55 years of age or older when the medical assistance was received. 
However, that clause and related provisions limit recovery to certain forms of medical assistance, 
including long-term care services and nursing facility services. Id. In this scenario, which appears 
to be the circumstance in this case, the state is required to include this expanded version of "assets." 
B. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(h) 
The State also dispuks the magistrate's interpretation of the definitions under § 1396p(h), 
particularly as applied to§ 1396p(b)(4). That provision states: 
(h) Definitions[:] In this section, the following definitions shall apply: 
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(1) The term "assets", with respect to an individual, includes all income 
and resources of the individual and of the individual's spouse, including 
any income or resources which the individual or such individual's spouse 
is entitled to but does not receive because of action--
(A) by the individual or such individual's spouse, 
The State argues that "assets" includes the property which originally belonged to the 
recipient, but of which she was divested due to the action of her spouse, even it he was acting as her 
agent at the time. The Court has several problems with this interpretation. 
First of all, "assets" as described in this definition include "income or resources." The Court 
notes that real property, while it might be described as an "asset" or "resource," is much more 
clearly described as "real property." The drafters of this section were likely aware of this, as they 
had previously used the phrase "real property" in multiple sections, including § 1396p(b )( 4)(A),(B), 
above. 
More importantly, the definition of "resources" as listed in 1396p(h)(5), "has the meaning 
given such term in section 1382b[.]" Thus, the definition of "resources," specifically excludes "the 
home (including the land that appertains thereto).'' 42 U.S.C. 1382b(a)(l). Accordingly, where 
"resources" as contained in this section (1396p(h)) specifically excludes the home, the Court finds it 
necessarily excludes it from the definition of "assets" as well. Thus, even with this expanded 
definition of "assets" applied to § 1396p(b )( 4 )(A),(B), the Court finds it fails to expand that 
recovery provision to include real property owned by a recipient prior to death. 
C. Interpretation, Construction, and Application of I.C. § 56-218. 
Idaho Code § 56-218( 1) is entitled "Recovery of certain medical assistance" and states: 
Except where exempted or waived in accordance with federal law medical 
assistance pursuant to this chapter paid on behalf of an individual who was 
fifty-five (55) years of age or older when the individual received such 
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assistance may be recovered from the individual's estate, and the estate of 
the spouse, if any, for such aid paid to either or both: 
The State argues this language clearly includes the option of recovery from "the estate of the 
spouse" and does not limit the "estate of the spouse" to property in which the recipient had an 
interest at the time of death. The Court recognizes and agrees that this departure from the language 
of the federal provisions indicates a more aggressive policy adopted by this state to recover costs 
from the estate of the recipient's spouse. 
As far as I.C. § 56-218 is concerned, the Court agrees with the State that this section clearly 
indicates an intent to recover medical costs from the estate of the spouse of a recipient. However, 
several concerns remain regarding whether this provision, standing alone, allows the state to look 
back to any period beyond those transfers effectuated at death. 
First of all, the subsequent provisions of §56-218 further define and limit what is meant by 
"estate." Subsection (4)(a)-(b) of LC. § 56-218. states "the tenn "estate" shall include:" 
(a) All real and personal property and other assets included within the 
individual's estate, as defined for purposes of state probate law; and 
(b) Any other real and personal property and other assets in which the 
individual had any legal title or interest at the time of death, to the extent 
of such interest, including such assets conveyed to a survivor, heir, or 
assign of the deceased individual through joint tenancy, tenancy m 
common, survivorship, life estate, living trust or other arrangement. 
Id. This language should look familiar, because it is, almost without exception, the same language 
used in the federal code, 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b)(4)(A), (B). The personal representative argues that 
because I.C. §56-218(4)(a)-(b) mirrors the language of the federal statute, it should be interpreted 
accordingly. As discussed above, this language taken in the context of the federal statute clearly 
limits the recovery-eligible estate of the recipient's spouse to property transferred at or around the 
time of death. Thus, the "assistance [which] may be recovered from the ... estate of the spouse" 
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appears to be limited accordingly. However, when taken in the context of the Idaho Code section, 
and the broader language targeting recovery costs from the estate of the recipient's spouse, the 
ability to recover from a spouse appears to be expanded. In I. C. § 56-218(1 ), it refers to the 
recipient as the "individual," and the spouse as the "spouse." The language of§ 56-218(4)(a),(b) 
refers only to the "individual's estate" or the estate of the recipient. It contains no reference or 
limitation on the estate of the spouse. 
The State's interpretation of these provisions, and the intent to reach the assets of a Medicaid 
recipient's spouse is further supported and explained by the internal rules and regulations of the 
Department. IDAPA 16.03.09.900 is entitled Liens and Estate Recovery, and "sets forth the 
provisions for recovery of medical assistance," among other things. IDAP A 16.03.09.905.01, states 
in relevant part: 
A claim against the estate of a spouse of a participant is limited to the 
value of the assets of the estate that had been, at any time after October 1, 
1993, community property, or the deceased participant's share of the 
separate property, and jointly owned property. 
Id. The plain language of this section does not restrict the language of I.C. § 56-218, which allows 
the Department broad authority to seek recovery against the "estate of the spouse." LC. § 56-
218(1 ). 
Id. 
A subsequent provision, IDAPA 16.03.09.905.05 states: 
A marriage settlement agreement or other such agreement which separates 
assets for a married couple does not eliminate the debt against the estate of 
the deceased participant or the spouse. Transfers under a marriage 
settlement agreement or other such agreement may be voided if not for 
adequate consideration. 
24 Taking into account the broad language of LC. § 56-218, in addition to the specific 
2s provisions in the Idaho Administrative Rules (which have the same force and effect of law per 
26 
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Mallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 619, 84 P.3d 551, 555 (2004)), it is clear 1:hat Idaho law permits 
recovery from the estate of the recipient spouse, limited only by the broad interpretation of "estate" 
of LC.§ 56-218(4)(a)-(b) and time and community property restraints ofIDAPA 16.03.09.905.01. 
Thus, the clear and plain language of Idaho law (without considering the federal provisions and 
effect they have) would allow the State to recover from the estate of the 5,pouse, so long as the 
property sought was community property held by the participant after October 1, 1993, which was 
the case here. 
E. Preemption Doctrine 
This Court has found that the plain meaning of the Idaho and federal Medicaid provisions 
differ, in that the Idaho provisions clearly and unambiguously broaden the ability of the State to 
recover from separate assets of the recipient's spouse beyond those assets in which the recipient had 
an interest at the time of death. This juxtaposition requires a discussion regarding the validity of the 
Idaho regulations in light of the doctrine of preemption. 
The basis for the doctrine of preemption is found in Article VI, cl. 2 of the United States 
Constitution, which states that the laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; 
... any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has established that a state law that conflicts with 
federal law is "without effect." Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, I 12 S.Ct. 2608, 
2617, 120 L.Ed.2d 407, 422-23 (1992); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.( 4 Wheat) 316, 427, 4 L.Ed. 
579,606 (1819); Lewis v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 418, 146 P.3d 684 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Congressional purpose is " 'the ultimate touchstone' " of the preemption inquiry. Malone v. 
White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,504, 98 S.Ct. 1185, 55 L.Ed.2d 443 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks 
Int'! Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963)). 
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This Court's primary focus in the analysis must be to ascertain the intent of Congress. See Cal. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81, 107 S.Ct. 683, 93 L.Ed.2d 613 (1987). The 
United States Supreme Court has explained that "[c]onsideration of issues arising under the 
Supremacy Clause 'start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] 
not to be superseded by Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 120 L.Ed.2d 407 
(1992) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 
(1947)). Thus, preemption is generally disfavored. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 518, 112 S.Ct. 
2608). 
Federal law may preempt state law in two ways, either expressly or impliedly. Boundary 
Backpackers v. Boundary County, 128 Idaho 371, 375, 913 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1996). Express 
preemption occurs where Congress exhibits intent to occupy a given field of law. Lewis v. State, 
Dept. of Transp., supra. Where such intent is shown, then any state law encroaching into that field 
is preempted. Id. In this instance congress clearly did not intend to occupy the entire field of 
Medicaid law. Rather, the intent appears to be to the contrary, as the laws in this area are full of 
provisions which encourage the States to enact legislation and rules, and incorporate them into their 
overall medical assistance plans. See inter alia 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)-(b). Nevertheless, many of 
the sections contained in the federal code require that the states must "comply with the provisions of 
the federal code, particularly with respect to liens and other recovery for assistance paid. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396p; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(l 8). 
Thus, where congress has not expressed the intent to occupy a given field of law, state law 
may still run afoul of the preemption doctrine to the extent the state law conflicts with federal law. 
Lewis v. State, Dept. of Transp., supra. This is called "conflict preemption" and requires that state 
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law is preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal law. Id. However, conflict preemption is 
only found where compliance with both state and federal laws is impossible (Fla. Lime Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963)), or when the 
state law is "an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941). 
In Stafford v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 145 Idaho 530, 534, 181 P.3d 456, 460 (S. 
Ct. 2008), the court conducted a review of the Idaho rules regarding Medicaid, in particular the rules 
involved with Medicaid qualification. While that court noted the need for the State to promulgate 
rules, it also found that ''both the federal government and state government expect federal law to 
predominate" in that regard. Id. at 460, 534. 
In the case of In re Estate of Barg, 752 N.W.2d 52, 64 (Minn. 2008),, the court specifically 
dealt with a conflict involving the federal statutes at issue in this case. As that court noted, the 
federal statute regarding recovery contains specific language limiting the field of available recovery. 
Id. Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1396p is entitled "Liens, adjustments and recoveries, 
and transfers of assets." Subsection (b) addresses "[a]djustment or recovery of medical assistance 
correctly paid under a State plan." Parenthesis (1) begins the subsection with the broad rule 
prohibiting recovery in general, and then requiring the State seek recovery in certain circumstances. 
That provision states: 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly paid on 
behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, except that the 
State shall seek adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan in the case of the 
following individuals: 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l). Thus, the federal government has outlined a general rule prohibiting 
recovery. As such, Congress has indicated its object and desire to prevent recovery in all but a 
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limited number of circumstances. It follows then, that if these circumstances are expanded by a 
particular state law, the state law becomes an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the 
full purposes and objectives of Congress to limit recovery, and is thereby preempted. 
Subsection (B) explains the required recovery exception against the estate of the recipient 
individual who was 55 years of age or older when assistance was received, but further limits 
recovery to care costs at nursing facilities, home and community. For convenience, that provision 
states: 
In the case of an individual who was 55 years of age or older when the 
individual received such medical assistance, the State shall seek 
adjustment or recovery from the individual's estate, but only for medical 
assistance consisting of--
(i) nursing facility services, home and community-based services, and 
related hospital and prescription drug services, or 
(ii) at the option of the State, any items or services under the State plan 
(but not including medical assistance for medicare cost-sharing or for 
benefits described in section 1396a(a)(10)(E) of this title). 
42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(l)(B)(i-ii). This provision limits recovery by age, by type of service, or by 
types of allowed services any particular state might choose to include. Neither party has argued 
regarding the ability to recover for services in this case. Thus, the issues in this case bring us back, 
full circle, to the interpretation and effect of 42 U.S.C. 1396p(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 1396p(h)(l), and 
J.C. § 56-218(1), regarding whether recovery may be had against the assets of the recipient's spouse 
in which the spouse did not have any interest prior to the time of death. As discussed in detail 
above, the federal provisions limit such recovery to assets of the spouse in which the recipient had 
an interest at death. 
Because the federal provisions seek, overall, to limit recovery except in certain 
circumstances, because exceptions to a general statement of policy are to be construed narrowly, and 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 15 
000720
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
1:2 
13 
14 
1 ,-
.J 
16 
17 
1B 
19 
20 
2 -, ,, 
23 
24 
2:c 
26 
because the state provisions expand this recovery policy, the Court finds the State provisions are 
preempted. Comm 'r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 ( 1989). 
D. Effect of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Jackm,m 
Up to this point in the process of interpreting and applying the provisions above, the Court 
has relied upon relatively little case Jaw. By so doing, the Court has followed the rules of 
statutory construction as required by Idaho law. The Court first considered the plain language 
contained in the provisions, which it found unambiguous. Consequently, legislative intent and 
case law are not necessary to further interpret the language. George W. Watkins Family v. 
Messenger, 118 Idaho 537, 797 P.2d 1385 (1990); Friends of Farm to Market v. Valley 
County, 137 Idaho 192, 197, 46 P.3d 9, 14 (S. Ct. 2002) (citing Lawless v. Davis,_98 Idaho 175,560 
P.2d 497 (1977) ("Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislative body must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to construe the 
language.")). 
The State, however,, argues throughout its briefing that Idaho has clear precedent 
interpreting these provisions differently. In the case of Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
v. Jackman, 132 Idaho 213, 970 P.2d 6 (1998), the recipient's spouse received nearly a11 
community property of the recipient pursuant to a marriage settlement agreement. After both the 
recipient and the spouse had died, the Department sought recovery from the estate of the spouse. 
Id. at 214, 7. The language of I.C. § 56-218 as it existed at that time allowed recovery from the 
spousal estate only where the estate of the recipient contained absolutely nothing. Thus, although 
there was clear legislative intent that the State should be able to seek recovery from the spousal 
estate, this expressed intent of the legislature would virtually never occur, where the imprecise, 
express language of the statute led to an absurd result. Id. at 215, 8. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - PAGE 16 
000721
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
15 
17 
-- -
The Idaho Supreme Court found that a more reasonable interpretation, which would be in 
line with the legislature's intent, would be to allow recovery against the spousal estate where the 
estate of the recipient was insufficient. Id. However, in the very next section, the court found 
federal law preempted the Department's authority given by I.C. § 56-218 to recover from the 
spouse's separate estate. Id. at 216, 9. The court's analysis in that case involved state and 
federal provisions which have since been replaced and/or amended. This Court finds it offers 
little or no guidance to the relevant and determinative issues in this case. 
The State's reliance on Jackman is based largely on the original opinion in that case, 
which has since been substituted. The State urges this Court to consider this opinion, arguing that 
it clearly shows the court's intent to give "assets" a broad interpretation, and that the decision 
would have been different if the court had been able to apply the statutes in their current form. 
The Court does not agree. The full reasons for issuing a substitute opinion are not ascertainable 
by simple comparison of a substitute opinion. Given Internal Rule of the Idaho Supreme Court 
15(t)'s prohibition against citation of unpublished opinions, the Court will not speculate about a 
withdrawn opinion to determine how the clear and unambiguous language of the statutes m 
question should be interpreted, or to determine the applicability of the preemption doctrine. 
19 III. Attorney's Fees 
2 J 
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25 
26 
Pursuant to I.A.R. 35(b)(5) and LC.§ 12-117, each party has reserved the right to attorney's 
fees on appeal. Idaho Code§ 12-117(1) requires this Court to award reasonable attorney's fees and 
expenses to the prevailing party "if it finds that the nonprevailing party acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law." Where questions of law are raised, attorney's fees should be awarded only if 
the nonprevailing party advocates a plainly fallacious, and, therefore, not fairly debatable, position. 
Lowery v. Board of County Com 'rs for Ada County, 115 Idaho 64, 764 P .2d 431 (S. Ct. 1988). A 
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state agency acted without reasonable basis where it has no authority to take a particular action. 
Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 90 P.3d 340 (S. Ct. 2004). In this 
case the State acted in accordance with the authority granted it by LC. 9 56-218 and corresponding 
agency regulations. Although this Court found that provision to be preempted, the magistrate did 
not make such a clear finding. Given this, and the fact that this is a matter of first impression, the 
State acted based on reasonable argument and authority. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the reasoning above, the decision of the magistrate is AFFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this Iv~ day of March, 2011. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
In the Matter of the Estate Of: 
George D. Perry, 
Deceased. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
________________ ) 
State of Idaho, Department of Health and 
Welfare, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
Barbara K. McCormick, Personal 
Representative of the Estate of George D. 
Perry, 
Respondent. 
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Case No. CV IE 0905214 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: Barbara K. McCormick, Personal Representative and her Attorney, Peter C. Sisson, Esq., 
and to the Clerk of the above Entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
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1. The State of Idaho, Department of Health and Welfare (hereinafter "the 
Department"), appeals to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision and Order, 
entered on the 16th day of March, 2011, Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, District Judge, 
presiding. 
2. The Department has the right to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the judgment or 
order described in paragraph 1 is appealable under and pursuant to Rules 1 l(a)i(2) and 1 l(b), 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code§ 17-201(7). 
3. The issues on appeal include, but may not be limited to: 
a. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that George Perry, through a general 
power of attorney, had the power to divest Martha Perry of her interest in the couple's home, and 
gift that interest to himself, even though the power of attorney did not include any gifling power. 
b. Whether the Magistrate erred in holding that Idaho Code § 56-218(1) -- which 
authorizes recovery from the estate of the spouse where the assets had been community property, 
or had been the property of the Medicaid spouse - is preempted by federal law. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. (a) 
(b) 
A reporter's transcript is requested. 
The Department requests the preparation of the following portions of the 
reporter's transcript: The standard transcript supplemented by: 
1. Oral argument presented to the district court at the hearing held November 
18, 2010 at 2:00 p.m. 
n. Oral argument presented to the magistrate division at the hearing held 
February 26, 2010, at 9:00 a.m. 
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6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the c:lerk's 
record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R. 
a. Last Will And Testament (03/19/2009) 
b. Claim Against Estate (4/15/2009) 
c. Demand For Notice (4/15/2009) 
d. Inventory (5/28/2009) 
e. Notice of Disallowance of Claim (6/4/2009) 
f. Petition for Allowance of Claim (6/15/2009) 
g. Affidavit of Barbara K McCormick In Support of Objection To Dept of Health 
and Welfare's Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009) 
h. Memorandum in Support of the PR's Objection to Dept of Health And Welfare's 
Petition for Allowance of Claim (11/27/2009) 
1. Memorandum in Support Of Petition for Allowance of Claim (01/29/2010) 
J. Exhibit Cover Page (Memorandum In Support Of Petition for Allowance of 
Claim) 
k. Exhibits A, B, C, E, F, G (Memo In Support of Petition for Allowance of Claim) 
I. Order Disallowing Claim (3/10/2010) 
m. Appellant's Brief (District Court) (07/08/2010) 
n. Respondent's Brief (District Court) (08/26/2010) 
o. Appellant's Reply Brief (District Court) (09/16/2010) 
p. Memorandum Decision and Order (03/16/2011) 
7. Not applicable:. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on 1he reporter. 
(b) That the clerk of the district court has been contacted and arrangements 
have been made to have the court reporter bill this office for preparation of transcripts of the 
hearings dated November 18, 2010 and February 26, 2010. 
( c) That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3212. 
(d) That the appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 67-2301. 
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( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be serv,ed pursuant 
to Rule 20. 
DATED this 6th day of April, 2011. 
~~~--
.C ~CARTWRIGHT 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I lodged one (I) transcript of a total of 36 pages in length, 
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with 
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District. 
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